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1The Euro Crisis & the State of European Democracy
1. THE EUROZONE CRISIS AND THE LEGITIMACY 
OF DIFFERENTIATED INTEGRATION 
Thomas Beukers1
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1.  Introduction 
The Eurozone crisis has led to important new 
forms of differentiated integration, both within 
the EU Treaties and outside. Existing and new in-
struments for differentiated integration have been 
used for the deepening of economic governance, 
for rules on increasing budgetary discipline and 
for the creation of emergency funds. These in-
novations apply to the member states of the Eu-
rozone, but sometimes include also others. Thus, 
the so-called ‘Six-Pack’ of EU legislation, which 
entered into force in December 2011 intends to 
strengthen economic governance and applies 
partly to all member states and partly only to the 
Eurozone. The Fiscal Compact (FC) was conclud-
ed in March 2012 by 25 member states mainly in 
order to strengthen budgetary discipline.2 In Sep-
tember 2012 the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM Treaty) establishing a permanent rescue 
fund entered into force for the member states of 
the Eurozone, succeeding the earlier EFSF, which 
originated in May 2010. These new forms of dif-
2.  Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in 
the Economic and Monetary Union.
ferentiated integration raise important questions 
of legitimacy.
This paper will examine and critically discuss the 
new forms of differentiated integration using a 
theoretical framework on the concept of legitima-
cy that builds on two commonly made assump-
tions. Firstly, that legitimacy is provided through 
legality. Secondly, it builds on the assumption that 
parliaments contribute to the legitimacy of politi-
cal projects, as an important element of so-called 
‘input legitimacy’.
The various legal instruments that are central to 
the political response to the Eurozone crisis (the 
‘Six-Pack’, ESM Treaty and Fiscal Compact) will 
not be discussed exhaustively here. Instead a num-
ber of elements from these instruments will be 
discussed that best illustrate the challenges of the 
most recent forms of further integration in light 
of legitimacy. The paper will illustrate some of the 
opportunities, challenges and risks of the recent 
forms of differentiated integration.
These opportunities, challenges and risks should 
be seen in the broader legitimacy context of Eu-
ropean integration and of the Eurozone crisis not 
only as a financial and political, but also a social 
crisis. There has been a shift from permissive con-
sensus on the European project to social unrest 
with mass protests and general strikes in member 
states such as Greece, Spain, Portugal and Italy.3
3.  Compare Giandomenico Majone, ‘Rethinking Euro-
pean Integration after the Debt Crisis’, UCL Working 
Paper, June 2012, p. 1-32 at p. 6-7 where he explains the 
replacement of the permissive consensus of the past by 
public debate and hostile reactions through “the fact 
that monetary union has put an end to the primacy of 
process as the criterion of policy evaluation on the EU.”
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2.  The paths to strengthened cooperation or 
further integration
The Eurozone crisis confronts the Union with an 
interesting legal and political puzzle. How to op-
erate when new powers are necessary for some – 
in this case for the Eurozone – but when not all 
member states – notably some outside the Euro-
zone – are willing to make this possible?
2.1 The obvious and less 
obvious paths (from a legal 
perspective) not chosen
The Treaties offer obvious paths for the creation of 
new powers for the European Union or the Euro-
zone. The first is Treaty amendment through ar-
ticle 48 EU. The ordinary amendment procedure 
is cumbersome though and involves several risks, 
most recently illustrated by the fate of the Consti-
tutional Treaty, rejected by France and the Neth-
erlands in 2005.4 Negotiations are complicated 
and time consuming, they risk opening Pandora’s 
4.  Note that the simplified amendment procedure of arti-
cle 48(6) EU does not allow for the creation of new com-
petences for the Union.
box and ratification by all member states is not at 
all guaranteed.
A second, less cumbersome, procedure available 
for the creation of new powers for the Union is the 
flexibility clause of article 352 TFEU. This article 
allows for the creation of new powers necessary 
for the attainment of the objectives of the Euro-
pean Union. Unanimity between the member 
states is still required (as with Treaty amendment) 
as well as consent of European Parliament, but 
no European Convention is convened or national 
ratification required. In the case of Germany, we 
know that use of this flexibility clause requires rat-
ification by the Bundestag and the Bundesrat, but 
the basis for this is to be found in German consti-
tutional law.5
It can be argued that several other and less obvious 
paths are available for creating new powers. A first 
one, proposed by Herman Van Rompuy at the eve 
5.  Bundesverfassungsgericht, BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08, Lisbon 
judgment, 30 June 2009, para. 328.
of the December 2011 European Council, is what I 
call the ‘protocol trick’ of article 126(14) TFEU. It 
comes down to an amendment of the ‘Protocol on 
the excessive deficit procedure’. This article repre-
sents an interesting abnormality in EU law, as it 
allows for Treaty change (protocols have the same 
status as the EU Treaties), but without requiring 
the Treaty amendment procedures of article 48 
EU. Instead provisions can be adopted to replace 
this protocol through a much simpler procedure, 
namely through unanimity in the Council and 
consultation of the European Parliament and the 
European Central Bank. Some argue that much of 
what has been agreed in the Fiscal Compact – to 
be discussed below – could have also been done 
this way.6 However, it was considered unattractive 
by some, including France and Germany, exactly, 
6.  Jacques Ziller, ‘Th e Reform of the Political and 
Economic Architecture of the Eurozone’s Governance. 
A Legal Perspective’, in: Allen, Carletti & Simonelli 
(eds.), Governance for the Eurozone. Integration or 
Disintegration (FIC Press, 2012) p. 115-138 at p. 130; 
Bruno De Witte, ‘Treaty Games – Law as Instrument 
and as Constraint in the Euro Crisis Policy’, in: Allen, 
Carletti & Simonelli (eds.), Governance for the Eurozone. 
Integration or Disintegration (FIC Press, 2012) p. 139-
160 at p. 152.
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though not only, because it does not require active 
involvement of national parliaments.
A second less obvious path is a combination of 
the flexibility clause of article 352 TFEU and the 
procedure for enhanced cooperation of article 20 
EU. This way new competences could be created 
to then only be applied by for example the twelve 
member states of the Eurozone.
An advantage of these paths is that also non-Euro-
zone member states can participate in the exercise 
of the newly created power intended to solve the 
current problems of the Eurozone. In other words 
they have an inclusive character.
None of the above procedures for creating new 
powers or competences for the Union has been 
used,7 because of different reasons. They include 
procedural/legal reasons (the unanimity required 
for Treaty change and use of the flexibility clause) 
and purely political reasons (France has arguably 
7.  A Treaty amendment has been initiated using the sim-
plified amendment procedure of article 48(6) TFEU – 
namely the addition of a new article 136(3) TFEU – but 
this new article does not create new competence for the 
Union; see also European Court of Justice, Case C-370-
12, Pringle, 27 November 2012, para. 73.
been keen to go outside the EU Treaties and cre-
ate a new nucleus of the Eurozone member states). 
Instead the policy responses have taken a different 
form, which is now discussed.
2.2 The policy responses and 
the paths chosen
In the first place a number of member states – no-
tably but not only the Eurozone member state – 
have gone outside the EU Treaties and concluded 
new intergovernmental treaties, namely the EFSF 
and ESM emergency fund Treaties and the Fiscal 
Compact. Also, there has been an extensive use of 
the procedure of article 136 TFEU which allows 
for a strengthening of Eurozone coordination and 
surveillance with regard to budgetary discipline 
and for the setting out of economic policy guide-
lines. Both paths will be discussed below.8
8.  The unconventional measures of the European Central 
Bank in the form of new legal practices, such as buying 
of government bonds on secondary market, although a 
very important element of the European response to the 
Eurozone crisis, are outside the scope of this paper. The 
focus here is on the policy responses.
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3.  Assessing the paths chosen: legality
The first perspective from which the new instru-
ments will be discussed is that of the principle of 
legality. In the European Union legal order this 
principle has found a specific expression in the 
principle of conferral or attributed powers. Thus, 
the Union shall act within the limits of the powers 
conferred by the member states (article 5(2) EU). 
Also, the institutions of the Union shall act with-
in the limits of the powers conferred on them by 
the Treaties (article 13(2) EU). This principle puts 
limits to what the member states and the Union 
institutions can do both within and outside the 
EU Treaties.
Moreover, it is useful to note at the outset that 
EU law has a combination of characteristics that 
is unique for an international organization. Based 
on the case law of the European Court of Justice 
(notably Van Gend & Loos and Costa/ENEL) EU 
law has primacy over and direct effect in national 
law. Not only do the new intergovernmental Trea-
ties lack these characteristics of EU law, the same 
characteristics also limit what member states can 
do through these new Treaties.9
3.1 Strengthened Eurozone 
cooperation WITHIN the EU 
Treaties (art. 136 TFEU); 
or, how far can you go 
within the Treaties?
One of the instruments that have extensively been 
used in the political response to the Eurozone 
crisis is the strengthened cooperation of article 
136 TFEU. This article allows for members of the 
Eurozone to adopt measures to “strengthen the 
coordination and surveillance of their budget-
ary discipline” and to “set out economic policy 
guidelines for them”, both “in order to ensure the 
9.  Similarly Vestert Borger & Armin Cuyvers, ‘Het 
Verdrag inzake Stabiliteit, Coördinatie en Bestuur in 
the Economische en Monetaire Unie: de juridische 
enconstitutionale implicaties van de eurocrisis, SEW 
Tijdschrift voor Sociaal Economische Wetgeving (2012) 
p. 370-390 at p. 389, who also add the EU principle of 
loyal cooperation.
proper functioning of economic and monetary 
union” (article 136(1) TFEU). How to understand 
this procedure? What are the limits to the action it 
allows for? And how has this article been applied 
in the Eurozone crisis?
Article 136 TFEU has been introduced by the Lis-
bon Treaty of 2009 and was included also in the 
failed Constitutional Treaty. At the time Amten-
brink and De Haan were critical about its inclu-
sion as “this new form of closer cooperation with-
in the already existing closer cooperation created 
by the provisions on EMU could open a gap be-
tween Member States with a derogation and the 
eurogroup.”10
How to understand this procedure? Clearly it is 
not intended as a flexibility clause in the sense of 
article 352 TFEU. No new powers can be created 
for the Union (Eurozone) in order to attain its 
objectives.11 Even though the procedure is some-
10.  Fabian Amtenbrink and Jakob De Haan, “Economic 
governance in the European Union: Fiscal policy 
discipline versus flexibility”, 46 CML Rev. (2003), p. 
1075-1106 at p. 1101-1102.
11.  Also the unanimity safeguard for member states – 
present in article 352 TFEU – is lacking in this procedure 
of article 136 TFEU as it prescribes qualified majority 
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times referred to as enhanced cooperation,12 this 
may also not be the best term for it (and it is not 
the one used by the Treaty itself). The enhanced 
cooperation procedure under EU law (article 20 
EU) is designed for the use of existing legal basis, 
but without the participation of all member states. 
Article 136 instead includes all Eurozone member 
states (or none) and does not allow for enhanced 
cooperation of only nine of them. In fact, calling 
it enhanced cooperation seems to imply that it is 
possible for member states to join or not, and that 
a minimum of member states of the Eurozone is 
required to participate, but not all.13 Instead article 
136 TFEU itself does not allow for a minimum of 
e.g. nine Eurozone member states to adopt mea-
sures, nor does it allow for non-Eurozone mem-
ber states to join.
among the member states of the Eurozone.
12.  M. Ruffert, ‘The European debt crisis and European 
Union law’, Common Market Law Review (2011), p. 
1777-1805 at p. 1801.
13.  Amtenbrink and De Haan in fact use the better term 
closer cooperation, see Fabian Amtenbrink and Jakob 
De Haan, supra n. 10, p. 1101-1102.
Article 136 TFEU can probably best be under-
stood as a Eurozone specific enabling clause.14 In 
fact it is similar to the enabling clause of article 
121(6) TFEU, which allows for the adoption of de-
tailed rules for the multilateral surveillance pro-
cedure by the Union. It can also be compared to 
the broad legal basis of article 114 TFEU (which 
allows for the adoption of measures which have as 
their objective the establishment and functioning 
of the internal market) or one of the many specific 
legal bases included in the EU Treaties.
It could be argued though that it has to a certain 
extent been applied as a sort of ‘Eurozone-flexibil-
ity clause’, creating new powers for the Eurozone. 
This relates particularly to the recent use of article 
136 TFEU by the member states of the Eurozone 
to fundamentally redesign the multilateral sur-
veillance system of article 121 TFEU, on which 
more below.
As there is no case law yet on the scope of article 
136 TFEU, it is useful to discuss the recent appli-
cation of article 136 TFEU together with the ques-
tion what the limits are to action under this proce-
14.  An interesting question is whether the combination of 
article 136 TFEU and article 20 EU would be possible.
dure. In general terms, Ruffert rightly argues that 
it does not cover deviance from Treaty rules.15 But 
how to interpret this? Piris argues that this article 
does not allow for the creation of a true economic 
union.16 Smits seems to be more generous.17
15.  “In the light of this clear wording, Article 136 TFEU 
does nothing but provide a means for enhanced coop-
eration of the Eurogroup, giving procedural indications 
about voting in its paragraph (2). Deviance from Treaty 
rules is not covered, even if this leads to strengthened 
budgetary control which is desirable.”, Ruffert, supra n. 
12, p. 1801.
16.  Jean-Claude Piris, ‘Which institutional solutions for 
managing the multi-tier governance can be found in 
the framework of the current EU treaties?’, Challenges of 
Multi-tier Governance in the EU, European Parliament 
AFCO Workshop, October 2012, p. 19.
17.  “The author’s [Ruffert, TWB] questioning of the legality 
of the changes brought about in economic governance 
raises valid points, but his conclusions seem to go too 
far. If Article 136 TFEU would not allow the Council 
and Parliament to strengthen budgetary discipline and 
economic policy coordination, the provision would be 
rather futile. It is, after all, the absence of strong en-
forcement powers for the EU executive that led to the 
2003 debacle with the Stability and Growth Pact. Only 
by strengthening the Commission, through the intro-
duction of reversed QMV, could this fault be remedied 
meaningfully.”, René Smits, ‘Correspondence’, Common 
Market Law Review (2012) p. 827-831 at p. 829.
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The recent use of article 136 TFEU contains three 
interesting elements.18 A first element is the use 
of article 136 TFEU for several specific steps in 
the final stages of the Excessive Deficit Procedure 
“with a view to reinforcing and deepening the fis-
cal surveillance” with regard to Greece since May 
2010. A second element is the introduction of re-
versed qualified majority voting in several steps of 
the Macro-Economic Imbalances Procedure, the 
Medium-Term Budgetary Objective Procedure 
(in the framework of article 121 TFEU) and the 
Excessive Deficit Procedure (in the framework 
of article 126 TFEU). A third element is the in-
troduction of new sanctions, most notably in the 
newly created Macro-Economic Imbalances Pro-
cedure (as part of the “Six-Pack”).
18.  The European Commission in its ‘Blueprint for a deep 
and economic and monetary union’ has proposed the 
idea of a future fourth element, namely the Convergence 
and Competitiveness Instrument (CCI), to be based on 
article 136 TFEU: “The instrument would be established 
by secondary legislation. It could be construed as part 
and parcel of the MIP reinforced by the contractual ar-
rangements and financial support as outlined above and 
thus be based on Article 136 TFEU.”; Communication 
from the Commission. A blueprint for a deep and genu-
ine economic and monetary union, Brussels, 30.11.2012, 
COM(2012) 777 final/2, p. 22.
A first most interesting element in the application 
of article 136 TFEU are the very detailed Com-
mission recommendations and Council decisions 
under article 126(9) TFEU to give notice and to 
reinforce and deepen fiscal surveillance with re-
gard to Greece. This decision was for the first time 
adopted in May 2010 and has been renewed many 
times since.19
On a procedural note, the combined use of ar-
ticles 126 and 136 TFEU provides an answer to 
the question what is meant in article 136 TFEU 
with the “relevant procedure” of article 126 TFEU, 
as it excludes and therefore cannot relate to the 
procedures of article 126(14) TFEU. Instead, it 
relates to the procedure of adoption for the dif-
ferent steps in the Excessive Deficit Procedure, 
in this case to the procedure for the adoption of 
a Council decision under article 126(9) jo. (13) 
TFEU. This means that the European Parliament 
is not involved (which is different from the use 
of article 136 TFEU in combination with article 
19.  4 and 10 May 2010, 19 August and 7 September 2010, 9 
and 20 December 2010, 24 February and 7 March 2011, 
5 and 12 July 2011, 26 October and 8 November 2011, 9 
and 13 March 2012.
121(6) which prescribes the ordinary legislative 
procedure – see for more below).
The combined use of articles 126 and 136 TFEU 
leads to very far-reaching decisions, including 
very detailed instructions to Greece. The detail is 
illustrated by the following examples of instruc-
tions included in the Council decisions on Greece: 
“a reduction of the Easter, summer and Christmas 
bonuses and allowances paid to civil servants with 
the aim of saving EUR 1500 million for a full year”, 
“a reduction of the highest pensions with the aim 
of saving EUR 500 million for a full year” and “an 
increase in excises for fuel, tobacco and alcohol, 
with a yield of at least EUR 1050 million for a full 
year”.20
These decisions are unprecedented and change the 
nature of the application of the Excessive Deficit 
Procedure. It can however arguably be reconciled 
with the scope of article 136 TFEU to the extent 
that it strengthens the coordination and surveil-
20.  See article 2 of Council Decision of 12 July 2012 ad-
dressed to Greece with a view to reinforcing and deep-
ening fiscal surveillance and giving notice to Greece to 
take measures for the deficit reduction judged necessary 
to remedy the situation of excessive deficit.
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lance of the budgetary discipline of the member 
states.
A second element is the introduction – through 
the “Six-Pack” measures adopted on the basis of 
articles 136 and 121(6) TFEU – of the reversed 
qualified majority voting modality for a number 
of steps/decisions in the Macro-Economic Im-
balances Procedure (MEIP), the Medium-Term 
Budgetary Objective Procedure (MTO) and the 
Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP).21 How should 
we assess this in light of the scope of article 136 
TFEU? According to the Council Legal Service 
the list of sanctions under article 126(11) TFEU 
21.  Articles 4(2) and 5(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1173/2011 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 
November 2011 on the effective enforcement of budget-
ary surveillance in the euro area; article 3(3) of Regula-
tion (EU) No 1174/2011 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 16 November 2011 on enforcement 
measures to correct macroeconomic imbalances in the 
euro area; articles 6(2) and 10(2) of Council Regulation 
1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of bud-
getary positions and the surveillance and coordination 
of economic policies as amended by Regulation (EU) No 
1175/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil of 16 November 2011; and article 10(4) of regulation 
(EU) No 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 16 November 2011 on the prevention and 
correction of macroeconomic imbalances.
may be enlarged for Eurozone member states to 
the extent that this aims at strengthening the co-
ordination and surveillance of their budgetary 
discipline. The possibility is limited though in the 
sense that these measures must respect the essen-
tial institutional equilibrium and architecture es-
tablished by the Treaties. What does this mean? It 
means that the introduction of reversed qualified 
majority voting is allowed.22 Suspension of voting 
rights on this legal basis for example would not be 
possible.
Two elements seem to make reversed qualified 
majority voting in the “Six-Pack” possible. Firstly, 
the new voting modality only applies to newly cre-
ated steps. This means that there is no interference 
with the existing voting modalities in the Treaties. 
This essential element, that it does not simply ap-
22.  Smits comes to a similar conclusion: “If Article 136 
TFEU would not allow the Council and Parliament to 
strengthen budgetary discipline and economic policy 
coordination, the provision would be rather futile. It 
is, after all, the absence of strong enforcement powers 
for the EU executive that led to the 2003 debacle with 
the Stability and Growth Pact. Only by strengthening 
the Commission, through the introduction of reversed 
QMV, could this fault be remedied meaningfully.”, 
Smits, supra n. 17, p. 829.
ply to all steps of for example the Excessive Deficit 
Procedure, is often overseen. Secondly, the new 
voting modality applies to so-called implementing 
acts and not to so-called legislative acts. The attri-
bution of an implementing power to the Council 
exercised through a procedure of reversed quali-
fied majority voting is, according to the Council 
Legal Service, not problematic.
The changing nature of the 
multilateral surveillance system 
(art. 121 TFEU)
Ruffert raises an interesting point with regard to a 
third element in the use of article 136 TFEU, one 
that has not received much attention so far. 
Some of the measures to achieve convergence and 
budgetary control are highly doubted in EU legal 
terms, though in a less spectacular way than those 
to react to financial emergency. Few scholars 
would argue that Article 121(4) TFEU covers the 
sanctions – fines or deposits – contained in parts 
of the reform package, in particular, if the provi-
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sion is compared with the elaborate mechanism of 
sanctions in Article 126 TFEU.23
The author refers to the introduction of sanctions 
in the Macro-Economic Imbalances Procedure 
(MEIP) and the Medium-Term Budgetary Ob-
jective Procedure (MTO) – respectively intro-
duced and strengthened by the “Six-Pack” – in the 
framework of article 121 TFEU on multilateral 
surveillance of economic policy.
The objective here is not to discuss the political 
desirability or the economic soundness of the re-
designed multilateral surveillance system of arti-
cle 121 TFEU as a response to the crisis. Suffice it 
so say that the Macro-Economic Imbalances Pro-
cedure is a reaction to imbalances in the national 
economies that have been argued to contribute to 
the deepening of the crisis, such as the housing 
bubbles in Spain and Ireland.
The objective here is to illustrate how the intro-
duction of sanctions has fundamentally changed 
the character of the multilateral surveillance sys-
tem of article 121 TFEU and to relate this to the 
notion of legality. For this it is important to know 
23.  Ruffert, supra n. 12, p. 1800, italics added TWB.
that the multilateral surveillance system of article 
121 TFEU is based on recommendations. These 
are obviously not legally binding under EU law 
(article 288 TFEU). In both the Macro-Economic 
Imbalances Procedure (MEIP) and the Medium-
Term Budgetary Objective Procedure (MTO) the 
adoption of recommendations and the non fol-
lowing-up on them can now lead to sanctions.24 
This, it is argued, fundamentally changes the na-
ture of the multilateral surveillance system of ar-
ticle 121 TFEU. Does this application stay within 
the scope of article 136 TFEU? According to the 
Council Legal Service the establishment of new 
sanctions, also in this preventive arm, is allowed 
in so far as it has the objective of strengthening 
the coordination and surveillance of the budget-
ary discipline of member states or contribute in 
setting out member states’ economic policy guide-
lines. It can easily be argued that the sanctions 
24.  See for more detail: article 3 of Regulation (EU) No 
1174/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil of 16 November 2011 on enforcement measures to 
correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the 
euro area; article 4 of Regulation (EU) No 1173/2011 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 No-
vember 2011 on the effective enforcement of budgetary 
surveillance in the euro area.
concerned have this aim. It can also be argued 
though that they go beyond mere coordination 
and surveillance as intended in the framework of 
article 121 TFEU.
In fact, a very broad reading of the scope of arti-
cle 136 TFEU has to be adopted to justify the in-
troduction of sanctions-based procedures in the 
framework of article 121 TFEU. If a more restric-
tive reading is adopted, a tension arises with the 
principle of attributed powers. The question seems 
to be: what action can be situated in between the 
provision becoming futile on one extreme (the 
fear of Smits)25 and it being abused to create a true 
economic union with converged budgetary and 
economic politics on the other extreme (clearly 
not allowed according to Piris)?26
25.  Compare Smits, supra n. 17, p. 829.
26.  Compare Piris, supra n. 16, p. 19.
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3.2 Strengthened Eurozone 
cooperation OUTSIDE the 
EU Treaties (ESM, Fiscal 
Compact); or, how far 
can you go outside the 
Treaties?
In response to the Eurozone crisis member states 
of the EU have concluded a number of new trea-
ties, next to the existing EU Treaties: the EFSF es-
tablishing a temporary emergency fund decided 
on in May 2010, the Fiscal Compact mainly in-
creasing budgetary discipline agreed in March 
2012, and the ESM Treaty establishing a perma-
nent emergency fund which entered into force in 
September 2012. These new Treaties raise inter-
esting questions: How to appreciate going outside 
the Treaties in general? Why was this Treaty in-
strument chosen in the specific cases?27 And what 
27.  This question is extensively discussed by De Witte, su-
pra n. 6, and will not be discussed here. De Witte dis-
cusses the relevant instruments in an article on Treaty 
games (and takes them together with the amendment 
procedure of article 136(3) TFEU) concluding that law 
functions as an instrument as well as a constraint in the 
Euro crisis policy.
is their relation – both substantively and institu-
tionally – to EU law?
How to appreciate going outside the Treaties in 
terms of the power of member states to do so and 
in terms of principle? With regard to the compe-
tence of member states to conclude so-called ‘in-
ter se Treaties’,28 it is relevant to note that mon-
etary policy is an exclusive policy so concluding 
new intergovernmental Treaties on this matter by 
some member states outside the EU Treaty frame-
work is not allowed. Economic policy however is 
a coordinating power of the EU, so it has been ar-
gued that member states are still allowed to con-
clude separate Treaties in this area, as long as they 
comply with EU law that takes primacy.29 From 
28.  See for this term, De Witte, supra n. 6.
29.  Compare Bruno De Witte, ‘European Stability Mecha-
nism and Treaty on stability, coordination and gover-
nance: role of the EU institutions and consistency with 
EU legal order’, Challenges of Multi-tier Governance in 
the EU, European Parliament AFCO Workshop, Oc-
tober 2012, p. 15 who calls economic policy a shared 
power: “Inter se agreements are not allowed in matters 
falling within the EU’s exclusive competence. Monetary 
policy is, in relation to euro area countries, an exclusive 
competence of the EU (Art 3.1 TFEU); it has been ar-
gued, also in the Pringle case, that the ESM Treaty deals 
with monetary policy and is therefore illegal under EU 
that perspective neither the ESM Treaty nor the 
Fiscal Compact raises a problem, as has recently 
been confirmed with regard to the ESM Treaty by 
the European Court of Justice in the Pringle case.30
Craig in his discussion of the Fiscal Compact in-
terestingly separates the power to conclude these 
Treaties from a possible principle justifying it. Is 
there such a principle justifying that “if the Mem-
ber States fail to attain unanimity for amendment, 
and do not seek or fail to attain their ends through 
enhanced co-operation, does it mean that 12, 
15, 21, etc. Member States can make a treaty to 
achieve the desired ends and the EU institutions 
can play a role therein, where the 27 Member 
States have not agreed to make use of the EU in-
stitutions, and where the treaty thus made deals 
law. However, in the system of the TFEU, the question of 
financial assistance to member states is clearly located 
in the Economic Policy chapter (Articles 120 to 126) 
rather than in the Monetary Policy chapter (Articles 127 
to 133), and economic policy is a shared competence, in 
which the Member State have preserved the right to de-
velop their own policies, alone or together with others.” 
[Italics in original.] See also Piris, supra n. 16, p. 19.
30.  European Court of Justice, Case C-370-12, Pringle, 27 
November 2012, paras. 60, 68-69.
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with subject-matter covered directly by the exist-
ing Lisbon Treaty?”31
Craig argues that if the reasoning of the European 
Court of Justice’s case law (on which more below) 
can be extended, then such a principle can be ac-
cepted.32 It would however have implications for 
“the way in which the European Union broadly 
conceived develops”.33 Two comments are in place 
here. Firstly, I believe that Craig, as do others, ex-
pects too much from the possibility of enhanced 
co-operation as an alternative to Treaty amend-
31.  Paul Craig, ‘Th e Stability, Coordination and Gover-
nance Treaty: principle, politics and pragmatism’, ELR 
(2012) p. 231-248 at p. 239. He distinguishes another 
principle, which would justify it “only where the issue is 
so important that the very survival of the European Un-
ion, or an important element thereof such as the euro, is 
at stake.” (p. 240).
32.  Note also that the authors of the ‘Tommaso Padoa-
Schioppa group’ actually suggest moving forward not 
on the basis of the current EU Treaties, but through a 
new intergovernmental Treaty as the best way forward. 
See Jean-Victor Louis, ‘Institutional dilemmas of the 
Economic and Monetary Union, Challenges of Multi-
tier Governance in the EU, European Parliament AFCO 
Workshop, October 2012, p. 6.
33.  Craig, supra n. 31, p. 240.
ment.34 Enhanced co-operation does not allow 
for changing the rules, only for applying them 
without the participation of all member states. 
The flexibility clause (possibly combined with en-
hanced co-operation) can function as a genuine 
alternative.
Secondly, it can be argued that the United King-
dom in the present case is not just ‘a certain’ mem-
ber state not agreeing to Treaty amendment, but is 
a special case. Clearly the United Kingdom had a 
different interest in the proposed Treaty amend-
ment from all other member states, even differ-
ent from the so-called ‘pre-ins’ (the member states 
with a derogation and therefore an obligation to 
join the Euro in the future). Firstly, it does not 
take part in the monetary union and will not, 
based on its op-out negotiated at Maastricht. Sec-
ondly, the rules of the economic union only partly 
34.  Craig, supra n. 31, p. 238: “The Lisbon treaty therefore 
embodies requirements before change can take place, 
namely the ordinary and the simplified revision pro-
cedure. These provisions enshrine the proposition that 
the rules of the game should not be altered unless all 
agree. They also contain criteria as to what should hap-
pen when all do not agree, by offering the possibility for 
enhanced co-operation.”
apply to it.35 Thus, article 7 of the Fiscal Compact 
(which intends to make reversed qualified major-
ity voting the practice under the Excessive Deficit 
Procedure for the Eurozone member states), even 
if it were not to apply to the Eurozone member 
states only, would have little impact on the United 
Kingdom, to which the obligation of article 126(1) 
TFEU to avoid excessive government deficits does 
not strictly apply.36 Similarly, the German wish to 
increase the powers of the European Court of Jus-
tice under the Excessive Deficit Procedure would 
not impact the United Kingdom (this was even-
tually not achieved through the Fiscal Compact). 
Even the obligation to include the balanced budget 
rule in national law, preferably constitutional, was 
arguably not intended for the United Kingdom.37
It can be asked whether this has no meaning at all 
for the principle discussed. Clearly, there is a dif-
35.  See Protocol 15 on certain provisions relating to the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
36.  It shall only endeavor to avoid it, see article 5 of Proto-
col 15 on certain provisions relating to the United King-
dom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
37.  See also article 4 of the Commission proposal of 23 No-
vember 2011, which only intended to apply to the Euro-
zone.
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ference between going outside when dealing with 
a matter that relates to something the ‘out’ who 
is blocking change is not directly affected by and 
when not. It would have arguably been different if 
the Treaty amendment dealt with banking union 
as the United Kingdom does share the internal 
market rules on financial services, so there is a 
much clearer interest there.
The compatibility of the new 
Treaties with EU law
At least three interesting legal questions are raised 
with regard to the compatibility with EU law of 
the Emergency funds and the Fiscal Compact. 
Two relate to the substantive conformity of the 
Treaties with EU law. Firstly, what is the relation-
ship between going outside the Treaties creating 
a permanent ESM emergency fund and article 
125 TFEU, often referred to as the ‘no-bailout’ 
clause?38 Borger argues that the prohibition of ar-
38.  Extremely critical about the earlier temporary EFSF 
fund, which I do not discuss here, is Ruffert, supra n. 12, 
p. 1785: “To begin with, Article 125(1) TFEU is rather 
explicit (…) In the present legal situation, a bailout by 
the Union (first sentence) or by one or more Member 
States (second sentence) is forbidden. As a result, the 
ticle 125 TFEU can be interpreted both narrowly 
and broadly.39 Smits is optimistic about the pos-
sibilities to create an emergency fund.40 De Gre-
gorio Merino, a member of the Council Legal Ser-
vice writing in a personal capacity (and acting as 
an agent for the European Council in the Pringle 
case), argues the following: article 125 TFEU pro-
hibits member states from guaranteeing the debt 
decision of the Eurogroup of 2 May 2010 concerning 
Greece, the establishment of the EFSF, the extension of 
both in 2011 and the Eurogroup’s support for Ireland 
and Portugal are in breach of European Union law.” 
Much less so Smits, supra n. 17, p. 827: “I beg to differ 
from the legal analysis that leads Ruffert to the conclu-
sion that the establishment of the EFSF and of the Eu-
ropean Financial Stabilization Mechanism (EFSM), the 
granting of credit to Greece, Ireland and Portugal, and 
the ECB’s Securities Market Program are in breach of 
Union law.”
39.  Vestert Borger, ‘De eurocrisis als katalysator voor het 
Europese noodfonds en het toekomstig permanent sta-
bilisatiemechanisme’, [The Euro crisis as catalyst for the 
European emergency fund and the future permanent 
stabilisation mechanism’] SEW Tijdschrift voor Sociaal 
Economische Wetgeving (2011) p. 207-216 at p. 212.
40.  See Smits, supra n. 17, p. 828: “Th e evolved interpreta-
tion of the no-bail out clause, which bars other Member 
States from assuming the debt of a fellow State but does 
not bar them from assisting the latter in repaying its 
own debts, is appropriate.”
of any member state and loans that defeat the pur-
pose of this article (that is, not accompanied by 
conditionality), but it does not prohibit loans and 
credits that are conditioned and where the benefi-
ciary is held to pay the loan back.41 De Witte does 
see a potential conflict, but as long as the ESM is 
not applied in the sense that no financial support 
is actually given in its framework before January 
1 2013 – when the ratification of article 136(3) 
TFEU should be completed in all member states 
of the EU (not only of the Eurozone!) – an actual 
conflict can be avoided.42 The envisaged article 
136(3) TFEU allows the Eurozone member states 
to establish a “stability mechanism to be activated 
if indispensable to safeguard the stability of the 
euro area as a whole”.
41.  Alberto de Gregorio Merino, ‘Legal developments in 
the economic and monetary union during the debt cri-
sis: the mechanisms of financial assistance’, Common 
Market Law Review (2012) p. 1616-1646 at p. 1627.
42. De Witte, supra n. 29, p. 15. Note in this regard that: 
“The Spanish bank bailout is being transferred from 
the temporary eurozone fund (EFSF) to the permanent 
fund (ESM), with the first tranche expected in Decem-
ber, ESM chief Klaus Regling said in a press confer-
ence.”, EuObserver.com, 13 November 2012.
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The question whether the ESM Treaty is in viola-
tion of article 125 TFEU has not been answered 
by the Bundesverfassungsgericht in its judgment 
of September 2012. It was however recently an-
swered in the negative by the European Court of 
Justice in the Pringle case,43 a case in which the 
Irish Supreme Court has asked a preliminary rul-
ing on the compatibility of the ESM Treaty with 
EU law and on the validity of the European Coun-
cil decision of March 2011 amending article 136 
TFEU (intended to introduce the abovemen-
tioned article 136(3) TFEU). The Court followed 
the reasoning of De Gregorio Merino, stating that 
“Article 125 TFEU does not prohibit the granting 
of financial assistance by one or more Member 
States to a Member State which remains respon-
sible for its commitments to its creditors provided 
that the conditions attached to such assistance are 
such as to prompt that Member State to imple-
ment a sound budgetary polity.”44
Secondly, what is the relationship between going 
outside the EU Treaties through the Fiscal Com-
43.  European Court of Justice, Case C-370/12, Pringle, 27 
November 2012.
44. European Court of Justice, Case C-370/12, Pringle, 27 
November 2012, para. 137.
pact by prescribing a balanced budget rule and the 
differently defined one incorporated in secondary 
EU law, namely the Medium-Term Budgetary Ob-
jective (MTO) of the ‘Six-Pack’. Observers see no 
legal problems here, even though they sometimes 
fail to make the most precise comparison (compar-
ing the Fiscal Compact with the 3% deficit norm 
instead of the MTO). De Witte argues: “However, 
it is clear that, whereas these figures are different, 
they are not incompatible. Just as the TFEU leaves 
the member states free to set a ‘golden rule’ which 
is stricter under their own constitutional law (as 
Germany and Spain have done, for example), it 
also allows the member states to do so collectively, 
by means of an inter se agreement.”45
A third question, which is raised by both Treaties, 
is of an institutional nature, namely about the le-
gality of the use of Union institutions outside the 
EU Treaty framework. The Fiscal Compact bor-
45.  De Witte, supra n. 29, p. 16; Craig does not see prob-
lems of compatibility and argues that the “TSCG does 
not advance matters very much from the obligations 
contained in the EU Treaty and accompanying legisla-
tion”, Craig, supra n. 31, p. 235; Borger & Cuyvers also 
see no problems: “De gouden regel levert op zich geen 
conflicten met Europees recht op.”, Borger & Cuyvers, 
supra n. 9, p. 379.
rows the European Commission, the Council and 
the European Court of Justice. The ESM Treaty 
borrows the European Commission and the Eu-
ropean Central Bank. This raises a question of 
principle about the use of EU institutions outside 
the Union Treaties.
The little case law of the European Court of Justice 
on this matter should be put in perspective in two 
ways. Firstly, it relates to relatively innocent use of 
the institutions, if we compare it with the recent 
Eurozone crisis related Treaties (in the Aid for 
Bangladesh case for example the Commission co-
ordinated the aid given by member states outside 
the framework of the EU Treaties).46 Secondly, the 
case law leaves a number of important questions 
open,47 such as: Do all member states need to con-
sent to the use of the institutions? And what kind 
of tasks can actually be carried out outside the 
framework of the European Union?
46.  European Court of Justice, C-181/91 and C-248/91, Aid 
for Bangladesh, Jur.1993, I-3685.
47.  See Borger & Cuyvers, supra n. 9, p. 382; ‘Editorial 
Comments. Some thoughts concerning the Draft Treaty 
on a Reinforced Economic Union’, Common Market 
Law Review (2012) p.1-14 at p. 9.
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The recent Pringle case of the European Court 
of Justice about the ESM Treaty has left the an-
swer to the first question open.48 This was pos-
sible, since different from the Fiscal Compact, the 
use of institutions was not contested among the 
member states here. In fact, on 20 June 2011 all 
27 EU member states have authorized the seven-
teen member states of the Eurozone to request the 
European Commission and the European Central 
Bank to perform the tasks provided for in the ESM 
Treaty. A similar thing has not happened though 
with regard to the Fiscal Compact and the United 
Kingdom has on several occasions expressed its 
reservations to the use of the European institu-
tions in this Treaty.
With regard to the second question, it follows 
from the Pringle case that the use of institutions 
as envisaged by the ESM Treaty is compatible with 
48.  European Court of Justice, Case C-370-12, Pringle, 27 
November 2012, para. 158. The Court did however speak 
of the Member States as opposed to Member States be-
ing entitled to entrust tasks to the institutions outside 
the framework of the Union.
EU law.49 Also, with exceptions,50 most observers 
have not been very critical about the Fiscal Com-
pact’s use of the EU institutions outside the Union 
Treaties.51 I believe this is rightly so. Here I will 
discuss one element of the use of the European 
Court of Justice which has not to my knowledge 
received attention so far, but which could prove to 
be more problematic, namely the power to impose 
sanctions under the Fiscal Compact.
ECJ power to impose sanctions under 
the Fiscal Compact
Most observers see no problem with the European 
Court of Justice’s role under the Fiscal Compact.52 
49.  European Court of Justice, Case C-370-12, Pringle, 27 
November 2012, paras. 155-177.
50.  Notably Craig, supra n. 31, p. 238-247.
51.  Borger & Cuyvers, supra n. 9, p. 384; De Witte, supra 
n. 6, p. 155-156; ‘Editorial Comments. Some thoughts 
concerning the Draft Treaty on a Reinforced Economic 
Union’, Common Market Law Review (2012) p.1-14 at p. 
6.
52.  Craig, supra n. 31, p. 245; Borger & Cuyvers, supra n. 
9, p. 385; De Witte, supra n. 6, p. 155: “the ‘use’ of the 
Court of Justice to enforce the international law obli-
gations contained in the Fiscal Compact is justified.” It 
can be expected therefore they also see no problem with 
the role of the European Court of Justice under the ESM 
It can in fact be argued that this is not a case of 
borrowing the European Court of Justice, but of 
applying a power of the European Court of Justice 
directly conferred on it by the Treaties, namely by 
article 273 TFEU. The very interesting case of the 
power given to the European Court of Justice by 
the Fiscal Compact to impose sanctions on mem-
ber states (article 8(2) FC) however remains un-
discussed.
This is an interesting element, since it cannot be 
explicitly found in article 273 TFEU. A power 
to impose sanctions for the European Court of 
Justice exists under EU law in relation to the in-
fringement procedure (article 258-259 TFEU) 
and an action for this can be started by the Eu-
ropean Commission under article 260 TFEU. The 
power to impose sanctions under the Fiscal Com-
pact should in fact be understood in analogy with 
article 260(2) TFEU. Article 260 TFEU confers a 
power on the European Court of Justice to impose 
a lump sum or penalty payment in case a mem-
ber state does not comply with a judgment by the 
Court. Importantly, it deals with infringements by 
member states of “an obligation under the Trea-
Treaty (article 37 ESM Treaty).
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ties”. However, not only are we dealing with an ac-
tion started by member states (article 273 TFEU) 
instead of the Commission (under article 260 
TFEU). Also, an infringement of the Fiscal Com-
pact as referred to in article 8 Fiscal Compact (the 
failure to comply with article 3(2) FC) does not 
qualify as an obligation under the EU Treaties.
Therefore the Fiscal Compact creates a new pow-
er for the European Court of Justice, as it is not 
simply exercising Treaty powers here. This is re-
markable from the perspective of the attribution 
of powers principle. The argument that a power to 
impose sanctions is simply implied in article 273 
TFEU is not very convincing.53 It would be inter-
esting to see if the European Court of Justice, if 
asked about the compatibility of article 8(2) Fiscal 
Compact with EU law, would be self-restraining 
on this point in the sense of rejecting a power giv-
en by Member States to make attainment of the 
objectives of the economic and monetary union 
53.  Even though the Court in the Pringle case has shown 
its willingness to adopt a broad reading of article 273 
TFEU to include also disputes between a member state 
and an international organisation; see European Court 
of Justice, Case C-370-12, Pringle, 27 November 2012, 
para. 175.
more effective. Peers argues that “the Court could 
hardly be accused of judicial activism if it simply 
carries out the task which member states have ex-
pressly given it here.”54 One way to solve the mat-
ter is by considering the imposition of sanctions 
as a mere ‘task’, as opposed to a new power, which 
does not alter the essential character of the Court’s 
powers conferred by the EU Treaties.55 But are we 
really merely dealing with a task? Another way for 
the Court to close the gap would be to go beyond 
the textual ‘notion’ of institutional balance of ar-
ticle 13 EU Treaty, and use the ‘principle’ of insti-
tutional balance as the source of a specific legal 
norm which could not be found in the text of the 
54.  Steve Peers, ‘The Stability Treaty. Permanent Austerity 
or Gesture Politics’, EuConst (2012) p. 404-441 at p. 420.
55.  Compare the Court’s approach to the ‘tasks’ given 
by the ESM Treaty to the Commission and the Euro-
pean Central Bank; European Court of Justice, Case 
C-370/12, Pringle, 27 November 2012, paras. 158-165.
Treaty,56 as it did in the Chernobyl case to over-
come a procedural gap.57
How should we appreciate this use? Overall, it can 
be argued that a very responsible use of the Treaty 
instruments seems to have been made. This can 
be illustrated by what has not been included in 
the Fiscal Compact, for example giving the Com-
mission the power to directly act on behalf of the 
member states (under article 8 FC) – desired by 
some, but equally denounced by others as going 
against the institution’s Treaty based indepen-
dence. In fact, the Fiscal Compact is to be seen 
as a compromise between those forces that would 
have liked to go further, and those who were more 
conservative. The choice of instrument itself, once 
56.  Compare Bruno de Witte, ‘The Role of Institutional 
Principles in the Judicial Development of the European 
Union Legal Order’, in: Francis Snyder (ed.), The Euro-
peanisation of Law. The Legal Effects of European Inte-
gration (Oxford, Hart Publishing 2000) p. 83-100 at p. 
92
57.  European Court of Justice, Case 70/88 European Parlia-
ment v Council (Chernobyl), 22 May 1990. In this case, 
not only did the Court increase the powers of locus stan-
di of the European Parliament, it thereby also increased 
its own powers.
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it was made, put serious constraints on what could 
actually be regulated.
Some of the comments made on the Fiscal Com-
pact, even though defendable from a strictly le-
gal point of view, seem to fail to take into account 
these political dynamics. De Witte argues that 
“There was, arguably, no strict need to adopt a new 
treaty to implement what is contained in the text 
of the Fiscal Compact. Most of what it contains 
in terms of economic governance at the European 
level could have been adopted through enhanced 
cooperation within the EU or by means of a modi-
fication of Protocol No. 12 on the excessive defi-
cit procedure.”58 Still, it will be argued below that 
the intergovernmental Treaty contains important 
advantages over secondary EU law when it comes 
to imposing on member states the obligation to 
incorporate a balanced budget rule preferably in 
the formal national constitution or otherwise ma-
terially in national constitutional law.
58.  De Witte, supra n. 6, p. 152. Similar comments were 
made by Commissioner Olli Rehn on12 December 2011 
in relation to the substantive agreement reached during 
the December European Council.
3.3 The way forward: Treaty 
change?
So far European politicians have been able to avoid 
using Treaty amendment for further integration 
(apart from the intended creation of article 136(3) 
TFEU). Recent Commission proposals on a bank-
ing union as well as the report “Towards a Genu-
ine Economic and Monetary Union” presented on 
5 December 2012 by the President of the Europe-
an Council – and prepared in close collaboration 
with the Presidents of the Commission, the Eu-
rogroup and the European Central Bank – again 
raise the question to what extent a fiscal union 
or political union can be brought about without 
Treaty change.
With regard to the banking union, three elements 
should be distinguished: the supervision of banks 
(Single Supervisory Mechanism), resolution pow-
ers and a deposit guarantee fund. Already with 
regard to the first element, which is the only one 
seriously on the table at the moment, several ac-
tors have argued that a Treaty change is required 
and that article 127(6) TFEU is not sufficient.59 
59.  Article 127(6) TFEU: “The Council, acting by means 
Sweden for example argues that only through a 
Treaty amendment the non-Eurozone member 
states can be involved (as article 127(6) TFEU 
only covers the European Central Bank, which is 
not an institution with powers in relation to the 
non-Eurozone member states, nor do the latter 
have voting rights in this institution). The Ger-
man Bundesbank argues that a Treaty amendment 
is needed to make a dual role of the European 
Central Bank possible: giving this institution both 
a supervisory role over national banks as well as a 
monetary role would otherwise endanger its in-
dependence as well as its price stability mandate. 
Similarly, according to the Council Legal Service 
a Treaty amendment would be necessary to give a 
separate bank supervision board within the ECB 
any formal decision-making powers.60
of regulations in accordance with a special legislative 
procedure, may unanimously, and after consulting the 
European Parliament and the European Central Bank, 
confer specific tasks upon the European Central Bank 
concerning policies relating to the prudential supervi-
sion of credit institutions and other financial institu-
tions with the exception of insurance undertakings.”
60.  Financial Times, ‘ECB supervisory proposal illegal, says 
adviser’, 18 October 2012.
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On the one hand a successful Treaty change that 
takes away any doubt about the legality of a Sin-
gle Supervisory Mechanism, but also the other 
elements of a banking union, provides increased 
legitimacy. On the other hand, a procedure that 
takes years can arguably not be part of crisis reso-
lution. Moreover, Treaty change has as a disad-
vantage that you have to get it right the first time 
or you risk starting another long process of fixing 
earlier faults. This means a Treaty change would 
have to lead to the introduction of broad legal 
bases or enabling clauses, leaving the details to be 
worked out under secondary law. It also means a 
political assessment has to be made (and agreed 
on!) of what is needed in the long-term to solve 
the Eurozone crisis as well as to prevent future 
ones. For now, especially since the December 2012 
European Council, the prospect of a big Treaty 
change is receding.61
61.  See also ‘Charlemagne’, The Economist, 22 December 
2012.
4.  Assessing the paths chosen: democratic 
legitimacy
In the following the democratic challenges of the 
different types of differentiated integration dis-
cussed above will be illustrated. As said, there will 
be a focus on input democracy, related to rules 
of change (the different procedural requirements 
for the creation of rules) and related to the new 
instruments set up, in particular the role of (rep-
resentative) institutions under them. I will also 
discuss the particular impact of the balanced bud-
get rule of the Fiscal Compact on the powers of 
national parliaments. 
Finally, I will touch upon the current debate about 
what level provides or is to provide the most im-
portant legitimating role for EU policy responses 
to the crisis, either the level of national parlia-
ments and democracy or the level of European 
Parliament and democracy.
4.1 Input legitimacy and 
new Treaties versus 
extensive use of secondary 
legislation 
From the above it is clear that the policy responses 
to the Eurozone crisis have led to important in-
novations both within and outside the framework 
of the EU Treaties.62 Outside the framework of 
the EU Treaties an emergency fund has been cre-
ated and an obligation to adopt at national level, 
preferably constitutional, a balanced budget rule. 
Within the framework of the EU Treaties a Mac-
ro-Economic Imbalances Procedure has been cre-
ated with the possibility of imposing sanctions.
In terms of input legitimacy, there is an interesting 
difference between the two paths chosen for these 
policy outcomes. The ‘outside’ route of an inter-
governmental Treaty leans on the legitimacy of 
62.  Again, I leave aside here the unconventional measures 
of the ECB.
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national parliaments, as the ESM Treaty and Fis-
cal Compact require ratification at national level. 
The ‘within’ route of article 136 TFEU instead 
leans to a great extent on legitimacy provided at 
the European level, as the “Six-Pack” measures ad-
opted on the basis of article 136 and 121(6) TFEU 
jointly are adopted through the ordinary legisla-
tive procedure. This means qualified majority vot-
ing in the Council and co-decision for the Euro-
pean Parliament.
How to appreciate the ‘outside’ route from an in-
put legitimacy perspective? The conclusion of new 
intergovernmental Treaties has been criticized for 
its lack of transparency and democracy.63 While 
63.  De Witte, supra n. 6, p. 154: “The main disadvantage 
of the non-EU treaty route is, of course, that the spe-
cial qualities of EU law are lost, namely the relatively 
democratic and transparent mode of decision-making 
(at least if compared to purely intergovernmental deci-
sion-making), and the capacity to make the rules ‘stick’ 
by means of a relatively efficient judicial enforcement 
system.”; Ruffert, supra n. 12, p. 1789: “Nonetheless, the 
erection of a new international institution enhances 
the complexity of the design of European integration, 
and it also sidesteps some crucial features of the EU’s 
institutional concept, which should strive for more 
transparency and not for a complex plurality. The re-
flection behind this critical remark leads to one of the 
core challenges of the new ESM for EU law. Indeed, its 
in terms of transparency the recent conclusion 
of the Fiscal Compact can surely be criticized, in 
terms of the involvement of parliaments one must 
not forget that these Treaties require ratification, 
so approval of national parliament and sometimes 
even a referendum (notably on the Fiscal Com-
pact in Ireland). Whatever the level of popular 
support among those represented nationally for 
the specific measures adopted, national Parlia-
ments arguably nonetheless still provide greater 
legitimacy than the European Parliament. And 
whatever the role played in the Irish referendum 
by the link between the ratification of the Fiscal 
Compact and the possibility to receive ESM fund-
ing, such a referendum nonetheless still provides 
greater legitimacy in Ireland than the conclusion 
of an EU regulation would have.
How then to appreciate the ‘within’ route of article 
136 TFEU? An extensive use of article 136 TFEU 
is possibly problematic considering the fact that 
this procedure prescribes qualified majority vot-
ing in the Council and member state representa-
construction is questionable in the light of the principle 
of democratic rule. The “democratic deficit” has always 
threatened progress in the course of European integra-
tion.”
tives can thus be outvoted. In practice, this for-
mally does not seem to have been the case with 
regard to the relevant ‘Six-Pack’ measures, but still 
it is clear that some member states have had to 
accept things they strongly opposed during nego-
tiations. The best example is the introduction of 
semi-automatic sanctioning (a decision is deemed 
to be adopted unless rejected), which France op-
posed. France initially seemed to be able to avoid 
the introduction of this type of sanctions through 
the October 2010 Deauville deal with Germany, 
but finally had to accept them in a showdown be-
tween the Council and the European Parliament. 
This illustrates another relevant element of article 
136 TFEU, namely the involvement of the Euro-
pean Parliament. Generally, involvement of the 
European Parliament is seen to compensate from 
a democratic perspective the possibility for mem-
ber states to be outvoted by providing legitimacy 
at the European level. To what extent is this true 
also for a (too) extensive use of article 136 TFEU? 
Obviously the European Parliament cannot le-
gitimate measures that overstep the boundaries 
of article 136 TFEU. In that case an opposing or 
outvoted member state can make recourse to the 
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European Court of Justice through the action for 
annulment (article 263 TFEU). To my knowledge 
there is no sign yet of a member state being out-
voted under article 136 TFEU or contemplating 
recourse to the European Court of Justice.
It can be said that the European Parliament has 
been successful, both in its linking of the six mea-
sures of the “Six-Pack” – note that the ordinary 
legislative procedure was not prescribed for all 
these measures64 – and in its impact on the final 
outcome (especially the mentioned semi-automat-
ic sanctioning).
Interestingly, also members of European Parlia-
ment not from Eurozone countries voted on the 
measures that only apply to the Eurozone. Is this 
institutionally problematic? Ideally the European 
Parliament should not be seen to represent nation-
als of member states as such, but to represent the 
Union’s citizens (article 14 EU). Obviously though 
64. Notably, Directive 2011/85/EU on requirements for 
budgetary frameworks of the Member States and 
Regulation No 1177/2011 on speeding up and clarify-
ing the implementation of the excessive deficit proce-
dure (amending Regulation No 1467/97) only required 
consultation of the European Parliament as they were 
adopted on the basis of article 126(14) TFEU.
there is a tension here, as Piris rightly notes.65 In-
terestingly, the European Parliament itself is not in 
favor of creating a (separate) Eurozone assembly.66
4.2 The (absent) role 
of supranational 
institutions under the new 
intergovernmental Treaties
The new intergovernmental Treaties have been 
criticized for the absence of accountability mech-
anisms involving the European Parliament.67 In 
65.  Piris, supra n. 16, p. 10: “Par ailleurs, les Etats partici-
pants pourraient avoir des difficultés politiques à accep-
ter que les décisions les concernant exclusivement soient 
proposées et décidées par une Commission et un Parle-
ment dans leur composition reflétant la totalité des Etats 
membres de l’Union européenne.”
66.  See Benjamin Fox, ‘No eurozone-only assembly, say 
MEPs’, EuObserver, 6 October 2012.
67.  Written evidence submitted by Simon Hix to the Euro-
pean Scrutiny Committee of the House of Commons, 
4 January 2012: “However, the European Parliament 
is currently absent in the proposed intergovernmental 
structures for a fiscal compact for the Eurozone. If the 
European Parliament was given an oversight role of the 
Commission and the Eurozone Finance Ministers, this 
would at least add one democratic check in the pro-
posed structure.”; Janis Emmanouilidis, ‘Which lessons 
fact, in our discussion of the legality of borrow-
ing the EU institutions outside the EU Treaties, no 
mention was made of the European Parliament. 
The European Parliament has no role in deci-
sion-making on providing financial assistance to 
member states under the ESM Treaty. The Presi-
dent of the European Parliament is not welcome 
at Euro Summits, even though he may be invited 
to be heard.68 Also, no new accountability mecha-
nisms are created for the Commission consider-
ing its strengthened role under the Fiscal Com-
pact and the ESM Treaty. Arguably though, the 
European Parliament can use existing account-
ability mechanisms to scrutinize the actions of 
the European Commission ‘under’ these Treaties. 
to draw from past and current use of differentiated inte-
gration’, Challenges of Multi-tier Governance in the EU, 
European Parliament AFCO Workshop, October 2012, 
p. 11-12: “the European Parliament runs the risk of be-
ing sidelined in some of the processes aiming to lead to 
a “Genuine Economic and Monetary Union”.”; Ruffert, 
supra n. 12, p. 1790: “As may be shown, parliamentary 
control and political accountability towards the Euro-
pean Parliament is non-existent in the ESM, and it is 
substantially diminished with respect to national par-
liaments as in all similar institutional structures at the 
international level.”
68.  Article 12(5) FC.
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The same holds for the European Central Bank’s 
actions under the ESM Treaty. Moreover, several 
commitments made in the Fiscal Compact, for 
example on the budgetary and economic part-
nership programme (article 5 FC), will be imple-
mented through secondary EU law, involving the 
European Parliament on the basis of its EU Treaty 
powers.
Some of the criticism is not so much related specif-
ically to the intergovernmental Treaties, but goes 
to the heart of the institutional set-up of the Exces-
sive Deficit Procedure of article 126 TFEU. Thus, 
Hix argues with regard to the budgetary role of 
oversight of the Commission that “(…) the Com-
mission does not have a sufficiently democratic 
mandate to pass judgement on national budgetary 
discipline.”69 With regard to key economic gover-
nance decisions of the Ecofin Council he argues 
that “ (…) while each minister might be account-
able to his or her own member state this does not 
make him or her either individually or collectively 
legitimate for the EU as a whole. Put another way, 
why would the public or a parliament in a Euro-
zone state accept a majority decision against them 
69.  Hix, supra n. 67.
by the Eurozone Finance Ministers (such as the 
imposition of a fine for breaching the 3% budget 
deficit rule)?”70 Hix is particularly concerned with 
democratic legitimacy since major redistributive 
consequences are now involved, both between 
Member States as a result of the funds, and within 
Member States as a result of austerity measures. 
With regard to redistributive consequences within 
states, the case of Greece is pressing in its relation 
to the use of article 136 TFEU (see above under 
paragraph 3.1). It should be noted that the deci-
sions that would arguably in the short term have 
the greatest redistributive consequences between 
Member States are taken unanimously (namely 
those under the EFSF and ESM Treaty). One ex-
ception is the so-called super-qualified majority 
under the ESM Treaty. Where the Commission 
and the European Central Bank both conclude 
that a failure to urgently adopt a decision to grant 
or implement financial assistance would threaten 
the Eurozone’s economic and financial sustain-
ability, a majority of representatives of member 
states representing 85% of the capital contribu-
tion key to the ESM Fund is sufficient (article 4(4) 
70.  Hix, supra n. 67.
ESM Treaty). While all member states but Germa-
ny, France and Italy can be outvoted in this proce-
dure, to compensate for this an emergency reserve 
fund is then automatically created to cover pos-
sible risks. A transfer from this emergency reserve 
fund back to the regular reserve fund can only be 
decided unanimously.
Interestingly, article 4(4) ESM has been subject of 
a Judgment of the Estonian Supreme Court. The 
Court concluded that this provision interferes 
with the financial competence of the Riigikogu 
(Estonian Parliament) and the financial sover-
eignty of the State of Estonia, but that this inter-
ference is justified by substantial constitutional 
values. Article 4(4) ESM Treaty provides for an 
appropriate, necessary and reasonable measure 
for the achievement of the objective of eliminat-
ing a threat to the economic and financial sustain-
ability of the euro area.71
Where under the intergovernmental Treaties each 
representative of a member state has a veto, the 
exact role of national parliaments is left to na-
tional constitutional law (whether this is previous 
71.  Estonian Supreme Court en banc, Constitutional 
Judgment 3-4-1-6-12, 12 July 2012, points 204-210.
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consent, accountability ex post, etc.).72 Hix again 
is critical: “The current plans do not specify in any 
detail how national approval would work. (…) 
Without an agreement on at least a set of mini-
mum procedures, there is a danger that some na-
tional governments will try to side-step national 
parliamentary approval of their contributions to 
the EFSF and ESM.” Even though Hix’s fears may 
be justified, it can be asked whether the solution 
should instead be found at the level of the inter-
governmental treaties. This route would easily 
lead to accusations of an attempt to interfere with 
the national constitutional identity of member 
states.73
72.  The German Bundesverfassungsgericht has recently 
decided that the Bundestag must consent to every indi-
vidual disposal and that there must be sufficient parlia-
mentary influence on the way the funds are handled by 
the receiving states. BverfG, 2 BvR 1390/12, 12 Septem-
ber 2012.
73.  See for the Treaty obligation of the European Union to 
respect the national constitutional identity of the mem-
ber states, article 4(2) EU.
4.3 The Fiscal Compact and 
the powers of national 
Parliaments
The Fiscal Compact intends to further increase 
budgetary discipline of member states and im-
pacts on the powers of national Parliaments. To 
understand how, one should first look at the defi-
nition of the Balanced Budget Rule in the Fiscal 
Compact and its relation to existing EU law. Sec-
ondly, and more importantly, one should look at 
the character of this rule and the intention of the 
Fiscal Compact to have it enshrined in the nation-
al law of the contracting parties, preferably of a 
constitutional level.
Even though the definition of the Balanced Budget 
Rule is not identical under the “Six-Pack” and the 
Fiscal Compact, the differences are not great.74 In 
general terms, the Fiscal Compact Balanced Bud-
74.  Moreover, the application of the rule is country specific. 
The Fiscal Compact starts from a more strict 0,5% limit 
of the structural deficit, but giving more leeway (1%) to 
member states with a relatively low general government 
debt (significantly below 60% of GDP). The “Six-Pack” 
starts from a less strict 1%, but can be more strict in its 
actual application to a specific country.
get Rule is similar to existing EU law in the sense 
that, as do the Treaty based 3% deficit rule and the 
“Six-Pack” Medium-Term Budgetary Objective 
rule (MTO), it provides a maximum to member 
states deficit, but without deciding what policy 
measure are to be taken to stay within these lim-
its.75 The recent combined application of articles 
126(9) and 136 TFEU in the case of Greece (dis-
cussed above) goes much further in this respect!
Arguably more important is the different charac-
ter of the new Balanced Budget Rule. The Fiscal 
Compact creates the following obligation with re-
gard to its Balanced Budget Rule:
75.  Compare also Brigid Laff an, ‘Testing Times: Respon-
sibility to the fore in the Euro Crisis’, Paper prepared 
for the conference in honour of Peter Mair: Responsive 
or Responsible, EUI, 26-28 November 2012, p. 1-17 at 
p. 12: “If national governments are increasingly drawn 
into budgetary and fiscal cycles within the EU and Euro 
area, how can national parliaments continue to exercise 
their traditional prerogatives in domestic public financ-
es.” But also on same page: “Budgetary and economic 
policy falls within the political space of constrained 
choice, but choice nonetheless. (…) There are choices 
about the balance between spending cuts and tax in-
creases and within both categories about where to cut 
and where to raise taxes.” 
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The rules (…) shall take effect in the nation-
al law of the Contracting Parties at the lat-
est one year after the entry into force of this 
Treaty through provisions of binding force 
and permanent character, preferably consti-
tutional, or otherwise guaranteed to be fully 
respected and adhered to throughout the na-
tional budgetary process.76
What does permanent mean? Or otherwise guar-
anteed to be fully respected? This unfortunately is 
not very clear.77 According to the Conseil Consti-
tutionnel, in France the introduction of binding 
and permanent provisions would require change 
of several provisions of the Constitution. Alterna-
tively, ‘otherwise guaranteed to be fully respected’ 
could be satisfied in France through the adoption 
of an organic law, which is of a permanent nature 
and would bind the entire public administration.78
76.  Article 3(2) Fiscal Compact.
77.  Borger & Cuyvers, supra n. 9, p. 380; Compare also J.H. 
Reestman, ‘Een Stille Constitutionele Omwenteling. 
Het Stabiliteitsverdrag in de Nederlandse Rechtsorde’ 
[‘A Silent Constitutional Revolution. Th e Stability Trea-
ty in the Dutch Legal Order’] (2012) forthcoming.
78.  Conseil Constitutionnel, Décision no. 2012-653 DC of 9 
Moreover, it is questionable in some member 
states, including the Netherlands, whether parlia-
ment can bind itself.79 That it further constrains 
national parliaments however seems to be undis-
puted.80 Member states must also create an auto-
matic correction mechanism, which is triggered 
in the event of significant observed deviations.81 
August 2012, points 20-24.
79.  ‘Editorial. Th e Fiscal Compact and the European Con-
stitutions: ‘Europe Speaking German?’, EuConst (2012) 
p. 1-7 at p. 3: “The United Kingdom and the Netherlands 
are among the countries in which the rule applies that 
a parliament cannot bind itself. A parliament deciding 
on the budget cannot be bound by a ‘balanced budget 
rule’ enacted by act of parliament, if parliament does 
not want to be bound by it or ignores it when deciding 
on the budget. Nevertheless the Dutch government has 
announced that it intends to implement the balanced 
budget rule by an act of parliament.”
80.  Borger & Cuyvers, supra n. 9, p. 381; ‘Editorial. Th e Fis-
cal Compact and the European Constitutions: ‘Europe 
Speaking German?’, EuConst (2012) p. 1-7 at p. 5-6: “The 
Fiscal Compact, however, strikes at the heart of the in-
stitutions of parliamentary democracy by dislocating 
as a matter of constitutional principle the budgetary 
autonomy of the member states. It affects the power of 
the purse of national parliaments (and also for the Eu-
ropean Parliament!), historically the primary spring of 
development of their powers.”
81.  See also the Commission communication of 20 June 
2012 on Common principles on national fiscal correc-
Nonetheless, again it can be argued that member 
states are still free to decide what policy choices to 
make in the design of their automatic correction 
mechanism.
Hix critically argues that: “As the agreement is 
currently designed, neither the new constraints 
on national budgets (…) nor the rules govern-
ing the transfer of resources between member 
states would be accepted as legitimate by citizens 
and national parliaments in the member states 
involved.”82 Should the balanced budget rule then 
better have been included into secondary EU law? 
This has implicitly been argued.83 In contrast, it is 
here argued that the path of a Treaty, preferably 
in the form of an amendment of the EU Treaties, 
tion mechanisms.
82.  Hix, supra n. 67.
83.  De Witte, supra n. 6, p. 152: “The core of the new treaty 
and its real novelty, also in terms of democratic practice, 
lies elsewhere, namely in the introduction of the ‘golden 
rule’: the obligation to introduce into national law (pref-
erably constitutional) the new budgetary limits defined 
in Article 3, para. 1, in particular a ‘structural’ deficit 
not exceeding 0.5% of the GDP. Again, this could have 
been achieved legally speaking by means of EU legis-
lation, if necessary adopted by means of the ‘enhanced 
cooperation’ mode of decision-making.”
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but in the absence of that in the form of a new in-
tergovernmental Treaty, is to be welcomed. Does 
secondary EU law, which can be adopted by a 
qualified majority vote,84 really have sufficient sta-
tus and legitimacy to mandate change of formal 
national constitutions or otherwise of material 
constitutional rules, in the sense that it requires 
guarantees implying similar status?85 I would ar-
gue that it does not and that ratification of such an 
obligation by member states, leading to an active 
involvement of national parliaments, is desirable.
4.4  The way forward: European 
or national democratic 
legitimacy?
Undoubtedly, the most prominent source of le-
gitimacy for European integration lies at the level 
84.  Note that the so-called “Two-Pack” in which a simi-
lar rule was originally included by the Commission has 
been proposed on the basis of articles 121(6) and 136 
TFEU. See article 4 of Proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on common 
provisions for monitoring and assessing draft budget-
ary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive defi-
cit of the Member States in the euro area, 23 November 
2011.
85.  Compare Reestman, supra n. 77.
of national parliaments and democracy. Is this 
sustainable in the long term, also in light of the 
current Eurozone crisis responses? Two opposing 
positions are found in the academic literature.
Some argue that the national level will have to lend 
its legitimacy to a solution to the crisis.86 Weiler 
argues that “at what will be a decisive moment in 
the evolution of the European construct, the im-
portance, even primacy of the national commu-
nities as the deepest source of legitimacy of the 
integration project will be affirmed yet again.”87 
Scicluna contends that “democracy is still best 
preserved by sovereign states within a more limit-
ed EU. The Eurozone crisis illustrates the dangers 
that ‘more Europe’ poses to European democracy 
much more rapidly than it points to Europeanisa-
tion as the solution.”88
86.  J.H.H. Weiler, ‘In the Face of Crisis: Input Legitimacy, 
Output Legitimacy and the Political Messianims of Eu-
ropean Integration’, European Integration (2012) p. 825-
841.
87.  Weiler, supra n. 86, p. 837.
88.  Nicole Scicluna, ‘EU Constitutionalism in Flux: Is the 
Eurozone Crisis Precipitating Centralisation or Diffu-
sion?’, European Law Journal (2012) p. 489-503 at p. 501.
Others argue that legitimacy must eventually be 
found at the European level. According to Laf-
fan the increased collective responsibility among 
executives in the Eurozone leads to a legitimacy 
gap. The “limits of responsiveness at national level 
must be compensated for by greater responsive-
ness at the EU level.”89 Maduro takes a more ex-
treme position arguing that: “a model that would 
make EU democracy wholly or fundamentally 
dependent on national democracies is destined to 
fail”90 and proposes several reforms – not requir-
ing Treaty amendment – for the creation of a Eu-
ropean political space, including a reform of the 
EU budget and true electoral competition on the 
Presidency of the European Commission. Fab-
brini takes a similar position on the appropriate 
level of legitimacy: “as shown by the protests in 
the streets of many European capitals, the legiti-
macy of decisions taken on behalf of the EU can-
89.  Laffan, supra n. 75, p. 13.
90.  Miguel Poiares Maduro, A New Governance for the Eu-
ropean Union and the Euro: Democracy and Justice (Di-
rectorate-General for Internal Policies of the European 
Parliament, September 2012) p. 1-31 at p. 14.
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not be a derivative of the legitimacy enjoyed by 
the governments of its member states”.91
91.  Sergio Fabbrini, ‘The Democratic Governance of the 
Euro’ in: Maduro, De Witte, Kumm (eds.), The Demo-
cratic Governance of the Euro, RSCAS Policy Papers 
2012/08, p. 27-31 at p. 29: “Decisions made at the EU lev-
el require a legitimizing mechanism at that level, not at 
the level of its member states. Without proper involve-
ment of the EP in those decisions, the latter will lack the 
justification sufficient to be accepted by the European 
citizens affected by those decisions.”
5.  Conclusions
In the absence of an increased legitimacy of dem-
ocratic politics at the level of the European Union, 
the most important legitimacy source remains at 
the level of national democracy and parliaments. 
This predominant national legitimacy source 
functions through various different steps, be it 
a Bundesverfassungsgericht, Estonian Supreme 
Court or Conseil Constitutionnel judgment, na-
tional parliamentary ratification of a new Treaty, 
a popular referendum in Ireland, a decision on 
European matters by a national Finance Minister, 
etc. Where the permissive consensus on the Euro-
pean project has made place for social unrest in 
several member states, the importance of these le-
gitimacy moments should not be underestimated. 
Moreover, they should not be avoided.
This leads to a number of conclusions. 
Firstly, the much criticized Fiscal Compact is to be 
preferred over secondary EU law as an instrument 
creating the obligation to introduce at the level of 
national, preferably constitutional, law, or at least 
with what can be called materially constitutional 
guarantees, a Balanced Budget Rule and an au-
tomatic correction mechanism. Secondly, Treaty 
change, or otherwise use of the flexibility clause 
in combination with enhanced co-operation, is 
to be preferred over a too extensive use of article 
136 TFEU (as a sort of ‘Euro-flexibility’-clause). 
Thirdly, ESM Treaty amendment is to be preferred 
(even though that would mean early amendment 
of an agreement that has already been renegoti-
ated in the past) over an over-extensive interpre-
tation of article 19 ESM Treaty (reviewing the list 
of financial assistance instruments) to make direct 
recapitalization of banks through the ESM possi-
ble in the future. And finally, from this perspec-
tive, the failure to have a Greek referendum on 
the outcome of the October 2011 Euro Summit, 
an idea proposed by then Greek Prime Minister 
Papandreou, but cancelled under Franco-German 
pressure, is to be seen as a missed opportunity.
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1.  The views expressed in this paper are strictly personal. This text was completed early 
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While complementing the EMU with the neces-
sary rules mandating budget discipline at do-
mestic level, the fiscal compact inevitably affects 
the autonomy both of national parliaments and 
executive powers, as well as the life of millions of 
European citizens. A culture of financial stability 
protects democracy from inter-generational con-
flicts and it is positive per se. Arguably, however, 
some provisions of the fiscal compact risk widen-
ing the democratic deficiency of the economic 
governance. Thus, the following legal analysis is 
carried out with the main aim of assessing the 
coherence of the fiscal compact with the principle 
of democracy. As tentatively showed, an issue of 
democratic legitimacy is indeed raised. The poli-
cy-making of the euro zone needs to be improved 
so as to rely less on national legitimacy inputs 
and more on its own direct source of democratic 
accountability – the European Parliament. 
The following paper is divided into eight parts. 
After a brief introduction concerning the general 
features of the new treaty (section 1), the grounds 
for adopting an instrument of pure international 
law, concluded by a limited number of states, 
outside the architecture of the EU legal order, are 
described (section 2). As to the core of the fiscal 
discipline, i.e. the balanced budget rule and the 
obligation to reduce the public debt, the legal 
appreciation is multi-faceted (section 3). Then 
the limited new power to adjudicate attributed 
to the ECJ, is examined (section 4). The reversed 
qualified majority principle with regard to the 
decision-making of the excessive deficit procedure, 
is relevant, since it implies the Commission being 
given a significant power to direct the decision-
making (section 5). Before evaluating en filigrane 
the fiscal compact in the light of the principle of 
democracy (section 7), a synthetic analysis of the 
rules regarding the economic policy coordination, 
convergence and governance of the euro area, is 
carried out (section 6). Finally, some conclusions 
will be drawn (section 8).
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1.  Introduction
The “Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Gover-
nance in the Economic and Monetary Union” has 
been negotiated – with a minimum involvement 
of the European Parliament – in a few weeks on 
the basis of the European Council mandate of De-
cember 9th, 20112. It was politically agreed upon 
late January and signed by all member states in 
Brussels on March 2nd, 2012, at the margins of the 
European Council, except for the United Kingdom 
and the Czech Republic. Known as the fiscal com-
pact (pacte budgetaire, traité sur la stabilité, patto 
di bilancio, Fiskalvertrag) due to its key provisions 
2. (*) Full Professor of International Law and European 
Law (University of Macerata, Italy). On leave from 
University. Currently, legal adviser at the Permanent 
Representation of Italy to the European Union. The 
views expressed in this paper are strictly personal. This 
text was completed early October 2012 and does not 
consider later developments.
 See Statement by the euro area Heads of State or 
Government, Brussels, 9 December 2011 SN/35/1/11 
REV 1. The negotiation showed positive results after six 
revisions of the original draft. Three MP’s represented 
the EP during the negotiation, Mr. Elmar Brok (PPE), 
Roberto Gualtieri (S&D) and Mr. Guy Verhofstadt 
(ADLE). The Commission and ECB were also involved 
in the negotiation.
on budgetary discipline, it comprises a long pre-
amble (26 paragraphs) and 16 Articles divided 
into VI Titles. Its outstanding norms are deemed 
to be applied to the member states whose cur-
rency is the euro (hereinafter, euro zone states)3. 
However, the rules regarding the new “Euro sum-
mit meetings” are applicable to all, regardless of 
ratification4. This body was established de facto at 
the outset of the financial crisis in order to bring 
together heads of state or government of the euro 
area.
To enter into force the fiscal compact requires at 
least the ratification of twelve euro zone states5. 
Not being a treaty revision of EU primary law, 
3.  Article 14(3).
4.  Article 14(4). That can easily be explained. The tasks 
of the new organ – i.e. responsibilities regarding the 
single currency, governance of the euro area, strategic 
orientations for the conduct of economic policies – 
require the participation of all the euro zone states.
5.  In principle, its entry into force is expected on 1st 
January 2013. However, this is a mere expectation. For, 
should the twelve ratifications be achieved sooner or 
later, its entry into force will vary accordingly pursuant 
to Article 14(2).
its efficacy does not require the ratification of all 
the signatories. The fiscal compact is obviously 
open to late accessions6. It is essentially tailored to 
fulfil the need of the euro zone states to preserve 
the attainment of the Union’s objectives in the 
framework of the monetary union, by avoiding 
both excessive government deficit and debt. 
However, under certain conditions, even the 
non-euro zone states may accept being bound 
by it. In particular, as long as they enjoy either a 
derogation or an exemption from participation in 
the single currency, they would be bound only by 
the selected provisions of titles III (fiscal compact) 
and IV (economic policy coordination and 
convergence) to which they declare their adhesion 
at the moment of depositing their instrument of 
ratification7. As a consequence, for them only the 
accession to the treaty can be selective (à la carte). 
Eight non-euro countries (Bulgaria, Denmark, 
6.  Article 15. The accession clause – which was not 
envisaged in the original draft and was suggested 
pending negotiation – is useful  because it allows the 
adhesion of the United Kingdom, the Czech Republic 
or Croatia (or even other future members of the EU) 
without amending the treaty beforehand and incurring 
in delays. 
7.  See last recital of the preamble and Article 14(5).
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Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and 
Sweden) showed their interest to be aligned to the 
fiscal compact by signing it8.
8.  As is usual in the EU treaty practice, the ratification 
requires the “respective constitutional” processes 
to be observed. The relevant instruments will be 
deposited with the General Secretariat of the Council 
of the EU (Article 14(1)). This element underlines the 
international nature of the treaty, though it is linked to 
the functioning of the common currency. Were it a EU 
treaty revision, it would have been deposited with the 
Italian Government.
2.  International treaty versus EU revision 
procedure
The fiscal compact is easier to understand and ra-
tionalize if the purpose for which it was enacted 
and the reasons that led to it, are considered. Its 
raison d’être falls squarely within the financial cri-
sis of the common currency that involved no less 
than five states. Some of them even faced the risk 
of leaving or being forced to leave the euro zone, 
despite the legal complexities of that perspective 
and the uncertainties of the legal framework9, not 
to mention the fact that nobody knows how exits 
can affect other euro zone states and the internal 
market as a whole10. The financial crisis of the euro 
zone clearly shows that the common currency 
performs only if all its members respect the basic 
principles of budgetary discipline. Since the begin-
ning of the crisis, serious shortcomings in the ar-
chitecture of the Economic and Monetary Union 
9.  See in general P. Athanassiou, Withdrawal and 
expulsion from the EU and EMU. Some reflections, ECB 
Legal Working Series, N° 10/December, 2009, 31 et seq.
10.  Among other things it seems likely that the state leaving 
the euro zone would need to impose serious limitations 
to the free movement of capitals.
(EMU) as designed by the Maastricht Treaty, have 
appeared11. Contrary to the original Delors’ sug-
gestion, the EMU did not set both the economic 
and monetary union, but the latter only12. Even the 
rules on economic coordination failed to be fully 
applied. Suffice it to recall the weaknesses of the 
excessive deficit procedure – the ECJ enjoys quite 
a limited role pursuant Article 126(10) TFEU; the 
Commission prepares reports, addresses opinions 
and proposes recommendations; yet, the Council 
never applied the sanctions provided for in Article 
126(11) TFUE. 
11.  C. Callies, C. Schoenfleisch, Auf dem Weg in 
die europäische “Fiskalunion”? – Europa- und 
verfassungsrechtliche Fragen einer Reform der 
Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion im Kontext des 
Fiskalvertrages, JuristenZeitung, 2012, 477-488, with 
regard in particular on the fiscal union process from the 
perspective of the German Constitution.  
12.  Much could be said about the structural imbalances 
of the Maastricht construction between the economic 
and monetary aspects. One of the best and concise 
summaries of what happened during the negotiation 
has been recently reported by J. Delors, The Maastricht 
treaty 20 years on – 7 February 2012, Notre Europe, 4. 
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Acting on the double legal basis of Article 126(9) 
and Article 136 TFUE, on 8th June 2010 the Coun-
cil adopted a decision addressed to Greece, re-
quiring an impressive set of 45 economic, social 
and fiscal measures13. Meanwhile the euro states 
had coordinated themselves bilaterally to grant 
loans facilities to Greece of up to 80 billion euro, 
alongside the IMF. Similar but lighter steps were 
taken for Portugal and Ireland14. In all cases, sanc-
13.  See the Decision of the Council N° 2010/320/EU, O.J. L 
145, 6 et seq., amended by the Decision of 7 September 
2010 N° 2010/486/EU, O.J. L 241, 12 seq., and by the 
Decision of 12 July 2011 N° 2011/734/ EU, O.J. L 296, 38 
et seq. For a brief economic evaluation of the measures 
imposed on Greece see D. Bohle, The Crisis of the 
Eurozone, EUI Working Papers, RSCAS 2010/77, 5. For 
a detailed view of the events since the Greek financial 
crisis see A. Viterbo, R. Cisotta, La crisi del debito 
sovrano e gli interventi dell’U.E.: dai primi strumenti 
finanziari al Fiscal Compact, Il Diritto dell’Unione 
europea, 2012, 323-366.
14.  R. Bieber, Observer – Policeman – Pilot? On Lacunae 
of Legitimacy and Contradictions of Financial Crisis 
Management in the European Union, EUI Working 
Paper Law 2011/16, 4, focusing on the structural 
weaknesses of the EU’s economic policy, as well as 
on the lack of its democratic legitimacy. With regard 
to Portugal and Ireland, see Council implementing 
Decision N° 2011/77/EU on granting Union financial 
assistance to Ireland, O.J. L 30, 4 February 2011, 34 et 
seq.; Council implementing Decision N° 2011/344/EU 
tions were not adopted – given the gravity of the 
economic crisis, they would have been hardly 
effective and possibly counterproductive. In ad-
dition the ECB was enacting some non standard 
measures concerning the acquisition on the sec-
ondary market of national bonds of the euro zone 
states affected by the crisis. Against this back-
ground, on 5th August 2011 the President of the 
ECB sent a letter to the Italian government asking 
for far reaching budgetary and economic reforms, 
including labour market measures and a constitu-
tional review to tighten fiscal rules15. 
In autumn 2011, governments acknowledged that 
a common currency, and the related constraints, 
could hardly be coupled with national sovereign-
ties on taxes and spending decisions16. Hence, the 
on granting financial assistance to Portugal, O.J. L 159, 
17 June 2011, 88 et seq. 
15.  See the Italian newspaper Corriere della Sera of 29 
September 2011.
16.  In brief, firstly, in order to pursue the political need 
to achieve a success, the EMU weaker economies 
were allowed to join the common currency without 
due scrutiny, giving them for over a decade (since the 
third stage of the EMU, started on 1st January 1999) 
the illusion of borrowing money at roughly the same 
interest rate as the stronger euro states. Secondly, 
euro zone states felt the need to ensure a stricter 
budgetary discipline and to foster common eco-
nomic governance among themselves 17. Some 
insufficient crisis contingencies were provided. Thirdly, 
despite the two rules on the 3 per cent limit for the deficit 
ratio and the 60 per cent limit for the debt-to-GDP ratio 
were established, transgressors were not sanctioned 
unless a discretionary decision-making process took 
place within the Council. Indeed, sanctions provided 
for in Article 126 were never applied. Tellingly, in 2003 
Germany and France, having failed to comply with the 
Pact, did not face any negative consequences (under 
the Italian Presidency of the Council: see ruling 13 July 
2004, C-27/04, Commission v. Council, ECJ Reports, 
2004, I-6649). Fourthly, even the no-bail out clause 
did not prevent secondary market interventions. As a 
result, the financial markets had the last say when the 
crisis actually hit Greece in 2009 with a high risk of 
contagion across the euro zone. Cf. inter alia J.-V. Louis, 
The No-Bail Out Clause and Rescue Packages, CML 
Review, 2010, 971 et seq.; House of Lords, The future 
of economic governance in the EU, Volume I: Report, 
March 2011 HL paper 124-I, 15 et seq., pointing out an 
asymmetry between a centralised monetary policy and 
the fragmented (not coordinated) fiscal and supply-side 
policies, combined with a build-up of competitiveness 
imbalances among member states. Likewise, G. Peroni, 
Il Trattato di Lisbona e la crisi dell’Euro: considerazioni 
critiche, Il Diritto dell’Unione europea, 2011, 971 et seq.
17.  See in particular the Statement by the heads of State or 
Government of the Euro area – 26 October 2011, points 
34 and 35, whereby they declared their willingness 
to “strengthen the economic union to make it 
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governments, and above all the ECB18, argued 
that Articles 121, 126, 136 TFEU and Protocol N° 
12, and Regulations 1466/97 and 1467/97, as re-
vised by the so-called Six pack, as well as the ap-
proval of the “Euro Plus Pact”19, were not enough 
to re-establish market confidence, though the Six 
pack reform focused on national debts and mac-
commensurate with the monetary union”, and asked the 
Presidents of the European Council and the Commission 
“to identify possible steps to reach this end. The focus 
will be on further strengthening economic convergence 
within the euro area, improving fiscal discipline and 
on deepening economic union, including exploring the 
possibility of limited Treaty changes. An interim report 
will be presented in December 2011 so as to agree on 
the first orientations. It will include a roadmap on how 
to proceed in full respect of the prerogatives of the 
institutions …”.
18.  See the European Central Bank opinion of 16 February 
2011 on economic governance reform in the European 
Union (CON/2011/13), OJ C 150 of 20 May 2011, 1 et 
seq., point 6.
19.  “The Euro Plus Pact. Stronger Economic Policy 
Coordination for Competitiveness and Convergence” 
is a political agreement concluded by the euro area 
heads of state or government (and joined by Bulgaria, 
Denmark, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania) 
on 24-25 March 2011. It is annexed to the European 
Council Conclusions adopted on the same days (see The 
European Council in 2011, Publications Office of the EU, 
Luxembourg, 2012, 40 et seq.).
roeconomics imbalances, impacting on states 
with earlier sanctions. Nor was a couple of Com-
mission proposals made on 23rd November 2011 
for a stronger economic governance, considered 
enough: the first aiming to allow the Commission 
to ask the euro area countries to review their draft 
national budgets in compliance with their com-
mitments20; and the second enhancing the surveil-
lance for euro area states benefiting from financial 
assistance or threatened by serious financial insta-
bility21 (the so-called Two pack).
At the European Council of 29th October 2011, a 
“limited” revision of primary law was envisaged 
as a key action instead. Further strengthening of 
economic convergence within the euro area was 
20.  See COM(2011) 821 final – 2011/0386 (COD) (Proposal 
for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the 
Council on common provisions for monitoring and 
assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the 
correction of excessive deficit of the Member States in 
the euro area). 
21.  See COM(2011) 819 final – 2011/0385 (COD) (Proposal 
for a Regulation of the European Parliament and 
the Council on the strengthening of economic and 
budgetary surveillance of Member States experiencing 
or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to 
their financial stability in the euro area).
needed22, much in the way suggested by Mr. Delors 
when the EMU was conceived. The main politi-
cal purpose was to tackle risks of spill-over effects 
of the crisis from some euro zone states to other 
states of the same area, their mutual destinies be-
ing interwoven23. Arguably, a set of comprehen-
sive rules, ensuring sustainability of national fiscal 
policies in the long run, was considered one of the 
levers in order to rebuild market confidence on 
both the euro currency and the related economies. 
European rescue funds had been meanwhile 
set up or about to be finalized by the euro zone 
states – i.e. the two temporary financial support 
mechanisms established in May 201024 and the 
22.  See The European Council in 2011, cit., at 65.
23.  D. Bohle, The Crisis of the Eurozone, cit., 1 et seq., 
noticing that the euro zone countries tied their own fate 
to that of the weakest member of the club.
24.  The European Financial Stabilization Mechanism 
(EFSM), adopted by a Council Regulation on the basis 
of Article 122(2) TFEU (N° 407/2010 of 11 May 2010 
8OJ L 118, 1 et seq.) and the larger European Financial 
Stability Facility (EFSF), the so-called special vehicle 
purpose set up as a company incorporated under the law 
of Luxembourg. For a description of these funds and the 
related legal questions see J.-V. Louis, The No-Bail Out 
Clause and Rescue Packages, cit., 971 et seq.; R. Smits, 
L’Europe à l’épreuve, Cahiers de droit européen, 2010, 
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permanent one, recently finalized to replace its 
predecessor25. In that respect, it was also advocat-
7 et seq.;  A. Viterbo, R. Cisotta, La crisi della Grecia, 
l’attacco speculativo all’euro e le risposte dell’Unione 
europea, Il Diritto dell’Unione europea, 2010, 961 
et seq; U. Häde, Die Europäische Währungsunion in 
der internationalen Finanzkrise – An den Grenzen 
europäischer Solidarität, Europarecht, 2010, 854 et seq. 
25.  On 25th March 2011, the European Council adopted 
a Decision adding Article 136(3) to the TFEU, with 
regard to a stability mechanism for euro zone states (OJ 
L 91 of 6 April 2011, 1), which runs as follows: “… the 
Member States whose currency is the euro may establish 
a stability mechanism to be activated if indispensible to 
safe guard the stability of the euro area as a whole” and 
that “the granting of any required financial assistance 
under the mechanism will be made subject to strict 
conditionality” (with regard to the legal reasons for 
the stability mechanism amendment see B. de Witte, 
The European Treaty Amendment for the Creation of 
a Financial Stability Mechanism, Sieps Report, 2011, 5 
et seq.). This Decision is based on Article 48(6) TEU, 
that empowers the European Council to make an 
amendment of the treaties through a simplified revision 
procedure, provided that the Decision is approved by 
the all member states of the Union in accordance with 
their respective constitutional requirements. This is 
reflected in Article 2 of the Decision, which states that it 
shall enter into force on 1st January 2013, provided that 
all member states have notified the ratification of the 
Decision, or, failing that, on the first day of the month 
following receipt of the last of those notifications. It is 
worth recalling that a first treaty establishing the ESM 
ed that the rescue funds ought to be balanced by 
was signed on 11st July 2011, and it did not contain a 
clause stipulating that access to funds by a euro zone 
state was conditional on that state ratifying the fiscal 
compact. On the contrary, the second ESM treaty, signed 
on 2nd February 2012, contains a recital 5 according 
to which: “… It is acknowledged and agreed that the 
granting of financial assistance in the framework of new 
programmes under the ESM  will be conditional, as of 
1st March 2013, on the ratification of the” fiscal compact 
“by the ESM Member concerned …”. However, the euro 
zone states completed the ratification process of the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM) sooner, so that 
it entered into force on 27th September 2012. The ESM 
makes a total of €700 billion of financial support (the 
capital stock) available to troubled euro zone countries. 
At a meeting of the financial Ministers on 30th and 31st 
March 2012, the so-called firewall has been raised. 
Actually, the EFSF would be allowed to overlap with 
the ESM. By a combination of the two rescue funds 
for perhaps one year, the lending capacity would be 
about € 740 billion. Concerning the ESM Treaty see M. 
Ruffert, The European Debt Crisis and European Union 
Law, CML Review 2011, 1777 et seq. After the ruling of 
the German Constitutional Court (12 September 2012, 
2 BvR 1390/12, 2 BvR 1421/12, 2 BvR 1438/12, 2 BvR 
1439/12, 2 BvR 1440/12, 2 BvE 6/12), the issue concerning 
the two reservations imposed by the same ruling, 
has been solved, with an erga omnes effect, through a 
Declaration of the 17 signatories, deposited with the 
General Secretariat of the Council on 27th October 
2012, which is assumed to have an interpretative nature, 
though it points out that the Declaration “constitute(s) 
an essential basis for the consent of the contracting 
imposing a strict fiscal discipline via primary law. 
A sort of equation was imposed – more solidar-
ity needs more national discipline. Moreover, the 
external visibility of a treaty could help in show-
ing the international markets the capability of the 
euro zone to provide for a fiscal compact and in 
contributing to tackling the profound confidence 
crisis of the euro zone. As a result, it was believed 
that the financial pressures on some weaker coun-
tries would be eased, particularly in those suffer-
ing from sovereign bond spread. 
Although the main concern of this debate was 
related to specific problems of the euro zone 
states, it was plain that any revision of primary 
law had to be done without affecting the position 
of the non-euro states, whose consent had to be 
acquired pursuant to the revision procedures 
laid down in Article 48 TEU. That requirement, 
however, soon proved hard to achieve. In the first 
part of December 2011 it became definitively clear 
States to be bound by the provisions of the Treaty”. 
Clearly, the legal value of the Declaration needs to 
be assessed having regard to its object and purpose. 
The Declaration permitted Germany to deposit its 
ratification instrument so that the ESM treaty entered 
into force according to its Article 48.
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that the United Kingdom would have prevented 
any resort to Article 48 TEU. Basically, its refusal 
was justified on the belief that the prospective 
of fiscal integration between euro zone states 
threatened British national interest regarding 
internal market, though it was reasonable to 
assume that any possible risk of a clash between 
fiscal discipline and internal market could be 
and had to be avoided26. As a result, a reform 
process under Article 48 TEU, with all the related 
positive consequences in terms of democracy and 
transparency27, could not be pursued.
26.  See the statements of the UK Prime Minister David 
Cameron published in « The Times », 7 December 2011, 
Yes to treaty change – but only on our terms.  According 
to J.-V. Louis, Les réponses à la crise, Cahiers de droit 
européen, 2011, 355, the United Kingdom opposed a EU 
reform treaty « faute d’avoir obtenu des garanties pour 
le maintien du marché intérieur et le respect des intérêts 
de la City ». See also House of Commons, The Treaty on 
Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic 
and Monetary Union: Political Issues, Research Paper, 
12/14, 27 March 2012, 5, as to the declaration made by 
the French President Nicolas Sarkozy concerning the 
rejection of UK requests, and 6 regarding more details 
to these requests.
27.  I. Pernice, M. Wendel, K. Bettge, M. Mlynarski, L.S. 
Otto, M. Schwarz, A Democratic Solution to the Crisis 
– Reform Model for a Democratic Based Economic and 
Financial Constitution of Europe, WHI-Paper 01/2012, 
Be as it may, the adoption of an instrument of 
pure international law, concluded by a limited 
number of states, outside the architecture of the 
EU legal order, was a choice pursued in a situation 
of urgency28. Other paths were conceivable, such 
as measures adopted under Article 136 TFEU, 
and revisions of Protocol N° 12 (as suggested 
by the President of the European Council in 
his Interim Report of 6th December 2011) or 
through enhanced cooperation acts29. However, 
in particular 9.
28. The doubt whether a member state can behave in such a 
way as to undermine the attainment of the fundamental 
achievements of the European integration process in the 
field of EMU, was not an issue, though it could be argued 
that the EU treaties, alike any international agreement, 
must be performed in good faith. As is known, Article 
26 of the Vienna Convention and the related authority 
states the principle of good faith which is a substantive 
part of the rule pacta sunt servanda (see inter alia 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission (1966), 
vol. II, 172, 211).
29.  See The European Council in 2011, cit., 73, stressing 
that treaty amendments would have been more time-
consuming than the other two paths (revision of 
Protocol N° 12 and secondary legislation). For an 
endorsement of the option suggested by the President 
of the European Council see J. Ziller, The Reform of the 
Political and Economic Architecture of the Eurozone’s 
Governance. A Legal Perspective, Governance for the 
it is debatable whether a balanced budget rule, 
implying at that very moment amendments 
to national constitutions, as informally agreed 
during the Summit of October 26th, 2011 (see 
infra para. 3), could have been adopted through 
secondary law acts. Under the Lisbon Treaty 
even for euro zone states the competence of the 
Union is basically a competence of coordination 
and surveillance of their budgetary strategy, as 
well as of setting out economic policy guidelines. 
Even considering the peculiarities of Article 136 
TFEU, this legal basis may not be used as a tool to 
modify Protocol N° 12: in that respect, pursuant 
to Article 136(1), it is necessary to apply Article 
126(14), second subparagraph. Therefore, one 
Eurozone: Integration or Disintegration (F. Allen, E. 
Carletti, S. Simonetti, Eds.) FIC Press, Philadelphia, 
2012, 115-138, at 130; B. De Witte, European Stability 
Mechanism and Treaty on stability, coordination and 
governance: role of the EU institution and consistency 
with EU legal order, Challenges of Multi-tier 
Governance in the EU – Workshop 4th October 2012, 
14-17, at 17 (according to the author, “the adoption of 
the EU legislation would have been preferable – from 
the perspective of the democratic legitimacy and 
stability”). Likewise, L.S. Rossi, ‘Fiscal Compact’ e 
Trattato sul Meccanismo di Stabilità: aspetti istituzionali 
e conseguenze dell’integrazione differenziata, Il Diritto 
dell’Unione europea, 2012, 293-307, at 295.
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may ask whether such a competence includes 
an obligation implemented at a constitutional 
level touching upon the autonomy of executive 
powers and national parliaments to define 
domestic budgets. That leads to the consequent 
consideration according to which a balanced 
budget rule may affect a constitutional value of 
some member state as long as it poses relevant 
constraints in terms of determining public 
revenue and expenditure. After all, the Union 
is deemed to respect the constitutional identity 
of its members states (Article 4, para. 2 TEU). 
Although the concept of “national identity” as 
embedded in domestic Constitutions is rather 
vague30, at that very moment one could not avoid 
recalling two lengthy rulings of the German 
Constitutional Court that shaped the limits of 
European integration rather narrowly under 
that national constitution31. In particular, the 
LissabonUrteil held that revenue and expenditure 
30.  The ECJ referred to it as a subsidiary point in Sayn-
Wittgenstein case (ruling 22 December 2010, C-208/09, 
ECJ Report 2010, I-13693). In a preliminary ruling con-
cerning the law of a Member State with constitutional 
status abolishing nobility, as well as the title of nobility 
and the nobiliary particle forming part of a surname, 
the ECJ acknowledged first, that “it must be accepted 
that, in the context of Austrian constitutional history, 
the Law on the abolition of nobility, as an element of 
national identity, may be taken into consideration when 
a balance is struck between legitimate interests and the 
right to the free movement of persons recognized under 
European Union law” (para. 83); second, that the refus-
al, by the authorities of a Member State, to recognize all 
the elements of the surname of a national of that State, 
as determined in another Member State, is justifiable 
inter alia because “in accordance with Article 4(2) TEU, 
the European Union is to respect the national identi-
ties of its Member States, which include the status of the 
State as a Republic” (para. 92). On the concept of na-
tional identity see A. von Bogdandy and S. Schill, Over-
coming Absolute Primacy. Respect For National Identity 
Under The Lisbon Treaty, CML Review, 2011,  1417 et 
seq.
31.  BVerfGE 89, 155 (Maastricht), and BVerfGE 123, 267 
(Lissabon).
including external financing were included in the 
domestic jurisdiction of Germany (paras. 248 et 
seq., 252, 256), likely to be respected by the EU 
as a part of its national identity, for they belong 
to identified core areas of national competence. 
In the end, it can reasonably be advocated that a 
balance budget rule entailed a strong interference 
in the constitutional identity of some member 
states32. In that respect, the direct involvement of 
national parliaments through their constitutional 
processes of ratification is a far better solution33, 
instead of using secondary law tools.
32.  It is not to say that a constitutional revision necessar-
ily requires a treaty revision. The French system, for in-
stance, has known some modifications of its Constitu-
tion which were adopted to implement a secondary law 
act (J.-C. Bonichot and F. Donnat, L’Union européenne 
et la Constitution de la République Française, Il Diritto 
dell’Unione europea, 2012, 1 et seq.). However, given the 
importance of the balanced budget rule and its impact 
on the national constitution, it is arguable that a sec-
ondary law act could raise some concerns in both con-
stitutional and EU law terms. 
33.  These arguments are underestimated by the scholars fa-
vouring a secondary law act. See however J.-C. Zarka, Le 
traité sur la stabilité, la coordination et la gouvernance 
dans l’Union économique et monetaire (TSCG), Recueil 
Dalloz, 2012, 893 et seq.
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In more general terms, the fiscal compact 
experience dramatically shows that the EU legal 
order lacks the capacity of a swift self-amendment. 
Therefore, for formal change it is reliant upon a 
process that does not depend on its institutional 
activity34. Moreover, a “17 plus” inter se agreement 
immediately raised several legal questions, notably 
as it touched upon a subject matter covered by 
EU Treaties, as well as secondary legislation, 
entailing the risk of inconsistencies. Indeed, the 
envisaged plan of a fiscal rule in order to attain a 
domestic balanced budget, coupled with stronger 
institutions surveillance over national budgets, 
including additional powers conferred to the 
Commission and to the Court of Justice, as well as 
new provisions on economic policy coordination 
and governance, posed a serious challenge in terms 
of legality. Admittedly, a customary rule of the law 
of treaties lays down a technique for modifying 
a multilateral treaty by only two or more parties 
to it35. But a modification limited to some parties 
34.  See in general N. Walker, Reframing EU Constitution-
alism, in Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, Interna-
tional Law and Global Governance (J.L. Dunoff and J. 
P. Trachtman eds.), Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2009, 149 et seq., at 166.
35.  See Article 41 of the Vienna Convention on the law of 
inter se posed several legal constraints, one of 
which being that the envisaged revision ought not 
be prohibited by the EU law. In this respect, one 
could assume that the EU legal order implicitly 
prevents them from resorting to a revision 
procedure different from the ones provided for 
in Article 48 TEU. From the broad logic of the 
system established by the Treaties, member states 
are not allowed to breach the rules laid down 
by Article 48 and thus cannot have recourse to 
alternative international law procedures to modify 
the treaties. In Defrenne the ECJ made it clear that 
“apart from any specific provision, the Treaty can 
only be modified by means of the amendment 
procedure carried out in accordance with Article 
236 (now 48 TEU)”36. 
Nonetheless, a situation of necessity required the 
overcoming of the UK veto. Even considering the 
potential inconsistency with the principles of EU 
legal framework, the essential need to save the 
common currency – not to mention the significant 
treaties (1969). Cf. ex multis M.N. Shaw, International 
Law, 5th ed., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2006, at 838.
36.  Ruling 8 April 1976, 43/75, ECJ Report, 1976, 455, para. 
58.
integration results achieved trough the EMU since 
the Maastricht Treaty – was perceived. Hence, 
rebus sic stantibus and bearing also in mind that any 
form of enhanced economic and fiscal integration 
would have been limited temporarily, it seems 
realistic to advocate that a 17 plus agreement was 
feasible, if not legitimate. The expected content 
of the new treaty entailed some positive effects 
in one of the most remarkable achievements 
of the European integration, outweighing any 
potential friction with the EU legal order. In this 
sort of rule of reason perspective, one could argue 
that an international law instrument aiming at 
not derogating primary law, but at setting out 
additional rules could hardly be considered an 
incoherence with the orthodoxy of EU law. In any 
case, the argument according to which the EU 
legal framework does not prevent member states 
from drawing up agreements among themselves, 
could be evoked. In fact, the treaty of Lisbon had 
deleted Article 293 of the European Community 
Treaty (with regard to the possibility to drawing 
up agreements between member states in some 
fields). However, that could not be considered as 
a decisive counterargument. Tellingly, Article 273 
TFUE – which allows member states to submit 
35The Euro Crisis & the State of European DemocracySection I
disputes to the ECJ related “to the subject matter 
of the Treaties … under a special agreement 
between the parties” – does not stop some 
member states stipulating agreements somehow 
concerning fields covered by the European 
integration process37. The mandatory condition to 
comply with is that the agreement must respect 
the Treaties, the institutional framework of the 
EU and its acquis38. Clearly, a 17 plus treaty could 
not encroach upon the institutions’ attributions 
since, evidently, Article 5(2) and 13(2) TEU 
imply that the institutions act within the limit of 
37.  R. Baratta, Sulle fonti delegate ed esecutive dell’Unione 
europea, Il Diritto dell’Unione europea, 2011, 295 et 
seq., whereby, as to the new provisions concerning the 
EU law sources, we incidentally argued that, despite the 
fact that the treaties no longer mention international 
law agreements between member states as a normative 
instrument anymore, such a form of cooperation re-
mains at their disposal, as long as it is compatible with 
the legal framework of the EU and its founding princi-
ples.
38.  See ruling 31 January 2006, C-503/03, Commission v. 
Spain, ECJ Report 2006, I-1122, para. 34 concerning 
the compatibility of Schengen Acquis with Community 
law. As to the legal constraints and institutional con-
sequences when optin out of EU law see the paper pre-
sented at this Conference by B. de Witte, International 
Treaties on the Euro and the EU Legal Order.
the powers conferred to them and pursuing the 
objectives laid down by the treaties only. As long 
as those powers and objectives are neither altered, 
nor undermined, these rules do not prevent a vast 
majority of member states from providing for 
additional tasks with respect to some institutions39.
It is worth recalling that in the Bangladesh case 
the ECJ, as well as the Advocate General Jacobs, 
stated that member states may confer tasks to the 
Commission aimed at coordinating their activities 
outside the treaties40. Likewise, in EDF case the 
39.  For a similar conclusion see A. de Streel, J. Etienne, Le 
Traité sur la stabilité, la coordination et la gouvernance 
au sein de l’Union économique et monetaire,  Journ. dr. 
eur., 2012, 182-185, at 184 ; and B. De Witte, European 
Stability Mechanism and Treaty on stability, coordina-
tion and governance: role of the EU institution and con-
sistency with EU legal order, cit., at 17.
40.  Ruling 30 June 1993, joined cases C-181/91 and 
C-248/91, European Parliament v. Council and Com-
mission, ECJ Report 1993, I-3713 et seq. The ECJ stated 
that the primary law did not prevent the Commission 
from being entrusted by the members states with coor-
dinating actions which they undertake collectively on 
the basis of an act of their representatives meeting in 
the Council, by doing so acting in their capacity of rep-
resentatives of their governments. Also according to the 
Advocate General Jacobs, where member states decide 
to act individually or collectively in a field within their 
competence, there is nothing in principle to prevent 
ECJ accepted without objections the fact that the 
administration of the European Development 
Fund established by member states outside 
the Community budget, had been entrusted to 
Community institutions41.
Undoubtedly, in that context the room for action 
appeared tiny from an EU law standpoint. For, 
according to Article 41 of the Vienna convention, 
a 17 plus treaty could affect neither the enjoyment 
of the rights of the non-euro zone countries under 
EU law, nor the performance of their obligations 
on the one hand, and could not amount to affect 
the effective execution of the object and purpose 
of EU law as a whole, on the other hand. However, 
one could argue that should a 17 plus instrument 
enhance the existing EU mechanisms of national 
budget surveillance, that outcome would be 
consistent with the object and purpose of the 
EU treaties and, ultimately, consistent with the 
them from conferring to the Commission the task of 
ensuring coordination of such action; it is for the lat-
ter to decide whether or not to accept such a mission, 
provided of course that it does so in a way which is com-
patible with its duties under the treaties (at I-3707, para. 
26). However, the ruling did not address the point.
41.  Ruling 2 March 1994, C-316/91, European Parliament v. 
Council, ECJ Report 1994, I-625.
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condition laid down in Article 41(1) ii of the 
Vienna Convention.
All in all, the approach to hold a 17 plus inter se 
agreement was in principle considered viable, 
provided that the future treaty would have 
avoided inconsistencies with the law and related 
principles of the EU (contra legem provisions)42. 
Furthermore, it was arguable that, if needed, the 
provisions aimed at supplementing EU legislation 
(praeter legem provisions) could be enacted 
through the usual legislative procedures based 
on a Commission initiative, while respecting 
its autonomous power of initiative. Basically, it 
could be broadly advocated that attributing some 
additional tasks to both the Commission and 
the ECJ could not affect the rights of the states 
not participating in the 17 plus Treaty, since the 
institutions would have continued to work in the 
general interest in accordance with the EU treaties. 
42. The ECJ jurisprudence is clearly oriented in the sense 
that the effects of multilateral mixed agreement on the 
bilateral relations between Member States cannot affect 
primary law, as well as the allocation of responsibilities 
defined in the treaties (see, in that regard, ruling 30 May 
2006, C-459/06, MOX Plant, ECJ Report 2006, I-4635, 
para. 123; Opinion 1/91, ECJ Report, 1991, I-6079, para. 
35, and Opinion 1/00, ECJ Report 2002, I-3493, paras. 
11 and 12).
After all, the history of the EU had experienced 
some precedents of pragmatic flexibility, such as the 
Schengen Agreement and the Prüm Treaty, albeit 
regarding subject-matters relatively addressed 
by EU law and having a less important impact. 
Moreover, in Parfums Christian Dior even the 
ECJ held that three member states could establish, 
through an international agreement, a common 
judge able to refer preliminary rulings in the 
field of trademark covered by the acquis43. More 
generally, nobody underestimated the versatility 
of an intergovernmental way-out in terms of 
reducing the minimum number of ratifications 
and so avoiding risks of rejection by referendum 
in one or two euro zone states44. 
43.  See ruling 4 November 1997, C-337/95, Parfums Chris-
tian Dior, ECJ Report 1997, I-6013, para. 21.
44. As expected, the Irish prime Minister, following the ad-
vice of the Attorney General, announced plans to call a 
referendum on the fiscal compact Treaty (see The Wall 
Street Journal, 29 February 2012 “Ireland to Hold A Ref-
erendum on EU Treaty”, stressing that “rest of the euro 
zone had nonetheless hoped to avoid such a vote, which 
could signal to investors that the plan to bring more fis-
cal unity to Europe is not well received by the people it is 
supposed to benefit”) to be likely held on May 31, 2012. 
Finally, the referendum took place with a favourable re-
sult so to enable Ireland to ratify the fiscal compact.
For better or worse, an inter se international 
agreement was perceived as the ultimate resort. It 
is a matter of course that the proper role of the 
EU institutions outside the EU legal framework 
was and remains debatable45. For instance, the 
ESM treaty showed that such a use was possible 
with the consent of all Member States, whilst the 
draft agreement on the unified patent litigation 
system is quite a counterexample46. The argument 
according to which Article 13(2) precludes 
allocation of new tasks to the institutions outside 
the EU legal framework unless a unanimous will 
to the contrary, goes too far. A treaty rule may not 
actually be derogated with the blessing of the 27 
governments. So it is not clear that a unanimous 
will is required in order to attribute additional tasks 
to the institutions, provided that their role and 
45.  Arguably, one may believe that this practice cannot be 
expanded without limits.
46.  Indeed, the last draft agreement is still waiting for fi-
nalisation and is supposed to give a preliminary rul-
ing competence to the ECJ, as well as some tasks to the 
Commission. However, it will hardly be signed by all 
the members states. See R. Baratta, National Courts as 
‘Guardians’ and ‘Ordinary Courts’ of EU law: Opinion 
1/09 of the ECJ, Legal Issues of Economic Integration, 
Vol. 38, 2011, 297 et seq.; J. Alberti, Il parere della Corte 
di giustizia sul Tribunale dei brevetti europeo e comuni-
tario, Il Diritto dell’Unione europea, 2012, 367 et seq.
37The Euro Crisis & the State of European DemocracySection I
nature are not altered47. In any case, the implied 
assumption was that the non-participating States, 
having recognized the need for the euro zone to 
have a proper fiscal discipline and taking part in 
the negotiations, as observers, could ultimately 
acquiesce or reduce their objections to the use of 
the institutions on the basis of a pure international 
instrument, provided that the EU treaties would 
be respected and the functioning of the single 
market would not be undermined48. 
47.  Opinion 1/92 ECJ Report 1992, I-2821, paras. 32 and 41; 
and Opinion 1/00, ECJ Report 2002, I-3493, para. 20; 
see also Opinion 1/09, not yet reported, paras. 74-76.
48.  The Prime Minister of United Kingdom has clearly 
indicated that his Government will not raise objec-
tions to the recourse to EU institutions under the fis-
cal compact, provided that the interests of the United 
Kingdom are not threatened (“Cameron U-turn over 
policing of tough new euro zone rules”, The Guardian, 
28 January 2012). However, on 31st January the Prime 
Minister explained to the House of Commons that “The 
new intergovernmental agreement is absolutely explicit 
and clear that it cannot encroach on the competencies 
of the European Union and that measures must not be 
taken that in any way undermine the EU single mar-
ket. Nevertheless, I made it clear that we will watch 
this matter closely and that, if necessary, we will take 
action, including legal action, if our national interests 
are threatened by the misuse of the institutions” (House 
of Lords, The euro area crisis, HL paper 260, 30, point 
Finally, it seems worth mentioning that the 
issues concerning the fiscal compact’s coherence 
with primary law are addressed in the several 
paragraphs of the preamble and in the many 
references to the EU rules embedded in the 
Treaty49; namely, Article 2, in line with ECJ case 
law50, sets out the principle of conformity with 
EU law in applying and interpreting the fiscal 
compact, and implicitly recognises the primacy of 
EU law over the treaty itself. Yet, this is not mere 
89). The Deputy Prime Minister took the view that the 
Government had agreed to co-operate with the EU by 
allowing euro zone countries to use the EU institutions 
to enforce the fiscal agreement (House of Commons, 
The Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance 
in the Economic and Monetary Union: Political Issues, 
cit., 23). That being said, after the signature of the fiscal 
compact, UK could, but did not actually challenged, its 
compatibility with the “unanimity rule” being violated. 
It could have indeed lodged an application against the 
25 member states pursuant to Article 259 TFEU.
49.  See in particular Article 3, 7 and 10, as well as several 
subordination calls included in the preamble.
50.  In Matteucci case (27 September 1988, case C-235/87, 
ECJ Report 1988, 5589, para. 19), the Court held that 
member states are obliged to take all appropriate meas-
ures to ensure fulfilment of the EU obligations even 
in the case of a bilateral agreement, falling outside the 
scope of the EU law, concluded between them.
coincidence since some national courts51 and 
even the Lisbon Treaty have always been cautious 
to admit explicitly the supremacy of EU law52. In 
the same vein, the commitment, to bring the fiscal 
compact treaty in the wake of the European legal 
framework “within five years, at most” (Article 
16), should be considered53. Incorporating the 
51.  In the long Maastrichturteil (1994) the Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht warned of the limits of Germany’s accept-
ance of the supremacy of EU law, focusing in particular 
on the conditions attached to that principle. However, 
in the Honeywell ruling (2010) the same Court softened 
the conditions concerning the acceptance of EU su-
premacy, by stressing inter alia the need of a prior in-
volvement of the ECJ before ruling on ultra vires act. For 
discussion on the primacy of EU law and its relationship 
with the jurisprudence of national constitutional courts 
see recently C. Grabenwarter, National Constitutional 
Law Relating to the European Union, in von Bogdandy 
and Bast (eds.), Principles of European Constitutional 
Law, 2nd ed., Hart, 2010, 83 et seq.
52.  As is well known, the Treaty of Lisbon also refrained 
from stating the primacy of EU law over national law 
due to the reluctance of some governments to admit it 
expressly. It contains Declaration No. 17 concerning 
primacy stated in an opinion of the Council Legal Ser-
vice.
53.  The incorporation of the fiscal compact into the EU pri-
mary law within a five years deadline was one of the ma-
jor requests of the Members of the EP who participated 
in the negotiation.
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substance of the new treaty into the EU primary 
law would entail a 27 states revision at  according 
to Article 48 TEU. At that very moment, possible 
inconsistencies, if any, with the EU orthodoxy 
would terminate.  
3. The core of the fiscal compact
The core of the fiscal compact is laid down in Arti-
cles 3 and 4 of the treaty, as they respectively estab-
lish the “balanced budget rule” and the obligation 
to reduce a “public debt” at the ratio of 60% – i.e. 
the same level provided for since the Maastricht 
Treaty. Unsurprisingly, given the political atmos-
phere, the fiscal compact rules do not contain any 
reference either to the issue regarding the pooling 
of national debt, or to any form of euro-bonds or 
project-bonds54. In that respect, it merely engages 
the parties to improve the reporting of their na-
tional debt issuance both to the Council and the 
Commission in order to coordinate their respec-
tive plans (Article 6). Moreover, the parties facing 
an excessive deficit procedure are expected to set 
up a budgetary and economic partnership plan 
(including a detailed description of structural re-
forms) to ensure an effective and durable correc-
tion of their excessive deficit (Article 5). As indi-
cated in point 8 of the preamble, the Commission 
54.  Point 7, first sentence of the mandate (“For the longer 
term, we will continue to work on how to further deepen 
fiscal integration so as to better reflect our degree of in-
terdependence”) could hardly be fostered in that sense.
is meant to present further legislative proposals 
for the euro zone in order to implement Articles 
5 and 6 within the EU legal order. Secondary law 
acts would likely solve any issue of potential fric-
tion between those provisions and the EU norma-
tive framework.
As to the core of the fiscal discipline, Article 4 
states that if the ratio of the general government 
debt to GDP exceeds 60%, the difference between 
the actual ratio and 60% should be reduced by an 
average of one-twentieth per year55. The final pro-
55.  “When the ratio of a Contracting Party’s general gov-
ernment debt to gross domestic product exceeds the 
60 % reference value referred to in Article 1 of the Pro-
tocol (No 12) on the excessive deficit procedure, an-
nexed to the European Union Treaties, that Contracting 
Party shall reduce it at an average rate of one twentieth 
per year as a benchmark, as provided for in Article 2 
of Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 
on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of 
the excessive deficit procedure, as amended by Coun-
cil Regulation (EU) No 1177/2011 of 8 November 2011. 
The existence of an excessive deficit due to the breach 
of the debt criterion will be decided in accordance with 
the procedure set out in Article 126 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union”.
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vision reflects what is already laid down in sec-
ondary law, despite some attempts to enhance the 
obligation to reduce public debt pending negotia-
tion. For it contains a mere renvoi to Article 2 of 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97, as amended 
by Council Regulation (EU) N°  1177/2011. This 
legislative measure reformed the corrective arm of 
the Stability and Growth Pact, which is applicable 
to all member states (except the United Kingdom 
and Denmark), aside from financial sanction ad-
dressed to euro zone states only. It was assumed 
that the former corrective arm of the Stability and 
Growth Pact, while referring mainly to the exces-
sive deficit procedure being triggered if a mem-
ber state deficit went above 3% GDP threshold, 
did not focus enough on the excessive debt crite-
rion, allowing therefore a member state to run up 
debts of well above 60% without being sanctioned. 
However, it seems worth reminding that the ex-
cessive deficit procedure set out in Article 126(11) 
TFUE provided for sanctions, which have never 
been enforced.
On the contrary, Regulation N° 1177 deters both 
excessive deficit and excessive debt and, if they oc-
cur, provides for prompt correction. In short, as 
to the ratio of government debt to GDP, Article 2 
of the Regulation states that the Council and the 
Commission take into account all the relevant fac-
tors and the economic and budgetary situation of 
the member state concerned, whilst considering 
the level and evolution of the debt and its overall 
sustainability, as well as the business cycle. Broad-
ly speaking, this evaluation of the ratio of the 
government debt requires that the latter be suf-
ficiently diminishing and approaching the refer-
ence value at a satisfactory pace, whilst providing 
a transitional period of three years. Article 4 of the 
fiscal compact endorses these normative elements 
of secondary law.
The other key provision of the fiscal compact is 
the balanced (or in surplus) budget rule, set out 
in Article 3(1)(a), which is essentially based on 
the model of debt brake laid down in the German 
Constitution56. Pending the negotiation of the fis-
cal compact, the requirement to implement that 
rule at national level has been downgraded to a 
“preferably” constitutional level (from “constitu-
tional or equivalent level”). It refers directly to the 
general government budget, but it is clear that the 
practice of accumulating debt outside the general 
government account undermines the attainment 
of the Union’s objectives in the framework of the 
EMU and amounts to a violation of the treaty 
rules, and in particular of Article 4, para. 3 TFEU. 
The balanced budget rule indicates a common will 
of the parties to embrace serious constraints on 
their sovereign rights when adopting the annual 
budgetary laws by limiting public indebtedness 
at an early stage. Despite the fact that this rule is 
a clear “addition” to the existing rules of EU law, 
not addressed by the Six pack57, and only men-
tioned in the Commission Two pack proposal58, it 
56.  See infra footnote 68.
57.  See for a different opinion Editorial. The Fiscal Compact 
and the European Constitution: Europe Speaking Ger-
man, European Constitutional Rev., 2012, at 6.
58.  Article 4(1) of COM(2011) 821 final; C. Callies, C. 
Schoenfleisch, Auf dem Weg in die europäische “Fiska-
lunion”? – Europa- und verfassungsrechtliche Fragen 
einer Reform der Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion im 
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pursues and enhances the fulfilment of the gen-
eral goals of the Union. Clearly, that rule entails 
no inconsistency with the 3% GDP threshold 
laid down in Protocol N° 12. The latter is a ceiling 
which does not prevent states to commit them-
selves in a stricter way. In other words, they are 
not conflicting provisions, the compliance with 
the former implying no violation of primary law 
and vice versa. As a result, there is no need to ap-
ply the coordination clause provided for in Article 
2(2) of the Fiscal compact.
Being somewhat different from the `Golden 
Rule´59, the balanced budget rule also seems to 
provide for four elements of flexibility. First, it is 
worth considering the presumption according to 
which the obligation is deemed to be respected 
if the annual structural balance has a structural 
deficit of 0,5%. This figure is raised to 1% for 
states having a public debt significantly below 
Kontext des Fiskalvertrages, cit., at 482.
59.  Generally speaking, a “Golden Rule” implies that the 
net of investment spending must be in balance or in 
surplus. It is derived from the macroeconomic view ac-
cording to which governments, in the economic cycle, 
cannot borrow money for the current spending, but 
only for investments favouring future generations.
60%60. However, this provision is defined in terms 
of the rapid convergence towards the medium-
term objective (MTO), pursuant to Regulation N° 
1466/97 as amended by Regulation N° 1175/201161. 
The convergence process entails the consideration 
of the country-specific sustainability risks, whilst 
the relevant progress towards the MTO is subject 
to evaluation in line with the Stability and Growth 
Pact62.   
Second, the time-frame for such convergence, as 
proposed by the Commission, takes into account 
the relevant “sustainability risks” for each party. 
The time for convergence (and the “progress” 
60.  Article 3(1)(d).
61.  This analysis tentatively excludes in itself any risk 
of incompatibility with the 3% maximum deficit 
laid down in the TFEU. For a different explanation 
taking into account that threshold see B. De Witte, 
European Stability Mechanism and Treaty on stability, 
coordination and governance: role of the EU institution 
and consistency with EU legal order, cit., at 16.
62.  Article 3(1)(b). As a consequence, it seems possible that 
even if the two figures do not collimate with the relevant 
rules of that Regulation, they would still be considered 
in line with this provision. One can even argue that 
states may accumulate a structural surplus, i.e. a positive 
income balance over expenditures, without taking into 
account the interests paid on public debt, and yet be 
considered compliant with the balanced budget rule.
towards the MTO) is evaluated on the basis of an 
overall assessment with the structural balance as a 
reference, including an analysis of expenditure net 
of discretionary revenue measures63. 
Third, in exceptional circumstances states may 
temporarily deviate from their respective medium-
term objective or the adjustment path towards it64. 
Exceptional circumstances include an “unusual 
event outside the control of the Contracting 
Party concerned which has a major impact on the 
financial position of the general government”, as 
well as  “periods of severe economic downturn”, 
causing a temporary deviation  in the budget that 
“does not endanger fiscal sustainability in the 
medium term”65. As a result, the treaty does not 
seem to prevent a party hit by a natural disaster, or 
a severe economic blow, to adopt some measures 
of fiscal stimulus. 
Fourth, the rule provides for a sort of a de minimis 
principle since only significant deviations – that 
is to say, having an appreciable effect on the 
commitment undertaken by the relevant state – 
from the virtuous budgetary conducts entail the 
63.  Article 3(1)(b).
64. Article 3(1)(c).
65.  Article 3(3)(b).
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automatic triggering of a correction mechanism 
aimed at implementing measures to correct the 
deviations over a period of time66. It is worth noting 
that the correction mechanism shall be put in 
place by states at national level in accordance with 
the principles established by the Commission. As 
a consequence, this institution acquires a relevant 
normative power to guide national legislation 
in terms of common principles regarding “in 
particular” (the list is thus not exhaustive) the 
nature, the size and time-frame of the corrective 
action to be automatically undertaken, also in 
cases of exceptional circumstances, and the role 
and independence of the national institution to 
monitor the compliance with the balanced budget 
rule67. This normative power is institutionally 
quite delicate and should be carefully evaluated 
when transposing the fiscal compact into the EU 
legal framework.
66.  Article 3(1)(e).
67.  Article 3(2).
4. The limited role of the ECJ as regards 
the respect of the fiscal compact rules 
The balanced (or in surplus) budget rule (Article 
3) plays a pivotal role in the architecture of the fis-
cal compact. The treaty makes it clear by posing 
constraints on the implementation of the rule in 
question at national level, as well as by attributing 
to the ECJ the power to adjudicate over the proper 
implementation pursuant to Article 868. It may be 
noted that the treaty empowers the ECJ solely if a 
party is alleged to have failed to correctly trans-
pose the balanced budget rule into the domestic 
law69. Other violations of the treaty fall within the 
68.  The rule must be implemented, within one year from 
the entry into force of the Treaty, in the domestic law 
“through provisions of binding force and permanent 
character, preferably constitutional, or otherwise 
guaranteed to be fully respected and adhered to 
throughout the national budgetary processes” (Article 
3(2)).
69.  Some member states have started a process of 
introducing a balanced budget rules even before the 
fiscal compact treaty was negotiated. In 2011, the Italian 
Parliament approved a first round of a constitutional 
reform incorporating a balanced budget obligation into 
Article 81 of the Italian Charter. The Constitutional 
reform of Article 81 was finalized on 17 April 2012, 
when the Senate approved it with a majority superior 
to two thirds of the Parliament, which prevents the 
holding of a referendum (provided for by the Italian 
Constitution in cases where reforms are adopted under 
a simple majority). The new Article 81, which takes 
effect from 2014, obliges the State as a whole to ensure 
the balance between budget revenue and expenditure, 
taking into account situations of adversity and favorable 
phases of the economic cycle (“l’equilibrio tra le entrate 
e le spese del proprio bilancio, tenendo conto delle fasi 
avverse e delle fasi favorevoli del ciclo economico”). 
Moreover, the borrowing is permitted for the purpose of 
considering the effects of the economic cycle only, and 
with the approval of both Houses by absolute majority if 
exceptional events occur (“il ricorso all’indebitamento 
è consentito solo al fine di considerare gli effetti del 
ciclo economico e, previa autorizzazione delle Camere 
adottata a maggioranza assoluta, al verificarsi di eventi 
eccezionali”). Finally, the reform gives the ordinary 
law the task to define the exceptional events that allow 
the state to exceed the balanced budget rule. In these 
cases, the Italian Government shall however present a 
readjustment plan so that a deficit spending must be 
redressed or recovered in the subsequent year, without 
turning out in a new public debt. An ordinary law, 
adopted by the absolute majority of the Parliament, 
will set up the basic rules and criteria to ensure that 
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ordinary international law rules on responsibility. 
Indeed, the Court has to verify compliance with 
two essential obligations only – (i) timely imple-
mentation (within one year, after the entry into 
force of the treaty) of the budget rule via bind-
ing provisions of permanent character, “prefer-
ably constitutional”; (ii) the setting up at national 
level of the mentioned correction mechanism on 
the balanced budget rule is implemented, as well as 
the sustainability of the public debt (see V; Lippolis, 
N. Lupo, G.M. Salerno, G. Scaccia (eds.), Costituzione 
e pareggio di bilancio, Jovene ed., Naples, 2011). The 
Italian constitutional reform has been considered as 
a “further major improvement in fiscal governance” 
and “another sign of Italy’s commitment to sound 
public finances” (Commission staff working document. 
Assessment of the 2012 national reform programme 
and stability programme for Italy, SWD(2012) 318 
final, Brussels 30.5.2012, 4). Other member states have 
already reformed their respective Constitutions long 
the same line. In 2009, the Grundgesetz was amended 
to insert the  Schuldenbremse  (debt brake), a balanced 
budget provision. The reform will be applied in 2016 
for the state and 2020 for the regions. As to Spain, an 
amendment to article 135 of the Spanish constitution 
provided for a cap on the structural deficit of the state 
(national, regional and municipal). The amendment will 
come into force as of 2020 (J.-V. Louis, L`es réponses à la 
crise´ , Cahiers de droit européen, 2011, 360; `Editorial. 
The Fiscal Compact and the European Constitution: 
Europe Speaking German ,´ cit., 2, footnote).
the basis of common principles to be proposed by 
the Commission, presumably via secondary EU 
legislation70. Other obligations stemming from 
the balanced budget rule do not fall within the 
power of the ECJ to adjudicate. In other words, 
the parties, and the euro zone states in particular, 
are indeed committed to comply in an effective 
manner with that rule in each economic cycle, but 
cases of alleged non compliance outside the scope 
of Article 8 fall under the classical regime of in-
ternational law responsibility. In that respect, the 
treaty provides (understandably) no jurisdictional 
control of the ECJ. Furthermore, while reflecting 
a somewhat new attitude of the governments as 
regards the involvement of the ECJ in assessing 
compliance with obligations related to budgetary 
situations, Article 8 does not collide with the lim-
ited role of the ECJ provided for in Article 126(10) 
TFEU, given their different scopes71.
70.  A view has been suggested so as to enlarge the role 
of the ECJ to adjudicate disputes between the parties 
concerning the rules of title III of the treaty (A. Viterbo, 
R. Cisotta, La crisi del debito sovrano e gli interventi 
dell’U.E., cit., at 359). This suggestion goes beyond the 
intention of the contracting parties, as reflected in 
Article 8.
71.  Contra J. Ziller, The Reform of the Political and 
The power to adjudicate is derived from Article 
273 TFEU72. Thus, it is assumed that the ECJ acts 
as a judge in a dispute between member states of 
the EU related to the subject-matter of the EU 
Treaties. In other words, the dispute is submitted 
to the Court under a special settlement of disputes 
clause contained in Article 8. The ECJ will take a 
binding decision which, if not implemented, can 
be followed by another proceedings before the 
same Court with a penalty up to 0.1% of the GDP 
of the relevant State73. Th is amount will be pay-
able to the European Stability Mechanism if the 
country’s currency is the euro, otherwise to the 
general budget of the EU. Needless to stress that, 
given the binding nature of the ruling, the fiscal 
compact does not alter the basic judicial character 
Economic Architecture of the Eurozone’s Governance. A 
Legal Perspective,  cit., 131-132, who seems to conceive 
Article 8 as having a larger scope.
72.  See the preamble, recital 15 and Article 8(3) of the 
treaty.  Likewise, on the basis of Article 273 of the 
TFEU, Article 37 of the ESM treaty attributes the power 
to adjudicate a dispute arising between member states 
and the ESM, or between member states, in connection 
of the interpretation or the application of the treaty, if a 
member state contests the decision given at first degree 
by the Board of Governors of the ESM.
73.  Article 8(2).
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of the ECJ. It can be noted that Article 8(1) and (2) 
have the same purpose, i.e. to ensure the effective 
implementation of the balanced budget rule into 
domestic law. The fact remains however that they 
constitute two different procedures each having 
its own object – Article 8(1) is designed to obtain 
a ruling that the conduct of a contracting party 
failed to correctly implement the balanced budget 
rule into domestic law and to terminate that con-
duct, whilst the procedure laid down in Article 
8(2) has a more narrow object, that is to say to 
decide whether a defaulting party did not comply 
with the judgment of the ECJ upon finding that 
failure. That being said, it seems quite obvious to 
assume that the possibility of a second judgment 
by the ECJ and the related penalty have been in-
cluded in the treaty mainly as a deterrent. One 
should expect that a second negative ruling will 
not occur, at least in principle.
This special clause has the plain purpose of in-
cluding the dispute settling mechanism of the 
fiscal compact within the EU legal framework by 
dint of Article 273 TFEU. Furthermore, Article 8 
aims at de-politicising the perspective of bring-
ing a dispute before the ECJ concerning the im-
plementation of the rule into domestic law74. This 
explains both the central, but limited, role given to 
the Commission in issuing a report on whether a 
party implemented the balanced budget rule into 
domestic law; and the automaticity of the ECJ in-
volvement, should the Commission report nega-
tively against a party (“.. the matter will be brought 
to the Court of Justice ... by one or more Con-
tracting Parties”). This is not to say that the Com-
mission will be a party in the proceedings. This 
outcome would hardly be in compliance with the 
EU legal framework. Quite to the contrary, only 
states collectively75 or unilaterally76 – and, in the 
latter case, regardless of the Commission’s report 
– have the legitimacy to lodge a case against an-
other state. The dispute remains strictly intergov-
ernmental even in the case where a party persists 
in not taking the necessary implementing meas-
ures after the first judgement of the ECJ. Yet, this 
second action is not automatic and unilateral in 
74.  As is known, member states are unwilling to dispute 
amongst themselves, as the practice related to Article 
259 infringements illustrates.
75.  Article 8(1), second sentence.
76.  Article 8(1), third sentence.
kind (“a Contracting Party … may bring the case 
before the Court of Justice ...”).
Finally, it is noteworthy that on March 2nd, 2012 
all the signatories agreed to annex to the Min-
utes of the Signing of the Treaty six “Arrangements 
Agreed” deemed to be applied in relation to Ar-
ticle 8(1), second sentence, should the Commis-
sion conclude in a report to the parties that one 
of them has failed to comply with Article 3(2) of 
the fiscal compact. The aim of the Arrangements 
is to enhance the automaticity of the judicial con-
trol by construing the action as a collective and 
obligatory tool – within three months of the Com-
mission’s report, the ‘Trio of Presidencies’ (as set 
out in Annex I to Council Decision 2009/908/EU 
of 1 December 2009) will lodge an application “in 
the interest of, and in close cooperation with, all 
the Contracting Parties”. Minimizing the politi-
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cisation of the dispute is the aim pursued by the 
Annex. In addition, the same Arrangements will 
also be used in relation to Article 8(2), should the 
Commission assess that a party has not taken the 
necessary measures to comply with the judgment 
of the ECJ provided for in Article 8(1) of the Trea-
ty77. 
The legal status of the Arrangements is to be eval-
uated having in mind that they were not included 
in the text opened for ratification by the parties. 
Thus, the consent of the parties to be bound by 
the Arrangements is not presumed. This could 
raise uncertainty since the Vienna Convention 
on the law of treaties does not address this situ-
ation in a conclusive way78. Even international 
case law shows ambiguity on the consequences of 
a given treaty being silent on the status of docu-
ments related to it. Indeed, according to an old 
ruling of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), 
if a document, which is separated from a treaty, is 
77.  Doubts may be raised as to the consistency of the 
Arrangements with the nature (non automatic and 
unilateral) of the action laid down in Article 8(2).
78.  M. Dixon, Textbook on International  Law, 6th ed., 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007, 64; see also 
M.N. Shaw, International Law, cit., 820.
part of the ratification process, this may amount 
to an important element for assessing its binding 
force 79. However, more recent decisions of the ICJ 
have endorsed a less formal approach by regard-
ing above all the actual terms and the particular 
circumstances in which a given agreement was 
drawn up80. It would follow that, considered in 
the perspective of the customary law of treaties, 
79.  In the Ambatielos case, the ICJ argued that since the 
United Kingdom regarded a declaration as part of the 
process concerning the ratification of a treaty, it was 
not possible for the Court to hold that the declaration 
was not included in the treaty (see Ambatielos case 
(jurisdiction ), Judgment of July 1st, 1952, ICJ Reports 
1952, 28 et seq., 43). 
80.  See the case concerning Maritime Delimitation and 
Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar 
v. Bahrain)(Jurisdiction – First Phase), ICJ Reports, 
1994, 112 et seq., paras. 22 to 30 (for further reference to 
its own jurisprudence). So it seems reasonable to argue 
that the need for a formal ratification to putting an 
agreement into operation, does not reflect the current 
development of international law, regardless of the 
fact that issues of consistency with domestic law may 
arise (R. Baratta, Trattato internazionale, Dizionario di 
diritto pubblico (S. Cassese ed.), vol. VI, Giuffré, Milan, 
2006, 5966 et seq.). That seems even more arguable if 
one considers that a treaty “may be made or concluded 
by the parties in virtually any manner they wish. There 
is no prescribed form or procedure ...” (M.N. Shaw, 
International Law, cit., 815).
the lack of ratification does not necessarily entail 
that the Arrangements in questions are deprived 
of any legal status. As a minimum, they should be 
at least considered as a means of interpretation of 
the treaty in accordance with Article 31(2)a of the 
Vienna Convention. As a collateral consequence, 
when applying the rules of procedure of the ECJ, 
the Arrangements should presumably be commu-
nicated to it, in case Article 8 of the fiscal compact 
is triggered.
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5. Pursuing a reverse qualified majority 
in the decision-making of the excessive 
deficit procedure 
Another key provision of the fiscal compact is set 
out in Article 7. It reflects the original will of some 
euro zone virtuous states, pointed out early De-
cember 2011, to amend Article 126 TFEU, where-
by it requires the Commission to monitor states’ 
excessive deficit and debt. In the end, the institu-
tion proposals would apply unless a qualified ma-
jority rejects them. As exposed above, a revision 
of the treaties could not be pursued.
As an alternative, Article 7 requires the euro zone 
states to support the Commission proposals or 
recommendations if one of them “is in breach 
of the deficit criterion in the framework of an 
excessive deficit procedure”, i.e. pursuant to 
Article 126 TFEU. The ultimate purpose of the 
rule is to facilitate the adoption of the measures 
proposed by the Commission in the course of that 
procedure leading to a Council decision. Their 
approval is deemed to become semiautomatic. 
For it is just founded on the reversed qualified 
majority principle81. In other words, the euro zone 
81.  Article 7 reads as follows: “While fully respecting the 
states have accepted to endorse the Commission 
proposal, unless a qualified majority of them – 
calculated by analogy with the relevant provisions 
of the EU treaties and without taking into account 
the position of the state concerned – rejects it. 
Given that Article 7 cannot deviate from the de-
cision-making process laid down in Article 126 
TFEU82, it must be assumed that the former ap-
procedural requirements of the Treaties on which the 
European Union is founded, the Contracting Parties 
whose currency is the euro commit to supporting 
the proposals or recommendations submitted by the 
European Commission where it considers that a Member 
State of the European Union whose currency is the euro 
is in breach of the deficit criterion in the framework of 
an excessive deficit procedure. This obligation shall not 
apply where it is established among the Contracting 
Parties whose currency is the euro that a qualified 
majority of them, calculated by analogy with the relevant 
provisions of the Treaties on which the European Union 
is founded, without taking into account the position 
of the Contracting Party concerned, is opposed to the 
decision proposed or recommended”.
82.  It is worth recalling that, in accordance with Article 2, 
the fiscal compact must be applied and interpreted by 
the Contracting Parties in conformity with the Treaties 
plies, so to say, outside the EU legal framework. 
Actually, the semi automatic approval by the 
Council of the Commission proposals in the ex-
cessive deficit (criterion) procedure, raises some 
issues of consistency with primary law. The re-
verse qualified majority rule is not unknown in the 
decision-making process of the EU. Derived from 
the old comitology system, within the current EU 
institutional architecture that rule is applicable 
when the Commission adopts both delegated and 
implementing acts (namely, under the examina-
tion procedure of the new comitolgy system). In 
terms of institutional balance, as we tentatively ex-
plained elsewhere83, this peculiar rule enjoys a ra-
tionale whenever the treaties directly confer to the 
Commission the competence to adopt that kind of 
acts. In that respect, the reverse qualified majority 
rule enhances the role of the Commission, given 
the double legal assumption that it has to pursue 
the general interests of the Union (Article 17 TEU) 
and that it must comply with the principles, rules, 
conditions and controls predetermined by the 
legislator pursuant to Articles 290(1) and 291(3) 
TFEU. A normative “third degree” function fits in 
within the EU framework and is coherent with the 
on which the European Union is founded.
83.  R. Baratta, Sulle fonti delegate ed esecutive dell’Unione 
europea, cit., 293 et seq.
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separation of power principle since the treaty and 
the legislator set limits on the Commission adop-
tion of delegating and implementing act. 
On the contrary, doubts arise as to the “obligation” 
of the euro zone states to support the Commission 
proposals unless a qualified majority of them 
is opposed in the domain of an excessive deficit 
procedure. For there is no legal basis in the EU 
primary law to do so, the power to approve a 
given proposal (or recommendation) of the 
Commission being founded on an international 
law rule, which is the nature of Article 7 of the 
fiscal compact. Therefore, it seems questionable 
whether the Council can legitimately deviate 
from the default rule of positive qualified majority 
rule provided for in Article 16(3) TEU, which is 
applicable to the decisions adopted under Article 
126 TFEU84. The fact that the rule in question 
84.  For a different analysis focusing on the principle of 
loyal cooperation as a mens to explain the compliance 
of Article 7 with EU primary law, see A. de Streel, J. 
Etienne, Le Traité sur la stabilité, la coordination et la 
gouvernance au sein de l’Union économique et monetaire, 
cit., 184-185  ; see also the paper presentend at this 
Conference by W. Van Aken, A Comparative Analysis 
of Reverse Majority Voting. The Reinforced Stability and 
Growth Pact and the Fiscal Compact.
fosters the achievement of euro zone objectives 
seems to have relative importance. Another 
approach is that the legal obligation to support 
the Commission’s evaluation when a euro zone 
state is in breach of the deficit criterion, is to 
be construed as a commitment which operates 
outside the Council and, as a consequence, before 
such an institution proceeds in the vote. This 
line of reasoning would entail that Article 7 does 
not ultimately affect primary law85. However, in 
order to safeguard the coherence with the treaty, 
the measure proposed or recommended by the 
Commission must be approved by the qualified 
majority of the Council members. In other 
words, the functioning of Article 7 entails that 
governments not forming (outside the Council) 
a blocking majority against the Commission 
measure are expected to approve it when they 
85.  This seems to be the clear intention of the signing 
states according to the incipit of Article 7 (“While fully 
respecting the procedural requirements of the Treaties 
on which the European Union is founded …”). For 
a positive evaluation of this provision see C. Callies, 
C. Schoenfleisch, Auf dem Weg in die europäische 
“Fiskalunion”? – Europa- und verfassungsrechtliche 
Fragen einer Reform der Wirtschafts- und 
Währungsunion im Kontext des Fiskalvertrages, cit., 
482-483.
enter the Council. In this respect, the added value 
of Article 7 is not to be underestimated86.
Article 7 raises another issue concerning its scope, 
which is explicitly limited to the excessive deficit 
procedure as regards the deficit criterion. By doing 
so, the wording of Article 7 complied exactly 
with the mandate of 9th December 2011, which 
did not mention the second volet of the excessive 
deficit procedure at all, i.e. the debt criterion. As is 
well known, according to Article 126 TFEU, the 
Commission is entitled to monitor the budgetary 
situation and the stock of government debt of 
member states with a view to identifying gross 
errors on the basis of two criteria – the government 
deficit to GDP if it exceeds a given reference value 
(3%), as well as the government debt to GDP if it 
exceeds a predetermined benchmark (60%)87. 
86.  The analogy of Article 7 with the so-called “Ioannina 
compromise” of 1994 is quite limited, however. For 
that compromise amounted to a political agreement 
finalized to achieve an accord among governments, 
whilst Article 7 of the fiscal compact sets out a legal 
obligation. In any event, when incorporating the fiscal 
compact into the legal framework of EU primary law, at 
the latest within five years of its entry into force (Article 
16), it appears inevitable to revise Article 126 TFEU in 
accordance with the reversed qualified majority rule.
87.  These two criteria have been fixed by Article 1 of 
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The more limited scope of Article 7 entails that 
it is not per se applicable to the excessive deficit 
procedures relating to the debt criterion. Certainly, 
at the very end of the negotiation, Article 4 of the 
fiscal compact has been completed by adding a 
last sentence:“the existence of an excessive deficit 
due to the breach of the debt criterion will be 
decided according to the procedure set out in 
Article 126 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union”. However, it does not but 
restate the obvious necessity to respect the scope 
of Article 126 and can not have any consequence 
in terms of expanding the euro zone’s undertaking 
laid down in Article 7. That being said, it must be 
acknowledged that the obligation to decide on 
the basis of the reversed qualified majority does 
already exist in the excessive deficit procedures 
related to the debt criterion. Indeed, with the 
aim of achieving the effective enforcement of the 
budgetary surveillance in the euro area, Regulation 
N° 1173/2011 already provides for the reverse 
qualified majority voting in two key passages of 
the excessive deficit procedure88. Moreover, it 
Protocol N° 12 on the excessive deficit procedure 
annexed to the Lisbon treaty. 
88.  First, when the Council obliges a euro zone state to lodge 
a non-interest-bearing deposit amounting to 0.2% of its 
seems likely that when transposing this rule in the 
EU legal framework the scope of this voting rule 
will be enlarged. 
GDP in the preceding year (Article 5(2)). Second, when 
the Council imposes a fine of the same amount against 
a state that has not taken effective action to correct its 
excessive deficit (Article 6(2)). Needless to say that these 
two provisions do not affect the (positive) qualified 
majority vote in the Council pursuant to Articles 126(6) 
and 126(8) in conjunction with the default rule enshrined 
in Article 16(3) TEU. Indeed, Articles 5(2) and 6(2) have 
to be construed as implementing measures adopted by 
the Council on the basis of a previous decision approved 
at (positive) qualified majority vote pursuant to 126(6) 
and 126(8) respectively.
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6. The economic policy coordination, 
convergence and governance of the euro 
area
Finally, the fiscal compact contains a limited 
(perhaps too limited) number of provisions on the 
coordination and convergence of member states’ 
economic policies and on governance in the euro 
area. 
As to the coordination of national policies – 
one of the insufficiencies of the Maastricht legal 
framework – under Article 9 the parties endorse 
quite a generic commitment to enhance economic 
policy coordination as defined by the relevant 
rules of TFEU. Indeed, they “undertake to work 
jointly towards an economic policy that fosters 
the proper functioning of the economic and 
monetary union and economic growth through 
enhanced convergence and competitiveness”. 
Even the general commitment to pursue economic 
growth (promoting “competitiveness” and 
“employment”) through the “necessary actions 
and measures”, seems to be designed in terms 
of a programmatic provision which again needs 
to be balanced with contributing “further to the 
sustainability of public finances and reinforcing 
financial stability”. These rules are completed 
with the commitment, provided for in Article 
11, to work “towards a more closely coordinated 
economic policy”, so that the parties are expected 
to discuss ex ante “all major economic policy 
reforms” and, “where appropriate”, to coordinate 
among themselves. In the same vein, Article 10 
concerns only the euro zone states and urges 
them to make use “whenever appropriate and 
necessary” of existing procedures in the TFEU to 
support measures in accordance with Article 136 
TFEU and the relevant provisions of the treaties 
under the enhanced cooperation procedure. 
Given its wording Article 10 is not prescriptive89. 
It rather envisages forms of enhanced cooperation 
measures limited to the euro area states, possibly 
in the field of taxation (the so-called Tobin tax 
89.  Contra L.S. Rossi, ‘Fiscal Compact’ e Trattato sul 
Meccanismo di Stabilità, cit., at 298.
could be a first experience). In that respect, it 
seems quite realistic to highlight that an increased 
use of these normative means by the euro zone 
states (but not necessarily all of them) could move 
some of them towards a more integrated process, 
leaving the others to the periphery of the Union. 
A sort of Two-Speed Europe may take shape90.
This seems all the more true if one looks at the 
governance of the euro area. The fiscal compact 
codifies, as mentioned, the practice of Euro 
Summit informal meetings, which will take place 
“when necessary, and at least twice a year”91, 
and therefore (understandably) leaves open 
the possibility to convene extra meetings. The 
establishment of this new high level body reflects 
a recent institutional practice, taking place since 
the sovereign debt crisis affected some euro zone 
countries. On 2nd March 2012, while signing the 
fiscal compact, the euro area heads of state or 
government unanimously appointed Mr. Herman 
90.  This evolution has been suggested by G. Maganza, `Can 
the Enlarged European Union Continue To Be That 
United? ,´ Fordham International Law Journal, 2011, 
1269 et seq.
91.  Article 12(2) first part.
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Van Rompuy as President of the Euro Summit92, 
the simple majority however being the voting 
rule for appointment93. The task of this new body 
is to discuss questions relating to the specific 
responsibility regarding the single currency, 
issues related to the governance of the euro area 
and the rules applicable to the governance itself, 
as well as the strategic orientations for conducting 
economic policies to increase convergence in the 
euro area94.
All heads of state or government of the euro 
zone – having no regard to their ratification of 
the fiscal compact – “meet informally”, together 
with the Commission and the President of the 
ECB95. The participation in discussion is also 
open to the Contracting states not being party 
of the euro zone, if the agenda touches upon 
some defined items, i.e. the competitiveness, the 
modification of the global architecture of the euro 
92.  See the Statement Euro area Heads of State or 
Government, SN 1670/2/12 REV 2 (Brussels, 2 March 
2012). See also Agence Europe 02/03/2012 - Van Rompuy 
to chair both EU27 and EU17.
93.  Article 12(1), second paragraph.
94.  Article 12(2) last part.
95.  Article 12(1), first paragraph.
area and the related fundamental rules, as well as 
“when appropriate and at least once a year” some 
“issues of implementation” of the fiscal compact96. 
This wording clearly shows the need to reach a 
compromise between, on the one side, the euro 
zone states pursuing the establishment of a new 
body tailored for the objectives for which they 
only bear responsibility, and on the other side, the 
non euro zone states which feared being put on 
the outside when discussing the core of the future 
economic governance. 
The sensitive point is the minimal involvement of 
the European Parliament – its President may be 
invited to be heard and the institution as a whole is 
deemed to receive ex post a report by the President 
of the Euro Summit97. Unsurprisingly, this feature 
of the fiscal compact has been deeply criticised 
by the European Parliament98. Consequently, it 
seems likely that the institution which enjoys the 
directly democratic investiture shall make use 
of all its powers for any follow-up of the Euro 
96.  Article 12(3).
97.  Article 12(4).
98.  J.-C. Zarka, Le traité sur la stabilité, la coordination et 
la gouvernance dans l’Union économique et monetaire 
(TSCG), cit., 898-899.
50The Euro Crisis & the State of European DemocracySection I
Summit whenever it requires implementation at 
secondary law level. Indeed, a follow-up in the 
EU legal framework is an envisaged possibility, 
given the participation of the President of the 
Commission to the meetings and the fact that the 
Euro Group is charged inter alia to perform the 
Euro Summit meetings99.
99.  Article 12(4), last part, which provides also that the 
President of the Euro Group may be invited to attend 
the meeting for that purpose.
7. The fiscal compact in the light of the 
principle of democracy
The normative instruments adopted to tackle the 
financial crisis of the euro zone – notably the Six 
Pack and the fiscal compact – show both merits 
and grey areas. They are aimed at reinforcing the 
constraints upon the national authorities of euro 
zone states, in particular of those whose public 
finances and fiscal policy are under the supervi-
sion of both Council and Commission. As already 
pointed out above, Article 5 of the fiscal compact 
provides that a party which is subject to an exces-
sive deficit procedure would have to submit to the 
Commission and the Council “a budgetary and 
economic partnership programme including a de-
tailed description of the structural reforms which 
must be put in place and implemented to ensure 
an effective and durable correction of its excessive 
deficit.” Rescue funds and ECB activism are illus-
trative of the advantages of safety nets that some 
states actually received or may receive in return. 
Incidentally, it seems worth noting that even vir-
tuous states continue to take advantage, both in 
economic and political terms, from participation 
in the Union100. 
In the complex scenario of the new economic gov-
ernance partially stepping outside the EU frame-
work101, what seems to matter is that the national 
100.  It would be wise not to underestimate those 
elements when biasing the restriction to national 
sovereignty implied by the participation to the EU or 
when pleading restitutions of some decision-making 
power to the member states. Pending the financial 
crisis some argued, even in Germany, for the exit of 
Greece from the euro zone or for the abandoning the 
common currency to get back to national currencies. 
A group of German economic experts replied that 
the “disadvantages would definitively outweigh the 
advantages for Germany”: see German Council of 
Economic Experts, Annual Report 2011-2, 95 et seq. 
Undoubtedly, the participation in the Union has 
historically produced a set of advantages for each 
member in a game that, in political and economical 
terms, is clearly “a positive sum game” (E. van Veen, 
The Valuable Tool of Sovereignty: Its Use in Situations of 
Competition and Interdependence, cit., 17 et seq.).
101.  Supra par. 2 with regard to the dilemma of 
adopting the fiscal compact rules under international 
law of the treaties or as a secondary law instrument. For 
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budgetary autonomy is going to be affected all the 
more in terms both of a duty to reduce govern-
ment debt 102, and to enact programs of structural 
reforms to ensure an effective correction of exces-
sive deficits103. These obligations affect the nation-
al autonomy to determine the level and distribu-
tion of public spending, as well as its funding. In 
practice, Articles 3, 4 and 5 of the fiscal compact 
are mandatory in terms both of the results to be 
achieved, and of social and economic instruments 
to use internally to pursue the same results. Al-
though the adoption of national budgets pertains 
to national parliaments, the Commission and the 
Council have the competence to review the obli-
gations of the pays sous programme and to moni-
tor their correct implementation. As a matter of 
fact, the space left to national parliaments to de-
viate from objectives provided for in the relevant 
a more general doctrine debate on the ‘treaty games’ 
touching upon matters related to the EU system, see 
the thorough analysis of B. De Witte, Treaty Games – 
Law as Instrument and as Constraint in the Euro Crisis 
Policy, Governance for the Eurozone: Integration or 
Disintegration (F. Allen, E. Carletti, S. Simonetti, Eds.) 
FIC Press, Philadelphia, 2012, 139-160).
102.  Supra, par. 3.
103.  Supra, paras. 5 and 6.
excessive deficit procedure, even in terms of debt 
criterion, is extremely tiny, if any. To say the least, 
governments of indebted states will be prevented 
from exercising expansionary fiscal policies.
 The problem is that these constraints do not flow 
from a mature democratic political process104. 
104.  The scope of this paper leaves no room for 
considering  the more general issue of the so-called 
democratic deficit of the EU. In that respect the 
literature is remarkable in terms both of its quantity and 
heterogeneity (see ex multis, Debating the Democratic 
Legitimacy of the European Union (B. Kohler-Koch & 
B. Rittberger, eds), Rowman & Littlefield Publ. Group, 
Lanham, Maryland, 2007, passim; V. Cuesta Lopez, The 
Lisbon Treaty’s Provisions on Democratic Principles: 
A Legal Framework for Participatory Democracy, 
European Public Law, 2010, 123 et seq.). One of the 
most acute critics of the EU system is Joseph Weiler: 
given the “non demos”, the EU lacks the structural 
conditions to become a genuine democratic system. He 
stresses inter alia that the transfer of national powers 
to the supranational system removes these powers from 
the control of national parliaments (J.H.H. Weiler, The 
Constitution of Europe, Cambridge University Press, 
1999, 264  et seq.). This concern is further exacerbated 
by the weakness of the European Parliament. The 
author also points to the lack of proper European-
wide elections, arguing that the European Parliament 
elections are ultimately simple national popularity 
contests (see recently J. Weiler, Democracy and limits of 
EU competence, Challenges of Multi-tier Governance in 
Indeed, the normative instruments adopted to 
tackle the financial crisis – while confirming the 
paradigm of the supranational model of the Un-
ion105 – show structural shortcomings in terms of 
the EU – Workshop 4th October 2012, 31-32, arguing that 
the two most fundamental features of any democracy 
which connect the people to governments - in that 
respect see the concept of democray according to K. 
Popper, All Life is Problem Solving, Routledge, New York, 
2010, 93 et seq. - , the principle of accountability and the 
principle of representation, have no place in European 
politics). Although a different and more pragmatic 
approach could be suggested, noticing the existence of 
other models of democracy for the EU that does not have 
a state-like character (A. von Bogdandy, The European 
Lesson for International Democracy: The Significance of 
Articles 9-13 EU Treaty for International Organizations, 
EJIL, 2012, 315 et seq.; J. Habermas, The Crisis of the 
European Union in the Light of Constitutionalization of 
International Law, EJIL, 2012, 335 et seq., at 339-345), 
the evolution of the EU economic governance will have 
to pay more attention to the criticism addressed to the 
EU system.
105.  The new discipline is meant to be a step 
forward to a more sophisticated level of integration, 
being it conceived as an irrevocable step in a fostered 
construction of the EMU, as reiterated by Heads of 
state and government when they reached the political 
agreement on the fiscal compact. In a joint declaration 
called “Agreed lines of communication by euro area 
Member States” (30 January 2012), they declared that 
the fiscal compact “represents a major step forward 
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democratic legitimacy. This seems all the more so 
if one considers the limited role reserved to the 
European Parliament in the economic governance 
of the EU106. In this scenario, more democratic le-
gitimacy has to be injected by means of the na-
tional systems, as the Bundeverfassungsgericht 
rightly demanded with regard to the rescue funds 
instruments recently adopted by the euro zone 
states107. However, this is true only if national par-
towards closer and irrevocable fiscal and economic 
integration and stronger governance in the euro area”.
106.  As is well-known, the primary law provides 
for no significant role to the EP when adopting broad 
guidelines of the economic policies of the member states 
and monitoring their economic developments under 
the multilateral surveillance procedure (Article 121 
TFEU), and when monitoring the budgetary situation 
with regard to both governments deficit and debt under 
the excessive deficit procedure (Article 126 TFEU).
107.  See the ruling 7 September 2011 (on the 
applications 2 BvR 987/10, 2 BvR 1099/10  e 2 BvR 
1485/10) concerning the compliance of the German 
laws authorizing financial aid to Greece with Articles 
38, 110, 115 and 14 of the Grundgesetz; see also ruling 
28 January 2012 (on the application 2 BvR 8/11). See L. 
Dechâtre, La décision de Karlsruhe sur le mécanisme 
européen de stabilité financière: une validation sous 
condition et une mise en garde sibylline pour l’avenir, 
Cahiers dr. eur., 2011, 303-342. As to the issue raised 
in the text see K. Auel, A. Benz, Expanding National 
liaments have the strength to effectively scrutinize 
the respective governments.
Arguably, the fiscal compact seems to widen the 
democratic deficit of the EU economic govern-
ance. As already noted, the prerogatives of nation-
al parliaments are formally respected when apply-
ing the balanced budget rule and the automatic 
“correction mechanism” that is closely linked to 
it. In concrete terms, however, the margin of ma-
noeuvre for national authorities facing budgetary 
problems is quite reduced. It has been observed 
that an imbalanced national budget may still be 
approved. Nonetheless, should that happen, this 
action would violate both national law (in some 
states, at Constitutional level) and the fiscal com-
pact, with the related international responsibil-
ity – not to mention the possible consequences 
laid down in the Six pack. Even assuming the full 
implementation of the rule regarding the joint 
discussion between the national and European 
Parliaments (through a “Conference”) of budget-
ary policies and other issues covered by the fiscal 
Parliamentary Control: Does it Enhance European 
Democracy?, Debating the Democratic Legitimacy of the 
European Union, cit., 57 et seq.
compact108, this would not be the panacea for re-
covering democratic accountability (if one adopts 
the idea of deliberative democracy through de-
liberation of citizens’ elected representatives109). 
Creating a system of rules affecting the autonomy 
108.  Article 13. See the Proposition de résolution 
européenne sur l’ancrage démocratique du gouvernement 
économique européen, présentée par M. C. Caresche 
à l’Assemblée nationale française le 25 septembre 
2012, that requires inter alia «  la création rapide de la 
Conférence prévue à l’article 13 du traité sur la stabilité, 
la coordination et la gouvernance au sein de l’Union 
économique et monétaire ». Literally considered, Article 
13 does not prevent the MPs of European Parliament 
elected in the states not being part of the fiscal compact, 
from being present at the “Conference”. According 
to A.de Streel, La nouvelle gouvernance economique 
européenne. Description et critique, Collection Cepess, 
Bruxelles, 2012, 51, in order to tackle the democratic 
deficiency of the economic governance the  «  TSCG 
représente déjà une avancée importante en prévoyant 
une conférence réunissant des parlementaires européens 
et nationaux pour débattre des politiques budgétaires et 
économiques visées dans le traité ». However, the author 
underlines the issue of efficacity of the Conference: « En 
particulier, elle devra être suffisamment rapide, malgré 
la diversité linguistique de ses membres, pour s’insérer 
utilement dans les délais serrés du semestre européen 
ou des procédures correctives en matière budgétaire et 
de déséquilibres macro-économiques ».
109.  A. Sen, The Idea of Justice, Allen Lane –Penguin 
Books, London, 2009, 324 et seq.
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of national economic policy has an impact both 
on the functioning and powers of domestic insti-
tutions and the daily life of (millions of) citizens 
and companies through the austerity measures 
likely to be related to the application of the cor-
rection mechanism110. In this context, as pointed 
out previously, the Commission role is enhanced 
– it will adopt the “common principles” to com-
plement the “correction mechanism” that the euro 
zone states have to set up when they deviate from 
virtuous budgetary actions; likewise, the reversed 
qualified majority rule in the framework of the 
excessive deficit procedure pursuant to Article 7 
of the fiscal compact, facilitates the adoption of 
the measures proposed by the Commission, mak-
ing it semiautomatic111. Needless to say that this 
110.  J. Habermas, The Crisis of the European Union 
in the Light of Constitutionalization of International 
Law, cit., at 337, observes that it remains unclear “how 
harsh austerity policies imposed from above … can be 
reconciled with a tolerable level of social security in the 
long-run. The revolts by young people are a portent of 
the threat to social peace”.
111.  Supra par. 5. Incidentally, it may be noted that the 
new economic governance framework (Six pack) provides 
for the Commission’s stronger role, in particular when 
it comes to the new ‘comply or explain rule’. Article 2ab)
(2) of Regulation 1466/97 on the strengthening of the 
principle aims to tackle the mutual indulgence 
among members states that prevented the proce-
dure from being effective. This positive result be-
ing achieved, the broader question of democratic 
deficiency remains open.
Conferring a normative role to the Commission 
poses an issue of democratic legitimacy, since one 
may wonder whether the Commission enjoys a 
full-fledged democratic mandate to play such a 
prominent role, being it still a semi-technocratic 
institution. In the meantime the EP, representing 
the European citizens directly, does not emerge 
as a net beneficiary in the fiscal compact, whereas 
the decision-making power of governments is re-
inforced. The EP is not involved in the shaping of 
the decision concerning the duty to reduce public 
debt pursuant to Article 4 and the relevant deci-
sion of the corrective arm (the excessive deficit 
procedure) of the Stability and Growth Pact under 
surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance 
and coordination of economic policies, which makes 
part of the section on “Economic dialogue”, states 
that ‘The Council is respected to, as a rule, follow the 
recommendations and proposals of the Commission or 
explain its position publicly’. The enhanced role of the 
Commission in the decision making process could be 
balanced by a major involvement of the EP.
Regulation 1177/2011. A democracy issue arises 
also from the fact that the EP is hardly involved 
in the Euro Summits since its President may be 
invited to be heard, whilst the institution repre-
senting the European citizens receives ex post a 
report by the President of the Euro Summit112. 
This is not to say that the governments are de-
prived of democratic legitimacy, but that their le-
gitimacy depends upon effective accountability to 
their national parliaments113. Even assuming that 
the Commission constantly pursues the general 
interests of the euro zone populations, that is not 
enough. Being legitimacy a concept with variable 
intensity per se114, it may be enhanced by injecting 
more accountability of the decision-making to-
wards the EP. It is true that the legal instruments to 
address the euro zone financial crisis have shaped 
new opportunities for the European integration 
112.  Supra par. 6.
113.  As to the actions taken within the Council, 
national ministers have traditionally been considered 
democratic, accountable through the means of their 
respective national parliaments. 
114.  Since there are several democratic forms in which 
a human organization may exercise the governmental 
authority, ultimately the democratic legitimacy is a rela-
tive concept.
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process. However, some deficiencies deserve to be 
corrected when the fiscal compact is incorporated 
into EU system115. The multilevel democratic na-
ture of the EU system needs to be reinforced so 
that it will rely less on national legitimacy inputs 
and more on its own direct source of democratic 
accountability116. A genuine European political 
115.  The democratic legitimacy and accountability of 
the EU, as long as the decisions on national budgets are 
more and more affected by European institutions, seem 
to be perceived as an issue to be tackled in the future de-
velopments of the EU legal order. See Towards a Genu-
ine Economic and Monetary Union, Report by President 
of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy, Brus-
sels, 26 June 2012 EUCO 120/12, at 6-7.
116.  As it has been recently pointed out, “it is not 
enough to ensure that the executive branch of national 
governments is closely supervised” by “national parlia-
mentary process (the path the German Constitutional 
Court has consistently focused on). The possibility to 
democratically control the national executive on the 
European level is limited for structural reasons” (M. 
Kumm, Democratic Challenges arising out of the euro-
crisis, Challenges of Multi-tier Governance in the EU 
– Workshop 4th October 2012, 33-35, at 34). However, 
focusing on the parliamentary own structures of the EU 
is only one of the way in which governance might gain 
legitimacy, according to A. Maurer, The European Par-
liament between Policy-Making and Control, Debating 
the Democratic Legitimacy of the European Union, cit., 
75 et seq. More proposals in order to tackle the demo-
democracy is needed in order to pursue a sense 
of collective identity when the citizens evaluate 
the output side of the measures adopted under the 
economic policy-making.
In that perspective, more focus ought be placed 
on European economic growth, as Article 9 seems 
quite poor in that respect117. That explains why 
this issue was rightly addressed by the European 
Council of 28th/29th June 2012, following the sign-
ing of the fiscal compact118. The ultimate objective 
is to enhance the social dimension of the EU in 
order to stimulate more popular support in a pe-
riod of acute economic recession and the related 
cratic problem of the euro governance has been sug-
gested by M. Poiares Maduro, B. De Witte, M. Kumm, 
The Euro Crisis and the Democratic Governance of the 
Euro: Legal and Political Issues of a Fiscal Crisis, EUI-R. 
Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, Global Gover-
nance Programme, The Democratic Governance of the 
Euro, RSCAS Policy Paper 2012/08, 3 et seq.; R. Bieber, 
Democratic Governance of the Euro: Shortcomings and 
proposals for reform, ivi, 13 et seq.; C. Closa Montero, 
The Democratic Governance of the euro: Some Proposals, 
ivi, 21 et seq.
117.  Supra, par. 6.
118.  See the Compact for Growth and Jobs, Annex to 
the European Council Conclusions of  28/29 June 2012.
social crisis faced in several euro zone states119. It 
cannot be overlooked that, according to its found-
ing principles120, the Union’s aim is to promote the 
well-being of European peoples and that democ-
racy is naturally related to the idea of economic 
development and social welfare121.
That being said, the fiscal compact also has its own 
merits. Should it, as expected, be incorporated into 
the EU legal framework, for some states national 
Constitutions will amount to being instruments 
to achieve the objectives of the European integra-
119.  For instance, more emphasis on growth seems 
necessary to tackle the risk of condemning the euro zone 
to austerity, as several MEPs argued (see the arguments 
raised by EMPs Sylvie Goulard, Daniel Cohn-Bendit, 
Guy Verhofstadt and Pervenche Berès, as reported by 
Agence Europe N° 10565, 2 March 2012). However, new 
commitments in that direction can always be endorsed 
at EU or international level. New forms of economic 
stimulus can also be inserted outside of the fiscal 
compact.  
120.  Articles 3(1) TEU and 9 TFEU (as to the 
promotion of a high level of employment, the guarantee 
of adequate social protection, the fight against social 
exclusion, and a high level of education, training and 
protection of human health): B. de Witte, A.H. Trechsel 
et al., Legislating After Lisbon. New Opportunities for the 
European Parliament, EUDO Report 2010/1, 58 et seq.
121.  A. Sen, The Idea of Justice, cit., 345 et seq.
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tion. It has been argued that by doing so the fiscal 
compact speaks German122. This is probably so. It 
nonetheless also speaks the language of social eq-
uity and, indirectly, of democracy. The new rules 
will arguably prevent the elites governing a coun-
try from adopting unethical debt-creating poli-
cies which will be paid by the future generations. 
Limits on national budget deficits may, as a con-
sequence, protect democracies from inter-gener-
ational conflicts. A fiscal discipline seems one of 
the basic elements of a social pact among genera-
tions. After the Six Pack, the fiscal compact is to 
be considered another clear signal – and perhaps 
not the last one, as well as not sufficient per se123 – 
that the euro zone states are giving up the laxity 
of the Maastricht Treaty and its related practice. 
The perspective of including a reverse qualified 
122.  `Editorial. The Fiscal Compact and the European 
Constitution: Europe Speaking German´ , cit., 3 et seq.
123.  It has been pointed out that “arguments against 
legally disciplining fiscal policy are also democratic”; 
that a fiscal discipline “is also insufficient to address the 
current crisis”, and that “a Union of rules and disciplines 
will also be democratically unacceptable” (M. Poiares 
Maduro, A new Governance for the European Union and 
the Euro: Democracy and Justice, European Parliament. 
Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Brussels, 
2012, at 16-17).
majority in the decision-making of the excessive 
deficit procedure is an outstanding demonstration 
of that intention, countering the habit of mutual 
indulgence amongst the euro zone states. Like-
wise, the competence attributed to the ECJ is to 
be considered, though it is limited to compliance 
with the obligation to correctly transpose the bal-
anced budget rule into the domestic law.  
Given that the euro zone is embracing a culture 
of financial stability to overcome its debt crisis, 
those states hit by the financial crisis have a seri-
ous chance to adopt virtuous behaviours and to 
get more confidence in their public finances in the 
medium run. Indeed, the swift negotiation and 
signing of the fiscal compact was considered – in 
those weeks of severe crisis – as an important ele-
ment to help restore confidence in the euro zone. 
In fact, in accordance with a general principle of 
treaty law, the signing of an international agree-
ment, pending ratification procedures, entails that 
states must refrain from acts that could under-
mine its object and purpose, unless their respec-
tive intentions not to become party to the agree-
ment itself have been made clear124. True, this 
does not imply a legal obligation to ratify the fiscal 
compact. Yet, its signature is not deprived of any 
legal significance, since every government has the 
responsibility under general international law to 
take all the possible steps for the entry into force 
of the fiscal compact, unless it declares a clear in-
tention to the contrary. 
124.  Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the law 
of treaties; cf. inter alia M. Dixon, R. McCorquodale, 
S. Williams, Cases & Materials on International Law, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011, 65, referring 
to the letter sent by the USA Government to the UN 
Secretary General about the refusal of the USA to accede 
to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court.
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8. Conclusions
Given the situation of urgency beforehand and 
pending negotiation, the choice of a 17 plus treaty 
stepping outside the EU legal framework, is legal-
ly viable, and more solid than the way-out based 
on secondary law tools. Since it is an international 
treaty requiring the national constitutional pro-
cesses of ratification to be observed, the fiscal com-
pact enjoys quite an evident standard of democrat-
ic legitimacy. Admittedly, a revision process under 
Article 48 TEU entails a high level of democracy 
and transparency. However, this path could not be 
pursued. The fiscal compact experience dramati-
cally shows that the EU legal order lacks the ca-
pacity of a swift self-amendment. Unavoidably, 
an international instrument poses some issues of 
inconsistencies with the law and principles of the 
EU, which  were examined throughout the paper, 
whilst suggesting interpretative solutions. How-
ever, the incorporation of the treaty into EU legal 
framework (Article 16) would terminate possible 
incoherencies, if any, with the EU orthodoxy.
The 17 plus treaty shows that the euro zone is em-
bracing a culture of financial stability aimed at pre-
serving the common currency as a fundamental 
achievement of the EMU. It shows also a serious 
commitment to consider the euro as an essential 
and irreversible normative value of the European 
integration process, even in terms of competences 
conferred to the EU institutions. The core of the 
fiscal discipline – laid down in Articles 3 (bal-
anced or in surplus budget rule) and 4 (obligation 
to reduce public debt which exceeds 60% of the 
GDP) – is complemented by Article 8 which con-
fers a limited role to the ECJ as regards the proper 
implementation into domestic law of two norma-
tive elements laid down in Article 3. This new 
power to adjudicate, based on Article 273 TFEU, 
intends to ensure the effective implementation of 
the balanced budget rule into domestic law, on the 
one hand, and to de-politicise some elements of 
the dispute concerning that implementation, on 
the other hand. It does not alter the judicial char-
acter of the ECJ.
By preventing the elites governing a country from 
adopting unethical debt-creating policies to be put 
on the backs of future generations, the fiscal com-
pact speaks the language of social equity. Thus, 
it can be conceived as one of the basic element 
of a social pact among generations and is posi-
tive per se: it protects national democracies from 
inter-generational conflicts. Inherent flexibilities 
of Articles 3 and 4 may partially ease the social 
impact of austerity measures. That being said, Ar-
ticles 3, 4, as well as the commitments stemming 
from Article 5, pose serious limits to the autono-
my of national parliament and executives in terms 
of determining public revenue and expenditure. 
Furthermore, the Commission role is enhanced at 
least in two ways, pursuant to Article 3(2) and 7. 
The problem is that all these constraints do not 
flow from a full-fledged democratic decision-
making of the euro zone governance. Th e EP, rep-
resenting the European citizens directly, does not 
emerge as a net beneficiary in the fiscal compact. 
The EP is not involved in the shaping of the de-
cision concerning the duty to reduce public debt 
and in the relevant decision of the excessive deficit 
procedure. Even at the Euro Summits, the role of 
President of the EP is quite limited. On the con-
trary, the decision-making power of governments, 
within the Council, is reinforced. 
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Searching for a more mature governance of the 
euro zone that enhances its democratic account-
ability, will be the challenge of the future steps of 
economic integration. The democratic governance 
of the euro needs to be improved so as to rely less 
on national legitimacy inputs and more on its own 
direct source of democratic accountability, i.e. the 
EP. A genuine European political democracy is 
thus needed. The democratic credentials of the 
Union will then be re-affirmed and improved.
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1. Introduction
This paper makes the claim that the legal frame-
work governing the European Stability Mechanism 
is contradictory, conceptually incoherent and may 
be characterised as a circumvention of Union law. 
It is further claimed that such circumvention, and 
the resulting establishment of a significant perma-
nent institution outside and beyond the scope of 
the Union legal order, represents a challenge to 
European democracy and to the principle of re-
spect for the rule of law.
The paper will first provide a brief overview of 
the background and legal framework govern-
ing the Treaty establishing the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESMT).2 It will then address recent 
litigation challenging the compatibility of that le-
2.  Treaty establishing the European stability mechanism 
between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Federal Republic 
of Germany, the Republic of Estonia, Ireland, the Hel-
lenic Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the French Re-
public, the Italian Republic, the Republic of Cyprus, the 
Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, Malta, the Kingdom of 
the Netherlands, the Republic of Austria, the Portuguese 
Republic, the Republic of Slovenia, the Slovak Republic 
and the Republic of Finland, concluded in Brussels on 2 
February 2012.
gal framework with obligations under Union law. 
Finally, it will assess how the process by which the 
European Stability Mechanism was established is 
liable to impact upon the quality of European De-
mocracy and the integrity of the Union legal order.
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2. Background and Legal Framework
The ESMT was conceived in the context of an on-
going financial crisis in Europe which is claimed 
to threaten the very survival of the Union’s single 
currency, the euro. The ESM, developed as a re-
sponse to this threat, is intended to safeguard the 
financial stability of the euro area as a whole and 
of its Member States.3 The ESMT creates a mecha-
nism by which the eurozone Member States pool 
their resources to ensure that individual Member 
States in financial difficulty possess sufficient li-
quidity to be able to meet their debts. The ESM 
has an initial authorised capital stock of €700 
billion, which may be used as a security against 
further borrowing.4 The initial maximum lending 
capacity of the ESM fund (combined with the ca-
pacity of the European Financial Stability Facility 
(the EFSF) an existing bail-out fund) was set at 
€500 billion.5 The Euro Member States have since 
agreed to increase that limit to €700 billion and 
to accelerate the contribution of paid-in capital to 
3.  Article 3 of the ESM Treaty.
4.  Article 8 of the ESM Treaty.
5.  Recital 6 and Article 39 of the ESM.
the fund.6 The ESM can be seen as a signal to the 
financial markets that significant resources stand 
behind the debts of individual eurozone Member 
States.
The establishment of a debt-crisis mechanism was 
initially proposed by a Task Force on Economic 
Governance set up by the European Council of 25 
and 26 March 2010. In its report, dated 21 Octo-
ber 2010, the Task Force recommended establish-
ing a “credible crisis resolution framework for the 
euro area capable of addressing financial distress 
and avoiding contagion”.7 Agreement on the need 
to establish a permanent crisis mechanism was 
announced at a European Council Meeting on 28 
and 29 October 2010.8 In setting up such a mech-
6.  Statement of the Eurogroup dated 30 March 2012.  This 
alters the terms of Article 39 of the ESM Treaty.
7.  “Strengthening Economic Governance in the EU” – 
Report of the Task Force to the European Council, 21 
October 2010. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/
cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/117236.pdf
8.  Conclusions of the European Council, 28-29 October 
2010 (EUCO 25/1/10 REV 1) accessible at: http://www.
consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/
en/ec/117496.pdf
anism, Member States were confronted with the 
challenge of identifying or creating a legal frame-
work within which such a crisis mechanism could 
operate. 
The Union had previously operated bailout funds 
through a European Financial Stabilisation Mech-
anism (the EFSM) and a European Financial 
Stability Facility. The former was established by 
Council Regulation 407/2010 on the basis of Ar-
ticle 122 TFEU.9 The latter was framed as a public 
limited company governed by the laws of Lux-
embourg.10 Yet, even if Article 122(2) TFEU was 
considered to be capable of serving as a legal basis 
for the EFSM, it was not clear that the provision 
could serve as the basis for the proposed perma-
nent stability mechanism. Article 122(2) TFEU 
is expressed in restrictive terms. Its wording sug-
gests that financial assistance may be granted only 
in exceptional force majeure type circumstances, 
such as natural disasters or comparable events the 
occurrence of which are beyond the control of 
9.  Council Regulation 407/2010 of 11 May 2010 establishing 
a European financial stabilization mechanism
10.  Registered as a Société anonyme, having a registered 
office  43, Avenue John F. Kennedy, L-1855 Luxembourg, 
R.C.S. Luxemoubrg B n⁰ 153.414
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Member States. It is not evident that Article 122(2) 
TFEU was intended to authorise the permanent 
bailout of Member States facing challenges of an 
economic nature.11 This restrictive interpretation 
is reinforced when Article 122 TFEU is read in 
combination with other provisions contained in 
Part Three, Title VIII of the TFEU. In particular, 
Article 123 TFEU prohibits the European Central 
Bank from extending credit facilities in favour of 
central governments and public bodies of Mem-
ber States or from the purchase of their debt in-
struments. Article 125 TFEU, often referred to 
as the “no bailout” clause expressly prohibits the 
Union or Member States from becoming liable or 
assuming commitments of other Member States. 
Appreciating that a bailout mechanism might not 
sit comfortably in a “no bailout” economic and 
monetary Union, the European Council invited 
consultation on the “treaty change required” to 
establish a permanent stability mechanism.12 Fol-
11.  This interpretation was confirmed by the Court of 
Justice in Case C-370/12, Pringle v. Ireland, at para 65.
12.  Conclusions of the European Council, 28-29 October 
2010 (EUCO 25/1/10 REV 1).  See also Recital 2 of 
European Council Decision of 25 March 2011 (2011 OJ 
L 91/1).
lowing this consultation the European Council, 
meeting on 16 and 17 December 2010, agreed 
that the TFEU should be amended and decided 
to effect such amendment using the simplified 
revision procedure (SRP) provided for in Article 
48(6) TEU.13 The SRP permits modification of 
Part Three of the TFEU by the adoption of a Euro-
pean Council Decision that must be approved by 
the Member States in accordance with their do-
mestic procedures.
The proposed Treaty amendment would add a new 
third paragraph to Article 136 TFEU authorizing 
euro Member States to establish a permanent sta-
bility mechanism that would operate subject to 
strict conditionality. European Council Decision 
2011/199/EU amending Article 136 of the TFEU 
was adopted on 25 March 2011.14 Pursuant to its 
Article 2, the Decision was to enter into force once 
approved by all Member States and, in any event, 
not earlier than 1 January 2013. 15
13.  Conclusions of the European Council, 16-17 December 
2010, accessible at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/
uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/118578.pdf
14.  European Council Decision 2011/199/EU amending 
Article 136 of the TFEU (2011 OJ L 91/1).
15.  It is of note that it is the Decision as opposed to merely 
The ESMT was negotiated at the same time as an 
inter-governmental agreement and a first version 
signed on 11 July 2011.16 However, following its 
signature, the Member States considered further 
amendments were necessary and a revised draft of 
the ESMT was concluded on 2 February 2012. At 
first, the ESM was to become operational in July 
2013.17 However, it was subsequently agreed that 
the entry into force of the ESMT should be accel-
erated so that the ESM would become operational 
in July 2012, that is, at least half a year prior to the 
entry into force of the European Council Decision 
authorising Member States to establish a perma-
nent stability mechanism.  18 A number of legal 
the amendment contained in the Decision that is to 
enter into force at the relevant date.
16.   See “Factsheet on the ESM”, published by the 
European Commission setting out the background 
and chronology to the adoption of the ESM Treaty and 
accessible at: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/
economic_governance/documents/127788.pdf
17.  “European Stability Mechanism (ESM) is inaugurated)” 
– Press release issued by the ESM and accessible at: http://
www.esm.europa.eu/press/releases/20121008_esm-is-
inaugurated.htm . The July 2013 date is also mentioned 
on the web-site of the European Commission at: http://
ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/articles/financial_
operations/2011-07-11-esm-treaty_en.htm
18.  See “Factsheet on the ESM”, published by the European 
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challenges to the ESM were filed with the German 
Federal Constitutional Court and the July 2012 
date was postponed. On 12 September 2012 the 
German Federal Constitutional Court delivered 
a preliminary judgment permitting Germany to 
proceed with ratification of the ESM Treaty.19 The 
ESM was launched on 8 October 2012.
Commission cited at 15 supra.
19.  Cases 2 BVR 1390/12, 2BvR 1421/12, 2BvR 1438/12 
, 2BvR 1439/12 , 2BvR 1440/12,  and 2BvE 6/12, Deci-
sion of the Federal Constitutional Court of 12 Septem-
ber 2013. For further details, see contributions in this 
special edition from Susanne K. Schmidt and Karsten 
Schneider.
3. The Legal Framework Governing the ESM 
Treaty and its compatibility with Union 
law
In addition to the challenges to the ESMT brought 
before the German Federal Constitutional Court, 
proceedings questioning the compatibility of the 
ESMT with national constitutional law or Union 
law were also instituted before the Courts in Es-
tonia and Ireland.20 The challenge in Ireland was 
instituted by Thomas Pringle, an independent 
Member of Parliament and resulted in a refer-
ence for a preliminary ruling by the Irish Supreme 
Court.21 That Court sought clarification on three 
20.  Supreme Court of Estonia, judgment no 3-4-1-6-12, of 
12 July 2012 introduced by Request of the Chancellor 
of Justice of 12 March 2012 and Pringle v. Government 
of Ireland, Ireland and the Attorney General Supreme 
Court, Ref no. 339/2012 pending before the Supreme 
Court of Ireland. Certain aspects of the case have al-
ready been subject to rulings by the Supreme Court 
[2012] IESC 47.
21.  Ruling of the Supreme Court of Ireland, delivered on 31 
July 2012 by Chief Justice Denham [2012] IESC 47. See 
http://www.courts.ie/__80256F2B00356A6B.nsf/0/E75
04392B159245080257A4C00517D6A?Open&Highlight
=0,Pringle,~language_en~ The Reference is available at: 
points:  (1) the validity of the European Council 
Decision of 25 March 2011; (2) whether the provi-
sions of the ESMT were compatible with Member 
States’ obligations under the Union Treaties; and 
(3) whether the entry into force of the ESMT was 
subject to the prior entry into force of the Europe-
an Council Decision authorising Member States 
to establish a permanent stability mechanism.
It is clear that, in establishing a permanent sta-
bility mechanism, the European Council and the 
Member States were confronted with a signifi-
cant legal obstacle. How could the Union or the 
Member States establish a bailout fund when it 
appeared that bailouts were expressly prohibited 
by the Union Treaties? It is worth recalling that 
the prohibition on bailouts, originally agreed as 
part of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, may not easily 
http://www.courts.ie/__80256F2B00356A6B.nsf/0/E44
922F2B6DBED2F80257A4C00570284?Open&Highligh
t=0,Pringle,~language_en~
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be dismissed as the product of some kind of over-
sight. On the contrary, it is apparent from records 
of the negotiations that Member States intention-
ally agreed that the particular form of Economic 
and Monetary Union established would be a “no 
bailout” EMU. 22 This approach had been agreed 
and ratified by democratically mandated Govern-
ments of the Member States.
In his challenge to the compatibility of the ESM 
Treaty, Pringle argued that an institution estab-
lished to carry out economic and monetary activi-
ties with the objective of saving the Union’s single 
currency must be established within the Union.23 
He observed that both the European Parliament 
and the European Central Bank favoured estab-
22.  See for example, the records of the proceedings of the 
Inter-Institutional   Conference   on   Economic   and 
Monetary   Union   accompanying   the   Intergovern-
mental Conferences, held on Tuesday 11 June 1991, at 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/emu_history/
documentation/chapter13/19910611fr14analyticalsum
mary. pdf. See also the records of the Monetary Com-
mittee, working on the preparation of the Maastricht 
Treaty.
23.  Observations of Pringle in Case C-370/12, Pringle v. Ire-
land at p. 7. This position rests on arguments concern-
ing competence of Union in economic and monetary 
policy set out in pages 20 to 28 of the submissions.
lishing the ESM within the Union.24 In its Opinion 
on the European Council Decision, the European 
Parliament warned that establishing a permanent 
stability mechanism outside the EU institutional 
framework posed a risk to the integrity of the 
Treaty-based system25. The European Parliament 
further expressed regret that the European Coun-
cil had not explored all the possibilities contained 
in the Treaties for establishing a permanent stabil-
ity mechanism within the Union legal order26. The 
24.  Observations of Pringle in Case C-370/12, Pringle v. 
Ireland at p.7.
25.  Resolution of the European Parliament of 23 March 
2011. At paragraph 7 the European Parliament “Warns 
that the intention to establish the permanent stabil-
ity mechanism outside the EU institutional frame-
work poses a risk to the integrity of the Treaty-based 
system”. The Resolution is accessible at: http://www.
europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//
NONSGML+TA+P7-TA-2011-0103+0+DOC+PDF+V0//
EN
26.  Resolution of the European Parliament of 23 March 
2011. Paragraph 9 states the European Parliament “Re-
grets that the  European Council has not  explored all 
the  possibilities contained in  the  Treaties for  estab-
lishing a permanent stability mechanism; considers in 
particular that, in the framework of the present Un-
ion competences with regard to economic and mon-
etary union (Article 3(4) TEU) and monetary policy for 
Member States whose currency is the euro (Article 3(1)
ECB similarly expressed support for recourse to 
the “Union method.” 27
Nevertheless, the Heads of State or Government of 
the eurozone opted to establish the ESM by means 
of an intergovernmental treaty outside the frame-
work of the Union legal order. In his submissions 
Pringle argued that this approach was adopted as 
a means of overcoming the TFEU’s prohibition on 
bailouts. This view was corroborated by observa-
tions lodged by Member States before the Court of 
Justice. A number of interveners sought to rely on 
the international status of the ESM to argue that 
it would not be subject to Union law or the prohi-
bition on bail-outs in particular.28 Pringle argued 
(c) TFEU), it would have been appropriate to make use of 
the powers conferred on the Council in Article 136 TFEU, 
or in the alternative to have recourse to Article 352 TFEU 
in conjunction with Articles 133 and 136 TFEU”.
27.  Opinion of the European Central Bank of 17 March 
2011 (2011/C 140/05). Paragraph 8 observes: “A key ele-
ment of the draft decision is that it provides for an in-
tergovernmental mechanism instead of a Union mecha-
nism. The ECB supports recourse to the Union method 
and would welcome that, with the benefit of the experi-
ence gained, the ESM would become a Union mechanism 
at an appropriate point in time.”
28.  Observations of Cyprus, Ireland, Austria in Case 
370/12 Pringle v. Ireland. Cyprus states “the prohibition 
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that the notion that Member States may collec-
tively step outside of the Union in order to carry 
out – on a permanent basis – activities that oth-
erwise would be prohibited inside of the Union 
is difficult to reconcile with Union law or indeed 
with a Union founded on the rule of law. 
The Union legal order rests on a number of prin-
ciples that are constitutional in nature and that 
have been developed by the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) in case-law spanning six decades. 
Such principles may be regarded as the concep-
tual backbone of Union law. They provide a con-
sistent framework through which the extremely 
diverse legal and factual contexts that arise in the 
Union legal order may be approached and exam-
in Article 125 TFEU relates to the Union and the Mem-
ber States, not to a third party such as the ESM, which 
has a legal personality distinct from Member States”. 
The Government of Ireland submitted at para 72 of its 
observations that “The Article 125(1) TFEU prohibition 
applies to “[a] Member State”, while the ESM will be an 
international financial institution. The ESM will have le-
gal personality, which will be separate and distinct from 
the ESM Members”. Austria submitted that “Article 122 
TFEU expressly relates only to the Union. An interna-
tional organisation such as the ESM is therefore not cov-
ered by that provision, especially since, furthermore, the 
Union is not a contracting party”.
ined. These “constitutional” principles include: 
the doctrine of supremacy and the direct effect of 
Union law; respect for general principles of Union 
law, including the principles of legal certainty and 
non-retroactivity; the principle of effective judi-
cial protection; and rules on the division of com-
petences within the Union legal order as well as 
the principle of sincere co-operation.
In his action, Pringle maintained that the estab-
lishment of the ESM outside the Union legal order 
was inconsistent with a number of these constitu-
tional principles. First, he argued that it followed 
from the principle of supremacy and loyal cooper-
ation that, if the Union Treaties prohibit Member 
States from engaging in a particular activity, then 
that prohibition applies to Member States regard-
less of the legal framework in which they operate, 
and in particular, regardless of whether they are 
acting inside or outside the Union.29 Pringle ob-
served that the ECJ has consistently held that the 
principle of loyalty precludes a Member State from 
entering into international agreements that would 
be incompatible with its obligations under the 
29.  Observations of Pringle in Case C-370/12, Pringle v. Ire-
land pp. 37 to 40. Express reference was made to Case 
22/70 Commission v. Council (AETR) [1971] ECR 263.
Union Treaties.30 Pringle argued that if the Trea-
ties prohibit bailouts inside the Union, then such 
bailouts are also prohibited outside the Union.
Second, Pringle submitted that, according to 
settled case-law, Member States were not merely 
prohibited from breaching Union law directly, but 
from tolerating breaches through the intermedi-
ary of organizations set up or recognized by them.31 
He noted that the ECJ has consistently held that 
breaches of Union law by entities under the deci-
sive control of Member States may be attributed to 
the relevant Member States.32
30.  Observations of Pringle in Case C-370/12, Pringle v. Ire-
land, p.38, para 3.97. Reference was made to cases Case 
C-307/97 Saint Gobain ZN [1999] ECR I-413, paras. 33 
and 34; Case C-55/00 Gottardo [2002] ECR I-413, paras. 
33 and 34, and Case C-376/03 D [2005] ECR I-5821, para 
52.
31.  Observations of Pringle in Case C-370/12, Pringle v. 
Ireland, pp. 34 to 38, and in particular paras 3.85 and 
3.91. Reference was made to Case 50/76 Amsterdam 
Bulb [1977] ECR 137, para. 35.
32.  Case 249/81 Commission v. Ireland [1982] ECR 4005; 
Joined Cases 67, 68 and 70/85 Van der Kooy BV and 
others v. Commission [1988] ECR 219; Case C-188/89 
Foster v. British Gas [1990] ECR I-3313, Case C-306/97 
Connemara Machine Turf Co. Ltd v. Coillte Teoranta 
[1998] ECR I-8761, and Case C-325/00 Commission v. 
Germany [2002] ECR I-9977. See also, by analogy, Case 
66The Euro Crisis & the State of European DemocracySection I
Third, Pringle argued that the legal framework 
establishing the ESM was incompatible with the 
principle of the division of competences delimit-
ing the boundaries between the Union legal or-
der and that of its Member States.33 He submitted 
that it was well established that the Union and the 
Member States are required to respect each other’s 
competences and that, in this context, Member 
States are subject to “special duties of action and 
abstention” to ensure that they do not encroach 
upon Union competences.34 The Union is con-
ferred with exclusive competence in the field of 
monetary policy � and shared competence in the 
C-196/04 Cadbury Schweppes and Cadbury Schweppes 
Overseas [2006] ECR I-7995 concerning creation of legal 
structures designed to avoid tax. The “decisive control” 
test was advocated by Advocate General Van Gerven 
in his Opinion in Case C-188/89 Foster v. British Gas 
[1990] ECR I-3313
33.  Observations of Pringle in Case C-370/12, Pringle v. 
Ireland, pp 20 to 28. See also page 51, para 3.146 of the 
observations.
34.  Observations submitted on behalf of Pringle before 
the ECJ, p. 52, para 4.3. Case C-266/03 Commission v. 
Luxembourg [2005] ECR I-4805. See also Case C-433/03 
Commission v. Germany [2005] ECR I-6985 paras 57 and 
59. See also Case 22/70 Commission v. Council (AETR) 
[1971] ECR 263. 
field of economic policy.35 Pringle argued that the 
Union has been conferred with and exercises a 
substantial degree of economic coordinating com-
petence in relation to measures that concern the 
single currency.36 Moreover, it was recalled that 
35.  Article 2(3). Lenaerts and Van Nuffel, EU Law (3rd 
Edition, 2011, Sweet & Maxwell), para. 7-023 “Since all 
competences outside the areas referred to in Arts 3 and 
6 are shared by the Union with the Member States (see 
Art.4(1) TFEU) [the coordination of the economic and 
employment policies of the Member States] can only be 
classified as falling within the general category of shared 
competences.”
36.  See, for example, Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 
of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the surveillance 
of budgetary positions and the surveillance and co-
ordination of economic policies (1997 OJ L 209/1) as 
amended by Regulation (EU) No 1175/2011 of the Eu-
ropean Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 
2011; Regulation (EU)  No 1173/2011  of  the  European 
Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  16 November  2011 
on  the  effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance 
in the euro area (2011 OJ L 306/1);  Regulation (EU) 
No 1174/2011 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 16 November 2011 on enforcement meas-
ures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances 
in the euro area (2011 OJ L 306/8); Regulation (EU) 
No 1176/2011 on the prevention and correction of mac-
roeconomic imbalances (2011 OJ L 306/25). Council 
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on speeding 
up and clarifying the implementation of the exces-
sive deficit procedure (1997 OJ L 209/6) as amended by 
the TFEU expressly requires that the coordination 
of economic policy take place within the Union.37 
Pringle submitted the nature of monetary and 
economic competences conferred on the Union 
was consistent with the fact that the euro consti-
tutes a core element of EMU and an intrinsic and 
fundamental part of the Union Treaties.
Pringle concluded that having regard to the prin-
ciple of the division of competences, and the spe-
cific competences of the Union in economic and 
monetary policy, it is anathema that an entity en-
trusted with stabilizing the euro currency could 
be established outside the Union legal order and 
would be able to dictate conditions that will be 
imposed on Member States in matters so funda-
mental and integral to the Union as its economic 
policy and its currency.38 Moreover, he argued 
that creating the ESM by means of an internation-
al treaty largely removed the institution from the 
legislative, judicial and democratic safeguards that 
formed an integral part of the Union legal order.
Council Regulation No 1177/2011 of 8 November 2011 
(2011 OJ L 306/33).
37.  Article 5(1) TFEU.
38.  Expressed in Oral observations on behalf of Pringle at 
the hearing of 23 October 2012.
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Fourth, Pringle submitted that the legal frame-
work governing the ESM Treaty was inconsistent 
with the principle of legal certainty and non-ret-
roactivity. He claimed that it was clear from the 
wording of the European Council Decision and of 
the October 2010 European Council Conclusions 
that the Member States and the European Coun-
cil considered that the establishment of an insti-
tution such as the ESM “required” Treaty change. 
Moreover, he noted that even the ESM appeared 
to attribute its foundation to the authorisation 
contained in the Treaty amendment.39 Yet the In-
39.  On its own web-site, the ESM expressly referred to the 
amendment to the TFEU as its legal basis, See:  http://
www.esm.europa.eu/pdf/FAQ%20ESM%2008102012.
pdf . In reply to the question “What is the legal basis 
of the ESM and how was it established”, it is stated 
that “the European Council agreed that the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) should 
be amended in order for a permanent mechanism - the 
European Stability Mechanism - to be established by the 
Member States whose currency is the euro to safeguard 
the financial stability of the euro area as a whole. The 
amendment (in Article 136 of the Treaty) was adopted 
by the European Council on 25 March 2011.” Although, 
this assertion was subsequently withdrawn and refer-
ences to the European Council Decision removed. This 
revised explanation of the legal basis is available on the 
Frequently Asked Question section of the ESM Web-
site http://www.esm.europa.eu/pdf/FAQ%20ESM%20
stitutions and Member States nevertheless consid-
ered it was permissible to launch the ESMT even 
prior to the approval of the TFEU amendment by 
all Member States and prior to that amendment 
entering into force.40
Finally, Pringle argued that amendment of the 
Treaties to permit bailouts ought to have been car-
ried out using the ordinary revision procedure.41 
He asserted that the SRP represents an exception 
to the general rules governing Treaty amendment 
and that its scope should be interpreted restric-
tively. He further argued that the substance of the 
amendment did not respect substantive limits im-
posed on the SRP by Article 48(6) TEU.42 
In their turn, the intervening Institutions and 
Member States essentially argued that the Euro-
pean Stability Mechanism is a funding facility that 
is a matter of economic policy and not monetary 
12112012.pdf.
40.  Observations of Pringle in Case C-370/12, Pringle v. 
Ireland, pp. 18 and 19, paras 3.6 to 3.10.
41.  Observations of Pringle in Case C-370/12, Pringle v. 
Ireland, p. 54, para 5.4.
42. Observations of Pringle in Case C-370/12, Pringle v. 
Ireland, p. 55, paras. 5.6 and 5.7.
policy.43 As a consequence, it was to be qualified 
as an activity in respect of which competence is 
shared between the Member States and the Union. 
The intervening Institutions and Member further 
submitted that Member States retained compe-
tence over the provision of financial assistance 
to safeguard the euro and therefore were free to 
establish a stability mechanism outside the frame-
work of the Union legal order.44 
The intervening Institutions and Member States 
also argued that the granting of financial assis-
tance under the ESM was subject to strict condi-
tions, including a repayment obligation and did 
not amount to the assumption of liability that 
would be prohibited by Article 125 TFEU.45 More-
over, it was argued that provisions of EMU that 
are concerned with the overall objective of estab-
lishing and promoting a single currency should 
43.  Observations of Ireland, para 78. See also, for example, 
Observations of  Greece, para 24, Observations of 
France, para 67, Observations of Cyprus, para 52, 
Observations of  the Netherlands, paras. 46 to 56.
44. See Observations of Austra, para 24 and Observations 
of the European Commission, para 78.
45.  See Observations of Austria, para 27 and Observations 
of the European Commission, paras. 69 to 72.
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not be interpreted in a manner that would threat-
en its survival.46 The intervening Institutions and 
Member States also considered that it was permis-
sible to amend Article 136(3) TFEU by means of 
the SRP because the relevant European Council 
Decision did not increase the competences of the 
Union.47
The intervening Institutions and Member States 
also defended the entitlement to launch the ESM 
in advance of the entry into force of the amend-
ment to the TFEU. They claimed that the proposed 
amendment was not in fact necessary and did not 
constitute a legal basis for the establishment of the 
ESM. They argued that it merely served to clarify 
and confirm Member States’ existing competence 
to establish the ESM.48 
In its judgment, the ECJ upheld the entitlement of 
Member States to participate in the ESMT as well 
as the validity of the European Council Decision 
46.  See Observations of Germany and Observations of the 
Netherlands, paras. 60 to 66.
47.  See for example Observations of Germany, para 77 and 
Observations of the Commission para 97.
48.  See for example Observations of Germany, para 77 and 
Observations of the Commission para 97.
amending Article 136 TFEU.49 First, approaching 
the “no bailout” clause enshrined in Article 125 
TFEU from a teleological perspective, the Court 
concluded that it did not prohibit the granting of 
financial assistance by the ESM.50 The Court ob-
served that the prohibition on bailouts sought to 
ensure that Member States remain subject to the 
logic of the market when they enter into debt so as 
to ensure that budgetary discipline is maintained.51 
In this regard, the Court noted that financial as-
sistance granted by the ESM was subject to con-
ditions and the recipient Member State remained 
liable for its own debts.52 Article 125 TFEU was 
therefore considered not to preclude financial as-
sistance to Member States under the ESM as such 
assistance did not diminish the incentive of the 
recipient Member State to conduct a sound bud-
49.  Case C-370/12, Pringle v. Ireland and others, Judgment 
of 27 November 2012, not yet reported.
50.  Case C-370/12, Pringle v. Ireland and others, Judgment 
of 27 November 2012, not yet reported, paras. 129 to 147.
51.  Case C-370/12, Pringle v. Ireland and others, Judgment 
of 27 November 2012, not yet reported, para 136.
52.  Case C-370/12, Pringle v. Ireland and others, Judgment 
of 27 November 2012, not yet reported, paras. 137, 138, 
141, 143, and 145.
getary policy.53  Moreover, the Court clarified that 
financial assistance could only be granted when 
indispensible to safeguard the stability of the Euro 
area as a whole.54 
The ECJ agreed with the intervening Member 
States and Institutions that the ESM was not an 
instrument of monetary policy.55 The Court noted 
that the defining feature of monetary policy was 
the maintenance of price stability. Although ac-
knowledging that the activities of the ESM could 
affect price stability, the Court held this was not 
its purpose.56 The Court observed that the ESM 
falls within the area of economic policy, which 
is a shared competence between the Union and 
its Member States.57 Considering that the Union 
Treaties did not confer any specific power on the 
53.  Case C-370/12, Pringle v. Ireland and others, Judgment 
of 27 November 2012, not yet reported, paras. 136 to 
138.
54.  Case C-370/12, Pringle v. Ireland and others, Judgment 
of 27 November 2012, not yet reported, para 142.
55.  Case C -370/12, Pringle v. Ireland and others, Judgment 
of 27 November 2012, not yet reported, paras. 53 to 57.
56.  Case C -370/12, Pringle v. Ireland and others, Judgment 
of 27 November 2012, not yet reported, para 56
57.  Case C-370/12, Pringle v. Ireland and others, Judgment 
of 27 November 2012, not yet reported, para 60.
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Union to establish a stability mechanism such as 
the ESM Treaty, the Court concluded that it was 
permissible for the Member States to create such 
a mechanism outside the Union.58 Even if it may 
be argued that the Union could have created such 
a mechanism within the Union pursuant to gen-
eral powers provided for in Article 352 TFEU, the 
Court observed that the Union had not exercised 
such powers and was not obliged to have done 
so.59
Finally, the Court noted that since the Treaties did not 
at present preclude Member States participating in the 
ESM, Member States could ratify the Treaty without 
it being necessary to await the entry into force of the 
European Council Decision amending Article 136 
TFEU.60  
58.  Case C -370/12, Pringle v. Ireland and others, Judgment 
of 27 November 2012, not yet reported, paras. 64 to 68.
59.  Case C -370/12, Pringle v. Ireland and others, Judgment 
of 27 November 2012, not yet reported, para 67.
60.  Case C -370/12, Pringle v. Ireland and others, Judgment 
of 27 November 2012, not yet reported, paras. 183 to 
185.
4. The Impact of the ESM Treaty on European 
Democracy 
It is suggested that even if the legal framework 
governing the ESM has been held to be entirely 
compatible with obligations enshrined in the EU 
Treaties, the process by which the Member States 
and the European Council established the Euro-
pean stability mechanism may be characterised 
as a circumvention of Union law which is liable 
to have an adverse effect on the integrity of the 
Union legal order and to the quality of European 
Democracy. 
This claim rests on three principal arguments. 
First, it is normatively incoherent to use intergov-
ernmental treaties to side-step restrictions and 
obligations contained in the Union Treaties. Sec-
ond, it is conceptually incoherent to regulate mat-
ters of fundamental and intrinsic concern to the 
EU Treaties outside the Union legal order. Third, 
the establishment and operation of an important 
institution outside the constitutional framework 
of the Union and beyond the reach of its citizens 
(and the rights they are guaranteed under the 
Charter) is inconsistent with the principle of dem-
ocratic governance. Each of these arguments will 
be considered in turn.
4.1 Normative Incoherence 
in Establishing the ESM 
Outside the Union Legal 
Order
The establishment and operation of the ESM out-
side the Union legal order represents a challenge 
to the scope and authority of binding EU Treaty 
norms. 
Article 123 TFEU expressly prohibits the Euro-
pean Central Bank or the central banks of other 
Member States from granting overdraft facilities 
or any other type of credit facility to public au-
thorities and bodies of the Union and of Member 
States from purchasing directly from them their 
debt instruments.61 Yet the Member States have 
61.  Case C -370/12, Pringle v. Ireland and others, Judgment 
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established, outside the framework of the Union 
Treaties, a new autonomous institution the essen-
tial function of which is to provide loans to Mem-
ber States and to purchase their debt instruments 
on the primary and secondary markets. The ECJ 
confirmed that as Article 123 TFEU is addressed 
specifically to the ECB and to the central banks of 
the Member States, it does not prohibit such assis-
tance by a group of Member States.62 Nevertheless, 
even if not prohibited, it is difficult to escape the 
conclusion that the establishment of a financial 
institution outside the Union that operates in liai-
son with and parallel to the ECB and is entrusted 
with carrying out precisely the activities that the 
ECB is prohibited from carrying out, constitutes a 
circumvention of the spirit of the prohibition con-
tained in Article 123 TFEU.
Equally, the so called “no bailout” clause enshrined 
in Article 125 TFEU has now been interpreted to 
permit a €700 billion bailout fund in circumstanc-
es where prohibition on bailouts was found not in 
secondary legislation, but enshrined in a provision 
of 27 November 2012, not yet reported, para 123.
62.  Case C -370/12, Pringle v. Ireland and others, Judgment 
of 27 November 2012, not yet reported, paras 123 to 128.
of primary Treaty law. It is clear that the inclusion 
of the “no bailout” clause in the Maastricht Treaty 
was intended to provide a clear signal to the finan-
cial markets that “neither the Community nor the 
other Member States stand behind a Member State’s 
debts.”63 But this is precisely what the ESM will do. 
In its judgment in Pringle the ECJ held that the 
Member States’ obligation under the ESM to grant 
financial assistance or to cover Member States 
failure to make contributions into the ESM Fund 
64 does not constitute a guarantee or even an as-
sumption of commitments prohibited by Article 
125 TFEU essentially because the primary debtor 
remains liable for its debts and that financial assis-
tance was subject to conditions.65 However, such a 
position implies the premise that a defining char-
acteristic of a guarantee is that it absolves a pri-
63.  See records of the Monetary Committee, working on 
the preparation of the Maastricht Treaty, cited by the 
Commission.
64. Case C -370/12, Pringle v. Ireland and others, Judgment 
of 27 November 2012, not yet reported, paras 144 and 
145, referring to obligations under Article 25(2) of the 
ESM Treaty.
65.  Case C -370/12, Pringle v. Ireland and others, Judgment 
of 27 November 2012, not yet reported, paras 138 and 
145.
mary debtor of its debtor status. However, the cre-
ation of a guarantee does not necessarily or even 
ordinarily affect the primary liability of a debtor. 
66 The defining feature of a guarantee is that it pro-
vides creditors with an alternative source of re-
dress in the event of a debtor’s default. A guaran-
tor is under an obligation to assume the financial 
commitments of a debtor’s debt regardless of the 
fact that the initial and primary duty of payment 
remains with the debtor. In other words, the fact 
that a primary debtor is legally liable for a debt 
does not mean that the guarantor called upon to 
pay that debt is not assuming the debtor’s financial 
burden.
66.  See for example Geraldine Andrews and Richard Mil-
lett “Law of Guarantees” (Sweet & Maxwell, 6th edition, 
2011). At para 1-005, the authors observe that “The es-
sential distinguishing feature of a contract of guarantee 
is that the liability of the guaranto is always ancillary, 
or secondary, to that of the principal, who remains pri-
marily liable to the creditor”. At para 1-001, the authors 
define suretyship as “the generic term given to contracts 
by which one person (the surety) agrees to answer for 
some existing or future liability of another (the princi-
pal) to a third person (the creditor), and by which the 
surety’s liability is in addition to, and not in substitu-
tion for, that of the principal” – (emphasis added). 
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Moreover, in practice, the provision of financial 
assistance on the scale envisaged by the ESMT 
will always be subject to conditions. It is practi-
cally and politically inconceivable that Member 
States would directly and fully assume such fi-
nancial burden without imposing any conditions 
on the recipient Member State. To suggest that 
Article 125 TFEU was only intended to prohib-
it unconditional indemnities that fully absolve 
a debtor Member State of its liability for debts 
would significantly restricts its scope of applica-
tion. Perhaps it was for this reason that the Court 
was careful to limit the permissibility of providing 
financial assistance to circumstances in which it 
is indispensable for the safeguarding of the finan-
cial stability of the euro as a whole.67 Yet, even this 
limitation finds no basis in the text of Article 125 
TFEU. That provision does not in any way qualify 
the prohibition on granting financial assistance 
depending on the particular purpose of such fi-
nancial assistance. 
In the context of the Pringle case, a number of 
interveners argued that the Union Treaty provi-
67.  Case C -370/12, Pringle v. Ireland and others, Judgment 
of 27 November 2012, not yet reported, para 136.
sions and prohibitions on financial assistance laid 
down in Articles 122 and 125 TFEU referred to 
the Union and the Member States alone and not 
to independent entities they might choose to cre-
ate.68 Therefore, even if Article 125 TFEU prohib-
ited the granting of financial assistance for the 
purposes of safeguarding the euro, such prohibi-
tion would not in any event extend to the ESM, 
which, as an international organization, possessed 
distinct legal personality and was not subject to 
Union law. 69 
Ultimately, the ECJ did not have to address this 
particular argument because it found that Article 
125 TFEU did not prohibit the kind of financial 
assistance envisaged by the permanent stability 
mechanism. Nevertheless, the nature and tenor 
of such arguments lend support to the view that 
the establishment of the ESM outside the Union 
legal order was considered to facilitate the cir-
cumvention of the prohibition of bail-outs in the 
Union legal order. This interpretation of Union 
law would be inconsistent with the principle of su-
68.  Observations of Cyprus, Ireland, Austria in Case 370/12 
Pringle v. Ireland. See footnote [27] Supra.
69.  Ibid.,
premacy of Union law and incompatible with the 
authority of the EU legal order.70 Indeed, the ECJ 
emphasized that, in operating outside the Union, 
the Member States were not performing functions 
that were prohibited inside the Union. The Court 
noted that, even when acting in areas of reserved 
competence, Member State must ensure that these 
competences are exercised in conformity with 
Union law.71
Finally, proceeding outside the framework of the 
Union Treaties facilitated the circumvention of 
the requirement to amend the TFEU using the or-
dinary revision procedure, which would have en-
tailed the establishment of a Convention and the 
participation of representatives of national parlia-
ments. Article 48(6) TEU restricts the use of the 
SRP to amendments that do not increase the com-
petence of the Union. An amendment authoris-
ing the Union to provide bailouts would, however, 
70.  See for example the approach of the ECJ  in Case 50/76 
Amsterdam Bulb [1977] ECR 137, para. 35, Case 106/77 
Simmenthal [1978] ECR I-629, para 14 and Case C-135/08 
Rottman v. Freistaat Bayern [2010] ECR I-1449, para 41.
71.  Case C -370/12, Pringle v. Ireland and others, Judgment 
of 27 November 2012, not yet reported, paras 69, 124 
and 126.
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have entailed an increase in the competences of 
the Union, since no such entitlement presently 
exists in the Union Treaties and consequently the 
SRP could not have been used.72
It is submitted that the decision to establish the 
ESM outside the EU legal order was intended to 
permit Member States to circumvent provisions 
prohibiting or restricting the granting of financial 
assistance by Member States or by the ECB. In ad-
dition, it facilitated Member States to side-step the 
requirement to amend the Union Treaties using 
the ordinary revision procedure. Taken cumula-
tively, the use of international agreements to by-
pass or circumvent provisions of Union law may 
be regarded as challenging the normative coher-
ence of the Union legal order.
72.  It is noteworthy that this point was also identified by 
the ECJ at the hearing of the Pringle case on 23 October 
2012. The Court inquired whether the establishment of 
the ESM outside the Union legal order could not reason-
ably be regarded as a circumvention of the requirement 
to amend the Treaties using an ordinary revision proce-
dure. 
4.2 Conceptual Incoherence 
in Establishing the ESM 
Outside the Union Legal 
Order
The Union’s single currency is at the core of EU 
economic and monetary Union and forms a fun-
damental and intrinsic part of the Union legal or-
der. Article 3(4) TEU expressly entrusts the Union 
with establishing an economic and monetary 
union with the euro as its currency. To this end, 
the Treaty confers the Union with exclusive com-
petence in monetary policy for eurozone Mem-
ber States.73 While economic policy is a field of 
shared competence, Member States are required 
to exercise their residual competence with a view 
to achieving the objectives of the Union, which 
include EMU.74 Article 5(1) TFEU expressly re-
quires that Member States coordinate their eco-
nomic policies “within the Union.” It is clear from 
Articles 119 TFEU that the activities of both the 
Union and Member States include the adoption of 
an economic policy that is based on the close co-
73.  Article 3(1)(c) TEU.
74.  Article 120 TFEU read in combination with Article 3(4) 
TEU.
ordination of Member States’ economic policies, 
as well as on the internal market and on defined 
common objectives. Article 119(2) TFEU clarifies 
that these activities also include the single cur-
rency and the definition and conduct of a single 
monetary policy and exchange-rate policy. Article 
136(1) TFEU confers upon the Union the compe-
tence to adopt measures specific to the Member 
States the currency of which is the euro in order 
to ensure the proper functioning of economic and 
monetary Union. The Union has made extensive 
use of the competence afforded to it in adopting 
a series of measures designed to strengthen eco-
nomic governance of the Union.75 
75.  See for example, Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 
of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the surveillance 
of budgetary positions and the surveillance and co-
ordination of economic policies (1997 OJ L 209/1) as 
amended by Regulation (EU) No 1175/2011 of the Eu-
ropean Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 
2011; Regulation (EU)  No 1173/2011  of  the  European 
Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  16 November  2011 
on  the  effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance 
in the euro area (2011 OJ L 306/1);  Regulation (EU) 
No 1174/2011 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 16 November 2011 on enforcement meas-
ures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances 
in the euro area (2011 OJ L 306/8); Regulation (EU) 
No 1176/2011 on the prevention and correction of mac-
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It is clear from these provisions that economic and 
monetary Union and the effective functioning of 
the eurozone is a matter falling within the scope of 
Union law. It is equally clear that, while the ESM 
may provide financial assistance to specific Mem-
ber States, it is essentially concerned with preserv-
ing the stability of the Union’s single currency and 
the euro area as whole.76 Given the fundamental 
and intrinsic place of economic and monetary 
union within the EU treaties, it is conceptually in-
coherent for a mechanism that is intimately con-
cerned with the preservation and functioning of 
that union to be established and to operate outside 
the Union legal order. 
In Pringle the ECJ observed that the Union Trea-
ties do not confer any specific power on the Union 
to establish a funding mechanism as envisaged by 
the European Council Decision. Indeed, the ab-
roeconomic imbalances (2011 OJ L 306/25). Council 
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on speeding 
up and clarifying the implementation of the exces-
sive deficit procedure (1997 OJ L 209/6) as amended by 
Council Regulation No 1177/2011 of 8 November 2011 
(2011 OJ L 306/33)
76.  Case C-370/12, Pringle v. Ireland and others, Judgment 
of 27 November 2012, not yet reported, para 136. See 
also Article 3 of the ESM Treaty.
sence of such an express power is to be expected in 
circumstances where the provision of financial as-
sistance had been expressly prohibited by Article 
125 TFEU. However, the mere fact that a specific 
legal basis for establishing a funding facility does 
not exist in Union law, does not mean that it is ap-
propriate for such a mechanism to be established 
outside the EU legal order once the mechanism 
relates to a matter that is of intimate concern to the 
Union Treaties and where that mechanism could 
have been established using more general powers 
conferred on the Union. It will be recalled that the 
European Parliament expressed regret that the 
European Council had not explored all the possi-
bilities contained in the Treaties for establishing a 
permanent stability mechanism within the Union 
legal order.77 Having regard to the present Union 
competences concerning economic and monetary 
union78 and monetary policy for eurozone Mem-
ber States,79 the Parliament considered it would 
have been appropriate to make use of the powers 
conferred on the Council in Article 136 TFEU, or, 
77.  See Resolution of the European Parliament of 23 
March 2011 footnote 25, supra.
78.  Article 3(4) TEU.
79.  Article 3(1)(c) TFEU.
in the alternative, to have recourse to Article 352 
TFEU in conjunction with Articles 133 and 136 
TFEU. In its Opinion the ECB equally supported 
recourse to the “Union method.”
The approach advocated by the European Parlia-
ment would have been more consistent with the 
competences of the Union in the field of economic 
and monetary policy. It is well established that in 
areas of shared competence, Member States may 
only exercise their competence to the extent that 
the Union has not exercised its competences.80 
Given that Member States conferred competence 
upon the Union to ensure the proper functioning 
of economic and monetary Union, and that such 
competence has been exercised, the Union frame-
work could have and ought to have been used to 
safeguard the stability of the eurozone area. Such 
an approach would moreover have ensured the in-
corporation of legislative, judicial and democratic 
safeguards that form part of the Union legal order.
80.  Articles 2(2) TFEU.
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4.3 Implications of 
Establishing the ESM 
Outside the Union Legal 
Order on Democracy and the 
Rule of law
The Union is a highly complex political entity that 
mediates and balances numerous and varying 
interests of different Institutions, of the Member 
States as well of different civil and political group-
ings within the Member States. Dawson and De 
Witte have argued that the Union’s response to the 
euro-crisis has significantly altered the Constitu-
tional balance upon which the Union’s stability is 
premised.81 These commentators note that, in the 
context of the Union legal order, the doctrine of 
institutional balance ensures that the generation 
of legal norms takes account of three distinct sets 
of interest: individual EU citizens (represented by 
the European Parliament); sovereign States (rep-
resented by the Council); and the supra-national 
interests (represented by the Commission). They 
further observe that the legislative process offers 
81.  Mark Dawson and Floris de Witte, “Constitutional Bal-
ance in the EU after the euro-crisis” (2013) 76 Modern 
Law Review (forthcoming).
multiple forums through which the citizen’s in-
terests can be articulated ensuring that citizens 
have authorship over the norms that bind them. 
Dawson and De Witte conclude that the balance 
between the different Union institutions’ deci-
sions and their different prerogatives within the 
decision-making process ultimately ensures the 
legitimacy of the law-making process and serves 
to stabilize the Union’s role as a supra-national 
setting for the generation of binding norms.82 
The establishment of the ESM by way of an inter-
governmental treaty outside the framework of the 
Union Treaties means, however, that the activities 
of the ESM are no longer subject to the legislative 
and democratic safeguards that are inherent in the 
Union legal order. 
First, as mentioned above, the creation of the ESM 
institution as an intergovernmental treaty has 
side-stepped the requirement for Member States 
to amend the Union Treaties using the ordinary 
revision procedure. Instead, it was possible for the 
European Council to introduce an amendment 
through the adoption of a Decision in accordance 
with the simplified revision procedure provided 
82.  Ibid., pages 10 and 11.
for under Article 48(6) TEU. It may be perfectly 
comprehensible for Member States in times of 
crisis to use as simple and swift a Treaty amend-
ment procedure as possible. However, the SRP is 
also a less democratic procedure. It removes the 
requirement for a Convention and, in particular, 
for the participation of representatives of national 
parliaments. In relation to the Treaty on Stability, 
Co-ordination and Governance in the Economic 
and Monetary Union, Craig has noted that
[w]hatever one believes about its desirability or 
not, this new treaty does raise an issue of princi-
ple, which you can call a rule-of-law issue of prin-
ciple, that is concerned with whether we should 
bear with equanimity the idea [of decision mak-
ing rules] being circumvented by a treaty outside 
the fabric of the Lisbon Treaty in circumstances 
where the rules as to how change should be un-
dertaken within the Lisbon Treaty are not capable 
of being met, particularly given that the SCG [Sta-
bility, Co-ordination and Governance] Treaty can 
only work through the participation of the EU in-
stitutions in the way that is written into that trea-
ty.83
83.  Oral Evidence of Professor Paul Craig before the Eu-
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Arguably similar considerations arise in connec-
tion with the use of an inter-governmental treaty 
that circumvents the requirement for an ordinary 
amendment of the Union Treaties.
Second, the form of stability mechanism that has 
been established by the Member States operates 
beyond the Union legal order and is largely unac-
countable to its citizens. Pursuant to Article 32(3) 
of the ESMT, the ESM enjoys “immunity from ev-
ery form of judicial process” except to the extent 
that the ESM expressly waives its immunity.84 
Moreover, as the ESM is not a Union body, it is 
not subject to the EU Treaties, the Charter of Fun-
damental Rights, or General principles of Union 
law. As the ECJ has confirmed, the Charter only 
applies in the field of Union law and is not binding 
on the ESM Institution. 85  At the same time, the 
activities of the ESM and, in particular, the “strict 
ropean Scrutiny Committee of   the House of Com-
mons. Answer to Question 12. The transcript is avail-
able at:  http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/
cm201012/cmselect/cmeuleg/uc1817- i/uc181701.htm
84.  Article 32(3) of the ESMT.
85.  Case C -370/12, Pringle v. Ireland and others, Judgment 
of 27 November 2012, not yet reported, paras. 178 to 
182.
conditions” attaching to its grants of financial as-
sistance, may well impact upon economic and so-
cial rights protected by the Charter. For example, 
Title IV of the Charter enumerates rights con-
cerning fair and just working conditions, the en-
titlement to social security and social assistance, 
and access to health care. Economic conditions 
attaching to the ESM’s financial assistance have 
the potential to directly and personally impact 
on citizens’ social rights.86 However, the ESM, in 
the performance of its functions, will not be sub-
ject to review against the provisions of the Char-
ter. The ESM is set to operate outside the reach of 
the democratic and constitutional limitations that 
form part of the Union legal order.  
Third, the accumulation of contradictions with 
and circumventions of the Union legal order gives 
the impression that, taken as a whole, the legal 
86.  For example, see cases giving rise to a prelimi-
nary reference in Cases C-434/11 Corpul Naţional al 
Poliţiştilor, Order of 14 December 2011 and C-134/12 
Ministerul Administraţiei şi Internelor (MAI), Order of 
10 May 2012. See cases giving rise to a reference in 
Cases C-128/12 Sindicato dos Bancários do Norte and 
Others v. BPN and C-264/12 Sindicato Nacional dos 
Profissionais de Seguros e Afins v. Fidelidade Mundial 
pending before this Court.
framework governing the ESM avoids a number 
of prohibitions and obligations set out in law. The 
extent of the circumvention becomes clear when 
one analyses the arguments raised in support of 
the legal framework governing the ESMT in the 
context of the challenge in Pringle. Defenders of 
the ESMT maintained that Article 125 TFEU, re-
ferred to as the “no bailout” clause did not pro-
hibit bailouts;87 that the ESM “bailout” fund ought 
not to be regarded as a “bail-out fund.”88 It was 
suggested that the ESM is immune from EU law 
prohibitions as it operates under international law 
and is an independent entity,89 even though it is 
87.  Observations of Germany and the Netherlands in Case 
370/12 Pringle v. Ireland. These Member States argued 
that the prohibition of Article 125 TFEU should be 
read teleologically in the context of the ongoing finan-
cial crisis. Germany argued that the prohibition on bail 
outs should be read restrictively “in certain exceptional 
cases which were not foreseeable when the provision was 
adopted”. 
88.  Observations of Ireland and France in Case 370/12 
Pringle v. Ireland. France argued that ESM is not “a 
bail-out” fund precluded by Article 125 TFEU because 
financial assistance is subject to repayment and condi-
tionality. It was submitted on behalf of Mr Pringle that 
a conditional bail-out remains a bail-out.  
89.  Observations of Cyprus, Ireland, Austria in Case 370/12 
Pringle v. Ireland. See footnote 27 Supra.
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entirely controlled by the Member States. It was 
simultaneously argued that the ESM is not an in-
dependent entity so that disputes with the ESM 
should be regarded as disputes between Member 
States relating to the subject matter of the Union 
Treaties,90 affording the ECJ jurisdiction to rule on 
disputes under Article 273 TFEU. It was argued 
that the ESM is not concerned with monetary 
policy – although its task is to save the euro;91 that 
the ESM falls outside the economic competence 
reserved to the Union – even though it is directly 
concerned with coordinating financial assistance 
to support the Union’s single currency;92 that the 
establishment of a bail-out fund requires a Treaty 
amendment93 – yet the ESM may operate before 
the amendment takes effect. Arguably the accu-
90.  Observations of the Netherlands in Case 370/12 Pringle 
v. Ireland. That government states “Disputes concerning 
the interpretation and application of the ESM Treaty are 
evidently disputes which relate to the subject matter of 
the Treaties”.
91.  Observations of Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, Ire-
land, Greece, France, Cyprus, Austria in Case 370/12 
Pringle v. Ireland.
92.  Observations of Germany and the European 
Commission in Case 370/12 Pringle v. Ireland.
93.  See Recital 2 of European Council Decision of 25 March 
2011 (2011 OJ L 91/1).
mulation of such contradictions and the circum-
vention of prohibitions contained in the Union 
Treaties represent a challenge to the Union’s fun-
damental commitment to respect for the rule of 
law as enshrined in Article 2 TEU.
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5. Conclusion
When attention is devoted to avoiding one par-
ticular hazard, it can be all too easy to fall into an-
other. In seeking to avoid restrictions on the pro-
vision of financial assistance or the requirement 
to amend the Treaties using the ordinary revision 
procedure, the Member States and Institutions 
proceeded to adopt measures that may be consid-
ered to impact adversely on the quality of Euro-
pean democracy. 
The adoption of measures that are inconsistent 
with or circumvent prohibitions or obligations 
laid down in the Union Treaties gives the impres-
sion that legal principles and provisions, which are 
negotiated and adopted by democratically man-
dated representatives of the Member States, may 
be subordinated and ancillary to considerations 
of a political nature. This writer subscribes to the 
view that selective or inconsistent application of 
Union law risks undermining the integrity of the 
legal reasoning within the Union legal order.94
94.  Paul Craig, “The Stability, Coordination and Govern-
ance Treaty” (2012) 37 E.L. Rev, June 2012.
The establishment of a body that is fundamentally 
and intrinsically concerned with the Union’s sin-
gle currency outside the Union Treaties is not eas-
ily reconcilable with the central place of economic 
and monetary union within the Union legal order. 
The creation of a permanent stability mechanism 
that is liable to have a direct impact on the lives of 
Union citizens and yet lies outside and beyond the 
reach of the Union legal order, and is subject nei-
ther to general principles nor the rights enshrined 
in the Charter of fundamental rights, may be re-
garded as undermining of the principle of effective 
judicial protection and democratic accountability. 
It has been argued that the Union is not so much 
defined by a common people or demos as by a 
shared commitment to common values, particu-
larly democracy and the rule of law.95 Even in ex-
ceptional circumstances, the adoption of perma-
nent measures that are inconsistent with such val-
95.  See for example the characterization of the Union legal 
order by Professor Walter Van Gerven in The European 
Union: A Polity of States and Peoples (Stanford Univer-
sity Press, 2005).
ues risks undermining the integrity of the Union 
legal order as a whole.
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1. Introduction
The European Union (EU) in general, and its Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union (EMU) component 
in particular, are going through a protracted cri-
sis of heretofore unknown magnitude. That crisis 
has led to important institutional changes. Some 
of them have occurred upfront in formal political 
arenas, are very visible, and openly contested – e.g. 
the adoption of the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM). Others, by contrast, have occurred in a 
more covert or invisible way, unfolding after the 
adoption of a different formal rule – e.g. the trans-
formation of comitology rules in the monitoring of 
excessive economic imbalances. In this article we 
focus on the latter type of institutional change and 
its consequences. We ask: Under what conditions 
does interstitial institutional change (IIC, defined 
as change between formal institutional decisions) 
occur, and what are its consequences?
Note preliminarily that, although our approach is 
that of positive political science, our motivation is 
normative. In seeking to highlight and explain re-
cent episodes of IIC in a “community of law” (ECJ 
1986) such as the EU, we wish to elucidate the im-
pact of the current financial, fiscal, and political 
crisis in the Euro-zone on a set of relatively well-
functioning institutions. Of course, fully-fledged 
democracy and total transparency belong to the 
realm of normative aspirations rather than to that 
of positive observations. Therefore, it should per-
haps not come as a surprise that institutions may 
change following unexpected, perhaps a-legal or 
extra-legal, procedures. Nevertheless, the process 
of European integration should, and can, be as-
sessed against its reliance on the transparent adop-
tion, implementation, and change of substantive 
and procedural rules (e.g. Héritier 1999; Pescatore 
1972; Rideau 1999, 2000). In fact, even official 
rhetoric adopts a “constitutionalist” tone, and ar-
gues that “the EU’s legal order is the true founda-
tion of the Union, giving it a common system of law 
under which to operate. Only by creating new law 
and upholding it can the Union’s underlying objec-
tives be achieved.” (EUR-Lex 2012)  
We also fully acknowledge the fact that not all 
laws can be designed, adopted, and implemented 
efficiently if abstract legal procedure is held para-
mount. For example, substantive legal rules, espe-
cially those emanating from “framework treaties” 
such as those of the EU, are constantly reinterpret-
ed. According to the structurationist school of le-
gal methodology (‘Strukturierende Rechtslehre’), 
that is precisely the raison d’être of all legal schol-
arship: think through all the practical implications 
of an abstract norm which can be conceived as a 
text-based programme (‘Sprachdaten’), and do so 
in light of all the detailed cases which can be en-
countered during its implementation (‘Realdaten’) 
(Müller 1993; Riesenhuber 2010). Similarly, going 
“by the book” may sometimes introduce unneces-
sary rigidities whereas real-world circumstances 
demand quick adaptations of substantive and pro-
cedural rules. That has been particularly true dur-
ing the recent (and on-going) financial and fiscal 
crisis, on which we focus in the rest of this paper. 
With these points in mind, we build on Farrell and 
Héritier (2005) and Héritier (2008: 47) and define 
IIC as informal institutional change which occurs 
between two formal rule revisions. For example, at 
time t1 a committee may initially formally agree to 
strictly adopt all its decisions by unanimity; pro-
gressively, and informally, it may accept to delegate 
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decision-making powers to individual members; 
and finally, and formally, at time t2 it may recon-
vene to discuss its decision-making rules. IIC is 
the second step in that sequence, i.e. the informal 
step taken between t1 and t2. What happens then 
may hugely affect the decision at t2. The study of 
this type of institutional change is therefore not 
only interesting from a policy-oriented perspec-
tive, but also relevant from a theoretical point of 
view because it informs the burgeoning literature 
on the nature of institutions and the conditions 
for institutional change.    
The main descriptive argument we make is that the 
current crisis in the Euro-zone has led to certain 
IICs with potentially far-reaching consequences 
for the governance of the EU as a whole, including 
its democratic attributes. To be sure, some impor-
tant changes in fiscal and economic governance 
rules have occurred upfront in the formal politi-
cal arenas. The examples we examine here include 
(1) the transformation of comitology rules in the 
monitoring of excessive macro-economic imbal-
ances; (2) the contested emergence of a super-
Commissioner for the Euro; and (3) the shifting 
mandate of the European Central Bank (ECB). 
On this basis, we make the following theoretical 
argument: far from fitting squarely into the main 
theoretical models currently used in the literature 
to analyze institutions and institutional change 
in the EU (i.e. principal-agent and/or transaction 
cost economics), IIC episodes in 2010-2012 create 
altogether new theoretical categories. 
The remaining of this paper is organized as fol-
lows. Section 2 describes the two dominant ap-
proaches to institutions in political science (the 
functionalist and the power-based approaches), 
and theorizes their implications in terms of the 
amendment of clear (“complete”) and less clear 
(“incomplete”) rules. Section 3 briefly presents the 
methodology followed in this research, namely 
analytic narratives. Section 4 turns to the actual 
cases of IIC identified above. Section 5 concludes 
with some thoughts on the refined theory of IIC. 
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2. Political science approaches to 
institutions and institutional change
We are interested in the reasons why apparently 
stable institutions (“equilibrium institutions”) 
may come to change – in this case, under the pres-
sure of the current financial and fiscal crises. Ac-
cordingly, this section first presents the two domi-
nant approaches to institutions and institutional 
change, namely “institutions as game forms” and 
“institutions as equilibria”. It then summarizes 
the two main theoretical tools used to study in-
stitutions in the EU, namely the principal-agent 
framework (PA) and transaction cost economics 
(TCE). We then note that both PA and TCE ex-
hibit a functionalist bias, whereby institutions and 
institutional change work to the benefit of at least 
one stakeholder and to the detriment of none. 
Building on that argument, we propose to exam-
ine less functional forms of institutional change, 
i.e. cases of IIC which clearly create winners and 
losers. We thereby arrive at the following hypoth-
esis: the more complete (incomplete) the rule to 
be amended, the more (less) contested and uncer-
tain the amendment will be at the interstitial stage. 
2.1 Institutions as game 
forms vs. institutions as 
equilibria
According to Kenneth Shepsle, there are currently 
two dominant approaches to institutions and in-
stitutional change in political science: “institu-
tions as game forms” and “institutions as equi-
libria” (Shepsle 2006: 1032-1040).  The former is 
a concept emanating from the work of economic 
historian Douglass North, who defined insti-
tutions as “the rules of the game in a society or, 
more formally, the humanly devised constraints 
that shape human interaction” (North 1990: 3). 
Institutions are thus understood as venues for 
strategic social interaction and choice. Examples 
from EU politics would be the Ordinary Legisla-
tive Procedure (‘OLP’, Articles 289 and 294 TFEU, 
formerly known as the co-decision procedure), 
the simple-majority decision-making rule in the 
European Commission (Article 250 TFEU), or 
the rule according to which only the Council of 
Ministers can decide to increase the number of 
Advocates General in the ECJ (Article 252 TFEU). 
As Shepsle notes, although this concept is useful 
to analyze the play of the game and its outcomes, 
it is insufficient when attention is riveted to un-
derstanding institutional creation and change. 
The mere fact that players keep playing the game 
does not explain they are playing this, as opposed 
to another, game.
A more promising concept to understand institu-
tional choice and change is “institutions as equi-
libria”. According to Shepsle, “rather than take an 
institution as an exogenously provided game form 
that induces equilibrium outcomes, one might in-
stead think of the game form itself as an equilibri-
um – as an endogenous product of a more primal 
setting, or what may be called an equilibrium insti-
tution” (Shepsle 2006: 1033). For example, rather 
than treating the EU’s OLP as a fixed and exog-
enous parameter, we can attempt to endogenize 
it and treat it as a variable that is the product of 
a more encompassing game (perhaps one played 
between large member states with many MEPs 
on the one hand, and smaller member states with 
considerably fewer MEPs on the other). Attention 
shifts from focusing on the operations of OLP 
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to an understanding of why co-decision was in-
troduced, whose interests it served, and for what 
purposes it was re-branded “ordinary legislative 
procedure”.   
Despite its seemingly abstract character, this 
theoretical discussion bears crucially on how we 
interpret current developments in the EU. Note 
first that North’s approach takes for granted the 
rationality of conforming to institutional practic-
es. Yet, under certain conditions, this assumption 
may become incompatible with the more basic as-
sumption of actor rationality. Shepsle’s approach, 
by contrast, requires demonstrating exactly why 
adherence to specific equilibrium behaviour is in 
an actor’s best self-interest – which includes show-
ing what negative consequences actors would face 
if they ever decided to defect, and therefore why, 
on balance, it may not be rational for them to do 
so after all. Of course, for the purposes of the pres-
ent paper, it is the flipside of this question which 
is of greater interest: under what conditions can 
certain national governments change the rules of 
the game? Once that question is posed, the issue 
of IIC comes to the foreground.       
2.2 Institutional change in 
principal-agent models 
and in transaction cost 
economics
The literature on EU governance uses two dif-
ferent theoretical methodologies to answer the 
question of institutional choice and change: the 
complete contracts approach of PA models, and 
the incomplete contracts approach of TCE. First, 
PA models are used to investigate institutions cre-
ated between a poorly informed principal (‘P’, 
‘she’) and a better-informed agent (‘A’, ‘he’) in a 
frictionless world where the only imperfection is 
that asymmetry of information. The main issue 
for PA analysts is to determine what institution P 
can propose to induce A to act on her behalf. For 
example, following Winkler (1999), we can model 
the politics of the Stability and Growth Pact of the 
Treaty on European Union as a contract signed be-
tween anti-inflationary principals (Germany and 
The Netherlands) and traditionally inflationary 
agents (France and Italy). Alternatively, following 
Steunenberg (2010), we can model the politics of 
Economic and Monetary Union since Greece’s en-
try as a contract signed between the Commission 
(as principal) and the Hellenic government (as 
agent). In both cases, P hires A to perform a task 
which bears on her welfare.      
Invariably, the interests of A and P are not aligned: 
there is at least some distributive dimension 
in their cooperative venture. In addition, A al-
ways benefits from informational asymmetries: 
he always has more information regarding his 
own type and/or actions. And finally, P may not 
know the type or actions of each specific A, but 
she knows the compensation requirements of all 
different types of A. Given these elements, P can 
propose a menu of different games to A, such that 
each game maximizes the objective function of A 
and her own utility given the real type or action 
of A.   
In PA models of adverse selection (AS), P may be 
the pivotal voter in the Council of Ministers who 
wishes to spend her time on the campaign trail 
rather than in Brussels, and therefore wishes to 
hire a supranational agent, A, to make EU policy. 
The AS problem stems from the fact that, at the 
time of hiring A, only A knows his own abilities. 
He therefore has an incentive to misrepresent his 
type: by claiming to be inefficient, he can hope to 
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command higher compensation for each given 
task. P’s task therefore consists in devising con-
tracts (c1 and c2) which act as screening devices, so 
that only a truly inefficient A would choose c1, and 
only an efficient A would choose c2. (Of course, in 
political science ability is usually not taken liter-
ally; rather, it refers to A’s ideal policy point.)
If P’s offer covers A’s participation constraint the 
latter starts exerting an effort to produce x (e.g. 
policy-making activities to produce specific out-
comes). At this second stage P’s welfare depends 
on the occurrence of moral hazard (MH). Once 
the terms of the contract are set, A can choose any 
level of effort that maximizes his own utility given 
that contract. Crucially, however, the final level of 
x depends both on A’s level of effort and certain 
entirely exogenous factors (e.g. floods, financial 
crises, etc). Whereas P can only wait to observe 
the final amount of x, A knows what effort he ex-
erted and what conditions prevailed. This creates 
a problem, since A must be paid for his effort, but 
the effect of this effort cannot be separated from 
the effect of his type and/or external random con-
ditions. Hence, to avoid type I and type II errors, 
P must incur some additional cost. In political sci-
ence, such costs are usually interpreted as moni-
toring costs (whereby P does not pay A a rent, but 
incurs a significant cost herself) and/or delegating 
more discretion to A (where the rent extraction 
– efficiency trade-off is resolved in the opposite 
direction). 
Finally, assuming that P has met A’s participation 
constraint and that the institution covers his in-
centive compatibility constraint, it is worth ask-
ing what might happen if either of the two parties 
wished to redraft the contract – e.g. if P wished to 
lower A’s remuneration, or if A started economiz-
ing on his effort, engaging in “shirking” or “slip-
ping”. Here, PA theory is clear: re-negotiation is 
possible, but only as long as the party who pro-
poses it is willing to pay the corresponding fine. 
Absent that, a perfectly functioning judiciary will 
intervene to redress the situation and impose the 
status quo ante.   
That last point provides a transition to the sec-
ond theoretical methodology commonly found 
in the literature on EU governance, TCE. In TCE, 
compensation may be a possibility, but it remains 
a rather distant one. The reason is that contracts 
here are seen as essentially incomplete, and there-
fore legally inconsequential. Contractual incom-
pleteness, in turn, is due to the bounded rational-
ity of actors. 
More specifically, TCE starts from the question 
of an organization’s external boundaries: why do 
some organizations internalize production, while 
others rely on external providers? To answer such 
questions, TCE first establishes a distinction be-
tween production costs (PC – e.g. the time and 
money needed to acquire raw materials and create 
a good or service) and transaction costs (TC – e.g. 
the time and money needed to the scan the market 
for the best inputs, plus the time and money need-
ed to negotiate, draft, register, and enforce the en-
suing contract). Although PCs and TCs are sub-
stitutes, limiting TCs is difficult because bounded 
rationality combines with whatever positive TCs 
to produce contractual incompleteness. That, in 
turn, combines with pervasive opportunism (de-
fined by Oliver Williamson as “self-interest seek-
ing with guile” – Williamson 1996: 8-9) to create 
a ubiquitous “hold-up problem”, which even a 
benevolent judiciary can do little about (because 
contracts are incomplete). The TCE solution to 
such problems is institutional: where investments 
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are so transaction-specific as to make the risk of 
hold-up expensive, parties seek to make their mu-
tual commitments credible by merging (William-
son 1975). Hierarchy thus supersedes the market; 
or, in the EU, supranational institutions are cre-
ated (Moravcsik 1998).  
What we wish to point out here is not so much the 
obvious differences in the assumptions and inner 
workings of PA and TCE (for this, see Karagiannis 
2007). Rather, it is that neither PA nor TCE can 
form an adequate basis for an insightful political 
analysis of institutional change in the EU. TCE is 
overtly functionalist. This is most obvious in Wil-
liamson’s a-political (or perhaps outright “anti-
political”) theory, where hierarchy not only su-
persedes the market through a process of efficient 
mergers and acquisitions, but also becomes “its 
own court of ultimate appeal” (Williamson 1996: 
98). Seen from outside the organization, there are 
no conflicts of interest inside it. The theory says 
nothing regarding the possible anti-competitive 
effects of mergers and acquisitions – or, in politics, 
the possible anti-democratic consequences of cre-
ating ever bigger and more integrated structures. 
PA models of institutional choice and change are 
more analytical, in the sense that they do allow for 
the definition of conditions under which a pro-
posed contract may not be Pareto-efficient. Simi-
larly, they do recognize that conflicts of interest 
may exist both between and inside organizations, 
because hierarchy does not change A’s identity. Ul-
timately, however, many PA models too are quite 
a-political. First, all the bargaining power lies with 
P. Second, when P wishes to re-negotiate the con-
tract, a well-functioning judiciary is assumed to 
operate, whereby A is adequately compensated 
for the institutional change. Like TCE, PA models 
thus end up proposing a rather consensual view of 
institutional choice, and an even more consensual 
view of institutional change. 
2.3 Less functional forms of 
interstitial institutional 
change
Is it possible to imagine cases where institution-
al change occurs in a way which clearly benefits 
some actors and clearly penalizes some others? If 
so, where would these cases stand in the context of 
current theory? To guide our quest for answers to 
these questions, we provide a two-by-two typol-
ogy illustrated in Table 1 below. On the horizontal 
axis we distinguish between complete (clear and 
fully-specified) institutions and incomplete (un-
clear or only partly specified) ones. That distinc-
tion roughly captures the difference between TCE 
(an incomplete contracts theory) and PA (a com-
plete contracts theory).1 On the vertical axis, we 
distinguish between Pareto-efficient and Pareto-
inefficient (i.e. redistributive) institutional change. 
TABLE 1: In quest for cases
Complete Contract Incomplete Contract
Pareto efficient change Principal-Agent Transaction Cost Economics
Redistributive (i.e. Pareto-
inefficient) change Case 1 Case 2 
1.  Note that PA models do not invariably assume that all 
contracts are complete; they do assume, however, that 
various types of incompleteness are acknowledged and 
appreciated ex ante. 
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Using this typology, our research task becomes 
clear: given that PA theory cannot explain change 
and that TCE theory can do so but only from an 
overtly a-political perspective, we are looking for 
cases of IIC which either (a) contravene a complete 
contract while at the same time not offering any 
guarantees of gains to all stakeholders (Case 1), or 
(b) contravene a less complete contract while at 
the same time not offering any guarantees of gains 
to all stakeholders. If we find such cases and are 
able to explain them, then we will have made a 
step forward in the understanding of current EU 
politics.  
Note that from the point of view of current 
international relations theory, we are far from 
stating the obvious. According to neo-realism, 
for example, absolutely all cases of institutional 
creation and change should obey the logic of 
relative gains, whereby no country allows its 
partners to benefit from a new rule more than 
it does (e.g. Grieco 1988). Similarly, according 
to liberal institutionalism (e.g. Keohane 2005) 
and liberal inter-governmentalism (Moravcsik 
1998), although some countries may sometimes 
focus on absolute rather than relative gains, 
all cases of institutional creation and change 
should either be consensual or otherwise follow 
predetermined procedures. Clearly, although both 
of these theories have proven their usefulness, 
it is also very easy to come up with cases which 
do not fit the theories well. By putting the bar 
even lower, we go one step beyond this: we 
make it more difficult to find cases which truly 
can question the usefulness of PA and TCE. 
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3. Methodological comments: analytic 
narratives            
Turning to our methodology, in what follows 
we focus on well-chosen “token” (as opposed 
to “typical”) events. Rational choice analysis is 
usually associated with the analysis of typical 
events (i.e. large N data: after asserting typical 
actors’ preferences and posited some generic 
game, analysts derive comparative statics on the 
basis of hypothetical values of the independent 
variables which constitute the game’s payoffs; 
hence, generic theory can be tested against any 
number of cases). Although that methodology 
can generate interesting insights, it can also 
equally easily lead to well-known aberrations, 
such as anachronistic attributions of preferences, 
reification of ontologically dubious actors, errors 
of commission, and under-researched specifics. 
For that reason, and because our goal is to discover 
cases where PA and TCE views on institutional 
creation and change are inadequate, we focus on 
the small-n, qualitative analysis of specific, micro-
political events.  
Further, we use the concepts of: (a) analytic 
narratives; and (b) clearly defined events. Analytic 
narratives combine researchers’ interest for 
specific historical events with social scientific 
theory (Bates et al., 1998). There exist two non-
mutually exclusive types of analytic narratives. The 
first type consists of analytic narratives that aim at 
adjudicating between competing historiographies. 
Here, the “analytic narrativist” assumes that 
historical actors are rational, and explores which 
of the competing historiographical claims is more 
consistent with that assumption. The second 
type aims at interpreting specific events using 
established social scientific approaches. The goal 
is to uncover and explain issues or historical 
events for which we still lack some convincing 
explanation (e.g. Bates et al., 1998). In what 
follows, we mainly use the second type of analysis.
Finally, we focus on clearly defined events as opposed 
to explananda focusing on long-term, complex 
processes which may lead to faulty inferences 
because they blur different events. We rely on 
Riker’s definition of analysable events, defined 
as “the existence … of some sort of perceived 
motion or action, sometime, somewhere” in a 
larger context of an infinitely moving reality. This 
presupposes imagining starts and stops. “What lies 
between the starts and stops we call events”. Riker 
distinguished between (1) a situation, defined as 
“an arrangement and condition of movers and 
actors in a specified, instantaneous, and spatially 
extended location”, and (2) an event, defined as 
“the motion and action occurring between an 
initial situation and a terminal situation such that 
all and only the movers and actors of the initial 
situation … are included in the terminal situation” 
(Riker 1957: 61). 
90The Euro Crisis & the State of European DemocracySection I
4. Case studies
Case 1: The Regulation on the 
Prevention and Correction of 
Macroeconomic imbalances (EU 1176, 
2011)
The first case refers to a new institutional rule in 
the application of delegated and implementing 
acts under the “six-pack” regulations revising the 
EU’s Stability and Growth Pact of 1997 as revised. 
The Regulation on the Prevention and Correction 
of Macroeconomic Imbalances contained a num-
ber of vague provisions whose specification and 
implementation required the passing of delegated 
legislation. The Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU 2009) distinguished, for 
the first time, between legislative delegation and 
executive delegation, and provided for two sepa-
rate procedures for “delegated acts” and “imple-
menting acts’ (Ponzano 2010). Under “delegated 
acts” (Art. 290 TFEU), the Commission – by leg-
islation – may be delegated the power to adopt 
acts of general scope supplementing or amending 
certain non-essential elements of the legislation in 
question. The legislators must explicitly define the 
objective, content, scope and duration of this dele-
gation. They also can choose the mechanism(s) in 
order to control the Commission when it applies 
these delegated powers, revocation and objection. 
In the case of revocation, either the Council or the 
Parliament may revoke a delegation. Similarly, an 
objection on the part of either the Council or the 
Parliament would prevent an individual “delegat-
ed act” from entering into force (see also Blom-
Hansen 2011).
The new provisions of the Lisbon Treaty leave 
open many questions as to how delegated acts 
(Art. 290) and implementing acts (Art. 291) 
should be applied. In other words the provisions 
constitute an incomplete contract. As a rule, when 
the Commission proposes a “delegated act” a con-
flict ensues between the Parliament, the Council 
and the Commission. The Council seeks to oppose 
it entirely or to reduce its scope, or to translate it 
into an implementing act. Frequently, in order to 
reach an agreement linkages are performed across 
various issues as to whether to use “delegating” or 
implementing acts (Interview Commission, Jan. 
2012).  
A recent instance of such a conflict over the choice 
of either Art. 290 or Art. 291 in recent legislation2 
is precisely the adoption of the Regulation on the 
prevention and correction of macro-economic 
imbalances. When deciding how to flesh out the 
scoreboard regime, i.e. the indicators used to 
measure and monitor macroeconomic and mac-
rofinancial imbalances, the Commission and the 
Parliament favoured “delegated acts” (Art. 290) 
whilst the Council wished to use an implement-
ing act (Art. 291) for the reasons described above. 
A deadlock ensued which after a round of nego-
tiations led to the use of an informal new type of 
procedure which is neither Art. 290 nor Art. 291, 
the “compromise”. The respective recital 12 of the 
Regulation stipulates 
“The Commission should closely cooperate 
with the European Parliament and the Coun-
2.  Other recent instances of a conflict between the 
Council, the Parliament and the Commission 
about the selection of a delegated or implementing 
act are the Cross-Border Health Care Directive and 
the Novel Food Directive.
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cil when drawing up the scoreboard and the 
set of macroeconomic and macrofinancial 
indicators for Member States. The Commis-
sion should present suggestions for comments 
to the competent committees of the Europe-
an Parliament and of the Council on plans 
to establish and adjust the indicators and 
threshold. The Commission should inform 
the European Parliament and the Council of 
any changes to the indicators and threshold 
and explain its reasons for suggesting such 
changes.” 
Note the difference to the “real” use of a delegation 
act used in another six-pack regulation on the ef-
fective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in 
the euro area.3 It states, as prescribed in the Comi-
tology Regulation of 2010, that the Commission 
shall be empowered to adopt “delegated acts” re-
garding the criteria establishing fines, procedures 
for investigations (Art. 8.4); that the Commission 
3.  Regulation (EU) No 1173/2011 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 16 Nov. 2011 on 
the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance 
in the euro area
shall draw up a report in respect of the delegation 
of power; and that the delegation may be revoked 
at any time by the Parliament or by the Council 
(Art. 11.2, and 3). 
What is striking from our theoretical perspective 
of covert institutional change under pattern one is 
that the existing formal rules constitute ambigu-
ous terms of contract, which in the situation of a 
decision stalemate were re-bargained and trans-
formed in such a way as to overcome the impasse. 
By so doing the power of the Commission was 
clearly strengthened. 
Case 2: A super-commissioner in 
charge of the Euro? 
Our second case refers to the (attempted) creation 
of a super-commissioner in charge of the Single 
currency. 
Unlike many other international organizations, 
the executive organ of the EU has traditionally 
been organized around the principles of majori-
tarian and collegial decision-making. This insti-
tution is not innocuous; on the contrary, it raises 
several issues pertaining to social choice theory 
(how does a majority of commissioners reach a 
stable decision in the absence of dictatorial pow-
ers?), transaction cost-economizing (how can 
agreements between commissioners be enforced 
in the face of changing circumstances?), incen-
tives schemes (how can an appointed official be 
held accountable if she does not have full owner-
ship of her decisions?), and even legal certainty 
(e.g. how can a party negotiate with one member 
of the Commission when her decisions risk being 
overturned in the college?).  
The origins of collegial decision-making can be 
traced back to the Schuman Declaration of May 
9, 1950. Then, French foreign minister Robert 
Schuman proposed that “Franco-German pro-
duction of coal and steel as a whole be placed 
under a common High Authority.” Regarding 
the High Authority (the predecessor of the Com-
mission), he said that it would be “composed of 
independent persons appointed by the govern-
ments, giving equal representation.” Less than a 
year later, the ‘Six’ signed the Paris Treaty creat-
ing the European Coal and Steel Community, and 
the most supranational executive bureaucracy the 
world had known. A key aspect was the majority 
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rule for High Authority decisions (Article 13(1) 
ECSC). Schuman and Jean Monnet had proposed 
to create a collegial common Authority instead of 
a series of separate, specialized agencies in charge 
of well-defined policy areas, because France and 
Germany held very different preferences on com-
mon antitrust rules (Karagiannis 2013). France, 
which wanted antitrust, had to offer Germany, 
which loathed it, assurances that no policy would 
be implemented by French agents against German 
targets. The institutional form of these assurances 
was multi-task and collegial governance. 
Over time EU politics generated new preferences 
and new events, some anticipated and some un-
foreseen. In two of the most central policies, com-
petition policy and the Single Market, most state 
actors eventually became “Europeanized”, mean-
ing that they readily could grant some specialized 
European regulator full authority. Yet the insti-
tution of collegiality was not abandoned. On the 
contrary, it proved to be both workable and ro-
bust. Not only did it continue to support the same 
equilibrium behavior despite greatly changing cir-
cumstances; it also facilitated the creation of new 
common policies (e.g. environmental policy, IT 
policy, etc) and the incremental enlargement of 
the Union to new Member States, including the 
United Kingdom. 
On the other hand, the idea to grant a member 
of the college independence has a long history. 
Such a possibility was already discussed in the 
late 1950s and the 1960s, but was vehemently de-
nied by Presidents Monnet and Hallstein (Monnet 
1976: 435; Hallstein 1962: 59). In July 1975, the 
Commission introduced into its Provisional Rules 
of Procedure a new Article 27 according to which, 
“subject to the principle of collegiate responsibility 
being respected in full the Commission may em-
power its members to take, in its name and subject 
to its control, clearly defined measures of man-
agement and administration.” (Official Journal, L 
199, at 43) That was accompanied by an internal 
Commission decision laying down the principles 
and conditions on which delegations of authority 
to particular persons would be granted. Among 
these were the following: (a) the decision to del-
egate authority internally could only be made by a 
meeting of the full Commission; (b) it could only 
concern designated categories of routine mea-
sures; and (c) the delegate could only make a de-
cision if (s)he were satisfied that all departments 
concerned were in agreement. 
In the autumn of 2011 President Barroso an-
nounced the end of across-the-board collegial-
ity as the main mechanism of governance of the 
executive branch of government of the EU. More 
specifically, Olli Rehn, the commissioner respon-
sible for the common currency, would become 
Vice-President “with a reinforced status and addi-
tional working instruments”, including the power 
to operate without previously consulting the col-
lege of commissioners. President Barroso’s deci-
sion was officially explained as: “the best way to 
guarantee the independence, objectivity, and effi-
ciency in the exercise of the Commission’s respon-
sibility of coordination, surveillance, and enforce-
ment in the area of economic governance of the 
Union and of the euro area in particular.” (Barroso 
2011) It soon emerged that commissioner Rehn’s 
new powers should grant him exclusive authority 
to control the national budgets of eurozone states, 
including the power to control tax and spending 
plans before national parliaments could do so. 
As Commissioner Rehn himself declared: “Rest 
assured, I will make full use of all these new in-
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struments from day one of their entry into force.” 
(Financial Times 2011a; Le Monde 2011; Note 
the use of the singular form, as opposed to more 
conventional expression “the Commission”, or the 
more diplomatic “we”.)
President Barroso’s decision triggered off numer-
ous immediate responses, most of them skeptical 
if not outright critical. According to the Financial 
Times, “Europe is moving toward the creation of 
a ‘budget tsar’ with expanded powers […] Rival 
commissioners would have limited means to chal-
lenge the decisions of the commissioner for eco-
nomics and monetary affairs” (Financial Times 
2011a). According to a popular blog, “EU Com-
missioner Olli Rehn [is] to get Reichmarschall 
powers from XXI century” (Ironiestoo 2011). 
Later, as the German, Dutch, and Finnish govern-
ments pushed on with the implementation of the 
decision, the Financial Times noted that “the lat-
est spark to anti-German tinders is a Berlin policy 
document, which contemplates giving the EU 
commissioner the authority to overrule Athens’ 
taxation and public spending decisions.” (Finan-
cial Times 2012) Thus, whereas the Commission 
had always been governed as a collegial body (of-
ten at the cost of policy effectiveness), its func-
tioning was now being interstitially re-designed to 
insulate certain policy areas from the usual horse-
trading politics of the college. 
In the end, new French President François Hol-
lande effectively vetoed the super-commissioner, 
and at the time of writing negotiations seem to 
still be going on. We can nevertheless clearly place 
this case in our analytical grid as a clear and com-
plete contract which is nevertheless re-negotiated 
with no compensation.  
Case 3: Delegation to the European 
Central Bank 
The ECB was delegated the task to conduct Eu-
ropean monetary policy. The Statute of the ESCB 
(European System of Central Banks), as laid down 
in the protocol to the Maastricht Treaty, empow-
ers the ECB with the primary monetary policy 
objective of achieving price stability. The bank is 
independent within a clear and precise mandate, 
and is accountable to the citizens and elected rep-
resentatives for the execution of this mandate 
(Scheller 2006). To obtain its main objective of 
price stability, the ECB sets key interest rates for 
the Eurozone seeking to keep inflation rates be-
low but close to 2% over the medium term. The 
ECB is also the sole issuer of bank notes and bank 
reserves for the euro area. It manages, moreover, 
the eurozone’s foreign currency reserves to keep 
exchange rates in check and supports national au-
thorities in supervising financial markets and in-
stitutions. 
Recently, there have been heated debates about 
whether the ECB has gone beyond the mandate 
delegated to it by member states. This is because 
in the course of the present European sover-
eign debt crisis the ECB has taken new innova-
tive measures. It repeatedly engaged in rounds 
of government bond purchases. Basically, it can 
purchase bonds of the struggling GIPSI (Greece, 
Ireland, Portugal, Spain, or Italy) governments 
in two ways: directly, or indirectly by making ad-
ditional loans to commercial banks that in turn 
acquire GIPSI bonds (White http://www.free-
banking.org/2012/09/07/). The ECB declared 
that it would not refinance the European Stabil-
ity Mechanism (ESM) by giving it a mechanism 
with a banking license. However, it decided that it 
will support any ESM bond/purchase operations 
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with potentially unlimited amounts of interven-
tions in the secondary market4, albeit limited to 
shorter maturity. The President of the ECB, Mario 
Draghi, described the new bond-buying program 
of July 2012, the Outright Monetary Transactions 
(OMT), intending to ease financial conditions 
for member states in financial and fiscal crisis, as 
clearly within the mandate of  monetary policy. 
Yet, formally, the ECB is prohibited from directly 
financing governments which renders its purchas-
es of governments bonds – even in the secondary 
market – highly controversial.
These crisis-driven activities raised questions of 
whether the ECB has stepped outside its tradi-
tional role and gone beyond its mandate. It was 
argued that due to the slowness of European po-
litical decision makers, i.e. governments, a vac-
uum was created that resulted in the ECB being 
“the only institution in the euro area capable of 
intervening promptly and decisively, into terri-
tory far outside its custom and practice” (Econ-
omist, October 2011; Schelkle 2012). “The ECB 
4.  An ESM fund endowed with limited funds cannot 
work as a back stop mechanism in case of liquidity 
crisis, especially if a large member state is in financial 
difficulties
has shown it is willing to step in when fiscal au-
thorities have not,…but also knows it is stretch-
ing its mandate” (Begg 2012 ……). Critique from 
Germany was particularly acute. The chief of the 
German Bundesbank, Jens Weidmann, challenges 
the ECB’s bond-buying and argues that the ECB 
is engaging in “monetary financing” or providing 
direct financial support to governments which is 
illegal under the EU Treaty. The broader debate, 
however, is whether the ECB should engage in 
bond-buying in Eurozone countries threatened by 
sovereign debt crisis, and – if so – which kind of 
budgetary and structural conditions should be at-
tached to it (Wolff 2012). 
From the perspective of our theoretical argument, 
the recent activities of the ECB offer an example 
of an agent which – forced by external shocks - 
engages in a redefinition of its mandate leading to 
a deepening of integration and, as a result, meets 
with attempts of some principals to contain the 
redefinition.
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5. Conclusion: a theory of interstitial 
institutional change
From the analysis of the above cases we conclude 
that in order to capture IIC it is useful to build 
on the theory of continuous institutional change 
(Héritier 1997; 2007; 2012; Farrell and Héritier 
and 2003, 2004; Stacey and Rittberger 2003). That 
theory emphasizes the renegotiation or re-inter-
pretation of incomplete institutional rules and 
policies, often at no obvious cost (no “fine”). We 
find that IIC emerges not only once informal and/
or incomplete contracts have been taken, but also 
when exogenous reasons come to shake partici-
pants’ beliefs regarding the stability of complete 
contracts. 
Regarding IIC after incomplete contacts, it is clear 
that incompleteness offers the possibility to rene-
gotiate and re-specify rules in the course of their 
application. This can be explained by reference to 
the assumptions of goal-oriented, boundedly ra-
tional actors who seek to maximize their institu-
tional power and thereby their power over policy 
outcomes. Answers to why patterns of deepening 
integration appear interstitially may be derived 
from the existence of external problem pressure, 
specific institutional conditions, and the relative 
bargaining power of the actors involved when re-
defining incomplete institutional or policy rules. 
Interestingly, our case on the super-commission-
er for the single currency shows that parts of the 
same pattern can be found in cases of IIC after 
complete contracts – though of course here in-
completeness cannot be identified as a necessary 
condition for IIC. Before rushing to conclude that 
“power politics” is all that matters, however, it may 
be advisable to remind ourselves that the mere 
election of François Hollande (a critique of the 
super-commissioner proposal) was a sufficient 
condition for the shelving of the plan.     
We conclude from this that given problem pres-
sure and a demand for coordination of national 
policies, it is crucial whether decisions to coordi-
nate at the higher level represent complete or in-
complete contracts. If member states have simi-
lar preferences and agree in a detailed decision 
to upload competences to the higher level which 
also clearly circumscribes the power given to su-
pranational actors, a limited transfer of national 
powers has occurred in a complete contract and 
in an overt way in the main political arena. If by 
contrast member states have diverse preferences 
regarding the desired policy solutions and appro-
priate limits of supranational power, the outcome 
of the decision process in the main arena is likely 
to be vaguely formulated (an incomplete contract) 
and/or at the lowest common denominator. An 
incomplete contract – for strategic reasons and 
reasons of substantive uncertainty (Cooley and 
Spruyt 2007) – leaves many details yet to be speci-
fied, and thereby opens the door for subsequent 
institutional and policy changes (Héritier 2007). 
These changes often happen outside the formal 
political arena. The renegotiation may give rise to 
informal rules regarding the handling of national 
powers emerging alongside the formal political 
arena. The outcome of the re-bargaining of the in-
complete contract will be determined by the most 
powerful actors (as defined by their fallback posi-
tion), the existing decision-making rule and ex-
ogenous events. When specifying the incomplete 
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contract supranational executive actors may form 
an alliance with judicial actors in interpreting the 
details of the contract and – through court rul-
ings - make an inroad into national competences 
previously not formally mandated. 
In short, a deepening integration may result 
from the fact that – given external problem 
pressure - the formal political decision-mak-
ers due to diverging preferences and consen-
sus or unanimity rules commit themselves to 
only vaguely formulated institutional rules or 
policy goals. Given the ambiguity of the rule 
or policy mandate, implementing actors, i.e. 
executive actors, and judicial actors, but also 
political actors at the national level, are able 
to redefine the generally stated goal. Depend-
ing on the preferences and the relative power 
of the actors involved in the re-negotiation 
of the incomplete contract and given institu-
tional restrictions deepening integration may 
ensue (Héritier 2007).5 This leads to conjec-
5.   S.Schmidt (2012) points out that case law often 
is “fuzzy” (p.3), and in turn may create new legal 
uncertainty in drawing “the line between the remaining 
ture one that “An incomplete institutional 
rule or policy may lead to a deepening of 
integration in the course of its application if 
pro-integration executive and judicial actors 
with pro-integration preferences specify the 
incomplete rule or lower level political actors 
with pro-integration preferences prevail in 
the re-negotiation.” 
national competences and European obligations” (p.3). 
Thereby it gives private actors and the legislature 
“an incentive to settle on the most far-reaching 
interpretation of the ambiguous case law, as otherwise 
an interpretation of secondary law in the light of case 
law may again fail to secure legal certainty” (p.23). 
S.Schmidt thereby underlines a highly interesting 
corollary of the pattern of judicial specification of 
incomplete contracts addressed here. 
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1. Introduction
The aim of the article is the following: to show the 
difficulty of the intergovernmental EU in dealing 
with the euro crisis. According to the Lisbon Trea-
ty, financial policy is a prerogative of the national 
governments of the EU member states. It is thus 
a policy that should be managed within an inter-
governmental framework. The extremely complex 
system of economic governance set up during the 
euro crisis (in the period 2010-2012) has been 
largely defined and implemented on the basis of 
the intergovernmental approach.  An analysis of 
how the EU has dealt with the euro crisis is thus an 
opportunity to assess the effectiveness and legiti-
macy of that approach. Indeed, after the failure of 
the Constitutional Treaty in the 2005 French and 
Dutch popular referendum, the intergovernmen-
tal ‘moment’ has become predominant within the 
EU, to the point that the defenders of the alterna-
tive Community method had to wonder whether 
the latter has in the meantime become ‘obsolete’ 
(Dehousse 2011). However, as a result of the fi-
nancial crisis that broke out in 2008, taking a se-
rious turn for the worse in 2010 and deepening 
since then, the intergovernmental structure set up 
in the Lisbon Treaty soon started to totter. The fi-
nancial bankruptcy of Greece and Ireland and the 
serious financial difficulties of Portugal, Spain and 
Italy determined the need to reconsider the EU in-
tergovernmental arrangement constructed in the 
course of the last two decades. An arrangement 
that was based on a centralized monetary policy 
(in the Frankfurt-based European Central Bank 
or ECB) and a decentralized financial, fiscal and 
budgetary policies (in the member states).
Under the financial threat of the euro’s collapse, 
the heads of state and government of the EU 
member states eventually ended up in dramati-
cally redefining the intergovernmental system of 
economic governance in Europe (and the euro-
area in particular). New radical legislative meas-
ures were approved (from the 2010 European Se-
mester to the so-called 2011 Six Packs and 2012 
Two Packs) within the institutional frame of the 
Lisbon Treaty and new intergovernmental deci-
sions (the 2010 European Financial Stability Facil-
ity or EFSF and the European Financial Stability 
Mechanism or EFSM1) and new intergovernmen-
tal treaties (the 2011 Treaty on European Stability 
Mechanism or ESM2 and the 2012 Treaty on the 
Fiscal Compact3) were set up outside of the Lisbon 
1.  The European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) was 
instituted in May 2010 “at the very same time as a new 
EU law instrument serving the same purpose of giving 
financial support to countries facing a severe sovereign 
debt crisis, namely the European Financial Stability 
Mechanism (EFSM) was established by a Council Regu-
lation based on Article 122(2) TFEU (…) Both instru-
ments have been used simultaneously and cumulatively 
with respect to Ireland and Portugal” (De Witte 2012:4). 
The EFSM will be superseded by the ESM when the lat-
ter will enter into force.
2.  The Treaty on the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) 
was signed by all the EU member states on 25 March 
2011 on the basis of a European Council’s decision, tak-
en on 16 December 2010, to amend TFEU Art.136 for 
authorizing the euro-area member states to establish a 
specific stability mechanism for their currency. It was 
finally established on 27 September 2012 and it will be-
come operative by January 2013 replacing the EFSM.
3.  It is generally used the term of Treaty on Fiscal Com-
pact for the sake of simplicity. Indeed, its name is Treaty 
on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union of which the fiscal compact 
is only one component. Signed by all the heads of state 
and government (except the Czech Republic and the 
United Kingdom or UK’s ones) in the meeting of the Eu-
ropean Council of 2 March 2012, it will enter into force 
on 1 January 2013, provided that 12 contracting parties 
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Treaty. The new measures and treaties attempted 
to ameliorate market pressures on the weaker and 
indebted member states of the euro-area, but they 
didn’t work as expected. They were considered in-
effective by the financial markets and illegitimate 
by the affected citizens (as shown by the strikes 
and riots in the capitals of the indebted EU mem-
ber states). Thus, if one defines the euro crisis as an 
existential crisis (that is, a crisis which antagonizes 
EU member states to the point of not allowing for a 
politics of normal bargaining between them based 
on side payments, trade-offs, postponed benefits, 
mutual recognition), then the intergovernmental 
Union has shown to be unable to generate effec-
tive and legitimate decisions in crisis condition. 
The euro crisis has thus called into question the 
intergovernmental EU rather than the EU as such.
The article is divided into three sections. The first 
section aims to show that the Lisbon Treaty has 
institutionalized a dual constitution or decision-
making regime (supranational regarding the 
policies of the single market and intergovernmental 
regarding inter alia economic and financial 
whose currency is the euro have deposited their instru-
ment of ratification.
policies), with the aim of qualifying the features 
and the logic of the latter. The second section 
will describe the measures taken in the period 
2010-2012 on the basis of the intergovernmental 
decision-making regime for dealing with the euro 
crisis, with the aim of showing their inability to 
offer effective and legitimate answers to the crisis. 
The third section will discuss the reasons why the 
euro crisis did not find a satisfactory solution in 
the period in question, with the aim of identifying 
the basic dilemmas of collective action the 
intergovernmental framework couldn’t resolve. 
This helps to explain the political reaction to the 
intergovernmental decisions and to reconsider 
the constitutional basis of the EU. 
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2. The Lisbon Treaty: The Dual Constitution 
2.1 The supranational side
The Treaty of Lisbon came into force on 1 Decem-
ber 2009 (Foster 2010)4. Although the Treaty of 
Lisbon has scrapped any constitutional symbol-
ism, it has defined (in terms of roles and func-
tions) the EU’s institutional structure (as constitu-
tions do). For a large majority of policies where 
integration proceeds through formal acts (integra-
tion through law), it is plausible to argue that the 
Lisbon Treaty has set up a system of democratic 
government (that is, using David Easton’s (1971) 
classic formulation, a formal structure of insti-
tutions endowed with the power and legitimacy 
of allocating values authoritatively). The Lisbon 
Treaty has formalized a governmental structure 
organized around two distinct legislative cham-
bers and two distinct executive institutions. 
4.  The Lisbon Treaty is constituted of the amendments to 
the two consolidated treaties, the Treaty on the Euro-
pean Union or TUE of 1992 and the Treaty on the Euro-
pean Community, renamed as Treaty on the Function-
ing of the European Union or TFUE, of 1957, plus the 
Declaration concerning the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights considered de facto as a third treaty.
It is possible to argue that the Treaty has brought 
to maturity a long process of distinction between 
the executive and the legislative branches. Cel-
ebrating the codecision procedure as “the ordi-
nary legislative procedure” (TFEU, Art. 289), the 
Treaty has institutionalised a two-chamber legis-
lative branch, consisting of a lower chamber rep-
resenting the European electorate (the European 
Parliament or EP) and an upper chamber repre-
senting the governments of the member states 
(the Council). According to TFEU, Art. 289, “the 
ordinary legislative procedure shall consist in the 
joint adoption by the European Parliament and 
the Council of a regulation, directive or decision 
on a proposal from the Commission”. The Treaty 
has thus celebrated the growing role acquired by 
the EP since its direct election in 1979 (Shackleton 
2005). The EP has finally become an institution of 
equal standing with the Council representing (in 
its various ministerial formations, 10, included 
the General Affairs Council, as of 2012) the min-
isters of the EU member states’ governments. The 
inter-institutional balance between the EP and 
the Council has contributed legitimacy to the law 
making process of the EU. At the same time, by 
recognising the European Council (which con-
sists of the heads of state or government of the EU 
member states, chaired by a president elected “by 
a qualified majority” of them “for a term of two 
and half years, renewable once”, TEU Art. 15(5)) as 
the body responsible for setting the general politi-
cal guidelines and priorities of the EU, the Treaty 
has finally transformed it into a political executive 
of the Union, while confirming the Commission 
in its role of technical executive of the latter. The 
European Council, therefore, can no longer be 
considered a body linked to the Council as it was 
in the past (Naurin and Wallace, 2008), because 
the latter exercises legislative functions, while the 
former executive ones (Kreppel 2011). The Lisbon 
Treaty has therefore built a four-sided institution-
al framework for governing the EU policies (on 
the single market), with a bicameral legislature 
and a dual executive branch. 
The four institutions  are separate because formed 
through different electoral procedures, represent-
ing different communities of interest, operating 
according to different prerogatives and neverthe-
less connected through several mechanisms of 
checks and balances. The European Council and 
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the Council are expressions of member state gov-
ernments, and their composition depends on the 
outcomes of the staggered national elections in 
the member states. The EP depends on the out-
come of the elections organized in districts within 
member states every 5 years5. The Commission’s 
president is nominated by the European Council, 
but should then receive the EP’s approval. Moreo-
ver, the Treaty requires (TFEU, Art. 17.7) the Eu-
ropean Council “of taking into account the elec-
tions to the European Parliament” in the appoint-
ment of the president of the Commission. The 
commissioners are nominated by the European 
Council, in cooperation with Commission’s presi-
dent, but even they have to pass through a process 
of approval by the EP. Thus, in the large major-
ity of single market’s policies, where integration 
is taking place through legal acts, the EU decides 
through a complex interplay of those institutions 
each independent from the other (see Fig. 1).
5.  It should be stressed that the Lisbon Treaty does not 
apportion the 751 seats of the EP strictly according to 
the population of the member states. Indeed: (1) a mini-
mum of 6 EP seats are assigned to each member states 
(162 seats); (2) the remaining 589 seats are assigned to 
member states in proportion to their population; (3) the 
larger member state (Germany) can obtain a maximum 
of 96 seats.
Fig.1 The supranational institutional system of the EU
European 
Council
Council European Parliament
European 
Commission
It is a decision-making system complex and nev-
ertheless balanced. In fact, “where reference is 
made in the Treaties to the ordinary legislative 
procedure for the adoption of an act”, the above 
procedure shall apply (TFEU, art. 294): the Com-
mission has monopoly over legislative proposals 
(although its proposals might increasingly reflect 
European Council’s political inputs) that have the 
form of a directive, regulation or decision; before 
submitting its proposal, the Commission will have 
to consult the various committees of the represen-
tatives of the member states (COREPER) support-
ing the activities of the Council, the parliamentary 
committees and interested or influential social 
and functional private organizations; once sub-
mitted, the Commission’s proposal will have to be 
discussed, amended and approved by both legisla-
tive branches (the EP and the Council). It is inter-
esting to notice that, in the first years after the Lis-
bon Treaty came into force, when the Commis-
sion’s proposal was finally submitted to one or 
another legislative chamber it was generally ap-
proved at the first reading, avoiding passage 
through the time-consuming procedure of recon-
ciliation between their different views on the pro-
posal (Costa, Dehousse and Trakalova  2011). This 
decision-making system tries to satisfy the effec-
tiveness’ criteria, with the competitive coopera-
tion between the European Council and the Com-
mission, and the legitimacy’s criteria, thanks to 
the legislative role of the EP and the Council and 
the supervisory role of European Court of Justice 
(ECJ), together with member states’ constitutional 
courts.
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The institutionalization of the quadrilateral deci-
sion-making system has had contradictory effects 
on the so-called Community method, which is at 
the origin of the EU’s transformation into a su-
pranational organization. In fact, according to this 
method, “the European Commission alone makes 
legislative and policy proposals. Its independence 
strengthens its ability to execute policy, act as the 
guardian of the Treaty and represent the Com-
munity in international negotiations. Legislative 
and budgetary acts are adopted by the Council of 
Ministers…and the European Parliament…The 
use of qualified majority voting in the Council is 
an essential element in ensuring the effectiveness 
of this method. Execution of policy is entrusted 
to the Commission and national authority. The 
European Court of Justice guarantees respect for 
the rule of law” (Dehousse 2011: 4). According to 
this method of integration, therefore, there is no 
role for the European Council in the EU decision-
making system, although it has become an insti-
tution of strategic importance for the EU. At the 
same time, the strengthening of the EP has cer-
tainly cohered with the Community logic envi-
sioned by Jean Monnet at the foundation of the 
integration process (although then the EP was an 
assembly constituted by representatives nomi-
nated by national parliaments). How do we rec-
oncile the European Council’s decision-making 
role with the decision-making independence of 
the Commission (which is the hinge of the Com-
munity method), given that both institutions ex-
ercise executive functions? Remaining within a 
strict Community method perspective, it would 
be difficult to find an answer6. In any case, with 
the Lisbon Treaty, the European Council has for-
mally entered into the supranational EU decision-
making system with its role of defining the ends 
of the integration process (Kreppel 2008). Because 
the European Council has come to stay, probably 
it is less confusing to speak of a supranational, 
rather than Community, method for the man-
agement of single market policies. In sum, in the 
supranational side, the EU has institutionalized a 
quadrilateral decision-making system trying to 
combine the effectiveness of the executive power 
with the legitimacy of the legislative power.
6.  Indeed, in the most articulated study on the 
Community method (Dehousse 2011), there are no 
references to the role acquired by the European Council 
in the supranational EU. For a discussion on the erosion 
of the Commission’s power of initiative, see Ponzano, 
Hermanin and Corona (2012).
2.2 The intergovernmental side 
Integration through law does not represent the 
only logic celebrated by the Lisbon Treaty. With 
the extension of the integration process to policy 
realms traditionally considered sensitive to the 
national sovereignty of the member states, such as 
welfare and employment policies, foreign and se-
curity policy (Common Foreign and Security Pol-
icies or CFSP), military and security policy (Euro-
pean Security and Defence Policy or ESDP) and 
economic and financial policies (and the Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union or EMU7), the EU 
has looked to organize the decision-making pro-
cess by new modes of governance. Since the 1990s, 
scholars have analysed and discussed this new ap-
proach to policy-making based on open method 
of coordination, benchmarking, mainstreaming, 
peer review and, more  generally, intergovernmen-
tal coordination (Heritier and Rhodes 2010; 
Trubek and Trubek 2007; Kohler-Koch and Ritt-
berger 2006; Caporaso and Wittenbrinck 2006; 
Idema and Keleman 2006). Indeed, it was the 1992 
7.  The EMU is constituted only by the member states 
whose currency is the euro.
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Maastricht Treaty that institutionalized 
Fig. 2 The intergovernmental institutional system of the EU
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European Council
Council
Euro Summit
Euro Group
Informs European 
Parliament
Recomends 
Advices
Commission 
European Central Bank
a compro-
mise between those asserting the need to promote 
integration also in policy’s areas historically at the 
centre of national sovereignty, as monetary and 
economic policy or foreign and security policy, 
and those unwilling to downsizing the powers of 
national governments in those policy’s realms. 
The compromise consisted, on one side, in inte-
grating at the Union’s level also those policies and, 
on the other side, in interpreting this integration 
as voluntary coordination between member states’ 
governments, with minor if not insignificant role 
of the supranational institutions. Indeed, for dis-
tinguishing between different models of integra-
tion, the Maastricht Treaty set up three distinct 
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institutional pillars or decision-making regimes, 
although some authors (Wallace and Wallace 
2007) identified at least five different regularized 
patterns of decision-making within and across 
those pillars. 
The Lisbon Treaty has abolished the institutional 
distinction between pillars, giving a unified legal 
personality to the EU, but it has maintained the 
distinction between different decision-making re-
gimes, the supranational and the intergovernmen-
tal. Although each regime accommodates several 
patterns of decision-making, the two decision-
making regimes embody two distinct constitu-
tional logics, one multilateral (because based on 
both supranational and intergovernmental insti-
tutions, i.e. the quadrilateral) and the other uni-
lateral (because based exclusively on the intergov-
ernmental institutions). Certainly, the boundary 
between the supranational and intergovernmen-
tal methods is not fixed and insurmountable, as 
shown by the home affairs and justice policy that 
since Maastricht was gradually transformed from 
an intergovernmental to a supranational policy. 
The so-called ‘cross-pillarization’ affected also 
other realms of policy, as foreign and security pol-
icy (Stetter 2007). Nonetheless, the Lisbon Treaty 
has formally entrenched the intergovernmental 
decision-making regime, thus celebrating an alter-
native model of integration based on (Allerkamp 
2009: 14): (a) “policy entrepreneurship (coming, 
n.d.r.) from some national capitals and the active 
involvement of the European Council in setting 
the overall direction of policy”; (b) “the predomi-
nance of the Council of Ministers in consolidat-
ing cooperation”; (c) “the limited or marginal role 
of the Commission”; (d) “the exclusion of the EP 
and the ECJ from the circle of involvement”; (e) 
“the involvement of a distinct circle of key na-
tional policy-makers”; (f) “the adoption of special 
arrangements for managing cooperation, in par-
ticular the Council Secretariat”; (g) “the opaque-
ness of the process to national parliaments and 
citizens”; (h) “the capacity on occasion to deliver 
substantial joint policy”.  What we have here is a 
simplified decision-making regime, based on the 
European Council and the Council, within which 
national governments play an exclusive role (see 
Fig. 2).
Regarding CFSP and EMU in particular, the in-
tergovernmental Lisbon Treaty has formally es-
chewed the principle that integration should 
proceed through legislative acts that are directly 
binding for all subjects involved. These policies 
are based on soft law, not hard law. As TEU, Art. 
24(1), states expressly, in CFSP “the adoption of 
legislative acts shall be excluded” and the deci-
sions are implemented through actions and po-
sitions (TEU, Art. 25). Thus, not only is the EP 
excluded from the decision-making process, but, 
as TEU, Art. 24 clarifies, “the Court of Justice of 
the European Union shall not have jurisdiction 
with respect to these provisions”, unless the for-
eign policy decisions infringe upon fundamental 
principles and rights the EU should respect, as 
stated in TEU, Art. 2 (“The Union is found on the 
values of respect for human dignity…” ) and TEU, 
Art. 3 (“The Union’s aims is to promote peace…”). 
It is certainly plausible to argue that the EP may 
be indirectly involved in foreign policy through 
its connection with the High Representative of 
the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 
(HR). Indeed, reformation of the HR’s role was 
considered by many scholars (Howorth 2011) one 
of the main innovations introduced by the Lisbon 
Treaty for bringing foreign and security policy 
as close as possible to the supranational institu-
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tions. The HR role was initially introduced in the 
1997 Amsterdam Treaty with the aim of giving 
technical support to the Foreign Affairs Council. 
Through the HR, the latter did not need to rely 
solely on the work of the General Affairs Council’ 
secretariat, thus giving the Foreign Affairs Coun-
cil an autonomous functional structure. 
The Lisbon Treaty has apparently transformed 
this technical role into a more political one. Ac-
cording to the Treaty (TEU, Art. 18.2), in fact, the 
HR must now wear a ‘double hat’, being assigned 
the role of vice-president of the Commission and 
permanent chair of the Foreign Affairs Council. 
He or she must be appointed by the European 
Council in agreement with the president of the 
Commission – an appointment that must then be 
approved by the EP. The HR is a member of both 
the executive (in his/her capacity as vice presi-
dent of the Commission) and legislative branches 
(because s/he permanently presides over the For-
eign Affairs Council, the only configuration of the 
Council not chaired by the half-yearly rotating 
presidency of the Council). The Treaty has thus 
tried to institutionalize a sort of ambiguous role 
for the HR, expecting s/he might bridge the supra-
national culture represented by the Commission 
and the intergovernamental interests protected by 
the Foreign Affairs Council. Notwithstanding this 
innovation, however, the CFSP has continued to 
function according to that regularized pattern of 
decision-making called as ‘intensive transgovern-
mentalism’ (Wallace and Wallace 2007). A pattern 
that, although it fosters a process of socialization 
between national civil servants and ministers and 
Union’s officials engaged in this policy realm, rec-
ognizes mainly the Foreign Affairs Council as the 
institution authorized to decide ‘actions’ and ‘po-
sitions’ for the EU (Thym 2011).
A similar logic governs the functioning of the 
economic and financial policy of the EU (and in 
particular of EMU) (Heipertz and Verdun 2010). 
Although monetary policy was centralized in the 
ECB, economic and financial policies were left in 
the hands of national governments. This is why 
TFEU, Art. 119, states that “the adoption of an 
economic policy (…) is based on the close coor-
dination of Member States’ economic policies”. 
For the Treaty, economic and financial policies are 
reserved territories of the Council with the Com-
mission allowed to play a technical role, although 
important, in monitoring the economic perfor-
mance of member states. Regarding excessive 
deficit procedures of the euro-area member states 
(annexed as Protocol n. 12 to the Lisbon Treaty, 
called the Stability and Growth Pact, or SGP, as 
regulated by TFEU, Art. 126), the Council mo-
nopolizes the policy’s decision, although the lat-
ter is generally based on reports or recommenda-
tions of the Commission. As stated in TFEU, Art. 
126(14), “the Council shall, acting unanimously 
in accordance with a special legislative procedure 
and after consulting the European Parliament and 
the European Central Bank, adopt the appropriate 
provisions” for implementing agreed-upon eco-
nomic guidelines. According to the special legis-
lative procedure, the Council, acting either unani-
mously or by a qualified majority depending on 
the issue concerned, can adopt legislation based 
on a proposal by the Commission after consulting 
the EP. However, while being required to consult 
the EP on some legislative proposals concerning 
economic and financial policy, the Council is not 
bound by latter’s position. Indeed, the Council 
took frequently decisions without even waiting 
for the EP’s opinion. Th e Council (in its confi gu-
ration as Council on Economic and Financial Af-
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fairs known as ECOFIN) is supported in its ac-
tivities by an Economic and Financial Committee 
whose task (TFEU, Art. 134) is to supervise the 
economic and financial situations of the mem-
ber states. It is an advisory body to ECOFIN to 
which “the Member states, the Commission and 
the European Central Bank shall each appoint 
no more than two members” (TFEU, Art. 134.2). 
Also the EMU functions according to a variant of 
intergovernmentalism, a decision-making pattern 
that Puetter (2012) has defined as ‘deliberative in-
tergovernmentalism’. In any case, either through 
recommendations or special legislative procedure, 
the ECOFIN is the institution with the power of 
making decisions concerning the economic and 
financial policies of the Union. 
In fact, although it is recognized (TUE, Art. 126(6) 
and 126(7)) that the Commission may initiate a 
procedure against a member state running an ex-
cessive budget deficit, the Commission’s recom-
mendation has however the status of a proposal, 
because only the Council can take the appropri-
ate measures (that may go from requests of infor-
mation addressed to the member state that fails 
to comply to fines imposed on it). It is thus up to 
the Council to decide whether or not to proceed 
along the lines of the Commission’s proposal (as 
it didn’t do in 2003, when the Commission pro-
posed opening an infringement procedure against 
France and Germany, who were not respecting 
the parameters of the SGP). The Lisbon Treaty has 
thus institutionalized the principle that financial 
policy is based on voluntary coordination. The 
sanctions for excessive deficits and debts should be 
subject to the wills of member states’ governments 
(or their financial ministers in the ECOFIN). This 
is even truer for euro-area member states, whose 
main deliberations take place either in the Euro 
Summit or in the Euro Group (consisting respec-
tively of the heads of state and government and 
the ministers of economics and finance of the 
EU member states adopting the common cur-
rency, as regulated by Protocol n. 14 annexed to 
the Lisbon Treaty), with the technical support of 
the Commission. The Euro Group has the status 
of an ‘informal institution,’ embodying a specific 
approach to policy-making defined as ‘informal 
governance’ (Puetter 2006). Protocol n. 14 doesn’t 
even mention the EP, at least as the institution re-
quired to be informed about the decisions made. 
And, as in the CFSP, no supervisory role is rec-
ognized or assigned to the ECJ. By establishing a 
common currency (the euro adopted by 17 mem-
ber states as of 2012), the EU has thus centralized 
monetary policy (assigning its management to a 
proper federal institution, the ECB). At the same 
time, by introducing the coordination framework, 
it has allowed for the decentralization of those fi-
nancial, fiscal and budgetary policies structurally 
connected to monetary policy.
The terms of coexistence between the suprana-
tionalism of the policies for the single market and 
the intergovernmentalism of the CFSP and EMU 
in particular were left uncertain by the Lisbon 
Treaty. In both realms, the Treaty has given a stra-
tegic role to the European Council, which is now 
the real political head of the Union (Scoutheete 
2011). Certainly, the permanent president of the 
European Council (although the half-yearly rotat-
ing presidency has remained in all configurations 
of the Council but Foreign Affairs Council) was 
supposed to dilute the strictly intergovernmen-
tal nature of the institution. Indeed, the first new 
president (Herman Van Rompuy) was quick to set 
up his permanent office in Brussels (at the Justus 
Lipsius building), which also symbolized that the 
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European Council’s presidency is now based in the 
Union’s capital and no longer in those of member 
states. At the same time, the decision to maintain a 
commissioner for each member state in the Com-
mission (although due to contingent reasons8) 
had the effect of introducing intergovernmental 
biases into the traditionally most supranational 
institution of the Union9. That notwithstanding, 
the Lisbon Treaty has formalized two different 
decision-making regimes or constitutional frame-
works for dealing with the policies of the single 
market and the policies of financial stability (as 
well as foreign affairs, security policy, welfare and 
unemployment policies). This is why it has been 
8.  The decision was made in order to appease Irish voters 
required to vote on the Lisbon Treaty for a second time 
(on October 2009) after having rejected it in a previous 
referendum (on June 2008).
9.  Certainly, the Lisbon Treaty, TEU Art, 17.5, states that 
each member state has a right to propose a national as 
commissioner till 1 November 2014, thus adding that 
after that date the Commission will be composed of 
“two thirds of the number of the Member States, unless 
the European Council, acting unanimously, decides to 
alter this number”. However, it is likely that the small 
member states will exert pressure to preserve the status 
quo, exactly because they want to guarantee the equal-
ly-weighted geographical composition even within the 
Commission regardless of what the treaty states.
the intergovernmental Union that was tested by 
the dramatic events of the euro crisis. For the first 
time since its post-2005 ascent to dominance, the 
pretension of the intergovernmental decision-
making regime of being more adept, than the su-
pranational one, in dealing with the challenges of 
integration has been empirically falsified.
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3. Intergovernmentalism: Ascent and Crisis
3.1 The politics of 
intergovernmentalism
Once the financial crisis arrived to Europe in 
2009-2010, the EU had already in place the Lis-
bon Treaty with its intergovernmental constitu-
tion. This intergovernmental Union enjoyed also 
the support of a powerful constellation of politi-
cal leaders and public opinions. Once the EU en-
tered the throes of a crisis after the failure of the 
Constitutional Treaty in the French and Dutch 
popular referendum of 2005, the intergovernmen-
tal approach emerged as the only feasible strategy 
for promoting integration. As The Economists’ s 
Charlemagne (2012) wrote, after “the French and 
Dutch voters killed the proposed EU constitution 
… intergovernmentalism (became) the new fash-
ion”.
The apex of the intergovernmental moment was 
reached between 2009-2011. In that period, in 
fact, French and German governments converged 
towards an intergovernmental interpretation of 
the integration process. President Sarkozy, in his 
2007-2012 mandate, behaved as the coherent heir 
of Charles De Gaulle’s vision of a ‘Europe of na-
tion states’, that is, of a process of integration pri-
marily controlled by the member states’ execu-
tives (Calleo n.d.). In Sarkozy’s vision (as in De 
Gaulle’s) there was no room for the EP and the 
Commission in the decision-making process, 
not to mention the ECJ. One might argue that, 
in France in particular, after the popular refusal 
of the Constitutional Treaty in the 2005 referen-
dum, this vision came to be shared by much of the 
ruling elite of the country, not only by Gaullists 
(Grossman 2008). This vision appears to cohere 
quite well with a domestic semi-presidential sys-
tem based on the decision-making primacy of the 
president of republic. At the same time, it may be 
surprising that such an intergovernmental vision 
of Europe came to be shared by the post-2009 
German government of Angela Merkel. After 
Helmut Kohl’s chancellorship, a new generation of 
German politicians with no experience of WWII 
has come into power. This change emerged clearly 
with the Schroeder government which followed 
the last Kohl government in 1998 and which last-
ed till 2005. Since then, “generational change…
allowed (German) political leaders to normalise 
EU policy in the sense of becoming more like 
other large member states” (Sloam 2005: 98). The 
new generation was “ready to articulate material 
German interests” (Ibidem: 88) and not only to 
profess guilty for the country’s past. During the 
first half of the 2000s, the social-democratic and 
green governmental elites began questioning the 
paymaster role that Germany traditionally played 
within the process of European integration (for 
instance, asking for a renegotiation of the EU 
budget), did not refrain from mobilizing German 
military force abroad (for instance, participating 
in the 1999 Kosovo war), and articulated a vision 
of a German interest distinct from the European 
interest10. However, this new German assertive-
ness remained within the federal perspective of an 
increasingly economically and politically integrat-
10.  In a famous 1997 statement, the new leader of the SPD 
(Social-democratic Party) Gerhard Schroeder said: 
“Kohl says the German have to be tied into Europe or 
they will stir up old fears of the ‘furum teutonicus’. I say 
that’s not the case. I believe that Germans have become 
European not because they have to be, but because they 
want to be. That is the difference” (now in Sloam 2005: 
89).
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ed Europe. This continuity was clearly expressed 
by the famous speech by the German Foreign Af-
fairs Minister Joschka Fischer at Humboldt Uni-
versity in Berlin on 12 May 2000, a speech not by 
chance titled “From Confederacy to Federation: 
Thoughts on the Finality of European Integration”.
When Angela Merkel took power for the first time 
in 200511, the generational change acquired also a 
new ‘territorial’ connotations. Angela Merkel was 
and is the first chancellor coming from the East-
ern part of Germany (the Deutsche Demokratische 
Republik or DDR), remained under Soviet control 
during the Cold War era. The DDR was not in-
volved in the public self-analysis of German re-
sponsibilities for the Holocaust and WWII that 
instead developed in the Western part if Germany 
(the Bundesrepublik Deutschland). A ‘territorial’ 
origin that might explain why Angela Merkel is 
considered to be a European more in the head 
than the heart12. Moreover, with the outcome of 
11.  She was elected chancellor of a grand coalition govern-
ment constituted by her party (the Christian Democrat-
ic Union, CDU), the sister party of the latter (the Chris-
tian Social Union, CSU) and the Social Democratic 
Party (SPD).
12.  See Charlemagne, ‘Angela the lawgiver’, The Economist, 
the 2009 German elections, which led to the for-
mation of a coalition government between the 
CDU and the Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP), 
the chancellorship of Angela Merkel became more 
exposed to the intergovernmental tone. The FDP 
took increasingly a clear euro-realistic position, 
quite unusual for German politics. At the same 
time, the German constitutional court or Bundes-
verfassungsgericht (BVerfG)13 has introduced 
powerful hurdles to the further transfer of nation-
al sovereignty to the EU. And finally the German 
public seemed increasingly wary of paying taxes 
to aid countries with high public debts and defi-
cits. It was probably this combination of factors 
that led the Merkel’s government formed in 2009 
to search for institutional and policy solutions to 
the euro crisis that would not be questioned by the 
Court, her coalitional partner, or her voters. Mer-
kel’s government gradually moved from a re-affir-
mation of national interests (as the previous gov-
hhhp://www.economist.com/blogs/Charlemagne.
13.  From the sentence of 30 June 2009 stating that the Trea-
ty of Lisbon (Zustimmungsgesetz zum Vertrag von Lissa-
bon) is compatible with the German Basic Law to the 
sentence of 6 September 2011 upholding the country’s 
participation in bailing out financially-ailing Eurozone 
member states such as Greece.
ernments did) to a preference for an intergovern-
mental solution to the crisis, a preference at odds 
with the political structure and public culture of 
her country. The German parliamentary-federal 
system, in fact, is quite different from the French 
semipresidential-unitary system. In Germany the 
bicameral legislature (the Bundestag, represent-
ing the citizens, and the Bundesrat, representing 
the laender’s executives) plays a crucial role in 
the policy-making process, and the judiciary is 
the indispensable mediator of any constitutional 
dispute. Thus, if France, in the 2007-2012 period, 
came to adopt the German economic paradigm, 
enshrined in the two new intergovernmental trea-
ties, in the same period Germany came to adopt 
the French political paradigm, accepting that de-
cision-making power in the EU should remain in 
the exclusive hands of the governments meeting 
within the European Council and the ECOFIN 
Council. This marked a significant change for a 
country like Germany, which was traditionally the 
defender of the Commission and the EP (Peder-
son 1998). Finally, among the larger countries, 
the intergovernmental vision was supported not 
only by the British coalition government of David 
Cameron (elected in 2010), but also by the Ital-
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ian government of Silvio Berlusconi (2008-2011), 
the latter in clear discontinuity with the previous 
government of Romano Prodi (2006-2008) and 
the country’s traditional preference for a suprana-
tional approach.
In sum, at the turn of the first decade of the 2000s, 
the consensus was that integration has reached 
such depth that only member states’ governments 
can drive it properly. As President Sarkozy made 
clear in his speech in Toulon on 2 December 2011, 
“the reform of Europe is not a march towards 
supra-nationality. (…) The crisis has pushed the 
heads of state and government to assume greater 
responsibility because ultimately they have the 
democratic legitimacy to take decisions. (…) The 
integration of Europe will go the intergovern-
mental way because Europe needs to make stra-
tegic political choices”. A month before President 
Sarkozy’ speech, on 2 November 201114, German 
chancellor Angela Merkel assessed that “the Lis-
bon Treaty has placed the institutional structure 
(of the EU) on a new foundation”, out-dating the 
traditional distinction between the “Community 
14.  Opening ceremony of the 61th academic year of the 
College of Europe in Bruges.
and the Intergovernmental methods”15. Indeed, 
she added, the EU is functioning according to a 
“new Union method”, which consists of “coor-
dinated action in a spirit of solidarity”. For her, 
coordination referred inevitably to the decision-
making role of national governments, not supra-
national institutions. 
If the decision-making pre-eminence of national 
governments was justified by the legitimacy com-
ing to them from their own domestic electorates, 
as both Sarkozy and Merkel asserted in several 
occasion, then the control of their action should 
be assigned to national legislatures, not the EP. 
Which is, indeed, the position expressed by the 
German constitutional court in its sentences. 
Thus, the intergovernmental logic brings with it 
an inter-parliamentary balancing: national parlia-
ments should coordinate for controlling the coor-
dinated national governments. The Lisbon Treaty 
prefigured this possibility, when (Protocol N. 1) it 
encourages “greater involvement of national Par-
liaments in the activities of the European Union 
and…enhance(s) their ability to express their 
views on draft legislative acts of the European 
15.  On this, see Dehousse (2011).
Union as well as on other matters which may be 
of particular interest to them”. In a speech given 
on 11 January 2012, the then French minister for 
European Affairs, Jean Leonetti, proposed the 
creation of a indirectly formed “Euro-area parlia-
ment”, consisting of parliamentarians of the na-
tional parliaments of the euro-area, as an institu-
tion balancing the Euro Summit. 
3.2 The crisis and its dynamic
Thus, when the crisis started to hit Greece, there 
was in place a decision-making regime for struc-
turing the institutional and policy’s answer to fi-
nancial turmoil. As established by the intergov-
ernmental constitution, the European Council 
and the ECOFIN Council took immediately the 
centre-stage of the policy-making process, while 
the Commission was marginalized and the EP left 
dormant. Continuous meetings of the European 
Council and ECOFIN Council were organized 
between 2010 and 201216, although none of them 
16.  It is interesting to note that, while the Lisbon Treaty 
(TUE, Art. 15.3) states that “the European Council shall 
meet twice every six months”, in the 2010 it met 6 times 
(8 times if one considers two meeting of the Euro-area 
member states’ heads of government), in 2011 it met 7 
times (9 times if one considers also the meetings of the 
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did come out as decisive. At least there were four 
rounds of crucial decisions concerning the new 
economic governance of the EU.
The first  round took place in 2010. At the ECO-
FIN Council of May 2010, first it was adopted a 
regulation to create the EFSM as a new EU law in-
strument and then, at the margin of that meeting, 
“the members of the Council from the 17 euro 
area countries ‘switched hats’ and transformed 
themselves into representatives of their states at 
an intergovernmental conference; in that capacity, 
they adopted a decision by which they commit-
ted themselves to establish the EFSF outside the 
EU legal framework” (De Witte 2012:2). The EFSF 
consisted of an executive agreement (not a new 
formal treaty), in the form of a private company 
established under Luxembourg law, thus autho-
rized to negotiate with its 17 shareholders. More-
over, in the Council of 7 September 2010, it was 
approved the European Semester, an instrument 
for enhancing time consistency in EU economic 
policy coordination, entered into force by January 
Euro-area member states’ heads of government) and in 
2012 it met six times, any time followed by a meeting of 
the euro-area member states’ heads of state and govern-
ment.
2011.  If the former was an instrument of crisis 
management (to help Ireland and Portugal to face 
the crisis of sovereign debt), the latter was rather 
a framework for promoting crisis prevention be-
cause finalized to coordinate ex ante the budgetary 
and economic policies of the EU member states, 
in line with both the SGP and Europe 2010 strat-
egy (see Hallerberg, Marzinotto and Wolff 2012).
The second round took place in the first half of 
2011. Between the European Council of 24-25 
March and the European Council of 23-24 June, 
several measures were taken. First of all, the so-
called Six Pack consisting of legislative proposals 
finalized to tighten further the policy coordina-
tion required by both the European Semester and 
the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). All of these 
became operative by 13 December 2011. They 
were: (1) the strengthening of the surveillance of 
budgetary positions and coordination of econom-
ic policies through a regulation amending Coun-
cil Regulation 1466/97 approved with the code-
cision procedure on Commission’s proposal; (2) 
the speeding up and clarification of the excessive 
deficit procedure through a Council regulation 
amending Council Regulation 1467/97 approved 
with a special legislative procedure (with the EP 
only consulted); (3) the enforcement of  budget-
ary surveillance in the euro area through a new 
regulation approved with the codecision proce-
dure on Commission’s proposal; (4) the definition 
of a budgetary framework of the member states 
through a new Council directive implemented 
with a non-legislative procedure (with the EP only 
consulted); (5) the prevention and correction of 
macroeconomic imbalances through a new regu-
lation approved with the codecision procedure on 
Commission’s proposal; (6) the enforcement of 
measures for correcting excessive macroeconom-
ic imbalances in the euro area through a new reg-
ulation approved with the codecision procedure 
on Commission’s proposal. To these measures it 
should be added the Euro Plus Pact, consisting of a 
political commitment (a sort if intergovernmental 
agreement) between the euro area member states, 
but also open to non-euro area ones (Denmark, 
Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Romania) 
aimed to foster stronger economic policy coordi-
nation. The signatories of the Pact made concrete 
commitments to a list of political reforms intend-
ed to improve the fiscal strength and competitive-
ness of each country. The Pact was intended as a 
more stringent successor to the  SGP although it 
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was based on the open method of coordination. It 
was finally adopted in March 2011.
The third round developed in the second half of 
2011 and the first month of 2012. In July 2011 it 
was signed a first version of the ESM Treaty, thus 
renegotiated in February 2012, as a permanent 
successor of the temporary EFSF. The ESM was 
located outside the EU legal framework on the ba-
sis of a European Council decision of 25 March 
2011 to amend TFEU Art.136 that states that “the 
member States whose currency is the euro may 
establish a stability mechanism to be activated if 
indispensable to safeguard the stability of the euro 
area as a whole”.  The ESM was thus established as 
a new treaty among the euro-area member states, 
endowed of its own institutions17, “as an intergov-
17.  The Conclusions of the European Council of 24-25 
March 2011 states: “The ESM will have a Board of Gov-
ernors consisting of the Ministers of Finance of the 
euro-area Member States (as voting members), with the 
European Commissioner for Economic and Monetary 
Affairs and the President of the ECB as observers. The 
Board of Directors will elect a Chairperson from among 
its voting members. (…) The ESM will have a Board of 
Directors which will carry out specific tasks as delegat-
ed by the Board of Governors. (…) All decisions by the 
Board of Directors will be taken by qualified majority 
(…) A qualified majority is defined as 80 percent of the 
ernmental organisation under public internation-
al law”, to enter into force by January 2013 (having 
to wait the decision of the German constitutional 
court regarding its constitutional congruence 
with the German Basic Law, decision finally and 
positively expressed in September 2012). In the 
second half of 2011, other crucial decisions were 
made, particularly during the European Coun-
cil’s meeting of 8-9 December 2011. Under the 
irresistible leadership of German chancellor An-
gela Merkel, followed by French president Nicolas 
Sarkozy, a proposal to amend the Lisbon Treaty 
for integrating the fiscal policies of the member 
states was advanced. This time, automatic mecha-
nisms of sanctions on member states who would 
not respect more stringent criteria of deficit-GDP 
percentage (0,5 per cent a year) and debt-GDP 
percentage (60 per cent, with the downsizing of 
1/20 of the over stock every year) were advanced, 
with the request that each member state would 
introduce the golden rule of a mandatory bal-
anced budget domestically at the constitutional or 
equivalent level. The UK’s opposition to pursuing 
fiscal integration within the Lisbon Treaty’s legal 
framework, motivated by the need to protect the 
votes”, EUCO 10/11, Concl 3, pp. 22-23.
London financial district from possibly-restric-
tive fiscal regulations, made it necessary to move 
beyond the Lisbon Treaty, an outcome that the 
French president, given his mistrust if not distrust 
of the supranational features present in the Lisbon 
Treaty, aimed for. Indeed, it may have been pos-
sible to recur to the procedure of reinforced co-
operation (TEU, Art. 20), on the basis of which a 
group of EU member states is allowed to advance 
towards deeper integration in policy fields that 
are not of exclusive competence of the Union or 
do not concern the common foreign and security 
policy (CFSP) (Dyson  K. and Sepos, 2010). 
However, this institutional strategy was not con-
sidered viable because of German domestic rea-
sons (chancellor Merkel had to appease her elec-
toral constituencies by displaying her capacity to 
impose stricter rules on the euro-area member 
states) and also because the activation of the re-
inforced cooperation’s procedure would have re-
quired (TFEU, Art. 326-334) the consent of the 
entire Council (UK included). For these reasons, 
it was decided that a new intergovernmental trea-
ty, the Fiscal Compact Treaty with its own gov-
ernance structure, would be set up outside the 
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Lisbon Treaty and signed by all the 17 euro-area 
member states plus those non-euro area mem-
ber states (all of them, apart from the UK and the 
Czech Republic) interested in participating in the 
Treaty.  
Finally, a fourth round developed from the Euro-
pean Council of 28-29 June and 13-14 December 
2012. If the June’s European Council moved the 
agenda of the EU from fiscal rigor to the need 
of promoting economic growth, the December’s 
European Council has formalized a road map 
for moving “towards a genuine economic and 
monetary union”. This direction implies, in par-
ticular for the euro-area member states, to share 
an integrated financial framework, an integrated 
budgetary framework, an integrated economic 
policy framework and to strengthen democratic 
legitimacy and accountability of the euro-area 
institutions. In this period, two regulations were 
approved through the codecision procedure (the 
so-called Two Pack), applicable to the euro-area 
member states only on the basis of TFEU, Art. 136, 
aimed to further strengthening the surveillance 
mechanisms in the euro-area. The two regulations 
build on the SGP and the European Semester and 
impose the euro-area member states to submit 
their budgetary plan for the following year to the 
Commission and the Euro Group before 15 Octo-
ber along with the independent macro-economic 
forecast on which they are based. The exercise in 
Autumn introduced by the Two Packs would al-
low the monitoring and sharing of information on 
the member states’ budgetary policies before their 
adoption. The Two Pack is a further and more 
stringent contribution to the crisis prevention re-
gime of the euro-area member states.
Considering the complex of the measures adopted 
in the period 2010-2012, one has to acknowledge 
their policy magnitude and institutional complex-
ity. Some of them, as the Six Pack and the Two 
Pack, have strengthened the supranational side of 
the EU, given they consisted of regulations and 
directives approved predominantly through the 
codecision procedure. However, with the deepen-
ing of the euro crisis, the EU has more and more 
shifted in an intergovernmental direction. In fact, 
a multiplicity of treaties were set up, as the EFSF 
thus substituted by the ESM for crisis manage-
ment and the Fiscal Compact for crisis preven-
tion. It was observed that those decisions have 
put “the EU system…in the throes of a revolution 
(although) like all revolutions, this one (too) dis-
plays numerous evolutionary features” (Ludlow 
2011a:5). However, that revolution was not suffi-
cient to appease the financial markets that indeed 
began demanding higher interest rates for buy-
ing public bonds from Italy and other southern 
and peripheral euro-area member states. Mar-
ket pressures became so powerful that many of 
these countries with high ratios of public debt to 
GDP had to register the collapse of their incum-
bent governments. In some cases (Ireland, Portu-
gal, Spain), the crisis was resolved through new 
elections, while in others (Greece, Italy) it was 
resolved through the substitution of the parties 
in government with a ‘national solidarity’ execu-
tive composed by technocrats and supported by 
a large trans-parties alliance in the parliament 
(Greece and Italy). The formation of executives in-
dependent from electoral consensus was consid-
ered necessary not only to promote the required 
reforms (previously vetoed by powerful electoral 
constituencies), but also to guarantee the virtuous 
euro-area member states (Germany, Netherland, 
Finland, Austria) that Greece and Italy would be 
serious in cutting their public debt and rational-
116The Euro Crisis & the State of European DemocracySection I
izing their general systems of public expenditure. 
The hope was to show the financial markets (and 
the domestic electorates of the virtuous countries) 
that the entire euro-area was committed to achiev-
ing financial stability. But nevertheless markets’ 
speculation continued. In sum, even the most au-
dacious decisions arrived late for answering to the 
market’s pressures, were too limited in their reach 
and were perceived as illegitimate by the affected 
interests. It is possible to argue that the contradic-
tory evolution of the euro crisis does not vindicate 
the claim that intergovernmentalism constitutes a 
more effective approach (than the supranational 
one) for dealing with the challenges of integra-
tion. The euro crisis is to the ‘intergovernmental 
method’ what the French and Dutch referendum 
were to the ‘Community method’.
4. Intergovernmentalism: Dilemmas and 
Reaction
4.1 The dilemmas of 
intergovernmentalism
Why has the intergovernmental EU set up an ex-
tremely complex system of economic governance 
that nevertheless was unable to appease the mar-
kets and to convince the citizens of the indebted 
countries? One might answer that the euro crisis 
has hit so deeply the EU to require the setting up 
of amazingly complex instruments of both crisis 
management and crisis prevention. But why have 
crucial policy’s instruments been located outside 
the legal structure of the EU? Such institutional 
intricacy has to be considered the logical outcome 
of a decision-making regime that is based primar-
ily on national governments’ coordination. Coor-
dination is insufficient for solving basic dilemmas 
of collective action. If any decision-making regime 
should be able to generate effective and legitimate 
solutions for the problems it has to deal with, the 
intergovernmental regime has shown to be based 
on shaky foundations for doing that. 
Let’s start from considering the effectiveness’ side 
of the intergovernmental decision-making re-
gime. Three basic dilemmas emerged during the 
euro crisis. The first was the veto dilemma: how to 
neutralize oppositions in a decision-making pro-
cess requiring unanimous consent? This dilemma 
accompanied the entire evolution of the euro cri-
sis, bringing the European Council and the ECO-
FIN Council to answer the crisis regularly ‘too late 
and too little’. Although the financial crisis was 
initially circumscribed only to Greece, it gradu-
ally began expanding to other euro-area member 
states because of the decision-making stalemate 
produced by divergent strategies for dealing with 
it. Divergences in the domestic electoral interests 
of the various incumbent governments (govern-
ments with a sound budget did not want to pay for 
the difficulties of indebted countries whose gov-
ernments expected instead to be helped for sur-
viving politically) made the decision-making pro-
cess dramatically muddled. The opposed financial 
needs of creditors and debtors caused endless ne-
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gotiations between governmental leaders despite 
the crisis required immediate answers. Indeed, for 
neutralizing the British veto on fiscal coordina-
tion, it was necessary to move outside of the Lis-
bon Treaty, setting up a new treaty. At the same 
time, the difficulty in speeding up the decision-
making process during the crisis increased the 
stake of the leadership’s role in driving the EU to-
ward the necessary answers.  As the financial cri-
sis deepened, the bi-lateral leadership of Germany 
and France, in the period 2009-2011, was  trans-
formed into a compelling directoire of the EU fi-
nancial policy. Analytically it is not clear where to 
locate the boundary between bi-lateral leadership 
on one side and bi-lateral directoire on the other. 
To be sure, as Heipertz and Verdun (2010: 20) ar-
gued, “when Member States governments bargain 
with one another, the largest countries have the 
greater influence”. And, of course, the bi-lateral 
leadership of France and Germany has historical-
ly represented the engine of the integration pro-
cess, although the various waves of enlargement, 
increasing the number of the EU member states, 
have inevitably reduced its efficacy (Cole 2010). 
Their bi-lateral leadership was not resented by the 
other member states as long as the two countries, 
although sharing a strategic goal, “started from 
quite diverging points when it came to sketching 
the road toward this common goal” (Schild 2010: 
1380). As Webber (1999: 16) put it, the greater the 
divergence between French and German prefer-
ences on the policy before reaching a common 
goal, the easier it was for the other member states 
to ‘multilateralize’ that common goal. 
The deepening of euro crisis prevented however 
this multilateralization, for two reasons. First, 
Merkel’s Germany and Sarkozy’s France came to 
share the same ends and means for dealing with 
the crisis. Although France initially used a strat-
egy different than Germany’s, fear of playing vic-
tim to market speculations if unprotected by an 
alliance with Germany brought France closer and 
closer to the Germany’s restrictive monetary posi-
tion (no role for the ECB to act as lender of last 
resort, no Euro-bonds, no expansive policies ei-
ther at the EU or domestic level). With the coordi-
nation of the Brussels office of President Herman 
van Rompuy, the financial strategy for dealing 
with crisis came to be dictated by Berlin and Paris 
sharing not only the same strategic goals (finan-
cial stability and fiscal integration), but also poli-
cies with which to reach them (the introduction 
of a balanced budget clause in the constitution 
of the member states even through a new treaty, 
domestic structural reforms, fiscal discipline). 
Second, Sarkozy and Merkel, in their attempt to 
solve the veto dilemma proper of the intergovern-
mental method, came to ‘verticalize’ the decision-
making process. They regularly met (in Berlin or 
Paris more than in Brussels) before the European 
Council meetings to identify common or shared 
positions that were later imposed in the following 
formal meeting of the heads of state and govern-
ments18. Probably, the epitome of this attitude was 
the meeting between the two leaders in Deauville 
on 5 December 2011 where they took decisions 
then ‘reported’ to the European Council meeting 
of the following 8-9 December. Indeed, it became 
common to talk in the press of a ‘Merkozy’ govern-
ment within the European Council. Is a directoire 
compatible with the logic of integration of and 
18.  It is worthwhile to read the chronicles of the prepara-
tion of the various European Council held into 2011 by 
Peter Ludlow with their detailed description of the tri-
angulation between chancellor Angela Merkel and her 
staff, president Nicolas Sarkozy and his staff and the of-
fice of president. Herman Van Rompuy. A good example 
is Ludlow (2011b).
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between asymmetrical states (i.e., states of differ-
ent demographic size, economic capacity, cultural 
and linguistic patterns, historical identities)?
The second is the enforcement dilemma: how to 
guarantee the application of a decision taken on 
a voluntary bases? The enforcement dilemma 
emerged dramatically with regard to the approval 
of the new treaties (the ESM and the Fiscal Com-
pact) by their contracting parties. In fact, to avoid 
jeopardizing the entire project by the possible re-
jection of one or another intergovernmental treaty 
by few of their contracting parties, the Fiscal Com-
pact Treaty (Title VI, Art. 14.2) had to state that it 
“shall enter to force on 1 January 2013, provided 
that twelve Contracting Parties whose currency is 
the euro have deposited their instrument of ratifi-
cation”. Twelve and not all the 17 member states of 
the euro-area. It is the first time (in the European 
integration experience) that unanimity has been 
eliminated as a barrier for activating an intergov-
ernmental treaty (that would require, by its own 
logic, the unanimous consent of all the contract-
ing parties). Or, anticipating plausible rejection of 
the Fiscal Compact Treaty, the ESM Treaty had to 
state (Point 5) that “the granting of financial as-
sistance…will be conditional, as of 1 March 2013, 
on the ratification of Fiscal Compact Treaty by the 
ESM Member concerned”. This threat was effica-
cious in cooling down the euro-sceptical mood 
of Irish voters (in the referendum on the Fiscal 
Compact held on 31 May 2012) or the anti-Euro-
pean mood of Greek voters. However, in moving 
in this direction, the intergovernmental logic had 
not only to cintradict itself, but it had to introduce 
explicit threats not properly congenial with “the 
spirit of solidarity” celebrated by Angela Merkel 
in her 2 November 2011 speech.
 The third is the compliance dilemma: once en-
forced an agreement, how to guarantee the respect 
of its rules even when they no longer fit the inter-
est of one or the other of the voluntary contract-
ing parties?  This dilemma emerged dramatically 
in the case of the disrespect of the rules of the SGP. 
It became apparent in 2009 that Greece cheated 
the other member states’ governments (manipu-
lating its statistical data regarding public deficit 
and debt) for remaining in the euro-area. How-
ever, the same dilemma emerged in 2003, when 
France and Germany were saved from sanctions 
by a decision of the ECOFIN (and in contrast to 
a Commission’s recommendation) notwithstand-
ing their disrespect for the SGP’s parameters. The 
Fiscal Compact Treaty tries to deal with the non-
compliance possibility providing for a binding in-
tervention of the ECJ upon those contracting par-
ties that do not respect the agreed rules. It is stated 
(Art. 8.1) that “where a Contracting Party consid-
ers, independently of the Commission’s report, 
that another Contracting Party has failed to com-
ply with Article 3(2), it may also bring the matter 
before the Court of Justice.  (…) the judgment of 
the Court of Justice shall be binding on the par-
ties in the procedure”. This also applies when the 
Commission issues a report on a contracting party 
failing to comply with the rules established by the 
Treaty. In the latter case, if the Commission, af-
ter having given the contracting party concerned 
the opportunity to submit its observations, still 
confirms the non-compliance by the contracting 
party in question, the matter will be brought to 
the ECJ. Art. 17 of the Fiscal Compact Treaty has 
come to stress that, in order to neutralize a rec-
ommendation of the Commission to intervene 
against a member state breaching a deficit criteria, 
“a qualified majority of the member states (should 
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be) opposed to the decision proposed or recom-
mended”.  
The clause of the reversed qualified majority is an 
attempt to make less likely non-compliance. In-
deed, the discretion of the Council has been re-
duced (if compared with the rules concerning the 
SGP institutionalized in the intergovernmental 
side of the Lisbon Treaty), not only by the Treaty 
but also by the combination of the Six Pack and 
Two Pack, recognizing the need to rely on third 
actors (the ECJ or the Commission) for keeping 
the contracting parties aligned with the agreed 
aims of the Treaty. Even the ESM Treaty states that, 
in case of a dispute between an ESM Member and 
the ESM (Art. 37.2), “the dispute shall be submit-
ted to the Court of Justice of the European Union. 
The judgement of the Court of Justice of the Eu-
ropean Union shall be binding on the parties in 
the procedure, which shall take the necessary 
measures to comply with the judgement within a 
period to be decided by said Court” (Art. 37.3). At 
the same time, majority voting is extended even in 
the ESM. In fact, its Board of Directors “shall take 
decisions by qualified majority, unless otherwise 
stated in this Treaty” (Art. 6.5). In any case, it may 
be impracticable to recur to QMV, corresponding 
to 80 per cent of the votes, without Germany that 
detains 27,1461 of ESM keys.
However, the various solutions of the non-com-
pliance dilemma seem problematic. It is problem-
atic, in fact, that a new organization (set up by the 
Fiscal Compact Treaty or ESM Treaty) might use 
an institution (such as the ECJ) of another orga-
nization (the EU of the Lisbon Treaty) to bind its 
own member states. This may also apply to the 
technical expertise of the Commission or ECB, 
upon which both treaties rely. In the ESM Trea-
ty, for instance, it is stated (Art. 17(5)) that “the 
Board of Directors shall decide by mutual agree-
ment, on a proposal from the Managing Direc-
tor and after having received a report from the 
Commission, … the disbursement of financial as-
sistance to a beneficiary Member State”; or (Art 
18(2)) that “decisions on interventions…shall 
be taken on the basis of an analysis of the ECB 
recognising the existence of exceptional financial 
market circumstances…”, although the Commis-
sion and the ECB are not allowed to play an in-
dependent role in the decision-making process. 
Certainly, the intervention of the ECJ is justified 
by TFEU, Art. 273, that states: “the Court of Jus-
tice shall have jurisdiction in any dispute between 
Member States which relates to the subject matter 
of the Treaties if the dispute is submitted to it un-
der a special agreement between the parties”. Nev-
ertheless, the ECJ or the Commission or the ECB 
are institutions operating within a legal structure 
defined also by the UK and the Czech Republic 
that did not agree upon the Fiscal Compact Treaty 
that utilizes them. Which are the political impli-
cations of this discrepancy? More in general, it 
is problematic, from an institutional perspective, 
to have established new treaties to solve the con-
tradictions of an old treaty and keep them alive 
simultaneously. It seems reasonable to argue that 
such coexistence between different treaties might 
be the source of new legal, technical and political 
problems.  
If the above dilemmas constrained the effective-
ness of the intergovernmental Union (regarding 
crisis management in the first case and crisis pre-
vention in the other two cases), that Union met 
also difficult hurdles in dealing with the legitimacy 
dilemma:  how to guarantee legitimacy to deci-
sions reached by national executives in the Euro-
pean Council or the ECOFIN Council that were 
never discussed, let alone approved, by the in-
stitution representing the European citizens (the 
EP)? Indeed, this dilemma became evident as the 
crisis deepened and the citizens of the indebted 
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member states had to pay high costs for making 
the necessary structural adjustment of their coun-
try possible. Not only did they have to abide by 
decisions imposed by impersonal financial mar-
kets, but above all by the Council and the Euro-
pean Council where the national executives of the 
larger member states (they never voted) played 
a predominant role. The problem does not con-
cern the content of the decision but the procedure 
for reaching it. Moreover, the highly centralized 
crisis prevention regime, set up during the euro 
crisis, will operate under the control of the larger 
and creditor member states, not the supranational 
institutions, that would impose their criteria to 
the small and debtor member states. The effects 
of the intergovernmental centralization were and 
will be uneven. Contrary to what happens in fed-
eral union, the transfer of sovereignty in financial 
policy has not gone from the states to the Union 
but from a group of states to another. Making 
content analysis of quality newspaper’s articles on 
the euro crisis in six European countries (Austria, 
UK, France, Germany, Sweden and Switzerland) 
from December 2009 to March 2012,  Kriesi and 
Grande (2012: 19) arrived to the conclusion that 
“by far the most important individual actor in in 
this (euro crisis, n.d.r.) debate was the German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel (…) followed by the 
(then) French President Nicolas Sarkozy”. Indeed, 
the affected citizens have continued to protest 
against Angela Merkel and not Herman van Rom-
puy or Manuel Barroso. This effect has inevitably 
increased the public perception of the illegitimacy 
of the intergovernmental decision-making re-
gime. The intergovernmental framework cannot 
identify a satisfactory solution to this dilemma 
because it assumes that the legitimacy of the EU 
derives from the legitimacy of its member states’ 
governments, as asserted by President Sarkozy in 
his Toulon speech on 2 December 2011. However, 
the legitimacy of decisions taken on behalf of the 
EU cannot be a derivative of the legitimacy en-
joyed by the governments of its member states. 
Decisions made at the EU level would require a 
legitimizing mechanism at that level, not at the 
level of its member states. Without a proper in-
volvement of the EP in those decisions, the latter 
inevitably lacks the justification for being consid-
ered legitimate by the European citizens affected 
by those decisions. 
4.2 Reacting to 
intergovernmentalism
From an intergovernmental point of view19, the 
emergence of a German-French directoire in fi-
nancial policy was considered a logical political 
outcome in a Union that exists thanks to the will 
of domestic governments. Indeed, with regard to 
the establishment of the ESM and the Fiscal Com-
pact Treaties, it was argued that Germany inevita-
bly had to play a domineering role in setting them 
up and defining the policy’s priorities of the euro-
area, given its condition as the continent’s most 
powerful economy and the major financier of the 
various instruments of financial stability. Howev-
er, with the deepening of the crisis, this intergov-
ernmental statement came to be questioned. 
Facing the German-French writhing into the in-
tergovernmental logic, the EP and the Commis-
sion started to react, more and more vociferously, 
to the directoire and its lack of legitimacy. Particu-
larly under EP’s pressure, both intergovernmental 
treaties were subjected to several revisions. The 
19.  This view was largely diffused in the press by ‘realist’ 
observers (journalists, analysts, politicians).
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Fiscal Compact Treaty, which passed through 
five different drafts in less than two months (8-9 
December 2011-31 January 2012) before a final 
version was published, was particularly affected 
(Krellinger 2012). In the final version, for in-
stance, it refers to the necessity of applying it (Art. 
2.1) “in conformity with the Treaties on which the 
European Union is founded (…) and with Euro-
pean Union law”. Moreover, because of the EP’s 
mobilization, the Treaty declares that (Art. 16) 
“within five years at most following the entry into 
force of this Treaty, on the basis of an assessment 
of the experience with its implementation, the 
necessary steps shall be taken, in compliance with 
the provisions of the Treaty on the European Un-
ion and the Treaty on the Functioning of the Eu-
ropean Union, with the aim of incorporating the 
substance of this Treaty into the legal framework 
of the European Union”. Indeed, the EP was fast 
to notice, already during the decision to create the 
ESM Treaty, that the latter “poses a risk to the in-
tegrity of the Treaty-based system” of the EU20. At 
the same time, the supranational institutions’ crit-
icism of the Fiscal Compact Treaty pressured the 
20.  Text adopted by the European Parliament at the sitting 
of Wednesday 23 March 2011, O.7.
Treaty’s framers to recognize that the operation 
of the intergovernmental Summit of the Heads of 
State and Government should rely on the presi-
dent of the Commission. As stated in Art. 12(4), 
“the President of the Euro Summit shall ensure 
the preparation and continuity of Euro Summits 
meetings, in close cooperation with the President 
of the European Commission.” 
The Fiscal Compact Treaty has finally arrived to 
formalize (Art. 10) the possibility for member 
states whose currency is the euro to recur “to en-
hanced cooperation as provided for in Article 20 
of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) and 
in Articles 326 to 334 of the Treaty on the func-
tion of the European Union (TFEU)”, thus making 
the new Treaty de facto redundant. After a long 
negotiation, the Fiscal Compact Treaty has come 
to recognize, first, that the Commission’s role in 
monitoring the excessive deficit’s member states is 
necessary and, second, that the EP cannot be con-
sidered an outsider on par with the EU member 
states whose currency is not the euro (both con-
ditions absent in the initial announcement of the 
Fiscal Compact Treaty). However, if the Commis-
sion has been finally included in the policy-mak-
ing process, the EP continues to be kept on the 
margins. According to Art. 12(5), “the President 
of the European Parliament may be invited to be 
heard (by the Euro Summit, ndr). The President 
of the Euro Summit shall present a report to the 
European Parliament after each of the meetings 
of the Euro Summits”. Thus, the EP has entered 
the Treaty, but its powers on Euro Summit’s Re-
ports remain undefined.  At the same time, the EP 
is never mentioned in the ESM Treaty. Although 
the intentions of the German and French promot-
ers of the new treaties were originally much more 
intergovernmental, the reaction coming from the 
EP and the Commission has tamed them, but only 
to a certain extent. 
A part from the EP and the Commission, also pri-
vate think-tanks and national governments came 
to criticize and to resent a Union dominated by 
a directoire. The influential think-tank Friends 
of Europe made public on 22 June 2011 a docu-
ment which denounced “the trend in which Eu-
rope’s national governments rather than the EU 
are increasingly in the driving seat…This is espe-
cially true in the economic domain where there is 
a global perception that Germany matters more 
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than the EU…” (Friends of Europe 2011). Or, com-
menting on the decisions to be taken by the Euro-
pean Council of 8-9 December 2011, an influen-
tial European group denounced “the temptation 
of a Franco-German coup de chefs d’Etat”21. The 
election in May 2012 of the new French president, 
Francoise Hollande, brought to a resetting of the 
relations between France and Germany and more 
in general to a multilateralization of the decision-
making process in financial policy. The new Ital-
ian government of Mario Monti (that substituted 
that of Silvio Berlusconi in November 2011) un-
moored Italy from the intergovernmental coali-
tion, returning the country to its supranational 
position. Medium-sized member states such as 
Spain or Belgium started to distance themselves 
from intergovernmental consensus, stressing the 
importance of involving supranational institu-
tions in financial policy. Finally, also in Germany, 
Chancellor Merkel gradually silenced the previous 
intergovernmental attitude. In a talk given at the 
Berlin’s Neues Museum on 7 February 2012, she in-
dicated the need for “a political union, something 
21.  Statement by the Spinelli Group (a coalition of infl u-
ential politicians and scholars) based in Brussels made 
public on 8 December 2011.
that wasn’t done when the euro was launched”, 
thus stressing the importance of having an effec-
tive Commission and a strengthened EP within an 
established bicameral legislature (Peel 2012). The 
distance from the intergovernmental approach 
was thus made explicit in the speech she gave to 
the EP on 8 November 2012, when she stated that 
“legitimacy and oversight are to be found on the 
level where decision are made and implemented. 
That means that if one of the European level’s 
competences is strengthened, the role of the Euro-
pean Parliament must also be strengthened”, thus 
adding “we should not contemplate – as is some-
times suggested- establishing an additional parlia-
mentary institution. The European Parliament is 
the bedrock”. Finally, the growing isolationism of 
UK contributed to the further weakening of the 
coalition in favour of the intergovernmental ap-
proach22. Of course, it remains to be seen how the 
22.  The European Union Act, enacted in UK on 19 July 
2011, calls even into question the constitutionalization 
of the EU brought about the by the European Court of 
Justices decisions of the 1960s on direct effect and su-
premacy of Community law. Indeed, it states that “there 
are no circumstances in which the jurisprudence of the 
Court of Justice can elevate Community Law to a status 
within the corpus of English domestic law to which it 
could not aspire by any route of English law itself (…). 
reaction to intergovernmentalism will be elabo-
rated by the critics of the latter.
The conditions of Parliament’s legislative supremacy in 
the UK necessarily remain in the UK’s hands”.
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5. Conclusion
The intergovernmental ‘moment’ has been called 
into question by the euro crisis. The intergovern-
mental EU, because constrained by its intrinsic 
logic, has not solved the dilemma of collective 
action in an effective and legitimate way. At the 
origins of the intergovernmental EU there was the 
assumption that crucial policies (as the financial 
one) may be europeanized only if controlled by 
the member states’ governments in the European 
Council and ECOFIN Council. Supranational in-
stitutions like the Commission and the ECJ were 
considered necessary for reducing the transac-
tion costs of the intergovernmental negotiation, 
but not for making more effective the decision-
making process. The euro crisis has shown that 
this assumption is unwarranted. The intergovern-
mental EU had not only difficulty in taking timing 
decision of crisis management, but it had also to 
rely more and more on the discretion of those su-
pranational institutions for making credible com-
mitments of crisis prevention. Furthermore, it has 
contradicted itself introducing rules contrasting 
the logic of voluntary coordination. At the same 
time, the intergovernmental EU was based on the 
assumption that the EP is a redundant institution, 
given that the legitimization function is or should 
be performed by the parliaments of its member 
states. The euro crisis has called into question also 
this assumption, showing that indirect legitimacy 
is insufficient for justifying decisions taken at the 
level and on behalf of the Union. The euro crisis 
has thus triggered the crisis of the intergovern-
mental EU, not of the EU as such, calling into ques-
tion  the viability of the Maastricht compromise 
as constitutionalized in and by the Lisbon Treaty. 
The future of the EU seems to depend again on its 
capacity to find a new balance between intergov-
ernmental and supranational institutions. While 
the debate has started (Piris 2012), a paradox has 
emerged, namely that the EU of the single curren-
cy (constituted by the more integrated member 
states) has unsuccessfully tried to operate accord-
ing to the intergovernmental constitution while 
the EU of the single market (constituted also by 
the less integrated member states) continues to 
function successfully according to the suprana-
tional constitution of the Lisbon Treaty. 
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1. Introduction
Enforcement is central to the functioning of the 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP or the Pact). Ef-
fective enforcement enhances the credibility of 
the Pact because it ensures that EU Member States 
comply with the fiscal rules embedded in the Pact. 
Such credibility is particularly important in a sys-
tem where monetary policy is conducted at the 
EU level while fiscal policy remains largely under 
the responsibility of the EU Member States. The 
mechanism that effectively enforces the rules of 
the SGP provides a credible backstop for the de-
centralised fiscal policies set at the Member State 
level. 
Nevertheless, an effective enforcement mechanism 
has been wanting since the inception of the SGP in 
1997 (Eichengreen and Wyplosz, 1998). Hitherto, 
the enforcement mechanism has not delivered on 
one of the SGP’s primary objectives: EU Member 
States respecting the rules of the Pact. The failure 
has been largely ascribed to the half-hearted im-
plementation of the SGP because the enforcement 
mechanism of the Pact was weak (European Cen-
tral Bank, 2012, p. 79). 
The rules that trigger the enforcement mechanism 
are laid down in the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union (the TFEU) and the SGP. 
They require that the euro area Member States 
avoid excessive government deficits on the basis of 
a specific deficit (3% of GDP) and a debt (60% of 
GDP) criterion and maintain sound and sustain-
able public finances. More precisely, the so-called 
preventive arm of the Pact forces EU Member 
States to work towards a medium term budget-
ary objective (MTO) while the so-called correc-
tive arm of the Pact guarantees the correction of 
excessive deficits. The corrective arm of the Pact 
comprises severe financial sanctions for euro area 
countries in case of non-compliance.       
Such sanctions have never been imposed to date 
despite a number of EU Member States breaching 
the Pact’s fiscal deficit criteria. The closest the EU 
has come to sanctions was in 2003 when the en-
forcement mechanism of the Pact’s corrective arm 
triggered an excessive deficit procedure (EDP) for 
France and Germany. The EU Council (the Coun-
cil of Ministers or the Council) blocked the EDP 
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and no further steps were taken against the two 
countries (Council press release, 25/11/2003). The 
event had a highly symbolic value with a long tail 
that laid bare the stand-off between the European 
Commission (the Commission) as the guardian 
of the Pact and the EU Council representing the 
EU Member States. In the following years the SGP 
was the subject of reform and the stalemate be-
tween EU Council and Commission disappeared 
from sight. The reform efforts significantly wa-
tered down the Pact because the fiscal rules could 
not properly be enforced (European Central Bank, 
2008).
The financial crisis that erupted in 2007 exposed 
the Pact’s weaknesses and the EU enacted a funda-
mental reform of the EU fiscal governance frame-
work in three steps. The reform process started 
in the spring of 2010 with the Task Force on Eco-
nomic Governance and the European Commis-
sion in parallel discussing proposals that resulted 
in the reinforced EU fiscal governance framework 
or the so-called Six Pack referring to six legislative 
changes (5 regulations and one directive) that en-
tered into force on 13 December 2011.  In the wake 
of the Six Pack the EU Member States negotiated 
the so-called Fiscal Compact as part of the Treaty 
on Stability, Co-ordination and Governance in the 
Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG). With the 
exception of the Czech Republic and the UK all 
the EU Heads of State or Government signed the 
TSCG on 2 March 2012. Finally, the Commission 
proposed in November 2011 two more legisla-
tive proposals, the so-called Two Pack, to further 
strengthen fiscal and economic surveillance of the 
euro area Member States.
Central to the reinforced EU fiscal governance 
framework is a more credible and effective en-
forcement of the SGP ensuring that sanctions 
are more automatic in relation to budgetary dis-
cipline. To strengthen effective enforcement the 
EU introduced the policy innovation of automa-
ticity for sanctions making recurrent breaches of 
the SGP subject to a more efficient treatment. 
Such automatic enforcement mechanism would 
enhance the credibility of the Pact, strengthen the 
role of the Commission and attach importance 
to a rule-based as opposed to the political based 
decision-making mechanism (Task Force on Eco-
nomic Governance, 21/10/2010). 
The mechanism underlying the automaticity of 
sanctions is based on the so-called reverse major-
ity voting (RMV) procedure in the EU Council. 
Under the RMV the Commission can impose a 
sanction on a Member State unless the Council 
decides by a reverse majority to reject the Com-
mission recommendation within a specified pe-
riod. More precisely, the decision-making mecha-
nism supporting the automaticity of sanctions is 
based on a reverse qualified majority voting proce-
dure (RQMV) in the Council of Ministers. It re-
quires a minority of EU Member States to agree 
on the Commission’s proposals or alternatively a 
qualified majority of Member States to block the 
Commission’s proposals. 
This reverse majority rule raises two questions: 
Does RMV effectively strengthen the enforcement 
mechanism? Second, does the importance of 
the minority in the RMV procedure suggest a 
trade-off between the decision-making capacity 
(effective enforcement) and its legitimacy?
To answer both questions this paper considers 
the motivation to introduce the RMV procedure 
and the likely impact it has on Council decision-
making, the Member States and the Commission. 
The focus of the analysis is on the likelihood of 
measures being adopted under the reverse major-
ity rule relative to the majority rule. To that end 
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the paper compares three cases where RMV has 
been introduced, i.e. the dispute settlement of the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO), the EU Trade 
Defence Policy (anti-dumping policy) and the re-
inforced SGP and Fiscal Compact. To our knowl-
edge the case selection represents the universe 
of cases where the different versions of reverse 
majority voting have been introduced. The cases 
show variation as to the institutional setting un-
derlining the common elements of the voting pro-
cedure. In each case we identify the institutional 
and procedural setting including the voting rule 
prior to the introduction of RMV. Subsequently, 
we discuss the causes for the procedural change 
and the objectives followed by an impact analysis. 
The key findings are based on a completely new 
database of EU Member States voting behaviour 
in the area of EU anti-dumping policy. The data-
base (68 roll calls or 1692 observations of individ-
ual votes cast) allows us to measure the dynamic 
effect of the introduction of reverse majority vot-
ing on Council legislative politics for the period 
(2002-2007).  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: 
The first section deals with the introduction 
in 1995 of reverse consensus in the dispute 
settlement system of the WTO. The second section 
studies the introduction in 2004 of reverse simple 
majority in the EU’s anti-dumping policy. The last 
section discusses the reform of the SGP and the 
new Fiscal Compact. The conclusions of the paper 
tie in the main findings. 
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2. RMV and the Dispute Settlement Mechanism 
of the WTO
Under the General Agreement on Trade and Tar-
iffs (GATT) member countries decided trade dis-
putes by consensus with each country represent-
ing one vote. The latent presence of individual ve-
toes weakened the enforcement mechanism and 
in 1995 the WTO introduced reverse consensus 
voting. The reverse consensus voting rule ren-
dered the WTO’s dispute settlement system more 
effective, predictable and credible but had some 
unintended consequences in the area of account-
ability and legitimacy.         
2.1 Institutions and Procedures
In the WTO member governments attempt to 
settle and negotiate common issues related to 
trade. One of the most important functions 
of the WTO is the mechanism that allows 
members to settle trade disputes under the 
WTO’s Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU). The 
fundamental objective of the DSU is to provide a 
rapid, efficient, predictable and rule-based system 
to resolve those disputes under the provisions of 
the WTO agreement  (WTO Secretariat, 2004, p. 
1). 
The DSU has evolved out of the regulations, pro-
cedures and practices that have been developed 
since 1947 with the inception of the General 
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT). Initial-
ly the Chairman of the GATT Council decided 
disputes between the contracting parties with a 
ruling. Later on working parties comprising the 
representatives of all contracting parties, includ-
ing the disputants, dealt with these disputes and 
adopted their reports by consensus. Over time 
panels of independent experts replaced the work-
ing parties and would recommend reports and 
rulings to the GATT Council made up of repre-
sentatives from all WTO member countries. Only 
after unanimous approval from all Council mem-
bers would these reports become legally bind-
ing on the disputants. The practice allowed the 
GATT panels to ‘built up a body of jurisprudence, 
which remains important today, and followed an 
increasingly rules-based approach and juridical 
style of reasoning in their reports’ (WTO Secre-
tariat, 2004, p. 13).
Under the 1947 GATT dispute settlement system 
the final decision-making power resided with the 
GATT Council deciding by consensus. The con-
sensual decision-making operated at different lev-
els and at key stages in the decision-making pro-
cedure. A single GATT party, including the party 
against whom a dispute was filed, could veto the 
key steps in the dispute settlement system such as 
the establishment of an expert panel, the adoption 
of a panel report and the final authorisation of 
countermeasures. 
Surprisingly, the system worked well despite the 
unanimity voting rule and the actual risks of ve-
toes. The parties’ short-term gains from opposi-
tion were weighed against long-term systemic risk 
whereby opposition today always involved the risk 
of a response in kind in the future. Owing to what 
one could call the boomerang effect the contract-
ing parties’ use of a veto was measured. Empirical 
research shows that in a large majority of cases the 
GATT 1947 dispute settlement system resulted in 
satisfactory outcomes (Read, 2007). 
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2.2 A weakened Enforcement 
Mechanism
Nevertheless, the empirical research on the ef-
fectiveness of the 1947 GATT dispute settlement 
mechanism is only based on complaints that were 
actually filed. It neglects those instances that were 
never brought before the GATT because ‘the com-
plainant suspected that the respondent would ex-
ercise its veto’ (WTO Secretariat, 2004, p. 14). This 
rational laid bare the structural weakness of the 
1947 GATT dispute settlement system. 
The rulings reflected the legal merits of the com-
plaints but also the political criteria as consen-
sual decision-making required the agreement to 
be acceptable to all parties. This structural weak-
ness contributed to the danger for paralysis that 
was increasingly on display in the 1980s. For in-
stance, in politically sensitive cases disputes were 
used as currency between the parties in ongoing 
negotiations in unrelated areas. Th e consensus 
requirement resulted sometimes in a diplomatic 
or political breakdown in which losing countries 
decided to veto the adoption of unfavourable re-
ports. Losing parties could also reject the panel 
reports on the basis of substantive disagreements 
with a panel’s legal analysis. They argued that the 
dispute settlement ruling was unfair, erroneous or 
incomplete because certain legal aspects had not 
been dealt with. 
The structural weakness resulted in delays in the 
establishment of panels, forum shopping, the 
growth of pending cases and the non-compliance 
with dispute settlement rulings. The 1947 GATT 
dispute settlement system also experienced a high 
percentage of legal failures and a rise in recourse 
to unilateral trade sanctions (Petersmann, 1997, 
pp. 90-91). In an area such as international trade 
where expedient decision-making is time criti-
cal to the interests of the contracting parties the 
absence of predictability was considered to be a 
major disadvantage to the dispute settlement sys-
tem. Th e contracting parties agreed that the sys-
tem required strengthening and in particular the 
enforcement mechanism needed change from a 
diplomatic to a more judicial approach.
2.3 The Reform: the 
Introduction of Reverse 
Consensus Voting
In the Uruguay Round (1986-1994) the negotia-
tions on improving the dispute settlement system 
received high priority and resulted in the reform 
of 1 January 1995 that introduced three major 
changes. First, a new political body, the Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB), composed of representa-
tives of all WTO members would deal with dis-
putes arising under any of the WTO agreements 
in accordance with the provisions of the DSU. The 
DSB supervises the entire process from the estab-
lishment of panels, the adoption of panel reports, 
the supervision of the implementation to the au-
thorisation of countermeasures when a WTO 
member fails to comply with a ruling. 
Second, a new expert body, the so-called Appellate 
Body, was created as a permanent body of seven 
members entrusted with the task of reviewing the 
legal aspects of the panel reports. The Appellate 
Body corrects potential legal errors in the panel 
reports and provides consistency of the decisions 
increasing the predictability of the dispute settle-
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ment system. The Appellate Body can also modify 
or reverse panel reports in case a party launches 
an appeal with the DSB (WTO Secretariat, 2004, 
pp. 22-23).
Third and most importantly, the DSB takes deci-
sions by consensus except when (a) it establish-
es panels (Article 6:1); (b) adopts panel (Article 
16:4) and Appellate Body (Article 17:4) reports; 
and, (c) when it authorises retaliation (Article 
22:6) within the time limits prescribed in each 
of the procedures. For these key steps the reform 
abolished the consensus driven decision-making 
process and introduced one of the most important 
policy innovations: the reverse consensus voting 
rule. Other than in the dispute settlement system 
the negative consensus applies nowhere else in the 
WTO decision-making framework (WTO Secre-
tariat, 2004, pp. 18-19). 
Under a reverse consensus only a single member 
country is needed to (a) approve the establish-
ment of panels; (b) adopt panel and Appellate 
Body reports; and (c) authorise counter measures 
in case of non-compliance. For each of those key 
steps the DSB must approve the decision by a re-
verse or so-called negative consensus, which is 
a consensus opposing the proposed decision. In 
practice, this means that for the three mentioned 
stages of the process (establishment, adoption and 
retaliation) the DSB must automatically decide to 
take the action unless there is a consensus not to do 
so. One single member can always prevent such 
a reverse consensus and avoid the obstruction of 
the decision. 
The significance of the reversed consensus rule 
becomes clear against the background that no 
member (including the effected or interested 
parties) is excluded from participation in the 
decision-making process. The member request-
ing the establishment of a panel can ensure that 
its request is approved by merely placing it on the 
agenda of the DSB. The adoption of panel and Ap-
pellate Body reports is guaranteed because there 
is always one party (out of more than a 100 mem-
bers) with a strong interest in the adoption of the 
reports unless the winner of the dispute agrees 
that it should not be. In contrast, any member in-
tending to block the decision to adopt the reports 
must convince all other WTO Members (includ-
ing the adversarial party in this case) to join the 
opposition or at least abstain from voting. 
The introduction of reversed majority voting in 
the form of a negative consensus rule at key stages 
in the decision-making process in combination 
with firm deadlines guarantees the virtual auto-
maticity of the new dispute settlement process. 
Unlike GATT 1947, the DSU does not provide an 
opportunity for its members to block the decision 
making mechanism. The sweeping reforms were 
accepted in exchange for having checks and bal-
ances introduced in the system such as  the interim 
review by the panel (Article 5) and the creation of 
a standing Appellate Body composed of seven in-
dependent experts appointed for a four-year term 
(Article 17). The interim review and the Appellate 
Body offered safeguards against potentially erro-
neous panel reports (Petersmann, 1997, p. 185).    
2.4 The Impact: the 
Judicialisation of the 
WTO’s Dispute Settlement 
System  
The reinforcement of the dispute settlement pro-
cedures by means of the reverse consensus has 
rendered the procedure more effective and con-
tributes to the predictability and credibility of the 
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multilateral trading system. However, the reform 
also resulted in a number of unintended conse-
quences in the area of accountability and legiti-
macy. Since its introduction the WTO witnessed 
a growing tension between the reformed, more 
judicial and rule-based decision-making mecha-
nism of the dispute settlement system and the un-
reformed, more political and legislative decision-
making system of the WTO.  
Compared to the 1947 GATT the dispute settle-
ment system under the WTO has become more 
effective and expeditious as a result of the reverse 
consensus voting rule. Between 1995 and 2005 
the panels and Appellate Body handled a large 
number of controversial cases and caught up with 
delays that built up in the previous era. For the 
period from 1995 to 2012 the system handled 446 
complaints at systemic and factual level demon-
strating that WTO members frequently resorted 
to the DSU. A review of the system in 1998-1999 
confirmed the general satisfaction among WTO 
member countries with its functioning and sug-
gesting that the reform’s objectives were satisfied: 
a well-functioning legal and judicial system that 
contributes to the predictability and credibility 
of the multilateral trading system (Petersmann, 
2005, p. 141). Today many cases have continued 
to experience delays but they have not threatened 
the credibility of the enforcement mechanism 
and the predictability of the global trading system 
(Davey, 2005, Grimmett, 2012, p. 3). 
On the contrary, the growing efficiency and effec-
tiveness of the WTO’s dispute settlement system 
has resulted in a potential imbalance within the 
organisation between judicial and political deci-
sion-making. 
The 1995 reform de-facto de-politicised the 1947 
GATT dispute settlement mechanism in favour of 
a significant legalisation and a quasi-judicialisation 
of the process (Petersmann, 1997, p. 186). The old 
1947 GATT dispute settlement system derived its 
political or diplomatic epitaph from the consen-
sus driven decision-making process. It required 
all GATT parties to agree and often strike politi-
cal deals in the GATT Council to make progress. 
In the absence of an accord the system was prone 
to delays and deadlock. The virtual automatic-
ity of the reversed consensus has removed these 
obstacles.  Panel and Appellate Body reports are 
virtually automatically adopted and are instantly 
binding when they reach the DSB, the political 
body composed of representatives from the WTO 
member countries. In short, the process changed 
the enforcement mechanism in favour of a far 
more procedural, rules-based dispute settlement 
system reducing the risks of unpredictability (Pe-
tersmann, 1997, pp. 185-186, Lewis, 2006, pp. 
897-898).
Simultaneously the virtual automaticity of the re-
versed consensus implies that the DSB as a politi-
cal body has less formal control over the key steps 
in the process and the eventual outcomes. The 
panels and in particular the standing Appellate 
Body increasingly resemble independent struc-
tures producing binding settlements upon the 
WTO members. This opens the decision-making 
structure to criticism on the grounds of obscur-
ing accountability. While the DSB is formally re-
sponsible for approving the panel and Appellate 
Body reports the actual decision-making capacity 
moved upstream in the process to the panels and 
in particular to the more permanent Appellate 
Body. Despite the fact that quasi automaticity sig-
nificantly reduced the control of the DSB its mem-
bers continue to be held accountable for the deci-
136The Euro Crisis & the State of European DemocracySection I
sions taken by the panels and the Appellate Body. 
This risk has been reinforced by the uniform opin-
ions of the panel and Appellate Body reports. The 
strong desire to reach unified decisions despite the 
fact that the Appellate Body can resort to decision 
making by a simple majority vote of its members 
contrasts with the frequent display of dissenting 
views in the political and legislative decision-
making process of the WTO (Lewis, 2006, p. 899). 
Similarly, the contrast between the active, virtual 
automatic and effective dispute settlement system 
and the more difficult political decision-making 
process suggests tensions between the two spheres 
within the WTO. While the mechanism used in 
dispute settlement depends on a limited and rath-
er independent number of experts (adjudicators) 
that must decide on the basis of regulations, the 
political and legislative area of  the WTO is run 
by a large number of government representatives 
who receive mandates from their respective capi-
tals and who may decide (Ehlermann and Ehring, 
2005, p. 69). The advent of the binding dispute 
settlement system subject to minority ruling has 
spurred activity and development in the area of 
adjudication. At the same time the 1995 reform 
of the dispute settlement system did not have a 
bearing on the functioning of the WTO’s politi-
cal procedures, which continues to operate under 
consensus. In this domain agreement is more dif-
ficult to attain and WTO member countries risk 
being unable to respond legislatively when they 
disagree with the panel’s or the Appellate Body’s 
legal interpretation. The imbalance has resulted in 
a new relationship between the political and judi-
cial processes in the WTO (Ehlermann and Eh-
ring, 2005, Cottier, March 2009).
For WTO member countries such evolution is 
problematic from a legitimacy perspective. The 
automatic and binding effect of panels and Ap-
pellate Body rulings make them increasingly in-
trusive on their domestic political economies. The 
rulings no longer allow the unilateral exit of mem-
ber countries and the cost of non-compliance has 
grown considerably. This in turn raises also im-
portant issues about the competing demands of 
the Member countries’ obligation under interna-
tional agreements and their domestic democratic 
mandates. The WTO frequently stands accused 
for ‘usurping’ the democratic process by enforc-
ing externally imposed rules on sovereign states 
(Read, 2007). 
In view of the duality between a stalling burden-
some political/legislative process and a binding 
expeditious judicial process member countries 
have become cautious in entering new obliga-
tions. They want to ascertain sufficient domestic 
support in the negotiation process (Cottier and 
Takenoshita, 2008, pp. 183-185, p. 192, Howse, 
2003, p. 17). Moreover, a number of observers 
have argued that the dispute settlement system is 
not only independent with a compulsory enforce-
ment mechanism but also a body that indepen-
dently develops a body of law strengthening the 
(quasi-)judiciary beyond what was foreseen and 
thereby threatening the legitimacy of the WTO 
(Ehlermann and Ehring, 2005, p. 52, 69, von Bog-
dandy, 2001, pp. 616-617).
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3. RMV and EU Anti-Dumping Policy
Until 1994 EU Member States decided defini-
tive anti-dumping proposals by a qualified ma-
jority vote and subsequent to the EFTA enlarge-
ment (1995) by a simple majority vote. However, 
with the growing EU membership and associated 
risk of Commission proposals being rejected in 
the Council the enforcement and effectiveness 
of the EU’s anti-dumping policy weakened. To 
strengthen the EU’s anti-dumping policy the EU 
introduced a reverse simple majority voting rule 
just before the Big Bang enlargement of 2004. The 
reform rendered EU anti-dumping policy more 
effective and strengthened the discretion of the 
Commission.   
3.1 Institutions and Procedures
The competences for administering EU anti-
dumping regulations are shared between the EU 
Member States, the EU Council and the Commis-
sion. The General Court gained competence over 
anti-dumping cases in 1994 and deals with the ap-
peals against decisions made in the course of an-
ti-dumping proceedings. The European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) addresses appeals against the judge-
ments of the General Court.   
According to the EU anti-dumping regulations 
EU producers can file an anti-dumping complaint 
about third countries imports with the Commis-
sion. Following such a complaint an anti-dump-
ing procedure with several stages is initiated. First, 
the Commission starts an investigation followed 
by an injury investigation and finally an analysis 
whether the imposition of anti-dumping duties 
would serve the Community’s interest. For each 
key step in the procedure the Commission con-
sults the EU Member States during meetings of 
the so-called anti-dumping Advisory Commit-
tee. While these consultations are compulsory the 
Member States opinions are not legally binding 
upon the Commission investigation. When the 
Commission decides in favour of definitive anti-
dumping measures it needs to address a proposal 
to the EU Council for adoption to become effec-
tive. In the meantime the Commission can im-
pose preliminary duties. 
Until March 1994 the EU Council approved these 
definitive anti-dumping proposals by a quali-
fied majority vote. In an EU of 12 Member States 
the qualified majority threshold made it rela-
tively straightforward to form a blocking minor-
ity against such a proposal, however, that did not 
happen very often. The political constellation in 
the EU Council guaranteed that more protec-
tionist Member States were at ease with the vot-
ing rule. Instead, they were concerned that Aus-
tria, Sweden and Finland as aspiring EU Mem-
ber States would upset the political balance in 
the Council carrying the risk that anti-dumping 
proposals would increasingly be defeated follow-
ing their accession. The three new Member States 
were perceived as potential candidates for joining 
the so-called free-trade coalition comprising the 
UK, the Netherlands, Germany and Denmark. 
Particularly France favoured the lowering of the 
voting threshold and in March 1994 ahead of the 
EFTA enlargement (1995) the decision-making 
procedure was changed. Definitive anti-dumping 
measures were to be adopted with a simple major-
ity vote instead and strict time-limits were insert-
ed from 1 September 1995 onwards (Bellis and 
Van Bael, 2011, p. 20-22). The reform lowered the 
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majority threshold in the Council and within the 
EU of 15 Member States it became more difficult 
to block a Commission anti-dumping proposal. 
3.2 A Weakened Enforcement 
Mechanism 
The EU anti-dumping policy process performed 
relatively well with proposals typically passing 
the majority threshold in the Council of Minis-
ters. However, in the first half of the 2000s the EU 
Member States rejected a number of the Com-
mission proposals in the Council. Disagreements 
between the Member States and between the EC 
and the EU Council occurred more often. The 
rejection of the proposals brought these disagree-
ments to the fore and placed the Commission in 
an awkward position. The investigations had con-
firmed the need for the adoption of anti-dumping 
measures and from the Commission’s perspective 
the adoption was time critical. For the complain-
ants the rejection also came in the last stage of the 
decision-making process (Bellis and Van Bael, 
2011, pp. 518-519, Commission of the European 
Communities, 27/12/2004, p. 8, pp. 38-41).
In those instances the required simple majority 
could not be found in the EU Council because 
of the unusual high number of abstentions that 
effectively counted as votes against. Rather than 
clearly supporting or opposing the proposals with 
a ‘yes’ or a ‘no’ vote the EU Member States choose 
to abstain from voting. This in turn, resulted in 
a situation whereby a Commission proposal was 
not adopted due to the number of abstentions. 
These abstentions had the effect of undermining 
the effectiveness of the Commission’s anti-dump-
ing policy and weakening the EU’s enforcement 
mechanism. The weakening carried all the more 
weight because of the presence of strict time limits 
in the anti-dumping procedure making expedient 
and effective enforcement particularly acute for 
EU producers. 
One symbolic case concerned a complaint brought 
by Eurocoton against imports of unbleached cot-
ton fabrics originating from China, Egypt, India, 
Indonesia, Pakistan and Turkey. Following the 
Commission investigation the Council rejected 
the proposal failing a simple majority in favour 
because of the high number of abstentions. Eu-
rocoton disagreed with the Council decision and 
appealed to the General Court but the complaint 
was rejected. As a last resort Eurocoton appealed 
to the ECJ and on 30 September 2003 the ECJ 
ruled in favour of Eurocoton against the Coun-
cil. The ECJ stated that the EU Council’s failure 
to adopt the proposal affected the interests of Eu-
rocoton. Moreover, the Court declared that the 
EU Council needed to clearly state the reasons for 
rejecting a Commission proposal (Bellis and Van 
Bael, 2011, pp. 519-520). The ruling resulted in a 
reform of the decision-making procedure and the 
voting rule governing anti-dumping policy in the 
EU Council (the so-called Basic Anti-Dumping 
Regulation). 
3.3 Reform: the Introduction 
of Reverse Simple Majority 
Voting
On 20 March 2004 the amended Basic Anti-
Dumping Regulation entered into force. The new 
regulation established that definitive anti-dump-
ing measures would be adopted in the EU Coun-
cil unless a simple majority of the Member States 
rejected the Commission proposal within a pe-
riod of one month after its submission (Council 
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press release, 09/03/2004). If the Council decides 
against a Commission proposal it must clearly in-
dicate its motivation. The voting procedure and 
the new mandatory time limits were also adopt-
ed for other key steps in the procedures such as 
reviews, reinvestigation, circumvention and sus-
pension of measures. The procedural reform was 
considered to be expedient in order to ‘facilitate 
the Community’s decision-making process with-
out changing the respective roles of the Commis-
sion and the Council in the application of the Ba-
sic Regulations, and without implying any changes 
for the decision-making procedures in other areas 
of the common commercial policy or other sectors’ 
(WTO, 2004, p. 2). Coincidentally, the reformed 
Basic Regulation entered into force just before 1 
May 2004 when the EU’s membership grew from 
15 to 27 Member States potentially upsetting the 
political balance in the Council on anti-dumping 
policy once more. 
Table 1: EU anti-dumping policy
Votes and majority thresholds in the EU Council (average in %)  
year yes votes no votes abstentions supporting opposing majority threshold
02 73.3 20.6 6.1 73.3 26.7 50+1
03 na na na na na na
04 85.6 10.7 3.7 89.3 10.7 47.3
05 80.2 13.0 6.8 87.0 13.0 43.2
06 77.5 12.8 9.7 87.2 13.8 40.3
07 74.1 12.9 14.0 88.1 11.9 36.0
av.’04-’07 79.4 12.4 8.6 87.9 12.4 41.2
Legend: averages as a % of total annual public anti-dumping votes with opposing votes in 2002 calculated as the sum of negative votes and abstentions. Supporting votes for ‘04-‘07 calculated 
as the sum of positive votes and abstentions. Note: data for 2003 are not public. Source: All acts on which a vote was recorded (except confirmatory replies) from the Council minutes (1999-
2010) and the Council press releases (1995-2010) of all individual Council sessions between the 1826th Council meeting for Agriculture (23 January 1995) and the 3061st Council meeting for 
Environment (20 December 2010). They were triangulated with the data from the monthly summaries of Council acts (1999-2010) and the Council Secretariat summary statistics (1996-2010).
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3.4 Impact: the Growing 
Discretion of the 
Commission 
Before the reform eight of the 15-EU Member 
States had to vote in favour of imposing anti-
dumping measures with abstentions effectively 
counting against a Commission proposal. Under 
the reverse simple majority rule (RSMV) absten-
tions count as positive votes forcing Member 
States to take a clear position and obliging them 
to explicitly vote against definitive duties, rather 
than following a more politically expedient route 
of abstaining. 
To study the impact of the RSMV on the EU 
Council and the Member States’ voting behaviour 
we base our analysis on a robust collection of data 
stretching over a period from 2002 to 2007. The 
data are a subset of a new database representing 
the total population of public votes and public roll 
calls between 1995 and 2010 in the EU Council of 
Ministers (Van Aken, 2012:2). The subset on EU 
Council public votes in the area of anti-dumping 
measures covers all publicly available roll calls 
between 1995 and 2010 representing 68 roll calls 
(1692 observations of individual votes cast) on 
individual regulations imposing definitive anti-
dumping measure on imports of certain goods. 
One caveat concerns the smaller number of ob-
servations before the introduction of RSMV in 
2004 (12 roll calls in total or 180 votes cast) com-
pared to 56 roll calls subsequently. It is also im-
portant to note that roll calls on anti-dumping are 
not systematically published and only those that 
were adopted are published (Van Aken, 2012:2, 
see annex pp. 62-70). 
Despite these drawbacks secondary sources partly 
corroborated our findings (Evenett and Vermulst, 
2004, Evenett and Vermulst, 2005). 
The empirical analysis of the new data reports four 
main findings. First, under RSMV abstentions 
have a dramatic effect on the majority threshold 
as demonstrated by the voting data on antidump-
ing measures. Normally, the threshold for pass-
ing a Council decision is fixed at 50%+1 with one 
Member State representing one vote. In contrast, 
under the RSMV rule the majority threshold be-
comes dynamic and largely depends on the num-
ber of abstentions. More precisely, under a simple 
majority vote negative votes or abstentions have 
no effect on the majority threshold as a decision 
requires 50%+1 votes in favour. Under the reverse 
variant the majority threshold is determined by 
the number of abstentions as positive votes are 
effectively counted towards the majority. For ex-
ample, in an extreme case the EU Council of 25 
Member States can pass a Commission proposal 
with a single Member State voting in favour, 12 
Member States voting against and 12 Member 
States abstaining. The majority voting threshold is 
therefore 4% of all the votes cast knowing that the 
12 abstentions (48%) effectively count as positive 
votes. The empirical analysis demonstrates that 
this is not just a theoretical observation but that a 
minority can effectively prevail against a majority 
of ‘no votes’.
Second, despite the lower majority threshold un-
der RSMV the data show that decisions on aver-
age receive approval from a large majority in the 
Council (see Table 1). In our sample on average 
decisions are approved with an 89% majority in 
2004; an 87% majority in 2005 and 2006; and with 
88% in 2007. In other words, the support for anti-
dumping measures in the Council rises between 
14 and 16% compared to the simple majority vot-
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ing rule. But these figures could be misleading 
as the sample shows that in 2006 two decisions 
would have failed the simple majority threshold 
with just 48% of support. In addition, secondary 
literature has confirmed more extreme cases oc-
curring where the votes were not published in the 
Council records. One such instance was an infor-
mal poll on the proposal for imposing anti-dump-
ing measures against shoe imports from Vietnam 
and the Republic of China in March 20062. The 
Commission proposal was approved by 3 Mem-
ber States only with 9-10 Member States voting 
against while 11-12 Member States abstained. In 
October 2006 the EU Council voted again on the 
proposal but this time with 9 Member States vot-
ing in favour, 12 against and 4 abstaining. These 
cases demonstrate that in practice proposals can 
be approved with the support of a minority of 
EU Member States (COUNCIL REGULATION, 
05/10/2006, EU Observer, 22/03/06, Financial 
Times, 22/09/2006). 
Third, when observing the majority threshold 
under RSMV (2004-2007) we empirically find a 
small but continuous declining majority thresh-
old from on average 47% in 2004 to 36% in 2007 
(see Table 1). The decline indicates that decisions 
are increasingly approved by a smaller group of 
countries that explicitly support the Commission 
proposals, i.e. with a ‘yes’ vote. The corollary of 
that finding is the gradual but steady rise in the 
2.  Footwear with uppers of leather from Vietnam and 
the Republic of China: initiation/review (2005 O.J. 
(C166)14); Provisional duty (2006 O.J. (L98)3); Definitive 
duty (2006 O.J. (L275)1).   
Legend: Country codes from two-letter ISO code (except Greece: EL, United Kingdom: UK). Source: All recorded votes (except 
confirmatory replies) under all voting procedures (QMV, Simple Majority and Unanimity) collated from the Council minutes 
(1999-2010) and the Council press releases (1995-2010) of all individual Council sessions between the 1826th Council meeting 
for Agriculture (23 January 1995) and the 3061st Council meeting for Environment (20 December 2010). They were triangu-
lated with the data from the monthly summaries of Council acts (1999-2010) and the Council Secretariat summary statistics 
(1996-2010). Note: Measure calculated on the basis of total votes against and abstentions (except confirmatory replies) for 
individual Member States as a % of total contested legislation in 2002 and 2004-2007.
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number of abstentions from 3% in 2004 to 14% 
in 2007. Most interesting is the sudden drop in 
‘no’ votes from 27% before 2004 to 12% of total 
after the reform. These changes can be the result 
of the reform in the voting rule (March 2004) or 
the growth of EU membership from 15 to 27 (May 
2004). 
Our calculations indicate that changing voting 
behaviour among the EU-15 are causing the de-
cline (see Figure 1) rather than just the growth of 
EU membership confirming the research in other 
domains (Van Aken, 2012:2, pp. 44-50). When 
only observing the EU-15 in 2002, Denmark, Fin-
land, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK regu-
larly appear in the anti-dumping coalition with a 
vote against. Overall these countries continue to 
oppose anti-dumping proposals for the period 
2004-2007, but they also and abstain more often. 
Countries like Germany, Austria, Spain and Por-
tugal that usually explicitly support anti-dumping 
measures now often tacitly agree by abstaining. 
Assuming that governments are not ignorant to 
the new voting rule they are able to qualify their 
support for anti-dumping legislation. Of the new 
Member States only Estonia and Latvia regularly 
vote against. All other countries differentiate their 
vote between explicit and tacit approval highlight-
ing that countries are willing lower the majority 
threshold in the Council.                
Finally, the combined effect of a dynamic majority 
threshold and the Member States changing voting 
behaviour in the EU Council show that the Com-
mission’s discretion vis-à-vis the Council has in-
creased considerably. The cliff-hangers approved 
with the marginal support among the Member 
States in 2006 are a case in point. While under the 
normal voting rule abstaining countries play an 
important role for the potential rejection of Com-
mission proposals they become the pivot for sanc-
tioning Commission proposals under a RSMV 
particularly for those proposals that do not enjoy 
extensive support among EU Member States. 
On 1 March 2011 a third reform of the voting 
procedure entered into force as a consequence of 
the new rules on the implementing powers of the 
Commission as part of the normal comitology 
procedure (EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND 
COUNCIL, 16/02/2011). Anti-dumping meas-
ures will be decided by a reverse qualified majori-
ty vote under the Lisbon Treaty rules representing 
a double majority of at least 55% of the Member 
States votes and 65% of the EU population. As we 
will discuss in the section on the EU fiscal gov-
ernance the new double majority requirement will 
lower the voting threshold even further rendering 
the procedure virtually automatic.  
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4. EU Fiscal Governance: the SGP and the 
Fiscal Compact
From 1997 onwards EU Member States required 
a 2/3rds majority to decide on Commission pro-
posals in the area of the EDP. However, during 
that period Member States have been reluctant to 
agree sanctions against other Member States in 
the EU Council as the EDP procedure on France 
and Germany in 2003 demonstrates. To address 
this fundamental weakness of the enforcement 
mechanism the EU introduced reverse qualified 
majority voting in the SGP in 2011 and the Fis-
cal compact in 2012. The reform renders EU fis-
cal governance more effective and strengthens the 
discretion of the Commission.   
4.1 Institutions and Procedures
The competences for administering fiscal policy 
in the EU are shared between the EU Member 
States, the EU Council and the Commission. The 
Commission monitors economic and fiscal devel-
opments and the conduct of the Member States in 
observing the SGP, it prepares reports and has the 
right of initiative in the area of the EDP proce-
dure. At different stages in the policy process the 
Commissions consults with the Member States 
at the preparatory level and political level in the 
ECOFIN Council. The ECOFIN Council has the 
competence to adopt Commission proposals and 
recommendations with respect to the Member 
States’ fiscal policies and has a final say over the 
imposition of sanctions on Member States that fail 
to respects their commitments under the SGP.      
4.2 A Weakening Enforcement 
Mechanism 
An effective enforcement mechanism of the SGP 
has been wanting since its inception in 1997. From 
the outset a number of institutional weaknesses of 
the Pact were present. In essence the weaknesses 
related to the likelihood of the Commission initi-
ating proceedings against EU Member States not 
respecting the Pact and the Member States agree-
ing to such proposal with a two-thirds majority 
in the ECOFIN Council. These flaws became par-
ticularly apparent between 2002 and 2003 with 
the faltering EDP procedure for France and Ger-
many (Council press release, 25/11/2003, Council 
press release, 09/03/2004). The institutional con-
flict between the Commission and the EU Coun-
cil weakened and cast a long shadow on the SGP. 
EU leaders have regularly referred to the negative 
impact of the decisions taken in 2003 on EU fiscal 
governance (Dams and Greive, 7/10/2011, Agence 
France-Presse, 29/09/2010, Little, 29/01/2012). 
For instance, in June 2010 Jean-Claude Trichet, 
former President of the ECB, referred to the 2003 
decisions in the following terms: ‘The govern-
ments were extremely unreliable, over the course 
of months and years’ (Agence France-Presse, 
20/06/2010). 
To understand the weakening of the SGP it is im-
portant to appreciate how and why the Pact broke 
down. The complete EDP for France and Germa-
ny including all the key steps, from the Commis-
sion’s report up to the ECJ’s annulment of the EU 
Council conclusions, lasted almost two years (see 
Table 2). 
The Commission started an EDP against Ger-
many in November 2002 and against France in 
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April 2003 with the preparation of a report. It 
subsequently requested the Council to formally 
acknowledge the existence of an excessive defi-
cit in both countries in the form of an opinion 
and a recommendation. On 21 January 2003 the 
ECOFIN Council unanimously agreed with the 
Commission and adopted the recommendation 
that Germany needed to take measures before 21 
May 2003 to keep its deficit under control. The 
ECOFIN Council also adopted with France ab-
staining a recommendation for an early warning 
to prevent an excessive deficit in France (Council 
Press release, 21/01/2003). The French abstention 
was all the more symbolic against the background 
that France seldom votes in the EU Council par-
ticularly in the area of economic and financial 
matters (Van Aken, 2012:2, p. 43, Hayes-Renshaw 
et al., 2006). On 3 June 2003 the ECOFIN Coun-
cil agreed unanimously with the Commission on 
the existence of an excessive deficit in France and 
decided that France needed to take effective ac-
tion before 3 October 2003 to bring the deficit 
under control. Denmark and the Netherlands vot-
ed against the Council decision because in their 
view France received special treatment compared 
to other countries in a similar situation (Council 
press release, 03/06/2003). 
Despite the severity of the situation France and 
Germany did not respect their commitments un-
der the Treaty, the SGP and the ECOFIN Council 
decisions. The EDP could not be abrogated and 
the Commission was left with little choice but to 
propose an additional two recommendations for 
each country, i.e. one for establishing insufficient 
action and another one to give notice to Paris and 
Berlin to take effective action within a certain 
deadline. It is important to note that these recom-
mendations were still one step ahead of the effec-
tive sanctions in the procedure. The provisions on 
sanctions in the SGP would have come into play 
only later in the process. Moreover, a number of 
technical difficulties in the EDP prevented the 
Commission from exercising its role as guardian 
of the Treaty (Gros et al., 2004, pp. 13-15).  
The procedure culminated in the ECOFIN Coun-
cil of 23 November 2003 when the Italian Presi-
dency, perhaps supported by a majority of the 
France Germany
Step Article Step in the Procedure
1 104(3) Commission report 02/04/2003 19/11/2002
2 104(5) Commission opinion on the existence of an excessive deficit 07/05/2003 08/01/2003
3 104(6) Commission recommendation for a Council decision on the existence of an excessive deficit 07/05/2003 08/01/2003
4 104(7) Commission recommendation for a Council recommendation to end the excessive deficit situation07/05/2003 08/01/2003
5 104(6) Council decision on the existence of an excessive deficit 03/06/2003 21/01/2003
6 104(7) Council recommendation to end the excessive deficit situation 03/06/2003 21/01/2003
7 104(8) Commission recommendation for a Council decision establishing inadequate action 08/10/2003 18/11/2003
8 104(9) Commission recommendation for Council decision to give notice 21/10/2003 18/11/2003
104(8) Council Decision 25/11/2003 25/11/2003
104(9) Council Decision 25/11/2003 25/11/2003
Council conclusions 25/11/2003 25/11/2003
European Court of Justice annuls conclusions 13/07/2004 13/07/2004
Table 2: EDP Procedure (2002-2004)
Date
Adoption in the Council
Legend: Under Article 104 of Title VII (Economic and Monetary Policy) of the Treaty (consolidated versions 2002) Source: 
European Commission and EU Council
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Council Members, decided to subject the four 
Commission recommendations to a vote (Van 
Aken, 2012:2, p. 18-19). The outcome of the vote 
prevented the sanction mechanism from be-
ing triggered and brought the EDP to a sudden 
halt. A blocking minority of Member States in 
the Council rejected all four Commission’s rec-
ommendations (see Table 3). On all counts the 
blocking minority prevented the formation of ‘a 
majority of two-thirds’ (not a qualified majority) of 
the weighted votes in support of the Commission’s 
proposal. The Member States concerned could 
not participate in the roll call3 and only countries 
which had adopted the euro were allowed to vote 
on the decisions under article 104(9) of the Treaty. 
It is important to note that the vote could not be 
taken within the group of euro area countries be-
3.  Under Article 104(13) of the Treaty. 
cause at the time the so-called Eurogroup had an 
informal status only. 
Instead the vote was held within the remit of the 
ECOFIN Council and the four Commission rec-
ommendations needed to garner at least 66.6% of 
the weighted votes in favour or less than 33.3% of 
the weighted votes against. Crucially, the absten-
tions are counted as votes against. In practice this 
meant that the Commission recommendation es-
tablishing inadequate action under article 104(8) 
needed to muster at least 52 out of 77 weighted 
votes in the ECOFIN Council (see Table 3). The 
decision only received 37 weighted votes in favour 
(48%) with a blocking minority of 40 votes (52%), 
which outweighs the required 26 votes by a signif-
icant margin. On the decision Belgium, Denmark, 
Greece, Spain, the Netherlands, Austria, Finland 
and Sweden voted in favour. Germany or France, 
the UK, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Luxembourg 
voted against. 
Similarly, for the approval of the Commission rec-
ommendation to give notice under article 104(9) 
the ECOFIN Council required at least 40 out of 
60 weighted votes in favour among the euro area 
countries (excluding the UK, Denmark and Swe-
Nr. legal basis decision/vote DE AT BE DK ES FI FR EL IE IT LU NL PT UK SE 2/3rds blocking minority total result
1 Art. 104(8) recommendation for France 2 1 1 1 1 1 * 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 37 40 77 rejected
2 Art. 104(9) recommendation for France 2 1 1 * 1 1 * 1 2 2 2 1 2 * * 30 30 60 rejected
3 Art. 104(7) Council conclusions for France 1 2 1 * 2 2 * 1 1 1 1 2 1 * * 40 20 60 adopted
4 Art. 104(8) recommendation for Germany * 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 37 40 77 rejected
5 Art. 104(9) recommendation for Germany * 1 1 * 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 * * 30 30 60 rejected
6 Art. 104(7) Council conclusions for Germany * 2 1 * 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 * * 40 20 60 adopted
Art. 205(2) weighted votes 10 4 5 3 8 3 10 5 3 10 2 5 5 10 4
weighted votes
Table 3: Votes on Commission Recommendation under the Stability and Growth Pact: EU-15 and Eurozone (EU-12)
Legend: 1=vote in favour, 2=vote against or abstention; *=excluding the vote of the representatives of the Member State con-
cerned, 2/3rds=two thirds of the weighted votes Note: According to the voting rule under the Nice Treaty (entry into force 
01/02/2003) of Art. 104 (13) only countries which have adopted the euro are allowed to vote on decisions on the Article 104(9) 
of the Treaty. Recalling that France or Germany were not allowed to vote and represented 10 votes each at least 52 out of a total 
of 77 votes were necessary for the adoption of an ECOFIN Council decision. When only euro area countries were allowed to vote 
a Council decision required at least 40 out of a total of 60 votes excluding France or Germany and the non-euro area countries 
(DK, UK and SW) representing a total of 27 votes. Source: Press release of the 2546th Council meeting (Economic and Financial 
Affairs) of 25 November 2003
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den and France or Germany). A blocking minor-
ity represented at least 20 weighted votes. On the 
decision Austria, Belgium, Spain, Finland, Greece 
and the Netherlands voted in favour representing 
30 votes (50% of the weighted votes) while France 
or Germany, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg and Por-
tugal opposed either by voting against or abstain-
ing from voting (50% of the weighted votes). In 
short, the defeating coalition on both decisions 
within the EU-15 and the Euro area-13 had a sub-
stantial winning margin of nearly 20% of the votes 
in the EU Council.
The rejection of the Commission proposals rep-
resented a conundrum for the EU as it would end 
the procedure on France and Germany despite 
the fact that the Commission and the Council had 
previously acknowledged the existence of an ex-
cessive deficit. The four decisions on two large EU 
Member States laid bare the weakness of the SGP 
and indirectly the Commission as the guardian of 
the Treaty (Gros et al., 2004). To remedy the situ-
ation the Italian Presidency and the euro area 
countries adopted with a vote the so-called ‘Coun-
cil conclusions on assessing the actions taken’ by 
France or Germany in the ECOFIN Council. The 
vote proved to be a cliff-hanger with the euro area 
countries only just reaching the required 2/3rds 
majority (66.6%) of 40 weighted votes needed 
against a blocking minority of 20 weighted votes 
(33.3.%). 
It remains doubtful whether this vote and the 
Council conclusions addressed the SGP’s credibil-
ity problem. At the time the ECB stated in unchar-
acteristically strong wording: ‘[…] the Governing 
Council took the view that the recommendations 
of the European Commission for the next steps in 
the excessive deficit procedure pushed the room 
for the interpretation of the rules and procedures 
to the limit […] The Conclusions adopted by the 
ECOFIN Council carry serious dangers. The fail-
ure to go along with the rules and procedures 
foreseen in the Stability and Growth Pact risks 
undermining the credibility of the institutional 
framework and the confidence in sound public 
finances of Member States across the euro area’ 
(European Central Bank, 25/11/2003). 
The Commission also profoundly disagreed with 
the ECOFIN Council decisions: ‘The Commission 
takes note of the rejection by the Council […] 
without giving the adequate explanation as laid 
down in the European Council Resolution on the 
Stability and Growth Pact […] The Commission 
deeply regrets that the Council has not followed 
the spirit and the rules of the Treaty and the Stabil-
ity and Growth Pact that were agreed unanimous-
ly by all Member States. Only a rule-based system 
can guarantee that commitments are enforced and 
that all Member States are treated equally’ (Coun-
cil press release, 25/11/2003). In January 2004 the 
Commission challenged the Council conclusions 
before the ECJ arguing that ‘the Treaty rules can-
not be ignored or changed for the sole reason that 
the Council could not reach the majority to adopt 
the decisions under articles 104(8) and 104(9), as 
recommended by the Commission’(Commission 
Presse Release, 13/01/2004, IP/04/35). The ECJ 
agreed with the Commission on 13 July 2004 and 
annulled the ECOFIN Council conclusions on 
procedural grounds, however, it also confirmed 
the EU Council’s competence in the area of deciding 
budgetary discipline (Court of Justice of the Euro-
pean Communities Press Release, 13/07/2004). 
Three important elements emerged with respect 
to the EDP procedure on France and Germany. 
First, the Treaty, the SGP and the EDP procedure 
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did not anticipate the possibility of a stalemate be-
tween the EU Council (the Member States) and 
the Commission. The Treaty did not specify what 
would happen under such circumstances. Second, 
the ECJ confirmed that the ultimate decision-
making power rested with a political body, the 
EU Council, rather than the executive, the Com-
mission. As a result the Commission’s proposals 
carried less weight until they were formally en-
dorsed (with a vote) in the EU Council particu-
larly in view of the procedures, including the vot-
ing rules and majority thresholds that are crucial 
to the credibility of the enforcement mechanism. 
Finally, the Council’s rejection of the Commission 
recommendations left the enforcement mecha-
nism of the SGP very much weakened. Despite the 
reform efforts over the following years the SGP 
never fully (re)gained the needed credibility.
4.3 The Reform: the 
Introduction of Reverse 
Qualified Majority Voting
The financial crisis that erupted in 2007 exposed 
the weakness of the SGP’s enforcement mecha-
nism even further particularly in view of the ma-
jority of EU (20 out of 27) and Euro area (12 out 
of 17) countries that found themselves in an EDP 
procedure.4 Against this background and in view 
of the experience with the EDP procedure for 
France and Germany in 2003 the EU embarked 
on a reform of the SGP. 
To that end the 2010 Spring European Council re-
quested the establishment of a task force compris-
ing the representatives of the EU Member States, 
the ECB, the Commission, the EU Presidency and 
the President of the European Council. Following 
intense preparations within this so-called EU Task 
Force on Economic Governance the Commis-
sion’s services put forward six proposals (5 regu-
lations and one directive) on 29 September 2010. 
The proposals strengthened the SGP’s enforce-
ment mechanism by introducing the principle of 
automaticity for key steps in the procedure within 
clearly specified time limits. The mechanism guar-
anteeing the automaticity is the use of RQMV as 
the preferred voting rule.
4.  For details see website of the Economic and Financial 
Affairs website of the European Commission: http://
ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/
sgp/deficit/index_en.htm  
In the preventive part of the Pact the Commission 
proposed for euro-area countries the introduc-
tion of RQMV for imposing sanctions (an inter-
est-bearing deposit of 0.2% of GDP). Under the 
RQMV such a proposed sanction is automatically 
adopted unless the Council objects with a QMV 
within ten days of its submission. Moreover, the 
Council may only alter the text of the sanction 
unanimously or based on a Commission proposal 
and a reasoned request from the Member State 
concerned. Only after the EU Council is satisfied 
with a remedy will the deposit be returned with 
interest (see Annex: Relevant Legal Texts). 
In the corrective part of the SGP the Commis-
sion also envisaged strengthening the key steps in 
the EDP procedure for euro area Member States. 
More precisely, at each step of the EDP a Com-
mission proposal is virtually automatically adopt-
ed unless the Council decides to vote against un-
der an RQMV within ten days of its submission. 
The text of the sanctions (a non-interest-bearing 
deposit of 0.2% of GDP) can only be changed 
unanimously unless the Commission submits a 
proposal on grounds of exceptional economic 
circumstances and/or a reasoned request by the 
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Member State concerned (European Commis-
sion, 29/09/2010b).
In a follow-up to the EDP and according to a 
similar enforcement mechanism the Commission 
also proposed to introduce fines (0.1% of the 
GDP) for euro-area countries that fail to correct 
excessive macroeconomic imbalances. The 
procedure for the application of the fines ‘should 
be construed in such a way that the application of 
the fine on those Member States would be the rule 
and not the exception’(European Commission, 
29/09/2010a).
The German government supported the 
Commission proposals but France opposed 
the virtual automaticity of the enforcement 
mechanism. Christine Lagarde, the French 
Finance Minister at that time, argued that 
France ‘has always been favourable to a solid 
and credible economic governance but not for a 
totally automatic mechanism, a power that would 
be exclusively in the hands of experts’ (Agence 
France-Presse, 29/09/2010). In October 2010 
France and Germany found a compromise which 
they presented ahead of the European Council. In 
the preventive and corrective arm of the Pact the 
Council would progressively impose sanctions but 
only with a qualified majority instead of an RQMV 
(Franco-German declaration, 18/10/2010). In the 
course of 2011 the discussions between the EP and 
the Council centred on the automaticity, the type 
of the sanctions and the voting procedure. Against 
the background of profound market turmoil a 
compromise emerged in the form of the so-called 
Six Pack in November 2011.  
Compared to the original Commission proposals 
the enforcement mechanism in the preventive 
and corrective arm of the Pact was significantly 
watered down (see Annex: Relevant Legal Texts). 
While automaticity would be maintained virtually 
guaranteeing the adoption of a Commission 
proposal the Council has the option of amending 
the proposed text with a QMV. This leaves the 
enforcement mechanism almost unchanged 
as RQMV and QMV cancel each other out. 
In its opinion the ECB highlighted that the 
automaticity did not go far enough (European 
Central Bank, 16/02/2011) and that the 
enhanced fiscal framework still lacked ‘sufficient 
automaticity in case of non-compliance with 
the rules. In particular, the Council continues to 
have substantial room for discretion under the 
reinforced SGP. For example, the Council – on the 
basis of an overall assessment – has to decide by 
qualified majority that an excessive deficit exists’ 
(European Central Bank, 2012, p. 82).
The Fiscal Compact negotiated in the autumn and 
winter of 2011 and 2012 addresses these concerns 
and re-introduces complete automaticity to rein-
force the EDP (see Annex: Relevant Legal Texts). 
In the area of the preventive arm the ECJ becomes 
the backstop for the effective enforcement and the 
Court can impose financial sanctions provided a 
case is brought before it. The corrective arm fully 
introduces virtual automaticity for each key step 
under strict deadlines. The RQMV applies for the 
decisions on the existence of an excessive deficit, 
for not having taken effective action, to give no-
tice and for imposing financial sanctions in case 
of non-compliance. In short, the Fiscal Compact 
compensates for the limitations of the enforce-
ment mechanism in the new SGP. 
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4.4 Impact: towards a Rule-
based Decision-making 
Mechanism
Before the reform decision-making power largely 
rested with the EU Council as the 2003 votes in 
the ECOFIN Council on France and Germany 
demonstrate. The approval of a Commission rec-
ommendation to formally launch the EDP and 
subject a Member State to a sanction regime re-
quired a 2/3rds (66.6%) majority of weighted votes 
in the EU Council. The recommendation failed 
if a blocking minority garnered at least 33.3% of 
the weighted votes. Abstentions were counted as 
votes against, the countries concerned could not 
participate in the vote and only members of the 
euro area could vote on decisions concerning euro 
area countries.  
With the entry into force of the Six Pack in Decem-
ber 2011 the balance of decision-making power 
leans towards the Commission, but only margin-
ally. The approval of a Commission recommenda-
tion in the preventive and corrective arm of the 
Pact requires the approval with an RQMV in the 
Council for two key steps in the EDP procedure 
Lisbon Pop
01/11/2014* (000,0)
AT 1 8,404,252
BE 1 10,951,665
DE 1 81,751,602
DK 1 5,560,628
ES 1 46,152,926
FI 1 5,375,276
FR 1 65,048,412
GR 1 11,309,885
IE 1 4,480,858
IT 1 60,626,442
LU 1 511,840
NL 1 16,655,799
PT 1 10,636,979
SE 1 9,415,570
UK 1 62,435,709
CY 1 804,435
CZ 1 10,532,770
EE 1 1,340,194
HU 1 9,985,722
LT 1 3,244,601
LV 1 2,229,641
MT 1 417,617
PL 1 38,200,037
SK 1 5,435,273
SL 1 2,050,189
BG 1 7,504,868
RO 1 21,413,815
Qualified 15/27 (55% votes) 502,477,005.000
Majority** and
62% (311,535,740,00)
65% pop. 65%(326,610,050.00)
Qualified 20/27MS (72%)
Majority*** 65%pop.
Blocking 
Minority 35% of the pop. of the 
participating MS+1MS 35%(175,866,951.80)
RQMV**** 13/27
and
>35% pop. 35%(175,866,951.80)
62 % pop.
18/27MS
91
91/345
255/345
4
10
14
255/345
and
14 MS
12
4
7
3
27
7
12
10
29
4
12
4
29
12
7
29
4
13
10
12
29
7
27
7
Table 4:
Evolution of QMV in the EU Council (EU 27, 2007-2017)
2007-2014 2014 onwards
01/01/2007
Nice Notes: *transition period from 01/11/2014 until 31/03/2017: 
a Member state can request that the voting rule for a particu-
lar decision will be reverted to the rules under the Nice Treaty. 
** QMV for an act proposed by the Commission; *** QMV for 
an act not proposed by the Commission; **** abstentions are 
counted as votes in favour Source: population data from Eu-
rostat (2011) 
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with strict time limits. The countries concerned 
are not allowed to participate and for decisions 
concerning euro area countries only members of 
the euro area are allowed to vote. This means that 
on paper at least the Council continues to take the 
final decisions but informally the RQMV shift the 
discretion towards the Commission because a rec-
ommendation only requires just over 26% of the 
Council’s weighted votes for approval. 
Moreover, abstentions play an important role for 
the approval of Commission recommendations 
because they lower the threshold to pass a pro-
posal under RQMV even further. As our analysis 
of reverse majority voting in the area of EU-anti 
dumping policy illustrates, the majority thresh-
old becomes dynamic depending on the effective 
number of abstentions. For example, in the ex-
treme case Malta with 3 weighted votes in favour 
of a Commission recommendation could pass a 
decision against a majority of Member States vot-
ing against as long as an equally strong group of 
Member states would abstain.
Unexpectedly, the reformed SGP cancels out 
the nearly automatic adoption of a Commission 
recommendation under RQMV as it allows the 
Council to change the text of the recommenda-
tion with a qualified majority (at least 73.91% of 
the Member States’ weighted votes under the Nice 
Treaty voting rules)5. That is a significant weak-
ening of the enforcement mechanism consider-
ing the 2003 EDP procedure on France and Ger-
many. If we apply the new voting rules and follow 
the voting weights of the Nice Treaty to the 2003 
EDP procedure the Commission recommenda-
tions could not have been blocked nor altered at 
the time. In contrast, when we apply the voting 
weights of the Lisbon Treaty the Commission 
recommendations would have been adopted but 
the Council would have had the opportunity to 
change the text of the recommendation. In other 
words, under the Lisbon Treaty voting rules and 
weights the discretion is likely to veer back in the 
direction of the Council (see Table 4).
5.  The proposal also requires the support of a majority 
of the Member States (14 Member States out of 27) 
and a Member State can always request verification 
that the majority represent at least 62% of the total EU 
population. The proposal is not adopted if a blocking 
minority of Member States represents at least 90 out of 
345 weighted votes. Note that abstentions under QMV 
are counted as votes against.
The Fiscal Compact addresses these weaknesses 
of the Six Pack and eliminates the possibility of 
the Council to change a Commission recommen-
dation for euro area countries. The Fiscal Com-
pact introduces RQMV in all the key steps of the 
EDP procedure under strict deadlines. Approval of 
a Commission proposal is virtually automatic re-
quiring only just over 26% of the weighted votes 
(Nice Treaty) or at least 4 Member States repre-
senting 35% of the population of the participating 
countries (Lisbon Treaty)6. Countries that abstain 
from voting in the procedure lower the necessary 
votes for approval even further. As a consequence, 
the Fiscal Compact shifts the decision-making 
capacity virtually entirely in the direction of the 
Commission and reduces the political discretion 
of the EU Council almost completely, notwith-
6.  The rule on the four countries is designed to prevent 
three of the four larger Member States (France, Germa-
ny, Italy and the UK) from being able to block a Com-
mission proposal with a QMV. They need to draw in at 
least a fourth Member State to block a proposal. For the 
measures referred to in Articles 4, 5, 6 and 8, only mem-
bers of the Council representing Member States whose 
currency is the euro shall vote, and the Council shall act 
without taking into account the vote of the member of 
the Council representing the Member State concerned. 
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standing that the EU Council and the Member 
States continue to be fully responsible for the final 
approval of the measures.  
Therefore, the Commission’s right of initiative in 
the area of fiscal policy will become the focus of 
attention. With a virtual automatic decision-mak-
ing and enforcement mechanism much more con-
sideration will be given to the Commission and its 
interpretation of the fiscal rules and procedures. 
These rules have become even more complex with 
the Fiscal Compact adding another layer to those 
already in place. Under the SGP and Fiscal Com-
pact all the ingredients are now in place for a fully 
functioning rule-based system with experts and 
officials interpreting the rules and their proposals 
supported by the virtual automatic procedures of 
reverse majority voting. 
Admittedly, the enforceability of the Fiscal Com-
pact largely depends on its legal status. The Fiscal 
Compact is an inter se international agreement be-
tween two or more EU Member States that recog-
nises the primacy of EU law. In practice this means 
that primary and secondary EU law both take un-
disputed precedence over conflicting provisions 
in inter se agreements between the Member States 
(De Witte, 2012, Craig, 2012, Baratta, 2012). Ac-
cording to this logic the weaker enforceability of 
the EDP procedure in the Six Pack takes prece-
dence over the stronger enforceability of the EDP 
procedure in the Fiscal Compact. Provided that is 
the case the impact of the reformed enforcement 
mechanism of the EDP is likely to remain limited 
and much will depend on the discretion for Mem-
ber States to respect their intentions and commit-
ments under the Fiscal Compact and the TSCG as 
well as their preparedness to challenge their fellow 
Member States in front of the ECJ (Baratta, 2012).
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5. Conclusions
With the agreement on the reinforced SGP in 
2011 and the Fiscal Compact in 2012 the EU ap-
proved a new set of rules for economic and fis-
cal surveillance of the EU Member States. To 
strengthen the effective enforcement the SGP and 
the Fiscal Compact introduce the policy innova-
tion of reverse qualified majority voting in the EU 
Council. Under the RQMV the Commission can 
impose a sanction on a Member State when a mi-
nority of EU Member States agree within a speci-
fied time limit. The EU Council can only block 
such a sanction with a qualified majority of the 
Member States.  
The reverse majority voting rule raises two ques-
tions: Does it effectively strengthen the enforce-
ment mechanism of the SGP and the Fiscal Com-
pact? And, does the importance of the minority in 
the voting procedure suggest a trade-off between 
effective enforcement and the legitimacy of the 
SGP and the Fiscal Compact? To answer the re-
search questions this paper compares three cases 
where three different types of reverse majority 
voting have been introduced: the dispute settle-
ment mechanism of the World Trade Organisa-
tion and reverse consensus; the EU anti-dumping 
policy and reverse simple majority; and, the rein-
forced SGP and Fiscal Compact and reverse quali-
fied majority.  
The comparison demonstrates that the RMV de-
cision-making procedure significantly lowers the 
majority threshold to pass legislation. In addition, 
under a reverse majority decisions are approved 
by a dynamic majority. The latter is the result of 
abstentions that effectively count as votes in fa-
vour lowering the required number of votes to 
adopt a Commission proposal. Since abstentions 
during roll call are often present in the Council 
the probability of decisions being approved rises 
considerably. The analysis of Member States vot-
ing behaviour on the basis of a new dataset in the 
area of the EU-antidumping policy also demon-
strates that Member States adjust their voting be-
haviour to the reverse majority voting rule and 
abstain more frequently. Most importantly, deci-
sions under a reverse majority are approved by a 
steadily declining majority of Member States vot-
ing in favour. In some instances decisions are ad-
opted with the explicit support of a minority of 
Member States only. Therefore, under the reverse 
majority voting rule abstentions become increas-
ingly important for sanctioning Commission pro-
posals that do not carry a broad support in the EU 
Council.
The combination of a lower majority threshold to 
approve Commission proposals and the ensuing 
adjustment of the Member States voting behav-
iour makes the RMV procedure virtually auto-
matic. With reverse qualified majority voting and 
strict time limits introduced at the start, the mid-
dle and the end of the enforcement mechanism 
the automaticity of the EDP is therefore almost 
guaranteed once the Commission formally sub-
mits a proposal. As a result, the RMV effectively 
strengthens the enforcement mechanism and en-
hances the automaticity and the predictability of 
the SGP and the Fiscal Compact.
However, the advent of a binding enforcement 
mechanism subject to an effective minority ruling 
highlights the potential trade-off between deci-
sion-making capacity and legitimacy in the area 
of economic and fiscal governance. In all three 
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cases the virtual automaticity of reverse major-
ity voting has moved decision-making power up-
stream in the process adding weight to the right 
of initiative and the interpretation of the rules and 
procedures. It increases the independence of the 
expert-body that produces the binding proposals 
and recommendations. It is therefore likely that 
under the SGP and Fiscal Compact the discretion 
of the Commission in the area of fiscal and eco-
nomic governance stands to grow considerably.
Simultaneously, the virtual automaticity implies 
that the political decision-making body has less 
formal control over the key steps in the process 
and the eventual outcomes. In the case of the EU 
it limits the discretion of the EU Council which 
continues to be, at least on paper, fully responsi-
ble. This opens the decision-making structure to 
criticism on the grounds of obscuring account-
ability. Despite the fact that the Member States in 
their legislative capacity agreed to the procedure 
of virtual automaticity it is the Commission that 
decides while the Member States are held account-
able. In the area of fiscal policy, traditionally part 
of national sovereignty, such observation gains 
additional weight. The automatic and binding ef-
fect has the potential of making of Commission 
proposals increasingly intrusive on the Member 
States domestic political economies as the cost of 
non-compliance grows considerably. 
Evidence from the WTO’s dispute settlement sys-
tem also suggests that the reverse majority pro-
cedure alters the balance between the rule- and 
political-based decision-making. The rule-based 
system becomes more efficient and expedient as 
a result of decisions taken by fewer officials on 
the basis of a rule book. The political body in 
contrast is less efficient and takes decisions based 
on negotiations among a larger group of national 
representatives. The imbalance suggests a new re-
lationship between the political and rule-based 
processes. In the EU the two distinct dynamics 
are likely to create tensions between the legisla-
tive and executive branches of fiscal policy with 
the Commission much more likely to be effective 
relative to the national governments and the EU 
Council. With the reluctance to embark on an-
other EU treaty reform the imbalance might give 
way to growing Commission activity spurred by 
the automatic procedure of reverse majority vot-
ing with spill over effects in other domains less 
subject to automaticity. 
These findings shift our attention to the Com-
mission and how it fulfils its newly gained discre-
tion vis-à-vis the EU Council. Will Commission 
policy reflect the views held among a majority 
of the Member States? Or, alternatively will the 
Commission interpret and enforce the fiscal rule 
book increasingly as an independent expert body? 
In both instances it is likely that the Commission 
will act as a uniform body, however, internally it 
might be divided and perhaps ironically take deci-
sions on Member States’ fiscal policy with a simple 
majority vote of its members.
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7. Annex: Relevant Legal Texts
A. Commission proposals 
(29/09/2010)
1. COM(2010) 524 final: Proposal for a regulation 
of the EP and the Council on the effective enforce-
ment of budgetary surveillance in the euro area
The preventive part of the SGP:
Chapter II: Sanctions in the preventive part of 
the Stability and Growth Pact
Article 3
Interest-bearing deposit
1. If the Council addresses to a Member State a 
recommendation in accordance with Article 
121(4) of the Treaty to take the necessary adjust-
ment measures in the event of persisting or partic-
ularly serious and significant deviations from pru-
dent fiscal policy-making as laid down in Article 
6(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1466/97, the lodging 
of an interest bearing deposit shall be imposed by 
the Council, acting on a proposal from the Com-
mission. The decision shall be deemed to be ad-
opted by the Council unless it decides by quali-
fied majority to reject the proposal within ten 
days of the Commission adopting it. The Coun-
cil may amend the proposal in accordance with 
Article 293(1) of the Treaty.
The corrective part of the SGP:
Chapter III: Sanctions in the corrective part of 
the Stability and Growth Pact 
Article 4
Non-interest-bearing deposit
1. If the Council decides in accordance with Ar-
ticle 126(6) of the Treaty that an excessive deficit 
exists in a Member State, the lodging of a non-
interest-bearing deposit shall be imposed by the 
Council, acting on a proposal from the Commis-
sion. The decision shall be deemed adopted by the 
Council unless it decides by qualified majority to 
reject the proposal within ten days of the Com-
mission adopting it. The Council may amend the 
proposal in accordance with Article 293(1) of the 
Treaty.
Article 5
Fine
1. If the Council decides in accordance with Arti-
cle 126(8) of the Treaty that the Member State has 
not taken effective action in response to a Council 
recommendation within the period laid down, the 
Council, acting on a proposal from the Commis-
sion, shall decide that the Member State shall pay 
a fine. The decision shall be deemed adopted by 
the Council unless it decides by qualified major-
ity to reject the proposal within ten days of the 
Commission adopting it. The Council may amend 
the proposal in accordance with Article 293(1) of 
the Treaty.
Chapter IV: General Provisions 
Article 8
Voting within the Council
For the measures referred to in Articles 3, 4 and 5, 
only members of the Council representing Mem-
ber States whose currency is the euro shall vote 
and the Council shall act without taking into ac-
count the vote of the member of the Council rep-
resenting the Member State concerned.
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A qualified majority of the members of the Coun-
cil mentioned in the previous paragraph shall be 
defined in accordance with Article 238(3)(a) of 
the Treaty.
2. COM(2010) 525 final: Proposal for a regulation 
of the EP and the Council on enforcement mea-
sures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbal-
ances in the euro area
Article 3
Fines
The decision shall be deemed adopted by the 
Council unless it decides, by qualified majority, 
to reject the proposal within ten days the Com-
mission adopting it. The Council may amend the 
proposal in accordance with Article 293(1) of the 
Treaty.
Article 5
Voting within the Council
For the measures referred to in Article 3, only 
members of the Council representing Member 
States whose currency is the euro shall vote and 
the Council shall act without taking into account 
the vote of the member of the Council represent-
ing the Member State concerned.
A qualified majority of the members of the Coun-
cil mentioned in the previous paragraph shall be 
defined in accordance with Article 238(3)(a) of 
the Treaty.
B. EP and Council Legislative Acts 
(16/11/2011) 
1. Regulation (EU) No 1173/2011 of the Europe-
an Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 
2011 on the effective enforcement of budgetary 
surveillance in the euro area
Chapter III : Sanctions in the Preventive Part of 
the Stability and Growth Pact
Article 4
Interest-bearing deposits
2. The decision requiring a lodgement shall be 
deemed to be adopted by the Council unless 
it decides by a qualified majority to reject the 
Commission’s recommendation within 10 days 
of the Commission’s adoption thereof.
3. The Council, acting by a qualified majority, 
may amend the Commission’s recommendation 
and adopt the text so amended as a Council de-
cision.
6. If the situation giving rise to the Council’s 
recommendation referred to in the second sub-
paragraph of Article 6(2) of Regulation (EC) No 
1466/97 no longer exists, the Council, on the basis 
of a further recommendation from the Commis-
sion, shall decide that the deposit and the interest 
accrued thereon be returned to the Member State 
concerned. The Council may, acting by a quali-
fied majority, amend the Commission’s further 
recommendation.
Chapter IV: Sanctions in the corrective part of 
the Stability and Growth Pact
Article 5 
Non-interest-bearing deposits
2. The decision requiring a lodgement shall be 
deemed to be adopted by the Council unless 
it decides by a qualified majority to reject the 
Commission’s recommendation within 10 days 
of the Commission’s adoption thereof.
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3. The Council, acting by a qualified majority, 
may amend the Commission’s recommendation 
and adopt the text so amended as a Council de-
cision.
Article 6 
Fines
2. The decision imposing a fine shall be deemed 
to be adopted by the Council unless it decides 
by a qualified majority to reject the Commis-
sion’s recommendation within 10 days of the 
Commission’s adoption thereof. 
3. The Council, acting by a qualified majority, 
may amend the Commission’s recommendation 
and adopt the text so amended as a Council de-
cision.
Article 12 
Voting in the Council 
1. For the measures referred to in Articles 4, 5, 6 
and 8, only members of the Council representing 
Member States whose currency is the euro shall 
vote, and the Council shall act without taking into 
account the vote of the member of the Council 
representing the Member State concerned.
2. Regulation (EU) No 1174/2011 of the Europe-
an Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 
2011 on enforcement measures to correct exces-
sive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area
Article 3 
Sanctions
3. The decisions referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 
shall be deemed adopted by the Council unless 
it decides, by qualified majority, to reject the 
recommendation within 10 days of its adoption 
by the Commission. The Council may decide, by 
qualified majority, to amend the recommenda-
tion.
Article 5 
Voting in the Council 
1. For the measures referred to in Article 3, only 
members of the Council representing Member 
States whose currency is the euro shall vote, and 
the Council shall act without taking into account 
the vote of the member of the Council represent-
ing the Member State concerned. 
2. A qualified majority of the members of the 
Council referred to in paragraph 1 shall be de-
fined in accordance with point (b) of Article 
238(3) TFEU.
3. Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 
2011 on the prevention and correction of macroeco-
nomic imbalances
Article 10 
Assessment of corrective action
4. Where it considers that the Member State has 
not taken the recommended corrective action, the 
Council, on a recommendation from the Com-
mission, shall adopt a decision establishing non-
compliance, together with a recommendation set-
ting new deadlines for taking corrective action. In 
this case, the Council shall inform the European 
Council, and shall make public the conclusions 
of the surveillance missions referred to in Article 
9(3). 
The Commission’s recommendation on estab-
lishing non- compliance shall be deemed to 
have been adopted by the Council, unless it de-
cides, by qualified majority, to reject the recom-
mendation within 10 days of its adoption by the 
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Commission. The Member State concerned may 
request that a meeting of the Council be convened 
within that period to take a vote on the decision.
Article 12 
Voting within the Council 
For the measures referred to in Articles 7 to 11, 
the Council shall act without taking into ac-
count the vote of the member of the Council 
representing the Member State concerned.
C. Treaty on Stability, Co-
ordination and Governance in the 
Economic and Monetary Union (signed 
by Head of State or Government 
02/03/2012)
Title III: Fiscal Compact
Article 7 
While fully respecting the procedural require-
ments of the Treaties on which the European 
Union is founded, the Contracting Parties whose 
currency is the euro commit to supporting the 
proposals or recommendations submitted by the 
European Commission where it considers that a 
Member State of the European Union whose cur-
rency is the euro is in breach of the deficit crite-
rion in the framework of an excessive deficit pro-
cedure. This obligation shall not apply where it 
is established among the Contracting Parties 
whose currency is the euro that a qualified ma-
jority of them, calculated by analogy with the 
relevant provisions of the Treaties on which 
the European Union is founded, without tak-
ing into account the position of the Contract-
ing Party concerned, is opposed to the decision 
proposed or recommended.
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1. Introduction
Although crises are commonly expected to gen-
erate innovative approaches and fresh outlooks, 
the current financial crisis in Europe has given 
rise to solutions that may remake the Union into 
something completely new. In an attempt to save 
the day, a number of regulatory undertakings have 
been launched which question the coherence of 
the European legal system, as well as the estab-
lished and functioning distribution of authority 
within the Union. Initiatives such as the Euro Plus 
Pact1 and even more the Fiscal Compact2 create 
new subgroups among the Member States, already 
divided in terms of participation in common fi-
nancial arrangements. They also create new dy-
namics not only with regard to economic gover-
nance, but also in the overall functioning of the 
1.  European Council, 2011/ Conclusions/EUCO 10/11 of 
25 March 2011, Annex 1.  
2.  Fiscal Compact, properly, Treaty on Stability, Coordi-
nation and Governance in the Economic and Monetary 
Union, available at: http://european-council.europa.eu/
media/639235/st00tscg26_en12.pdf. Initially the term 
was used in reference to the entire document. Upon the 
adoption of the TSCG, the fiscal part of it is referred to 
as the “Fiscal Compact”. 
Community. Consequently, juxtaposing the posi-
tion of the EU and its Member States, they trans-
gress the traditional division of authority between 
the national and the supranational level, creating 
new hybrid forms of regulation and governance. 
Irrespective of their eventual capacity to facilitate 
Europe’s way out of the crisis, they need to be ana-
lysed from the point of view of the long-term sys-
temic consequences they may have on the legal as 
well as political aspects of European integration.
This contribution will address those challenges 
by examining shifts of established modes of dis-
tribution of competences between states and a 
supranational organization, concentrating on the 
two related, but significantly different examples in 
the field of economic governance. The first one, 
the Euro Plus Pact, entails the intervention of the 
supranational organization in fields, which, in ac-
cordance with the Treaty, have been reserved for 
the Member States. By those means, the Euro Plus 
Pact questions the constitutional principle of the 
limited competences of the European Union. By 
contrast, the second example – the Fiscal Compact 
– pertains to matters which should be decided in 
the forum of the European Union and its institu-
tions, but which will now be partly governed by 
an international agreement among a group of 
participating states. Much debate about those two 
documents is devoted to the issue of participation 
of individual countries in the various setups they 
create. What is crucial, however, and not so openly 
discussed, is the fact that they both concern values 
of higher importance. They both question funda-
mental constitutional rules and arrangements that 
have previously been seen as cornerstones of the 
European project.
The next part of this contribution sketches the 
background of the core analysis, presenting first 
some theoretical reflections on the traditional bal-
ance of powers and authority distribution in the 
EU. Second, it introduces the larger perspective of 
economic governance reform in the EU. Third, in 
part three, the two core documents, the Euro Plus 
Pact and the Fiscal Compact are presented and 
analysed from the perspective of their impact on 
the distribution of authority over economic gov-
ernance, as well as their long-term systemic impli-
cations. Fourth, a short overview of measures fol-
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lowing the adoption of the Pact and the Compact, 
which continue the trend of regulation outside 
the traditional framework, is presented. Finally, in 
part five, the outcomes of the analysis are summed 
up and generalized, and some preliminary con-
clusions are drawn.
2. Conferral, power balance and economic 
governance at the time of crisis
2.1 Traditional patterns of 
power balance in the EU
Towards clear distribution of power 
in the EU: general scheme after 
Lisbon
European Communities have been built on a con-
cept of attributed competence, which implies that 
the EU only possesses the competences which 
had been conferred on it by the Treaty. Continu-
ous striving towards an ever clearer division of 
responsibilities has been among the fundamental 
moves throughout the formation of the Commu-
nities, embedded in the Treaty and interpreted 
in the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU). It is only in the Lisbon 
Treaty, however, that the clear-cut categories and 
limits of competences have been established and 
constitutionalized.3
3.  For a general, yet all-encompassing description of the 
current state of competence distribution in the EU, 
The overarching principle of conferral, expressed 
in Article 5(2) of European Union Treaty (TEU) 
stipulates that the Union shall act only within 
the limits of the competences conferred upon it 
by the Member States in the Treaties to attain the 
objectives set out therein, while competences not 
conferred shall remain with the Member States. 
Within this sphere, the Lisbon Treaty organizes 
EU competence into three categories: exclusive 
competence, shared competence and competence 
only to take supporting, coordinating or supple-
mentary action. It has to be pointed out, however, 
that borders between the three are not always clear, 
and that there are areas of competence which do 
not fall under any of the categories, or which can-
not easily be subsumed under just one of them.
Apart from the question of existence of an EU 
competence, the question of its scope should also 
be considered. Here, the scope of EU competence 
see: P. Craig, G.de Burca, EU Law: Text, Cases, and 
Materials, Fifth Edition, Oxford University Press 2011, 
pp.43–102.
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shall be judged in accordance with the principles 
of subsidiarity and proportionality. Yet again, even 
in the revised version of the Treaty, expressions of 
those principles, as well as the additional guide-
lines provided by respective Protocols attached to 
the Treaty, still leave room for interpretation and 
potential disagreements.
The last general issue to highlight in this intro-
ductory paragraph is the issue of implied powers. 
In a narrow understanding, existence of a given 
power implies the existence of any other power 
that is reasonably necessary for the exercise of the 
former. In accordance with a broader definition, 
however, even the existence of a given objective 
implies the existence of a power which is reason-
ably necessary to attain the objective in ques-
tion.4 In the European context, the narrow defini-
tion has commonly been accepted,5 but some of 
the CJEU jurisdiction has also incorporated the 
boarder meaning.6 Irrespective of the applied un-
4.  Ibid, p.77.
5.  See for example Case 8/55, FédérationCharbonnière de 
Belgique v. High Authority, [1956], ECR 245. 
6. For example, Cases 281, 283–285, 287/85, Germany 
v. Commission, [1987], ECR 3203, and Case 176/03, 
Commission v. Council, [2005], ECR I-7879.
derstanding, the mere existence of implied pow-
ers additionally blurs the picture, as they escape 
the general categorization and create competence 
where there may be a lack of explicit conferral.
In order to provide a theoretical background for 
my further queries, in the following part of this 
paper, I will briefly characterize the three cat-
egories of EU competence and I will make brief 
remarks about the interpretation of the type and 
scope of certain competences.
Demarcation of competence – 
authority struggle
Article 2(1) of Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU) establishes a category of 
exclusive competence, which implies that only the 
European Union can legislate and adopt legally 
binding acts, while the Member States can do so 
solely if empowered by the Union or in imple-
menting the acts of the Union. The scope of ar-
eas which fall under the exclusive EU competence 
is set forth in Article 3(1) TFEU and it includes 
“monetary policy for the Member States whose 
currency is the euro”.
Article 2(2) TFEU defines shared competence, 
where both the Union and the Member States 
may legislate and adopt legally binding acts. In 
those areas, the Member States may exercise their 
competence to the extent that the Union has not 
done so, and again to the extent that the Union 
decided to cease exercising its competence. The 
wording of the Treaty is in itself rather confus-
ing. Its interpretation and application is, however, 
even more complicated. To make matters worse, 
the scope of application of the shared competence 
is not clearly delimited either. The list of “princi-
pal areas” of application prescribed in Article 4(2) 
is not exhaustive, and to further complicate the 
picture in our particular case, the economic and 
employment policies were extracted into a special 
category, subject to Article 5 TFEU. Hence, the 
real delimitation of competences will have to be 
established case by case, on the basis of detailed 
provisions assigning EU competence in the vari-
ous areas of shared powers.
The third category of competence, under Article 
2(5) TFEU allows the EU to take actions to sup-
port, coordinate or supplement Member States’ 
activities. Although there is no general power to 
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harmonize in those areas, the EU can pass legally 
binding acts on the basis of the provisions specific 
to those areas, which will constrain actions of the 
Member States to the extent established therein. 
The list of areas which fall within that scope, con-
tained in Article 6 TFEU, is again not exhaustive. 
The most problematic subject areas, namely some 
aspects of social and employment policies, al-
though intuitively fitting under this category, are 
not mentioned. The mere notions of support and 
complementation give an idea of the width of the 
scope of possible measures and potential interpre-
tation problems. The most important distinguish-
ing feature to keep in mind, however, is the lack 
of competence to harmonize, which nonetheless 
leaves the EU with a wide variety of potential legal 
measures, from coordinative and legal incentive 
measures, to persuasive soft law, guidelines and 
best practices.7
Although categorization and its interpretation are 
technical and rather complicated issues, this short 
introduction was meant to sketch out the general 
rules and divisions, and to point out that com-
7.  See broader and well exemplified description in P. 
Craig, G.de Burca, EU Law…, op. cit., pp.86–87.
petences over the wider scope of economic and 
monetary governance can be found in all three 
categories, which signals the width of potential 
cross-influences, and controversies with inclusion 
and delimitation of authority over particular sub-
ject matters.
Authority over economic, employment 
and social policy after Lisbon
As introduced above, authority over economic, 
employment and social policies is included under 
a separate competence category, which is con-
structed with the help of two Treaty provisions. In 
accordance with Article 2(3) TFEU, the Member 
States shall coordinate their economic and em-
ployment policies within arrangements as deter-
mined by this Treaty, which the Union shall have 
competence to provide. Article 5 concretizes this 
general provision by stating, inter alia, that the 
Union shall take measures to ensure coordination 
of the employment policies of the Member States, 
in particular by defining guidelines for those 
policies, while in the field of social policies, the 
Union may take initiatives to ensure coordination 
among Member States. It also lays down grounds 
for specific provisions to apply to those Member 
States whose currency is the euro. This creates 
three different sub-categories, with various de-
grees of intervention, within just this one special 
category of competences. Here, again, it is difficult 
to imagine that problems with cross-penetration 
of certain measures through a number of those 
sub-categories, and possible problems connected 
with authority questions, could be avoided. It is 
also symptomatic that the category in question 
was at all created. It may illustrate the high degree 
of politicization of EU law making in this area. It 
emphasizes the reluctance of Member States to 
include the economic, employment and social 
issues, traditionally considered “national”, in the 
more general sphere of shared competences, as 
the possibility of pre-emption of national action 
in case of the exercise of EU power was unaccept-
able to many of them.
To add yet another layer of complexity, it has to be 
noted that the mere reading of the Treaty provi-
sions does not give the full picture of the situa-
tion. The regulatory rationale of this very specific 
segment of the common market needs to be con-
sidered in order to really understand the issue of 
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competence and authority over economic gover-
nance. The European Monetary Union (EMU) in 
itself is a controversial beast. Elevating monetary 
governance above the national electorates and 
separating new currency from popular democrat-
ic processes and accountability, it constitutes an 
exercise in de-territorialization of matters which 
are in themselves very national and territorial.8 
This breakaway can, however, be no more than 
partial, leaving a considerable portion of fiscal, 
social and employment policies in the hands of 
Member States. Such separation is to a large extent 
fictitious and hardly possible to realize in practice. 
Hence, a lack of “political union” supporting mon-
etary union has aggravated the situation the EU is 
currently facing. The growing complexity of eco-
nomic governance in the global context, as well 
as the unavoidable interconnections between the 
EU polity and the national spheres of competence 
and decision making, had built up a confusing 
governance architecture with unclear responsibil-
8.  D. Bohle, ‘The Crisis of the Eurozone’, EUI Working 
Paper RSCAS 2010/77, pp.1–4; see also D. Chalmers, 
‘Fiscal Governance and the Problems of Masking Eu-
rope’s Conflicts’, paper presented at the Dahrendorf 
Symposium, Berlin, 9–10 November 2011, in particular 
pp.3–9.
ity and control demarcation, as well as lax proce-
dural rules which, lacking sufficient accountabil-
ity, could be easily neglected and blended by their 
drafters themselves where necessary.
2.2 Economic governance at the 
time of crisis
Departing from the more theoretical background 
sketched in the paragraphs above, it is important 
to also provide an outlook towards the empirical 
background of the regulatory responses to crisis 
which will be analysed in this paper. It is, hence, 
interesting to look at the totality of initiatives 
which have been undertaken in recent years in 
the broader framework of economic governance 
in the EU. Both regulatory acts under study must 
be considered as elements of this larger European 
exercise in economic governance. Hence, in order 
to place them in the context of the economic re-
form agenda, a brief and simplified overview of 
the reform framework will first be provided.
The new EU economic governance programme is 
guided by three major objectives: to reinforce the 
economic agenda with closer EU surveillance, to 
safeguard the stability of the euro area and to re-
pair the financial sector. In order for those three 
aspects to be adequately tackled, a number of ini-
tiatives have been undertaken. Among them, it is 
valuable to mention new strategic policy docu-
ments, new legislation, new institutional architec-
ture, new planning and surveillance mechanisms 
as well as supporting measures. In general, the 
counter-crisis measures went in two main direc-
tions. First, there were measures providing assis-
tance to the states in trouble, which culminated 
in the establishment of the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM). Second, there was a sequence 
of measures aiming to increase fiscal discipline 
in the Eurozone countries and improve supervi-
sion over national decision making on budget-
ary issues. The improvement took the form of the 
introduction of new techniques of oversight, but 
also an increase in the degree of EU authority over 
national procedures.9
Henceforth, in the light of the reform agenda, 
the EU activities in the economic governance 
9.  For a more detailed overview and analysis of the eco-
nomic governance reform agenda see D. Adamski, ‘Na-
tional power games and structural failures in the Eu-
ropean macroeconomic governance’, Common Market 
Law Review, Vol. 49, 2012, pp.1319–1364. 
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area will be guided by priorities agreed upon in 
the Europe 2020 strategy,10 and will aim to rein-
force the Stability and Growth Pact11. They follow 
new regulations proposed as an economic gover-
nance legislative package, referred to colloquially 
as a “six-pack”.12 The regulations are implemented 
10. European Commission Communication 2010/ 
COM(2010) 2020/EC 3 March 2010, Communication 
from the Commission: EUROPE 2020. A European 
Strategy for Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive Growth.
11.  European Council Resolution 1997/ OJ C (97) 236/1/
EC 17 June 1997, Resolution of the European Council on 
the Stability and Growth Pact.
12.  “Six-pack” is a colloquial nick-name for a package of 
legislative instruments, which entered into force in De-
cember 2011, and which strengthen fiscal surveillance, 
as well as macroeconomic surveillance under the new 
Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure. The six pack 
consists of the following legal instruments: Regulation 
(EU) No 1173/2011 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 16 November 2011 on the effective en-
forcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area; 
Regulation (EU) No 1174/2011 of the European Par-
liament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on 
enforcement measures to correct excessive macroeco-
nomic imbalances in the euro area; Regulation (EU) No 
1175/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil of 16 November 2011 amending Council Regulation 
(EC) No 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveil-
lance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and 
coordination of economic policies; Regulation (EU) No 
in accordance with the new working method re-
ferred to as the European Semester,13 which facili-
tates effective coordination of the Member States’ 
economic and structural policies with EU consid-
erations already at an early stage in their national 
budgetary processes. Moreover, in order to dimin-
ish macroeconomic imbalances between states, 
a new surveillance mechanism was proposed to 
monitor national economies for emerging mac-
roeconomic imbalances and to initiate corrective 
actions where necessary. Common principles for 
national fiscal correction mechanisms were also 
proposed.14 Additionally, with the aim of further 
strengthening budgetary surveillance in the euro 
1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil of 16 November 2011 on the prevention and correc-
tion of macroeconomic imbalances; Council Regulation 
(EU) No 1177/2011 of 8 November 2011 amending Reg-
ulation (EC) No 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying 
the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure; 
Council Directive 2011/85/EU of 8 November 2011 on 
requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member 
States (OJ L 306, 23.11.2011).
13.  Economic and Financial Affairs Council, 2010/PRESSE 
229/EFAC 7 September 2010, The European Semester.
14.  Communication from the Commission. Common 
principles in national fiscal correction mechanisms, 
COM(2012) 342 final.
area, the Commission also proposed two new 
regulations on the monitoring and surveillance of 
budgetary planning and processes, referred to as 
the “two-pack”.15 Furthermore, the Commission 
has initiated a discussion on the issue of stability 
bonds with a Green Paper setting out three main 
options for such an instrument in Europe.16
With regard to the institutional structure, new 
agencies were established in the financial sector, 
to facilitate early detection of problems and prop-
er supervision of financial institutions in Europe. 
Hence, the European System of Financial Super-
visors (ESFS), which consists of three new Euro-
pean Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) for banking, 
insurance and securities markets, was established 
to reinforce the European framework for micro- 
15.  Proposal for a Regulation on common provisions for 
monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and en-
suring the correction of excessive deficits of the Member 
States in the euro area, COM(2011)821 final; and pro-
posal for a Regulation on the strengthening of economic 
budgetary surveillance of Member States experiencing 
or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to 
their financial stability in the euro area, COM(2011) 819 
final.
16.  Green Paper on the feasibility of introducing Stability 
Bonds, COM(2011) 818 final.
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and macro-prudential supervision; and the Euro-
pean System Risk Board (ESRB) was created, to 
monitor, identify and prioritize systemic risks to 
financial stability. Additionally, in October 2012, 
the new permanent ESM was initiated17 with 
the objective of replacing the temporary support 
mechanism established in response to the 2010 
crisis, namely the European Financial Stability 
Facility (EFSF), and assuming the tasks currently 
fulfilled by the European Financial Stabilization 
Mechanism (EFSM) in providing, where needed, 
financial assistance to euro-area Member States.
Many other ideas have been discussed during 
those last couple of months, ranging from the es-
tablishment of Eurobonds to various institutional 
solutions for further integration and surveillance 
of financial institutions and banks.
Finally, as a complementary element of this entire 
economic governance exercise, the Euro Plus Pact 
is intended to support national implementation 
of the reform, through the National Reform Pro-
grammes that will be adopted by the participating 
states.
17.  Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM), 2 February 2012, OJ L 91, 2011.
3. From the Pact to the Com-Pact – shifting 
authority over economic governance
3.1 Euro Plus Pact18
The Euro Plus Pact, subtitled, “Stronger Econom-
ic Policy Coordination for Competitiveness and 
Convergence”, is a product of a Franco–German 
effort for better economic policy coordination. 
Initially, it was referred to as the Competitiveness 
Pact, or later the Pact for the Euro; as such, it is 
designed as a more stringent successor to the Sta-
bility and Growth Pact, which received criticism 
for being implemented inconsistently.
The Euro Plus Pact disciplines the Member States 
of the European Union to make concrete com-
mitments to a list of political reforms, which are 
intended to improve economic and fiscal policy 
coordination, with a view to strengthening com-
petitiveness and convergence. Hence, it contro-
18.  Previous version of some parts of the analysis 
pertaining to the Euro Plus Pact form part of the 
author’s policy analysis undertaken at SIEPS. For more 
details see: K. Zurek, ‘Euro Plus Pact: Between Global 
Competitiveness and Local Social Concerns’, SIEPS, 
European Policy Analysis, No.13, 2011.
versially concentrates primarily on actions in 
areas that fall under the national competence of 
the Member States.19 The Pact was adopted by the 
Eurozone countries with the participation of six 
non-Eurozone states, and remains open for other 
Member States to participate. However, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Sweden and the UK deliber-
ately opted out of it, thus manifesting resistance 
towards extending the EU’s influence to impor-
tant, traditionally national policies, which partici-
pation in the Pact entails.
Perhaps, if read optimistically and in isolation 
from other developments in the area of economic 
governance, the Euro Plus Pact would not make 
such a consequential impression. Hence, perhaps 
the criticism and resistance would not find such 
fertile ground in some EU Member States. How-
19.  On the consequences of the divided sovereignty over 
Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union, see N. Jabko, 
Which Economic Governance for the European Union. 
Facing the Problem of Divided Sovereignty. SIEPS Report 
No.2, 2011.
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ever, if read and analysed in conjunction with a 
number of other recent initiatives and undertak-
ings, which were briefly outlined in the preceding 
paragraph, the firm and one-sided move towards 
economic strengthening seems much more signif-
icant and far-reaching. The Stability and Growth 
Pact, the European Semester, and Europe 2020 
all follow a similar rationale. If we consider their 
aggregated impact, the degree of influence on na-
tional regulatory systems may, in fact, build up 
into something significant.
The following section will provide a very brief and 
simplified outlook on the provisions of the Pact. 
Its aim, however, is not to analyse the potential 
impact of every individual provision in depth; 
rather, it aims to provide an overall idea of the 
Pact’s undertaking.
The efforts for stronger economic policy coordi-
nation under the Euro Plus Pact shall be directed 
by four guiding rules:
1. they should be in line with existing economic 
governance in the EU and strengthen it while 
providing an added value. They should, thus, 
be consistent and coordinated with the exist-
ing instruments in the area. Yet, they should go 
beyond that scope by including concrete com-
mitments and actions, supported by a timetable 
for implementation and included in National 
Reform and Stability Programmes, which will 
be subject to regular surveillance;
2. they will focus on priority policy areas that are 
essential for fostering competitiveness and con-
vergence, concentrating on the actions where 
the competence lies with the Member States. 
In those selected areas, common objectives will 
be agreed upon at the Governmental (Heads of 
State) level, and participating states will pursue 
those objectives within their own policies with 
regard to their specific challenges at hand;
3. concrete national commitments will be under-
taken each year by each participating Member 
State. Implementation of those commitments 
and progress towards policy objectives will be 
monitored politically by the Governments or 
Heads of State on a yearly basis; and, finally,
4. the Pact will fully respect the integrity of the 
Single Market, as all participating states remain 
committed to its development.
5. In line with those general guiding principles, 
Member States participating in the Pact commit 
to undertake all necessary measures to pursue a 
number of defined goals. They are: a) to foster 
competitiveness; b) to foster employment; c) to 
contribute further to sustainability of public fi-
nances; and d) to reinforce financial stability.
Each participating state will individually develop 
and present the specific national measures it will 
undertake to achieve those goals. Although the 
choice of those specific actions remains the re-
sponsibility of each state, particular attention will 
be paid to the set of measures listed in the Pact.
Finally, progress towards the common objectives 
will be monitored on the basis of a set of indica-
tors covering: competitiveness, employment, fis-
cal sustainability and financial stability. Participat-
ing states which face particular challenges in any 
of those areas will have to commit to addressing 
those challenges in a given timeframe. For each 
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defined policy objective, concrete policy commit-
ments together with monitoring indicators are 
foreseen.
3.2 Ownership of the Pact vs. 
authority over the areas 
covered
The legal nature of the Pact is in itself somewhat 
dubious. As a regulatory measure falling outside 
the traditional EU legal system, and rather con-
sidered as an instrument of intergovernmental 
cooperation, the Pact can, in the European con-
text, be understood to be a tool of the new soft 
law type of governance. Contrary to this general 
comprehension, however, thorough reading of its 
provisions suggests a rather different qualifica-
tion. The nature of the commitments induced by 
the Pact goes far beyond that by which the new 
governance tools are characterized. Thus, it con-
tradicts this first impression. To be more precise, 
on the surface, the Pact constitutes a soft regula-
tory instrument, open for participation on a vol-
untary basis. If adhered to, however, it imposes a 
number of firm, defined, time-restricted and veri-
fiable commitments for participating states. While 
many of the obligations are indeed of a general 
new governance type, with referral to consulta-
tions, best practices, benchmarking, indicators, 
and so forth, a significant number of provisions 
demand concrete commitments, where specific 
objectives have to be achieved within a defined 
time-period, and participating states are subject 
to surveillance. Even if the concrete yearly com-
mitments undertaken by the participating states 
are based on their own assessments of need and 
abilities, and on their own planning of national re-
forms (“guided” by the objectives of the Pact), the 
National Reforms Programmes and Sustainabil-
ity Programmes are submitted for assessment by 
the Commission, the Council and the Eurogroup. 
Hence, the commitments, in a way, become bind-
ing upon those states, irrespective of the fluctua-
tions in the overall conditions.20
20.  Th is emphasis on national commitment is further am-
plified in the so-called Van Rompuy Report, according 
to which national economic policy reforms and their 
implementation are supposed to be subject to individual 
arrangements of a contractual nature with the EU in-
stitutions. See: European Council, Towards a Genuine 
Economic and Monetary Union. Interim Report, Brus-
sels, 12 October, 2012, p.7. 
In that perspective, the Euro Plus Pact can be seen 
as stepping on the national turf, which is prob-
ably why some Member States chose to opt-out. 
The stepping on national turf is performed not 
by means of negative integration through judicial 
activism, but more indirectly, through quasi-pos-
itive means. Namely, the Pact creates a situation 
where planning and implementation of national 
regulatory developments are steered by an exter-
nal actor (the EU), instead of the state’s demo-
cratically accountable framework. Moreover, this 
external guidance is directed towards delicate and 
sensitive national regulatory spheres, such as la-
bour or fiscal regulation. Hence, although the Pact 
underlines the “voluntariness” of participation, it 
does not warn enough about its consequentiality.
The Pact may be a cause for interference in na-
tional social contracts as well as sensitive systems 
of provision and protection of labour and welfare. 
It openly positions itself as focusing primarily on 
areas that fall under national competence. There-
fore, it is important to judge whether it does this 
with due proportionality and sensitivity which are 
required in situations where an indirect breach, as 
soft as it may be, of the principle of enumerated 
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competences occurs. The objectives of increased 
competitiveness and higher convergence are defi-
nitely important, but only if carried out in respect 
of the variety of Europe’s social models. Other-
wise, there is a risk of striving for competitive-
ness at a cost of social welfare and national social 
regulatory balance, which would again “assign 
supremacy to economic freedoms over political 
citizenship”.21
Initiatives such as the Euro Plus Pact extend the 
European influence in domestic policymaking. 
Despite the declaration about “ownership” of the 
Pact by the participating states, the reality is that 
for those states, national activities undertaken in 
a number of important and sensitive areas will be 
subjected to external influence and control. De-
spite its voluntary and soft character, the Pact will 
result in a transfer of a portion of Member States’ 
national sovereignty to make independent deci-
sions within their Treaty-reserved field of activity. 
It is difficult to presently judge whether actions 
21. Ch. Joerges, “Unity in Diversity as Europe’s Vocation 
and Conflicts Law as Europe’s Constitutional Form,” 
in: Ch. Joerges (ed.), After Globalisation. New Patterns 
of Conflict and their Sociological and Legal Re-construc-
tions, RECON Report No15/2011, 2011, p.91.
such as an indirect transfer of supervisory powers 
to the EU institutions will result in serious conse-
quences, and how serious the outcome of such ac-
tions will be. Only the factual implementation of 
the Pact will show how the EU and the participat-
ing states use the new dynamics, and how it affects 
those states which chose not to join.
Finally, an important element in the assessment 
of such situations of de facto competence trans-
fers is a simple cost-benefit analysis, or what the 
CJEU refers to as the proportionality test. What 
do we expect to gain and what do we risk losing? 
In the case of the Euro Plus Pact, an instrument of 
soft experimentalist governance with an insecure 
impact and unknown outcomes, this estimation is 
difficult. For a number of states, the risks seem to 
have outweighed a potential benefit. The time and 
the implementation process will show whether 
their cautiousness was warranted. It will also be 
interesting to observe how this division affects the 
development of initiatives proposed by the Pact in 
the participating states and in the EU as a whole. 
A careful preliminary impact assessment of the 
Euro Plus Pact suggests that, despite the impor-
tant concessions that the participating states have 
made, there is no guarantee that its objectives will 
be fulfilled, or that reinforced crisis-resistance 
will materialize. It may, however, at least for some 
of those states, require a stepping down in their 
domestic social policy and withdrawing from the 
political commitments they have undertaken to-
wards their citizens.
3.3 Fiscal Compact
The Council summit of December 2011 conclud-
ed with yet another pact to be introduced in the 
EU economic governance regime. The outcomes 
of the summit mark an attempt to rescue the cri-
sis-tormented Eurozone, and to propose a more 
sustainable long-term solution for future eco-
nomic union. At the same time, however, this so-
lution marketed as the best available at the time of 
trouble and resistance, indicates a new twist in the 
institutional and regulatory tradition of the EU.
Instead of the Council Conclusions, which were 
typically outcomes of previous summits, this one 
concluded with a “Statement by the Euro-Area 
Heads of State or Government”.22 Instead of a pro-
22.  Statement by the Euro Area Heads of State or Govern-
ment, European Council, Brussels, 9 December 2011, 
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posal to reform existing acquis in the economic 
area, we received an invitation to join a pact, an 
international agreement referred to as “the new 
Fiscal Compact”. Although the long-term objec-
tive is to incorporate the new provisions into the 
Treaties, in the absence of unanimity among the 
EU Member States, the decision was taken not to 
continue negotiating and bargaining as the Euro-
pean law-making tradition would imply, but rath-
er to circumvent the resistance and resort to inter-
governmental cooperation instead. In an attempt 
to save the day, the Eurozone Member States de-
cided to continue the intergovernmental path of 
building the system outside the system. Unlike in 
the case of the Euro Plus Pact, however, this time 
it does not concern complementary issues, but the 
core of European economic governance.
As a point of departure, it is interesting to recall 
that other options of responding to the immediate 
needs of the crisis were discussed in this context. 
One alternative, suggested by the President of the 
European Council was a revision of Protocol 12 to 
the Treaty, on excessive deficit procedure, which 
available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/
cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/126658.pdf.
could be exercised by a unanimous decision of 
the Council on a proposal from the Commission 
after consultation with the European Parliament 
and the European Central Bank, and which could 
introduce the immediate necessary changes with-
out the need of Treaty revision. The other alterna-
tive was in fact the fully-fledged Treaty revision in 
accordance with Article 48, which entails a time- 
and resource- consuming process of negotiations 
as well as ratification by all Member States. In 
view of the direct and firm opposition of the UK 
towards the Treaty reform, this option was aban-
doned, opening up the way for a new external in-
ternal treaty, hanging somewhere between inter-
governmental agreement and an intra-European 
regulatory instrument.
In March 2012, the Treaty on Stability, Coordina-
tion and Governance (TSCG) was adopted, and 
signed by 25 Member States, with the UK and the 
Czech Republic abstaining. It is currently subject 
to the ratification process, with an assumption 
that its entry into force is dependent on ratifica-
tion by at least 12 euro-area Member States. When 
in force it will be binding for all euro-area Mem-
ber States, while other contracting parties will 
be bound once they adopt the euro or earlier if 
they wish. In the latter case, partial application is 
also possible, allowing the non-euro participating 
states to choose the provisions they wish to com-
ply with.
The overarching objective behind the TSCG, sim-
ilarly to all the other elements of the economic 
governance reform programme outlined above, is 
to remedy the structural weakness of the Stabil-
ity and Growth Pact by strengthening discipline 
and control. In view of those targets, the TSCG 
establishes, first, a “golden rule” of balanced 
budgets, which reduces the states’ fiscal discre-
tion, and which is supposed to be implemented 
in national law through provisions of “bind-
ing force and permanent character, preferably 
constitutional”.23Second, it grants the CJEU the 
power to control the observance of those provi-
23.  See Article 3 of the TSCG for details. In brief, the rule 
in detail requires that states ensure convergence to-
wards a country-specific medium-term objective, as 
defined in the Stability and Growth Pact, with a lower 
limit of structural deficit of 0.5% GDP, or 1.0% of GDP 
for countries with a debt ratio significantly below 60%, 
and where correction mechanisms should be triggered 
automatically whenever significant deviation from the 
objective or the adjustment path occurs.
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sions, including the competence for the Court to 
impose financial sanctions of up to 0.1% GDP in 
cases of non-compliance. Third, it aims to rein-
force the Stability and Growth Pact by restating 
the rule set up already in the “six-pack”, apply-
ing the Reverse Qualified Majority Voting to all 
stages of the Excessive Deficit Procedure against 
euro-area Member States. Hence, it commits the 
contracting parties to support the Commission’s 
position, and reverses the power of the qualified 
majority. Finally, the TSCG reinforces economic 
governance in the euro area by providing for the 
Euro Summits to take place at least twice a year, 
as well as strengthening surveillance and coordi-
nation of economic policies. This simplified and 
brief presentation does not pay attention to all the 
details of course, but highlights the most impor-
tant directions of engagement as well as empha-
sizing the channels of competence distribution, 
which should facilitate later discussion of author-
ity issues.24
24.  For a thorough analysis of the legal design of the TSCG 
see R. Baratta in this volume, as well as A. Kocharov 
(ed.), ‘Another Legal Monster? An EUI Debate on the 
Fiscal Compact Treaty’, EUI Working Paper LAW 
2012/09.  
3.4 TSCG: contested authority 
over economic governance in 
Europe
If one analyses the TSCG from a strictly regulatory 
perspective, its added value appears rather doubt-
ful. The great majority of its provisions are in fact 
already present in other elements of EU legisla-
tion in particular the “six-pack”. Hence, it seems, 
primarily to be of political or even symbolic sig-
nificance. The strengthening of procedural rules, 
with the aim of introducing austerity in place of 
previous vagueness and laxity by which the Sta-
bility and Growth Pact proved to be affected, is, 
at the same time, put into doubt by the choice of 
the intergovernmental character of the instru-
ment. Following the same line of reasoning, reli-
ance on the EU institution by a treaty remaining 
outside the scope of the EU legal system can be 
questioned not only from the point of view of ef-
fectiveness, but also legitimacy. What seems to be 
the most upsetting is that, irrespective of whether 
the doubtful crisis-repellent effect of the TSCG 
ever occurs, the problematic legal and systemic 
consequences of its adoption will remain.
Renaud Dehousse, in his short analysis of the 
Fiscal Compact preceding its official adoption, 
talks about it in terms of “legal uncertainty and 
political ambiguity”.25 He is analysing the new 
instrument in the light of the right to conclude a 
separate treaty and its restrictions, and emphasizes 
the disproportion between the modest scope of 
the agreement and the formal shape it was given.
He also points out another important aspect of the 
exercise, namely the fact that the TSCG intervenes 
in a heavily regulated area, including spheres 
where strong competences were ascribed to the 
EU. Rejection of Community control in those ar-
eas results in increased uncertainty about the legal 
solutions. This may be the case not only with re-
gard to their content, scope and procedural appli-
cation, but also with regard to their legality as such. 
In such situations, effectiveness of the established 
rules is highly dependent upon the goodwill of the 
parties to the agreement. It is, on the one hand, a 
question of goodwill to abide by the agreed provi-
sions, but it is also an issue of goodwill to accept 
the agreed framework and not question the legal-
25.  R. Dehousse, ‘Th e “Fiscal Compact”: Legal Uncertain-
ty and Political Ambiguity’, Notre Europe Policy Brief, 
No.33, 2012.
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ity of the undertaking altogether. As far as it may 
be possible to achieve such goodwill at the time of 
commitment and an enthusiastic engagement in 
the new wave of political action to combat the cri-
sis, it is not always equally easy to sustain the sup-
port when the burden of implementation and en-
forcement starts to build up. In situations such as 
the one at hand, there is an additional factor of the 
need for national ratification and implementation, 
which requires mobilization of societal approval 
on the home front, for commitments which were 
taken outside the established framework, and in a 
doubtful legitimacy and accountability setup.
Another important issue to point out in this con-
text is that a political act, such as the signing of 
the Compact, can turn out to be a double-edged 
sword. Although it may temporarily strengthen 
the commitment and the spirit of political coop-
eration within the euro area, it may, on the other 
hand, seriously weaken trust in and commitment 
to the European integration project in general. 
By showing how easy it is to disregard and trans-
gress the communally established rules on the 
functioning of the Union, it puts into question 
the fundamental principles of constitutionalizing 
value for EU integration, such as the principle of 
conferral. Considering that the legitimacy of the 
EU is already a constructed one,26 and is frequent-
ly put into question, such games with principles 
of higher importance risk devaluing the general 
agreement, and wasting some of the political capi-
tal and trust built up during the decennia of the 
relatively successful integration process.
Finally, one last noteworthy aspect to be empha-
sized here is that the adoption of the TSCG can 
be interpreted as practically revoking the require-
ment of unanimity, which was traditionally nec-
essary for Treaty amendment. The unanimity 
requirement had been one of the fundaments of 
European integration and an important guaran-
tee of the “authority” of individual Member States 
in situations where crucial provisions of primary 
law (seen as elements of the initial constitutional 
agreement among them) are being altered. Hence, 
the paradigm of the “strict construction” of EU law 
has never been seriously questioned, and theoreti-
26.  See the writing of F. W. Scharpf, e.g. ‘Legitimacy in the 
multilevel European polity,’ European Political Science 
Review, Vol. 1, Issue 2, 2009, pp.173–204, but also in his 
flagship: Governing in Europe. Effective and Democratic? 
Oxford University Press, 1999.
cal considerations of such possibility, expressed 
on a number of occasions have been treated as 
dismissive if not even unlawful.27
27.  C. Closa Montero,Moving Away from Unanimity. Rati-
fication of the Treaty on Stability Coordination and Gov-
ernance in the Economic and Monetary Union, RECON 
Online Working Paper 2011/38, pp.4–6; B. De Witte, 
‘Saving the Constitution: The Escape Route and Their 
Legal Feasibility’, in: G. Amato, H. Bribosia, B. De Witte 
(eds.), Génèse et Destinée de la Constitution Europée-
nne – Genesis and Destiny of the European Constitution, 
Brussels: Bruylant, pp.929-38.
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4. Not the first and definitely not the last
To start with, it has to be pointed out that this was 
not the first example of initiatives regulated by the 
EU Member States outside the EU Treaty frame-
work. The most important precedents of this type 
are probably the Schengen Agreements28 and the 
Prüm Treaty.29 The Schengen Agreement, signed 
in 1985 between five original states, later joined 
by more, concerned abolishing border controls 
between a number of EU Member States. It was 
supplemented by the Implementing Convention, 
which was signed in1990 and took effect in 1995, 
28.  Agreement between the Governments of the States of 
the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of 
Germany and the French Republic on the gradual ab-
olition of checks at their common borders, OJ L 239, 
22.9.2000, pp.13–18, and Convention implementing the 
Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Gov-
ernments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, 
the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Re-
public on the gradual abolition of checks at their com-
mon borders,  OJ L 239, 22.9.2000, pp.19–62.
29. The Prüm Convention (also referred to as Schengen III), 
signed in 2005, involved an agreement between seven 
EU Member States on cross-border cooperation on ex-
change of data on vehicle registration, DNA and finger-
prints, and cooperation on anti-terrorism matters.
abolishing checks at the internal borders of the 
signatory states and creating a single external bor-
der.
Schengen was adopted in the form of an inter-
governmental instrument outside the EU regular 
system due to the inability to reach agreement be-
tween all Member States, and strong opposition 
by some of them to enhance cooperation to the 
extent proposed by the initiators. Following the 
signing of the Treaty of Amsterdam, this intergov-
ernmental cooperation was in fact incorporated 
into the EU framework on 1 May 1999, with opt-
outs for the abstaining Member States. The inter-
governmental history of the instrument, however, 
still seems to remain and affect its current opera-
tion. One of the illustrations of this legacy is the 
higher degree of willingness and ease to criticize 
and claim suspensions, threats thereof as well as 
threats of exit, which are being invoked in cases of 
problem and unrest, often of purely internal char-
acter.30 This gives the impression that the Schen-
30.  See for example S. Veljanovska, ‘Danish “No” for Schen-
gen Agreement – Beginning of the Disintegration of the 
gen provisions, although now officially a part of 
the EU acquis, are perceived as somewhat weaker 
and easier to lift.
The example of Schengen shows that there was ar-
guably a history of unions outside the Union and 
within the Union as well, before the Fiscal Com-
pact, even though the question of authority and 
competence struggle was much less controversial 
in the previous case, where strict EU competence 
was restricted to movement of workers for eco-
nomic purposes, while free movement of people 
in general remained outside it. Fiscal Compact, on 
the other hand, intervened in an area highly regu-
lated by the EU, often repeating the provisions of 
the acquis, which in itself is a controversial exer-
cise. What is even more interesting, however, for 
my argument is that which comes after the Fiscal 
Compact and illustrates its precedential character 
in the sphere of economic governance, which I am 
attempting to highlight here. In striving to take the 
EU out of the crisis, the Pact and the Compact do 
not seem to be isolated examples of breaching the 
governance patterns and creating solutions which 
European Union?’, Singidunum Journal of Applied Sci-
ences,  Vol.9 (1), 2012, pp.88–94.
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go against the regulatory logic of the system. In 
fact, it started a trend, if not an avalanche.
Chronologically speaking, in fact in conjunction 
with the adoption of the Fiscal Compact, the ESM 
was established. It was adopted in the form of a 
treaty signed by 17 Eurozone members, creating 
a permanent financial institution. The institution 
is correctly characterized as “international” 
as it was established by a public international 
law agreement, and it does not constitute an 
EU agency, although through its operation it is 
factually linked to the EU economic governance 
structures.31 Its legal status and rules, as evaluated 
by Maduro, De Witte and Kumm, seem to fail to 
live up to its institutional ambition.32
The second example is the European initiative 
for growth, which took the form of another 
ambiguous legal creature. In response to the 
Germany-pushed strengthening of austerity 
31.  For a detailed analysis of the legal framework and the 
controversies about the establishment of the ESM see J. 
Tomkin in this volume.
32.  M. P. Maduro, B. De Witte, M. Kumm, ‘Policy Report. 
The Euro Crisis and Democratic Governance of the 
Euro: Legal and Political Issues of a Fiscal Crisis,’ Global 
Governance High-level Policy Seminar; The Democratic 
Governance of the Euro, 10 May, 2012, pp.8–9. 
measures, French President François Hollande 
called for a Growth Pact for Europe. The idea was 
to counter the austerity, as well as to complement 
the growth related component of the Stability and 
Growth Pact. The interesting thing, to start with, 
is that no strictly EU legal or policy instrument 
relating to growth was discussed as a serious 
alternative option. A pact was the first choice, as if 
this was the most natural scenario to follow. In the 
end, the pact transformed into a compact, and, at 
the European Council summit of 28–29 June 2012, 
a decision was taken on adoption of the “Compact 
for Growth and Jobs”.33What the Compact entails 
in this case is unclear as are the legal form and 
consequences it produces. It seems most probable 
that it should be understood as a declaration of 
intent and strategic programming, rather than 
a legal act with binding obligations. Why call it 
a Pact, in that case? Why did European leaders, 
during the time of the greatest crisis ever faced by 
the EU, instead of showing firm commitment to 
the established rules of the game chose to turn to 
rhetoric and political name games?
33. European Council 28/29 June 2012 Conclusions, EUCO 
76/12, Brussels, 29 June 2012.
It may be seen as a way of covering up the 
actual inability to act efficiently against the 
developments of the crisis. Where nothing 
meaningful can be decided, another toothless 
and declaratory document is being adopted and 
called by a serious name in order to show that 
actions are being taken. In the particular case of 
the Growth Compact, this suspicion is confirmed 
to a large extent by the Commission Report of 
October 2012.34 It is significant that a report on 
implementation uses predominantly the future 
tense, where “will”, “should” and “need” are used 
with regard to progress in almost every priority 
area envisaged by the Growth Compact. The 
progress reported was mainly the range of the 
Commission’s legislative proposals, which had, in 
any case, been progressing in the framework of 
implementation of the Europe 2020 strategy. The 
most tangible element of the Growth Compact, 
namely the 120 billion euros-worth of investment 
to boost the economy, has not been realized, and, 
in accordance with the report, “(t)he Commission 
does not have sufficient payment credits available 
34.  European Commission, Implementation of the 
Compact for Growth and Jobs, Report to the European 
Council, 18–19 October 2012.
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to pay the payment requests now being submitted 
by the Member States”.35 Decisions to be taken 
on the 2013 budget as well as on the Multiannual 
Financial Framework seem to constitute important 
prerequisites in mobilizing the financial package 
promised and advertised in June.
Finally, the most recent illustration of the ten-
dency of building unions within the Union is the 
creation of the Banking Union. The project was 
launched in June 2012 and planned during the 
October European Council meeting, which con-
cluded with a range of ideas on “completing the 
EMU”.36 The European Council invited the legisla-
tors to prioritize proceeding with establishing the 
framework for the Single Supervisory Mechanism 
(SSM), with the objective of agreeing on the leg-
islative framework by 1 January 2013. Under that 
scenario, work on the operational implementation 
is supposed to take place in the course of 2013. 
Although it is emphasized that the process should 
fully respect the integrity of the Single Market, 
doubts as to the treatment by the new system of 
the Eurozone “outs” remains a cause for concern. 
35. Ibid, p.2.
36. European Council Conclusions on completing the 
EMU, Brussels, 18 October 2012.
At the core of the problem is how to include the 
euro “outs” in the supervisory scheme if they want 
to opt in, given that the governing council of the 
European Central Bank (ECB) is legally a Euro-
zone-only body.37 Hence, we cannot exclude the 
possibility of having yet another set of countries 
participating in this Banking Union, in addition 
to those in the framework of other pacts, com-
pacts and unions within the Union.
37.  V. Pop, Ministers at odds on banking supervision, 
Euobserver, 14 November 2012, available at: http://
euobserver.com/economic/118185.
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5. Conclusions
Regulating at the time of crisis and, more im-
portantly, with the aim of combating it, requires 
intensified commitment and effort. It is often 
accompanied by pressure, discontent, and senti-
ments which make it difficult to explain the need 
to take time to perform the necessary impact as-
sessment and choose the best possible option. A 
crisis can, however, also be seen as an opportunity 
to take difficult decisions, gain new momentum, 
and reinforce commitment. It can be used to move 
forward with a new speed, propelled by the shared 
necessity of facing unfavourable circumstances. 
This article questions whether instruments ad-
opted during recent years in order to combat the 
financial crisis in the EU managed to make good 
use of this opportunity.38
38. For discussion on the wider implications of the euro cri-
sis reforms on the EU constitution and the integration 
project see: Ch. Joerges, ‘The European Economic Con-
stitution and its Transformation through the Financial 
Crisis’, forthcoming in: D. Patterson, A Södersten (eds.), 
Blackwell Companion to EU Law and International Law, 
Wiley-Blackwell, 2013; G. Majone, ‘Rethinking Euro-
pean Integration after the Debt Crisis’, UCL Working 
Paper No.3/2012.
The regulatory initiatives analysed in this paper, 
especially the two that were examined in detail, 
namely the Euro Plus Pact and the Fiscal Compact, 
seem, in fact, to provide arguments for contrary 
allegations. Although they represent shifts in au-
thority in two different directions – into and out-
side the EU sphere of competence – they have a lot 
in common. First, both illustrate the phenomenon 
of the crossing of the established competence divi-
sions, which is built on political consensus rather 
than following an established procedural path, 
and which de facto changes the distribution of au-
thority in the organization of the Union. Second, 
they are both questioned with regard to their pos-
sible impact and usefulness in the crisis-recovery 
process, not only that their material provisions are 
of limited scope and objective, but also the extent 
to which they can be effectively enforced in the in-
tergovernmental setup they themselves created is 
doubtful. Which brings me to the third common 
feature, namely, in both cases it was decided to 
abandon the established EU normalcy, and resort 
to an alternative intergovernmental path outside 
the general EU legal and institutional system. Yet, 
both documents relate to the system in various 
ways, create cross-dependencies and cross-influ-
ences, and in fact build new contexts and setups, 
adding to the already existing complexity of the 
economic governance area. The immediate ques-
tion which emerges is: why? Why risk so much in 
terms of established balance, institutional memo-
ry and accumulated trust in return for so little and 
something so doubtful? One can only hope that 
those measures bear more significance and more 
optimistic prospect in the eyes of the economists, 
because, from the legal systemic perspective, they 
are rather questionable.
Europe is gradually becoming more and more 
about “packs”, “pacts”, and “compacts”, where the 
lingo outgrows the content, where some are in and 
some are out, and where the situation becomes 
more and more confusing and difficult to navigate. 
Irrespective of the decisions of individual states 
to move along or stay out, it is now already 
clear that there will be new divisions in Europe. 
The “two Europes” as President Nicolas Sarkozy 
put it in his comments to the December 2011 
summit, will develop different dynamics, and will 
gradually diverge, as the decisions taken following 
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the adoption of the TSCG will not only reform 
financial and budgetary issues, but will directly or 
indirectly affect cooperation and decision making 
in other fields of European integration.
What is even more worrying, however, is the 
evolution of the EU mode of operation towards 
increased incidentality, which seems to be 
developing here. It marks a tendency to break away 
from the established forms of cooperation towards 
other solutions, be they intergovernmental or 
hybrid, in order to achieve short-term gains, at 
times of merely political character. Ad hoc changes, 
intergovernmental solutions to Community 
problems, as well as complex public–private 
institutionalization have gone very far from the 
constitutionalized procedures established by the 
Treaty and on its basis. As the crisis-recovery 
process has largely been driven by political will, 
law seems to have been degraded to fulfilling a 
rather subordinate role in that process.
The establishment of the Eurozone created a 
formal division along the lines of participation. 
The Euro Plus Pact attempted to transgress those 
boundaries by introducing the factor of political 
commitment, and created new lines of delimitation. 
The TSCG adds another layer of complexity to 
the already difficult setup. The Banking Union 
may open up the way for yet another setup. 
Hence, the development of the reforms leads to 
increased fragmentation, and complicates further 
the simple original EU Member States divide. Not 
only do various sets of countries participate in 
various instruments, but also the scope and level 
of participation varies among the countries within 
those groups. One may wonder how many more 
speeds will be required for Europe’s escape from 
the crisis, and how much of the European Union 
will be left in the end.
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1. Introduction
One of the most important effects of the economic 
and financial downturn, which started in late Au-
gust 2007, was the sovereign debt Crisis of some 
of the Euro zone States, namely: Portugal, Ireland, 
Italy, Greece and Spain. (1).
This group of States is known by the acronym PI-
IGS, a clearly depreciatory term indicating States 
who are unable to respect the fiscal constraints 
established both the Maastricht Treaty and the 
Stability Growth Pact (SGP): the ceilings of 3% 
of Gross Domestic Production (GDP) on budget 
deficits and of 60% of GDP on government debt: 
1. () The Crisis can be divided in two phases: a first stage 
corresponding to the burst of the financial downturn 
(2007-2008) and a second stage (2010-2012) that has spe-
cific characteristics to Euro zone and this has required 
many different actions of the European Union institu-
tions and above all of the European Central Bank. It is 
important to underline that until 2010 the interest rate 
spreads on sovereign bond issued by each of the State 
member of Euro zone didn’t represent for European 
Monetary Union a problem; in fact, for international in-
vestors Greek, Italian, Spanish and German bonds were 
the same.
probably the best known elements of the Europe-
an Monetary Union (EMU) framework.
The issue of sovereign debt is the climax of the 
economic and financial Crisis and it is the direct 
consequence of the inefficiency of those States to 
satisfy the macroeconomic provisions mentioned 
above. This topic has not only shown the fragilities 
of the global financial system and, in particular, 
of the EMU (2) in front of speculative attacks (3), 
but above all it highlights the lack of confidence of 
2. () According to P. De Grauwe (see Only a More Active 
ECB Can Solve the Euro Crisis,  in CEPS Policy Brief, n. 
250 August 2011, p. 1.) ‘The reason is that national gov-
ernments in a monetary union issue debt in a foreign 
currency, i.e. one over which they have no control. As a 
result, they cannot guarantee to the bond holders that 
they will always have the necessary liquidity to pay out 
the bond at maturity. This contrast with stand alone 
countries that issue sovereign bonds in their own cur-
rencies’.
3. () It should be noted that speculative attacks, justified or 
not by economic fundamentals, always start from small 
items (e.g. Grecian sovereign bonds) to arrive big ones. 
The former, because relatively cost less, is used as a test 
for verifying and implementing strategies against the 
latter, normally most expensive.
the financial markets in the economic stability of 
the Euro area and of the single currency: the Euro 
(4). In fact, even the possibility of one of the PIIGS 
leaving the Euro zone has not been excluded (5).
At the moment, we know that this hypothesis is 
not mentioned in any article of the European trea-
ties. If it were to happen, the economic effect on 
the Euro zone could be devastating. In fact, an exit 
from the Euro by one of its members would mean 
that country was no longer able to respect the 
EMU provisions and above all to repay its debts, 
particularly to its foreign investors. 
In order to avoid this dramatic scenario the Eu-
ropean Union, has during the last two years de-
veloped a set of new macro economic provisions 
4. () See P. De Grauwe, Crisis in the Eurozone and How to 
Deal with it, in CEPS Policy Brief, No. 204, 2010, Febru-
ary; B. Hall, Q. Peel, Paris and Berlin at Odds over De-
fault System, Financial Times 2010, Oct. 26; R. Canale, 
O. Napolitano, The Recessive Attitude of EMU Poli-
cies: Reflections on the Italian Experience, 1999-2008, in 
MPRA Paper No. 20207, 2009.
5. () See C. Proctor, The Future of Euro. What Happens 
if a Member State Leaves? in European Business Law Re-
view, 2006, pp. 909-937; P. Athanassiou, Withdrawal 
and Expulsion from The EU and EMU: Some Reflections, 
ECB Legal Working Paper Series n. 10; December 2009.
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and mechanisms designed to manage and at same 
time to solve the Crisis, for example: the European 
Stability Mechanism (MES), that establishes a per-
manent emergency fund which entered in force in 
September 2012 and the Fiscal Compact, agreed 
in March 2012, that mainly increases budgetary 
discipline (6).
6. () These new treaties raise interesting questions with 
particular reference to their compatibility with the 
EU law. On this specific point see G. Peroni, La Crisi 
dell’Euro: limiti e rimedi dell’Unione economica e mo-
netaria, Milano, 2012, pp. 151-185; id., Il Trattato di Li-
sbona e la crisi dell’Euro: considerazioni critiche”, in Il 
Diritto dell’Unione europea, 2011, pp. 971-998 G.L. To-
sato, L’integrazione europea ai tempi dell’euro, in Rivi-
sta di diritto internazionale, 2012, pp. 681-703; G. Bon-
vicini, F. Brugnoli (ed. by), Il fiscal compact, Roma, 
2012; B. De Witte, The European Treaty Amendement 
for the Creation of a Financial Stabilitiy Mechanism, in 
European Policy Analysis, June 2011.
2. The Limits of the Treaties of Maastricht 
and Lisbon
The legal instruments before mentioned, that do 
not exhaust all the means devised by the EU in 
tackling the Crisis, show the fundamental weak-
ness of the economic and legal framework of the 
Euro and of the Euro zone as defined in the Maas-
tricht Treaty and substantially not changed in the 
Lisbon Treaty (7). These European agreements 
have not even addressed the possibility of an eco-
nomic Crisis such as the one we have at this mo-
ment and have not, in fact, considered the institu-
tion of a mechanism able to prevent an economic 
situation of such gravity as the one in progress. 
This approach reflects, in reality, the Maastricht 
philosophy, strongly influenced by the Bundes-
7. () For a general analysis of the contents of the Lisbon 
Treaty, see M. C. Baruffi (ed. by), Dalla costituzione 
europea al trattato di Lisbona, Padova, 2008; F. Bas-
sanini, G. Tiberi (ed. by), Le nuove istituzioni euro-
pee: commento al trattato di Lisbona, Bologna, 2010; 
P. Craig, The Lisbon Treaty: law, politics and treaty 
reform, Oxford-New York, 2010; J. C. Piris, The Lisbon 
Treaty: a legal and political analysis, Cambridge, 2010; 
C. Zanghì, L. Panella (ed. by) Il trattato di Lisbona tra 
conferme e novità, Torino, 2010.
bank model, the German Central Bank, which ar-
gues that single currency was based on the idea 
that it was necessary to limit as far as possible the 
interference of EU institutions in the field of eco-
nomic policy. 
‘Maastricht’ specifically recognized the EMU as 
the only mechanism able to control the trend of 
inflation, as its restraint was considered, by ‘the 
founding fathers’, to be the essential condition 
for Euro countries to maintain the equilibrium of 
their respective balance of payments (8) and at the 
same time the comply with the macro economic 
criteria and parameters fixed in the article 121 par. 
1, 122 par. 2 e 123 par. 5 of that Treaty. 
8. () The balance of payments is a statistical statement that 
systematically summarizes, for a specific time period, 
the economic transactions of an economy with the rest 
of the world. With reference to the conceptual frame-
work of the balance of payments accounts and the inter-
national investment position and national accounts see 
IMF, Balance of Payments Manual, Washington, 2012, 
pp. 6-20.
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In synthesis, the Monetary Union was built on the 
unbelievably naïve assumption that there would 
be no crises. But, if the EMU, thanks to the mon-
etary action of European Central Bank, was able 
to dominate inflation during the last ten years, the 
excessive deficit procedure and the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP) have not succeeded in main-
taining budgetary discipline during that period.
As earlier mentioned, this model has not been 
modified by the recent Lisbon Treaty. On the 
contrary, in the light of the effects of the current 
Crisis, there should be at senior European level 
economic plans to directly stimulate the growth 
in employment, especially among the young, the 
sector of the European population most affected 
by the Crisis. This has been highlighted on several 
occasions by the EU Commission in their official 
economic reports and forecasts (9).
But, as we know economic and fiscal policies are 
not included within the competence of the Eu-
ropean Union, they remain firmly in the ‘hands’ 
9. () European Commission, European Economic Fore-
cast, Spring 2012, pp. 86-87, p. 104, p. 116; European 
Commission, European Economic Forecast, Autumn 
2011, pp. 63-68, p. 99.
of the States (see Articles 120-121 TFEU). At the 
same time, the Euro countries are unable to fi-
nance plans to stimulate their economy because 
on one hand, they do not have enough resources 
and on the other hand, they could be running the 
risk of breaking the rules of Maastricht and the 
provisions of the SPG. Besides, the Euro States are 
not allowed to devalue their currency in order to 
balance their books and to give new stimulus to 
their economy, as monetary policy is by now, as 
we know, in the responsibility of the European 
Union (see art. 3 par. 1, lett. c TFEU).
In my opinion, in the light of what is happening, 
it is clear that is not longer possible to maintain a 
single monetary policy with largely decentralized 
fiscal and economic policies. The Euro States and 
in particular the PIIGS have been unable to ensure 
the high degree of self responsibility and sound 
policies necessary not to undermine the stability 
of the common currency. The case of Greece is, 
probably, the most significant example (10). 
10. () See J. Manolopoulos, Greece’s “odious” debt: the 
looting of the Hellenic Republic by the Euro, the Greeks, 
the political elite and the investment community, Lon-
don, 2011.
Robert Mundell, the winner of the Nobel Prize for 
economics and ‘father’ of the theory of ‘optimum 
economic areas’, (11) maintains that in order to re-
alize a such a monetary area there must be a full 
free movement of goods and capitals, a system of 
fixed exchange rates and an economic policy not 
separated by monetary policy. Not one of these 
elements has been fully realized inside the Euro-
pean common market (12).
For all these reasons, it is essential to revise the 
existing EU treaties in order to ensure that politi-
cians are directly responsible to European citizens 
for the economic and political choices that the EU 
must adopt in order to solve the current Crisis, 
which has been compared, by many economic ob-
11. () See R. Mundell, A Theory of Optimum Currency 
Areas, in American Economic Review, 1961, pp. 657-665.
12. () With reference to the limits of the European inter-
nal market see J. Gronden, The Internal Market, The 
State and Public Private Arrangements in The Light of 
European Law, in Legal Issues of Economic Integration, 
2006, pp.105-137; P. Nebbia, Internal Market and the 
Harmonization of European Contract Law, in European 
Union Law for Twenty First Century: Rethinking The 
New Legal Order, 2004, pp. 89-101; G. Davies, National-
ity Discrimination in The European Internal Market, The 
Hague, 2003.
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servers, with the Crisis of 1929 (13). This is a lon-
ger term solution, probably the most effective, but 
which will take time to come into being while the 
Crisis also demands quick answers.
13. () See K. Galbraith, Il grande crollo, Milano, 2006; 
C. P. Kindleberger, La grande depressione nel mondo 
1929-1939, Milano, 1982; M. Almunia, A. S. Bénétrix, 
b. Eichengreen, K.H. O’Rourke, G. Rua, From 
Great Depression to Great Credit Crisis: Similarities, 
Differences and Lessons, Cambridge MA, National 
Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, 2009; P. Krugman, 
The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 
2008, New York, 2009; G. Sapelli, La crisi economica 
mondiale: dieci considerazioni, Torino, 2008.
3. The Role of the European Central Bank in 
front of the Crisis
Within the framework described a central and de-
cisive role in managing the Crisis has been car-
ried out by the European Central Bank (14), whose 
main task is to maintain the Euro’s purchasing 
power and thus price stability in the Euro area 
(see art. 3, par. 3 TEU), a concept on which the 
Treaty focuses in various provisions (15). This ap-
proach has not been modified with the Lisbon 
14. () See C. Zilioli, M. Selmayr, La Banca Centrale 
Europea, Milano, 2007; T. Padoa Schioppa, L’euro e 
la sua banca centrale. L’Unione dopo l’unione, Bologna, 
2004; C. Giannini, L’età delle banche centrali. Forme 
e governo della moneta fiduciaria in un prospettiva 
istituzionalista, Bologna, 2004; D. J. Howarth, P. H. 
Loedel, The European central bank: The new European 
leviathan, New York, 2003; J. de Haan, The European 
central bank: credibility, transparency and centralization, 
Cambridge, 2005; J. Harold, Making The European 
monetary union: The role of the Committee of Central 
bank governors and the origins of the European central 
bank, London, 2012.
15. () Price stability is mentioned in Articles 119 par. 2 and 
3 TFEU; Article 127 par. 1 TFEU and in Article 2 par. 
1 of the Statute of the ESCB and ECB. Price stability is 
also one of the convergence criteria for the adoption of 
the Euro (see Article 140 par. 1 TFEU).
Treaty even if there have been a few but really sig-
nificant changes to some rules relating to the ECB.
First of all with art. 13 par. 1 of the European 
Union Treaty, the ECB has been incorporated into 
the group of EU institutions. This is most impor-
tant because in this way the European Central 
Bank is not longer considered, as in the past, an 
‘external body’ to the European Union. It becomes 
a vital organ perfectly inserted within the EU with 
the consequence that the rules of the treaties gov-
erning all the EU institutions must now apply to 
the Euro tower. But, the Lisbon, it has not taken 
the opportunity of solving the question concern-
ing the legal personality of the Euro tower viz: if 
it has or not international legal personality in the 
international community. This aspect is closely 
linked to the unsolved problem of the role of ECB 
and EU within the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), where, as we know, the European Union 
is not one of its members, but it is ‘represented’ 
by the governments of its single States. It should 
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be noted the IMF is the international organization 
created by Bretton Woods conference in 1944 to 
specifically deal with monetary matters, in order 
to guarantee the stability of the different curren-
cies and the economic and financial support to its 
members in case of liquidity crisis. For these rea-
sons, the IMF is the first and the most important 
economic and monetary ‘forum where the inter-
national representation of the Euro area should 
naturally be foreseen’. (16)
Secondly, with the Lisbon treaty we see a rein-
forcement of the independence of the Euro tower, 
16. () See S. Cafaro, The Missing Voice of the Euro: Le-
gal, Tecnical and Political Obstacles to the External 
Representation of Euro Area, in Il Diritto dell’Unione 
europea, 2011, pp. 895 – 913. For the Author, many any 
are the reasons which explain the limited development 
of the external dimension of the EMU above all with 
reference to the IMF. First of all we have to consider 
that Euro area states have not played a proactive role for 
fear that a single voice could reduce national positions 
and priorities and decrease their role in external poli-
cies. Secondly, the IMF action covers both monetary as 
well as economic profiles while in the EU the economic 
policy is still run by Members States, conversely mon-
etary policy falls within exclusive competence of the 
European Union. Thirdly, the IMF does not foresee in 
its Statute (see art. II) the possibility that an economic 
regional organization can become an its member.
for which the ECB, in its conduct of monetary 
policy, is not allowed to receive any commitment 
or order from any political body whatsoever (see 
art. 130, 131 and 282 TFEU). It is this form of in-
dependence that most distinguishes the European 
Central Bank from the others EU institutions like 
the EU Parliament, the EU Council, the European 
Council and the Commission, all of which play a 
political role. Particularly, we note with interest 
the introduction of a new procedure for the selec-
tion of members of the ECB’s executive board who 
in the future will be appointed by the European 
Council by a qualified majority rather than una-
nimity. In this way members of the Board would 
not need the support of all States of the Euro zone, 
as happened in the past.
The changes concerning the ECB continue to pro-
duce the effect of strengthening the Euro tower in 
the framework of EU system without changing its 
mission: to ensure price stability and a low rate of 
inflation (17). These aims constitute the so called 
17. () The mandate of ECB is essentially confined to the 
maintenance of price stability. Contrary to the U.S. Fed-
eral Reserve, for example, the ECB is not committed to 
support growth or employment.
European economic ‘constitution’ (18) that finds 
its legal basis essentially in the articles 3 TEU and 
119 TFEU (19).
But even with the Lisbon Treaty the State mem-
bers have still not taken the chance to consider the 
negative impact that the pursuit of price stability 
can produce on economic growth when inflation 
figures do not act as a reliable index for the future 
growth of prices (20). Despite this, the ECB has 
played and is still playing a central role in solving 
the Crisis of sovereign debt.
The ECB has had to react strongly to unprecedent-
ed threats to monetary stability in the Euro area. 
18. () See I. Pernice, F. C. Mayer, La Costituzione inte-
grata dell’Europa, in G. Zagrebelsky (ed. by), Diritti 
e Costituzione nell’Unione Europea, Roma, 2003, p. 43 
ss.; F. Snyder, EMU Revisited. Are We Making a Con-
stitution? What Constitution are we Making?, Firenze, 
Istituto Universitario Europeo, WP Law, 6/1998.
19. () See S. Giubboni, Diritti sociali e mercato. La dimen-
sione sociale dell’integrazione europea, Bologna, 2003, p. 
27; M. P. Chiti, Diritto amministrativo europeo, Milano, 
1999, p. 138; G. Della Cananea, L’Unione europea: un 
ordinamento composito, Bari-Roma, 2003, p. 61.
20. () See G. La Malfa, L’Europa legata. I rischi dell’Euro, 
Milano, 2000, pp. 92-93.
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Firstly the ECB, in full consistency of its mandate 
reduced its key policy interest rate rapidly be-
tween October 2008 and May 2009, from 4, 25% 
to 1%. In other words, the Euro tower reduced its 
policy rate faster than any euro area country has 
ever done in recent history (21).
Secondly, the European Central Bank took addi-
tional non standard measures to ensure that its 
interest rate decisions were transmitted effective-
ly to the ‘real economy’ despite the volatilities of 
the financial markets. Its idea is to give support 
to banks who that cannot easily access the money 
markets or other sources of finance and so have 
difficulty in providing credit to firms, companies 
and individuals. Consequently in the autumn of 
the last year the ECB, in order to enhance the pro-
visions of liquidity to the banking system, decided 
to introduce two very long term refinancing op-
erations (LRTO) (22) with a maturity of three years 
21. () The Role of the Central Bank and Euro Area Govern-
ments in Times of Crisis. Speech by Peter Praet, Member 
of the Executive Board of the ECB at the German Fed-
eral Ministry of Finance, Berlin 19 April 2012.
22. () W.H Buiter and E. Rahbari (see The ECB as Lender 
of Last Resort for Sovereigns in the Euro Area, in CEPr 
Discussion paper Seires, n. 8974, May 2012, p. 1 ss) ar-
gue that the ECB ‘has been acting as lender of last re-
which were conducted in December 2011 and in 
February 2012. The extraordinary long maturity 
of these operations gave above all banks a wider 
horizon for their liquidity program. 
In addition to these measures, the ECB adopted 
other resolutions  in order to address the severe 
tensions in the financial market. The most impor-
tant was the controversial decision to purchase 
the PIIGS bonds ‘to ensure… liquidity in those 
markets segments which are dysfunctional’(23). 
This would appear to contravene European Union 
legislation which clearly prohibits any monetiza-
sort for the sovereigns of the euro system since it started 
its outright purchases of euro area periphery sovereign 
debt under the securities market programme (SMP) 
in May 2010. The scale of its interventions as LoLR for 
sovereigns has grown steadily since then and its range 
of instruments has expanded. We interpret the longer 
term refinancing operations (LTROs) of December 2011 
and February 2012 as being as much about acting, indi-
rectly, as LoLR for the Spanish and Italian sovereigns by 
facilitating the purchase of their debt by domestic banks 
in the primary issue market as about dealing with a li-
quidity crunch for Euro area banks’.
23. () See J. C. Trichet, The ECB’s Response to the Recent 
Tensions in Financial Markets, speech at the 38th Eco-
nomic conference of the Oesterreichische National-
bank, Vienna, 31 may 2010, www.ecb.int/press/key/
date720107html/sp100531-2.en.html.
tion and bail-out options. Specifically Article 123 
of the TFEU (repeated in Article 21 of the Stat-
ute of the ESCB and the ECB) forbids any form of 
monetary financing of deficits or public debt, pre-
cisely the direct acquisition of debt instruments 
of EU Members States by ECB or national central 
banks, while Article 124 rules out privileged ac-
cess to financial institutions by the public sector 
and the Article 125, with the “no-bail-out clause”, 
precludes EU institutions and any one member 
State becoming liable for the financial liabilities of 
another State of the Euro area, with the one excep-
tion concerning ‘mutual financial guarantees for 
the joint execution of a specific project’ (24). Thus 
excludes any form of financial and economic soli-
darity between EU member States.
The above mentioned EU primary rules are based 
on clear and sound economic principles and are 
an essential part of the ‘budgetary code’ of the 
Union and beyond their literal wording are the 
expression of the responsibility of each member 
24. () The above mentioned three prohibitions are linked 
with the obligation of Member States under article 126 
TFEU to avoid excessive deficits and with correlated 
Stability and Growth Pact.
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State for its own public finance. (25) In particular, 
there is an implicit reference to the risk of mon-
etisation of sovereign debt that would inevitably 
lead to higher inflation and an instability of the 
prices, with ineluctable costs to economic growth. 
According to the ‘founding fathers’ of the Maas-
tricht Treaty the financial transfers between Euro 
member States would create significant ‘moral 
hazard effects’ (26) in the beneficiary countries and 
so the possibility of encouraging opportunistic 
behaviour, (27) with the further consequence of 
25. () The States have to finance themselves, if necessary, 
on the market and at the conditions set by the Market. 
The Market is the ‘Judge’ of their financial health. A 
Member state must borrow on the financial markets in 
the same way as, and in competition with, other bor-
rowers, including large corporations. In this sense see 
M. Townsed, The Euro and EMU. An Historical Institu-
tional and Economic Description, London, 2007, p. 108.
26. () According to G. Mankiw, Principles of Economics, 
Thompson South Western, 2007, p. 484, moral hazard 
is ‘the tendency of a person or entity that is imperfectly 
monitored to engage in undesirable behaviour.’.
27. () This could be the risk if the ECB guarantees that 
money will always be obtainable to pay out sovereign 
bond holders, it could lead governments to issue too 
much debt. On this specific point see P. De Grauwe, 
Only a More… , cit., p. 3.
undermining the economic stability of the whole 
European Monetary Union.
In synthesis, the ECB cannot purchase government 
bonds on the primary market as it cannot buy the 
debt of insolvent governments. But, the articles 
aforementioned do not forbid the purchase of 
governmental bonds on the secondary market; 
the market place for the bonds that are already 
issued in the primary market and where the re-
selling of government bonds is possible. 
This was the solution adopted by the ECB 
for reducing the spread between the PIIGS 
government bonds and the German bunds, that 
we know are used as an economic benchmark 
because Germany is generally considered the State 
with the strongest economy within the Eurozone. 
Inter alia, in order to avoid a corresponding 
increase of the monetary mass, the ECB decided 
to sterilize its purchases by the use of the deposit 
facility opened to banks with the Central banks of 
the Euro system.
Last September 2012 this kind of monetary opera-
tion was confirmed by Mario Draghi, the Presi-
dent of ECB, during his speech to the members of 
the EU Parliament. (28) On that occasion, Draghi 
said that Euro tower would continue to purchase 
of governments bonds until the tensions on the 
financial market were reduced and at the same 
time he declared that the purchase of government 
bonds for up to three years is not a monetary aid 
to the member States because it is a too short loan 
to be classified as ‘money creation’. 
This kind of operation was strongly criticized by 
the Bundesbank and by the German members of 
the Euro tower’s executive board (29) because, in 
their opinion, it could create inflation and mon-
etization of debts and thus favour the so called 
‘moral hazard’ between States, undermining the 
principle of ‘Stabilitatsgemeinschaff ’ a fundamen-
tal value that for German Constitutional Court 
is in particular embedded in the above described 
no bail - out clause. An evolution of the European 
Monetary Union contrary to this binding profile 
28. () See European Parliament Bulletin Session 10-13 Sep-
tember 2012.
29. () The climax of the above mentioned conflict within the 
ECB was reached in September 2011 with the controver-
sial resignation of Jurgen Stark, the German member of 
the Executive Board of ECB.
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could, according to German judges, justify the 
withdrawal of Germany from the Union (30).
In any case, what is really significant here is the 
ECB’s decision to take an extraordinary action in 
the light of exceptional circumstances in the Euro-
pean Union’s hour of need. In this sense, the ECB’s 
action, in my opinion, is consistent with the aims 
expressed in the Article 3 par. 3 TEU (‘The Union 
shall establish an internal market. It shall work for 
the sustainable development of Europe based on 
balanced economic growth and price stability’) 
and the objectives set out in the article 136 TFEU. 
This rule allows for the Members of the Euro zone 
to adopt measures ‘to strengthen the coordination 
and surveillance of their budgetary discipline’ and 
to ‘set out economic policy guidelines for them’ 
both ‘ in order to ensure the proper functioning 
of economic and monetary union’ (art. 136 TFEU 
par.1). In this view, it is possible, for me, to affirm 
that a slight rise of inflation, as a possible effect 
of ECB purchasing PIIGS bond on the secondary 
market can be considered acceptable if it is use-
30. () See Bundesverfassungsgericht, 12 October 2003, II, 5 
e, in A. Oppenheimer (ed by), The Relationship between 
European Community Law and National Law: The Cas-
es, Cambridge, 1994, p. 569.
ful in preserving the stability of the EMU and the 
future of the European Union and its integration 
process.
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4. Conclusions
The strong activism that has characterized up un-
til now the action of European Central Bank since 
the beginning of the Crisis is a direct consequence 
of the political vacuum that has arisen within the 
European Union and of institutional and policy 
failures in the Euro area. During these years we 
have seen on the one hand, the proliferation above 
all of meetings of European Council and Ecofin 
and on the other hand, the introduction of new 
mechanisms and new organisms without reaching 
a final solution to the Crisis. In this framework, 
the ECB has developed a crucial and essential role 
by providing the monetary answers that the finan-
cial markets were expecting: in particular to be re-
assured about the reimbursement of PIIGS bonds. 
In the meantime, the European Central Bank has 
conditioned its support to the States by insisting 
on the adoption of stringent fiscal measures such 
as the famous letter to the Italian Government on 
5 August 2011 signed by Trichet and Draghi testi-
fies (31). 
31. () The text of the above mentioned letter is published on 
Corriere della Sera, September 29, 2011, p. 3.
The use of the conditionality’s method is moreover 
confirmed by the recent treaties on the European 
Mechanism of Stability and by the Fiscal Com-
pact. In the new juridical framework designed by 
those treaties (international agreements external 
to the EU system and characterized in their func-
tioning by the intergovernmental method) the 
ECB plays a fundamental role (see e.g. Article 4, 
par. 4 and Article 5 par. 5 lett. g) in the granting 
of approval of financial aid to States in difficulty. 
This is done in collaboration with the European 
Commission while the European Parliament is 
left to play a minimal role. In this way, the whole 
question of democratic legitimacy of the financial 
decisions taken by EMS, ECB and other European 
technocratic organism arises.
The European Central Bank has become the con-
troller of the National Governments in the man-
agement of their political economy especially 
when the latter have shown that they are not be-
ing able to manage the effects of the Crisis. In this 
view, the ECB has partially changed its nature and 
is no longer only a technocratic institution but is 
now the central hub of European economy policy 
making. Therefore it is clear that the Crisis of the 
Euro is not only due to the lack of coordination 
of the economic policies of the Euro States but in 
particular is the consequence of the absence of a 
centre of fiscal policy at European level that can-
not be represented by the before mentioned EMS 
(32) that is the EU answer to the ECB’s decision to 
formally decline the role of lender of last resort in 
the government of the bonds market. 
Only the transfer of the fiscal policy from individ-
ual States to European Union will probably solve 
the Crisis of the Euro. 
In my opinion, the action of the ECB on the finan-
cial markets by its different monetary instruments 
can only serve to limit the negative effects of the 
Crisis, but it will never be able to solve this dra-
matic phenomenon definitively because financial 
markets are waiting for a political answer on the 
future of the Euro. 
32. () The EMS will never have the necessary credibility to 
stop the speculative attacks because it cannot guarantee 
that the liquidity will always available to pay out sover-
eign bond holders, in fact only a Central bank can create 
unlimited amounts of money can provide such guaran-
tee.
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The choice for European States and which must 
be formally democratically embraced by Europe-
an citizens remains the one identified by Aristide 
Briand “unite or perish”. 
We have no more time to lose, it is time to act.
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1. Introduction
Prior to the eruption of the crises, most discus-
sions on EMU’s legitimacy and sustainability con-
sidered the impact of (the lack of) European po-
litical integration as exogenous to the process of 
monetary integration and governance. They also 
centred on spillovers from the monetary side to 
the economic side of EMU1.
The academic and policy debates during EMU’s 
first decade of existence (see for instance Ender-
lein, 2006) focused on the fact that EMU’s func-
tioning – basically limited to a one-size-fits-all 
monetary policy – triggered spillover effects across 
various policy areas. Those spillovers, which run 
from the monetary side to the economic side of 
EMU, could affect its legitimacy and therefore its 
sustainability. Some authors (notably De Grauwe, 
2006; 2009; 2011) consistently argued that EMU 
could not survive without a political union since 
the Eurozone had fewer explicit compensation 
mechanisms than the United States (no automatic 
1.  I wish to thank Bruno De Witte, Adrienne Héritier, Fe-
lix Roth and other participants in the EUDO conference 
for valuable comments and discussions.
fiscal transfers, lower labour mobility and wage 
flexibility, and less integrated financial markets).
Yet, on the one hand, there are endogenous 
legitimising mechanisms at work – a wider output 
legitimisation of EMU, provided by the EMU cum 
EU governance framework – that can contribute 
to a collective acceptance of EMU’s redistributive 
implications. Such expected endogenous effects of 
the monetary integration process (some of which 
are political in nature) could partly compensate 
the non-satisfaction of the traditional Optimum 
Currency Area (OCA) criteria, making EMU 
sustainable.2
On the other hand, the joint impact of the financial 
and economic crisis and the sovereign debt crisis 
2.  The traditional OCA theory states that the condition for 
a country to surrender its monetary autonomy and to 
join a monetary union is that the (essentially microeco-
nomic) efficiency gains outweigh the macroeconomic 
costs of participation. These depend on the character-
istics of the country wishing to join a monetary union. 
OCA theory tended to focus mainly on stabilisation pol-
icies (the macroeconomic costs) of a monetary union, 
namely the loss of the exchange rate as an adjustment 
mechanism. See Torres (2009b).
made it plain that member states had insufficiently 
accounted for negative (systemic) spillovers not 
from the monetary to the economic sphere but vice 
versa: from the economic part of the union to its 
monetary side.3 This has been repeatedly stressed 
by the ECB, in those very terms, since 2009/10. In 
sum, EMU’s spillover effects across various policy 
areas run both from the monetary side, with its 
one-size-fits-all monetary policy, to the econom-
ic side of the union and also from the economic 
side, where there has been insufficient (fiscal and 
economic) policy coordination and structural re-
forms to prevent major macroeconomic imbal-
ances, to the monetary side of the union.
The ensuing section proceeds to analyse the nature 
of EMU’s spillover effects across various policy ar-
eas: how the negative (systemic) spillovers from 
the economic to the monetary sphere of EMU ex-
posed a further-reaching need for enhanced eco-
nomic governance and its redistributive implica-
3.  Competitiveness and fiscal imbalances (very much as-
sociated with the fragility of the banking system) were 
in part due to the lack of EU mechanisms to enforce fis-
cal sustainability and to address financial regulation, ag-
gravated by the fact that financial markets almost did not 
distinguish between Eurozone sovereigns until 2010.
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tions. Section 3 interprets the variety of steps that 
have been taken towards enhanced governance 
and reinforced cooperation in terms of endog-
enous political institutions, as explained by the 
convergence of preferences in the framework of 
the experiences of incomplete open-ended mech-
anisms. Section 4 discusses how the crisis affected 
EMU’s legitimacy and the sustainability of various 
policy strategies within EMU, pointing to the im-
portance of the strategic role of the ECB and of 
the wider EU regulatory/governance framework. 
Section 5 addresses the domestic dimensions as-
sociated with EU endogenous political changes, 
namely whether multi-level governance contrib-
utes to more efficient and legitimate national re-
sponses to the crisis, through the creation of better 
incentives and a higher degree of politicisation of 
EU constraints, respectively. Section 6 concludes. 
2. New EU governance constraints and new 
institutions and policies
The negative spillovers from the economic to the 
monetary sphere of EMU highlighted the con-
straints of economic governance in the Eurozone 
and revived the debate on political integration, 
namely how to refound EMU’s economic side to 
make it sustainable. Whether such a quantum leap 
in political integration in the Eurozone takes the 
form of (can be termed) enhanced economic gov-
ernance, some form of gouvernement économique 
(Jabko, 2011) or a much stronger degree of po-
litical integration depends on the convergence of 
preferences on EMU’s open questions and on the 
evolution of and on the institutional and political 
responses to the sovereign debt crisis.
As a consequence, the question of the collective 
acceptance of EMU’s redistributive implications 
became different in nature and also more acute, 
with monetary policy and various quasi-fiscal 
measures such as the ECB’s Securities Markets 
Programme (SMP), Long Term Refinancing Op-
erations (LTRO) and Outright Monetary Transac-
tions (OMT) as well as various EU-IMF adjust-
ment programmes subject to conditionality par-
tially and temporarily addressing the causes of the 
built-in macroeconomic imbalances and of their 
negative spillover effects onto the monetary side.
The two crises, especially the sovereign debt cri-
sis, exposed a further-reaching need for enhanced 
economic governance – a re-founding of EMU’s 
economic side – in the EU and particularly so in 
the Eurozone, where interdependencies are larger. 
EMU’s sustainability came to depend on a further 
pooling of sovereignty.4 The sovereign debt crisis 
added urgency regarding increased European eco-
nomic cooperation in order to address the causes 
(competitiveness differentials between member 
states and budgetary disequilibria) as to impede 
4.  As put by former ECB President Trichet (2011): “in a 
union with a single monetary policy and 17 different 
fiscal and economic policies, a ‘quantum leap’ in eco-
nomic governance is necessary to ensure that the degree 
of economic union is fully commensurate to the already 
achieved monetary union” (see also Schuknecht et al., 
2011).
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spillovers into the monetary sphere, in particular 
in the Eurozone.
Most, if not all, member states came to accept 
stronger fiscal coordination anchored on Germa-
ny, like monetary policy in the asymmetric phase 
of the European Monetary System (EMS) and 
to address competitiveness issues (structural re-
form) given the built-up macroeconomic imbal-
ances. There has been a relatively wide consensus 
among a large part of the European polity (as wit-
nessed by the activism of various EU institutions 
and national governments, European Parliament 
(EP) resolutions and national parliaments’ ratifi-
cations) regarding additional measures, mecha-
nisms and institutions, which were deemed neces-
sary (Trichet, 2011, De Grauwe, 2011) and expect-
ed to be put into practice as the crisis continued to 
unfold in 2012, putting at risk the functioning and 
existence of EMU.
In the process, the Lisbon Strategy did not only 
lose its transitory character, with economic coor-
dination continuing under the Integrated Guide-
lines (IG) and the Europe 2020 Strategy from 2010 
onwards, but the Euro Plus Pact and the ‘fiscal 
compact’ also introduced a more explicit mone-
tary union dimension. Structural reform was also 
part of the formal EU/IMF (Greece, Ireland and 
Portugal) or informal ECB (Italy and Spain) con-
ditionality programmes. The ‘fiscal compact’, an 
intergovernmental legal framework, subsequent-
ly became the Treaty on Stability, Coordination 
and Governance in the Economic and Monetary 
Union (TSCG), which was signed on 2 March 
2012 and entered into force in in January 2013 for 
the member states that had completed ratification 
by 2012.
This enhanced economic governance, namely the 
economic governance reform package proposed 
by the Commission and which entered into force 
in December 2011, dubbed the ‘six pack’, and the 
Euro Plus Pact adopted by the European Coun-
cil in March 2011, went some way in strengthen-
ing economic and fiscal governance in line with 
the needs for a well-functioning monetary union. 
Progress was made notably in strengthening both 
the preventive arm and the corrective arm of the 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and with a view 
to impeding macroeconomic imbalances and 
fostering structural reforms.5 The TSCG in the 
5.  Surveillance of macroeconomic imbalances under the 
Economic and Monetary Union, envisaged to be 
incorporated into the treaties of the Union, fea-
tures stronger coordination of economic policies 
in areas of common interest. This illustrates the 
perceived need to address those questions at the 
European level. Likewise, the adoption of various 
European Parliament resolutions on EMU cum 
EU governance subsequent to the outbreak of the 
financial crisis in 2008 and the evolution to the 
sovereign debt crisis since 2010 are good exam-
ples of the perception of the need (and the will) to 
respond in terms of European governance.
macroeconomic imbalance procedure (MIP) forms part 
of the European semester, which takes an integrated 
and forward looking approach to the Union’s economic 
policy challenges, namely regarding fiscal sustainabil-
ity, competitiveness, financial market stability and eco-
nomic growth. The first alert mechanism report with a 
scoreboard of indicators was issued in February 2012 by 
the European Commission (COM(2012) 68 final).
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3. Endogenous political institutions: 
completing the economic side of EMU
Most Eurozone countries have consistently evi-
denced some degree of openness to political in-
tegration (shown by Eurobarometer surveys and 
political declarations) but not necessarily agree-
ment on a political quantum leap forward. Euro 
bonds, fiscal transfers, a European monetary fund 
and even more so the creation of a transfer union, 
have been resisted on the grounds of asymmetry 
since such a process would first require a common 
or highly coordinated fiscal policy or a European 
government accountable to the European parlia-
ment, i.e., a much stronger degree of sovereignty 
sharing among EU (or EMU) countries. 
Independently of how a crisis of the magnitude of 
the sovereign debt crisis affects the sustainability 
of EMU, a (albeit slow) convergence of preferenc-
es in the economic and social areas contributes to 
facilitating the collective acceptance of its redis-
tributive consequences in the absence of political 
union. It thereby contributes if not to the compli-
ance with the traditional optimum currency area 
criteria at least to reducing EMU’s heterogeneity 
costs and to making it sustainable.
In any case, with the crisis, economic (labour 
mobility, wage flexibility, financial market inte-
gration) and/or political/institutional adjustment 
mechanisms (public insurance mechanisms) or 
the coordination of a number of policies, such 
as social policy, have been, with the exception of 
market restrictions due to perceived risks, evolv-
ing in the direction of more integration.
Such dynamism is consistent with EMU as an evo-
lutionary process, as presented by Padoan (2002). 
It is also consistent with the evolution of the Eu-
ropean monetary integration process as explained 
by the convergence of preferences in the frame-
work of the experiences of incomplete open-end-
ed mechanisms, such as the EMS and EMU (Tor-
res, 2011), and by the endogenous responses of 
institutions, especially in times of crises.
The 2008/09 financial crisis and the subsequent 
2010-12 sovereign debt crisis have come to affect 
the way monetary policy is implemented and per-
ceived. Judging from the responses (albeit hesitant 
and taken under the constant pressure of events) 
it appears that the crises have been leading to a 
convergence of preferences among member states 
on the need to tackle some of the issues that ei-
ther had remained unresolved at Maastricht and/
or which had then been perceived clearly beyond 
the scope of monetary policy and institutions. 
 In fact, a variety of steps that have been taken 
towards enhanced governance and reinforced 
cooperation in economic and even in social poli-
cies reflect the recognition that the interplay of 
monetary policy with EU wider governance and 
coordinated action is essential for a successful re-
sponse to the crisis.6 The need for action will tend 
to build upon the economic governance reform 
package, the ‘six-pack’ (including the reinforced 
SGP, the national budgetary frameworks and the 
new Excessive Imbalance Procedure), the Europe 
6.  The reluctance of the ECB to take relief actions that 
might blur responsibilities between monetary policy 
and fiscal policy (of member state responsibility), con-
tributed to keeping up the pressure.
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2020 Strategy and further structural reforms as 
envisaged in the Euro Plus Pact and the new EU 
financial institutional architecture. In fact, this is 
already happening both in terms of institutions 
(TSCG) and policy implementation (MPI) and 
bailout programmes.
Notwithstanding this apparent convergence of 
preferences, significant divergences were dis-
played within countries and their respective gov-
ernments let alone their political establishments, 
interest groups and networks and within the 
ESCB and the ECB. Beyond the reached consen-
sus, approaches have remained divergent and old 
divisions, which had impeded a more complete 
institution than EMU, came to the surface, giv-
ing the idea of apparently insurmountable diver-
gences. And, yet, multi-level governance is mov-
ing and incremental institutional change is taking 
place.7 Such a process may also benefit from some 
form of throughput legitimacy (a type of legiti-
macy in general associated with government with 
the people – see Schmidt, 2012, and Risse and 
Kleine, 2007) and greater responsiveness to EMU 
7.  See Salines et al. (2011) for a classification of institu-
tional changes occurred in EMU from its inception un-
til 2010.
cum EU governance, which together constitute a 
bridge between the input-legitimate act of EMU’s 
creation and the (procedural) phase of internali-
sation and implementation of its objectives. 
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4. EMU’s legitimacy and sustainability
Monetary policy spillovers to other policy areas, 
the concern most frequently discussed in the lit-
erature before the crisis, seem not to have much 
affected EMU’s legitimacy. Prior to the crisis, be-
tween 1998 and 2007, support for EMU (based 
on Eurobarometer evidence, reported in Torres, 
2009b) was overall rather stable and even in-
creased in countries that experienced slow growth 
and/or difficulties of adjustment. That fact sug-
gests the existence of some endogenous legitimis-
ing mechanisms in normal times.8
8.  One should note here that, between 1998 and 2007 
(leaving therefore aside the effects of the financial, eco-
nomic and sovereign debt crises), support for EMU (Eu-
robarometer) increased in countries that experienced 
slow growth (Germany) and/or difficulties of adjust-
ment (Portugal), suggesting the existence of some en-
dogenous legitimising mechanisms in normal times. 
Since 2008, the EU broader regulatory (EMU cum EU 
governance) model has tried to encompass events and 
has enlarged in scope. However, trust in European and 
in national institutions has decreased substantially. 
Surveys also indicate that, on average, in the Eurozone 
more than four out of five citizens are increasingly in 
favour of greater policy coordination between countries 
to overcome the sovereign debt crisis. Such support has 
grown continuously since January 2009 (Economic 
EMU’s sustainability was called into question 
thereafter, when negative externalities from the 
economic side of the Union started to visibly af-
fect monetary policy at a very fast pace. Since 
2008, the EU broader regulatory (EMU cum EU 
governance) model has sought to account for 
events and has enlarged in scope. The fact that it 
tended to lag behind them became a problem as 
those events proved to be of a never seen mag-
nitude since EMU was created or even since the 
end of the Bretton Woods system. Since the out-
break of the crises, trust in European and in na-
tional institutions has decreased substantially. 
Both the 2008/09 financial crisis and the 2010-12 
sovereign debt crisis also had a negative impact on 
European citizens’ trust in the ECB, although to a 
lesser extent than on national institutions, other 
EU institutions and other central banks, such as 
Governance in the EU, Standard Eurobarometer sur-
veys 74 and 75, published in January and August 2011, 
respectively). See also Roth et al. (2011) and Roth et al. 
(2012), according to whom “the crisis has hardly dented 
popular support for the euro”, and Roth (this volume) 
for evidence and a thorough analysis.
the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England.9 In 
a situation characterised by a high level of eco-
nomic, social and political uncertainty it is hardly 
surprising that trust should be negatively affected. 
Surveys (Standard Eurobarometer surveys 74 and 
75) also indicate that, on average, in the Eurozone 
there is a large majority (which has grown con-
tinuously since January 2009) in favour of further 
broadening the EU regulatory (EMU cum EU gov-
ernance) model through greater policy coordina-
tion between countries to overcome the sovereign 
debt crisis. It remains to be seen whether Euro-
pean politicians and policy makers will rise to the 
challenge and will be able to implement both the 
necessary domestic reforms and EU coordinated 
9.  Reported in Chart 2 of “Central Banks”, The Econo-
mist, 17 February 2011, based on Bank of England, GfK 
NOP, European Commission, Eurobarometer and Gal-
lup surveys. It should also be noted that although trust 
in four EU institutions, the European Parliament, the 
ECB, the European Commission and the Council of 
the European Union (ranking the EP systematically the 
highest and the Council systematically the lowest and 
the European Commission and the European Central 
Bank in the middle), fell with the crises it is on average 
still significantly higher than trust in national institu-
tions.
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action at a higher level of integration to overcome 
the crisis.
A quantum leap forward in European integration 
approved through a ratification process would 
benefit from input legitimacy. In the case of in-
cremental institutional changes, multi-level gov-
ernance may only be legitimised through rather 
complex channels of responsiveness, rather than 
through traditional or even weaker forms of ac-
countability that involve other organisational 
actors in the EU governance system besides the 
EP. This fact then implies the pursuit of innova-
tive ways (such as the way in which the monetary 
dialogue between the EP and the ECB has evolved 
since EMU’s inception) of seeking both through-
put legitimacy (which one may term wider input 
legitimacy and which is in any event more com-
patible with the complex channels of responsive-
ness) and (narrow and wider) forms of output le-
gitimacy for EMU (Torres, 2013). 
4.1 4.1. The Strategic Role 
of the ECB: filling in an 
incomplete contract
As far as the (narrow) output legitimacy of EMU 
is concerned, the role of the ECB has been crucial 
and highly visible in addressing the 2008/09 glob-
al financial crisis. The ECB provided the necessary 
liquidity to stabilise the markets and shielded the 
Eurozone economies from destabilising exchange 
rate movements (which, at the time, further com-
plicated the capacity of non-Eurozone member 
states to respond to the crisis). 
The ECB’s actions proved however insufficient and 
the financial crisis transformed into a fiscal and 
sovereign debt crisis, affecting primarily Greece, 
Ireland and Portugal, which needed strong addi-
tional support from the ECB as well as EU and 
IMF financial support provided on the basis of 
an agreement on an economic adjustment pro-
gramme. Notwithstanding, access to ECB-pro-
vided liquidity proved essential for Ireland to buy 
the time required to implement the programme. 
The same is true, although to a lesser extent, for 
Greece and Portugal and for Spain and Italy. The 
ECB had to directly engage in the purchase of 
government bonds in the secondary market to 
respond to the crisis. Given that there were no 
intergovernmental funds in place nor were they 
operational to buy government bonds or simply 
not sufficient for countries such as Italy and Spain 
in Summer 2011, the ECB was the only European 
institution that could step in to avert major credit 
incidents. For the same reason, it also engaged in 
the building up of new institutions such as (the 
modalities of) a EU banking union and agreed to 
take on supervisory powers. Moreover, in August 
and September 2012 the ECB announced that it 
would impose strict conditionality on member 
states, that is, governments would have to “stand 
ready to activate the EFSF/ESM in the bond mar-
ket with strict and effective conditionality in line 
with the established guidelines” (ECB, 2012a) 
upon OMTs in secondary sovereign bond mar-
kets, aiming “at safeguarding an appropriate mon-
etary policy transmission and the singleness of the 
monetary policy” (ECB, 2012b). OMTs substitute 
the SMP in order to address the severe malfunc-
tioning in the price formation process in the bond 
markets of euro area countries (which may hinder 
the effective working of monetary policy). Such 
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purchases and other ECB rescue actions through-
out the sovereign debt crisis, namely the lowering 
of the creditworthiness requirement for the col-
lateral that banks had to offer for their refinancing 
credit, have triggered controversy and may have 
contributed to diminishing trust in the ECB and 
therefore to lowering EMU’s output legitimacy. 
In any case, building on its strategic role and its 
sense of mission as a lonely institution (Padoa-
Schioppa, 2000: 37; Dyson, 2009; Jabko, 2009: 
401) in a new incomplete political construct such 
as EMU, the ECB will remain the Eurozone’s ulti-
mate lender of last resort in one way or another. 
This fact liaises EMU’s narrow output legitimacy 
with its wider output legitimacy with consequenc-
es for EMU’s sustainability.
A move by Eurozone governments (through an 
intergovernmental pact among Eurozone mem-
bers like the TSCG or a future treaty revision) to 
improve Eurozone (or EU) fiscal governance and 
increase political integration provides the condi-
tions for the ECB to act and provide the necessary 
liquidity to facilitate fiscal and economic adjust-
ment programmes in most Eurozone countries. 
Conversely, such a move only happens through 
pressure (conditionality) from the ECB in the 
terms in which it can exert pressure over Euro-
zone governments: proclaiming its treaty-based 
independence and holding back its supportive 
action until governments take the necessary po-
litical steps in their domain to solve the crisis. 
In fact, the ECB has been acting strategically in 
a consistent way throughout the sovereign debt 
crisis, namely with its support for the European 
Parliament, against the position of the Council on 
the approval of the six-pack or in letters with spe-
cific policy recommendations to the Italian and 
Spanish governments in Summer 2011, in which 
it made interventions in secondary debt markets 
conditional upon domestic reforms. The ECB’s 
various statements have voiced its resistance 
against pressure from Eurozone governments for 
it to act as a lender of last resort while it has sig-
nalled its readiness to act in areas of its respon-
sibility provided Eurozone governments were to 
assume their (fiscal consolidation and economic 
reform) responsibilities.
The ECB has therefore strategically engaged in 
conditioning reform in some Eurozone member 
states, notably Italy and Spain and arguably France 
(not to mention the countries under the supervi-
sion of the Troika, of which the ECB is part), gain-
ing in this way the support of other members, 
such as Germany, for some of its more controver-
sial (with potential significant redistributive ef-
fects) policies aimed at sustaining EMU.
As stressed in Torres (2013), the ECB has been 
acting strategically because of the perceived threat 
to its independence from an incomplete EMU (on 
its economic side). It has sought to derive its le-
gitimacy not only from delivering price (and fi-
nancial) stability but also from acting as a guard-
ian of EMU objectives, doing “whatever it takes 
to preserve the euro”. In that sense, it has aimed 
at guaranteeing what may be termed its foremost 
objective: the sustainability of EMU as such. This 
implicit objective has led the Bank to engage in 
exceptional policies, beyond standard monetary 
tools, and wider economic policy debates, push-
ing for “a gradual and structured effort to com-
plete EMU” (Draghi, 2012).
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4.2 The wider EU regulatory 
model
Since its inception, EMU was expected to affect 
a number of other policy areas. EMU being an 
open-ended compromise (Torres, 2011), it was 
therefore also expected that appropriate mecha-
nisms and institutions would need to be created, 
thereby building on endogenous political institu-
tions. 
The wider EU regulatory model includes various, 
more or less institutionalised, common goals in 
the macroeconomic area, financial market sta-
bility and the need to address the fragility of the 
banking system but also areas such as labour mar-
ket and social policy reform, climate change and 
energy efficiency and security, migration and ex-
ternal trade. An appropriate – necessarily multi-
level – EU regulatory model can thus affect EMU’s 
legitimacy (the acceptance of its redistributive 
spillover effects) and sustainability (the preven-
tion and correction of negative externalities from 
the economic side affecting monetary policy spill-
over effects) through an increased openness to EU 
political integration and convergence of prefer-
ences. Such multi-level EU regulatory model en-
compasses European coordinated action (through 
common agreed upon principles), together with 
market and peer pressure. It further enhances the 
wider EMU cum EU governance framework in 
the Eurozone. Finally, the capacity to influence 
global governance in the areas of financial market 
regulation, climate change, energy security and 
world trade is also conditioned by EMU’s external 
dimension.
The success of these apparently convergent objec-
tives depends on their acceptance and on delivery, 
as several of those reforms and institutions are 
either still to be enacted or still not fully imple-
mented. However, they seem to mobilise common 
long-term interests (as there has been a relative 
consensus among, at least, Eurozone members 
and EU institutions in approving them at an ex-
traordinary pace), even at the expense of possi-
ble short-run political conflicts (both internal to 
member states, enacting reforms, and also among 
members states and between them and EU institu-
tions, which tend, as in other key historical occa-
sions referred above, to be bypassed by intergov-
ernmental, or even bilateral, cooperation). These 
wider political goals feed back into the acceptance 
of EMU’s redistributive consequences, therefore 
into EMU’s legitimacy, but also into the avoidance 
of spillover effects that run from the economic 
side of the union to its monetary side, making the 
monetary union more sustainable.
The expected endogenous effects of the monetary 
integration process, some of which are political in 
nature, partly compensate for the non-satisfaction 
of the traditional OCA criteria. They thereby con-
tribute to EMU’s legitimacy and sustainability 
(Torres, 2011). These endogenous political insti-
tutions reflect and contribute to a convergence of 
preferences – that also translated into the devel-
opment of new linkages between EMU and other 
EU policies – and, necessarily, the consideration 
(not without controversy and potentially disrupt-
ing tensions) of a more active stance on European 
integration, thereby fostering support for EMU.
This is despite the fact that there is not always 
an explicit (institutionalised) or obvious policy 
link between EMU and those policy areas (so-
cial, economic, financial, environmental, politi-
cal) and sometimes, arguably, even some political 
decoupling between monetary and political in-
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tegration.10 One should however not underesti-
mate those links. On the one hand, they seem to 
amount to endogenous legitimising mechanisms, 
which in the absence of political union are neces-
sary to sustain EMU.11 On the other hand, they 
function as prevention and correction mecha-
nisms of spillover effects from the economic side 
that affect monetary policy.
The wider EMU cum EU multi-level regulatory 
model, including various more or less institution-
alised common goals and policy areas, has con-
tributed to the acceptance of the redistributive 
spillover effects of EMU. With the 2008/09 glob-
al financial crisis cum the sovereign debt crisis, 
which started in 2010, policy links between EMU 
10.  Hodson (2009) argues that both the Constitutional 
Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty effectively decoupled mon-
etary and political integration issues. However, the two 
processes may have de facto linked up again with the re-
sulting external (market) pressure in the crises, forcing 
the creation of new institutions and an increased level of 
policy coordination and political integration in order to 
sustain EMU and European integration as such. 
11.  This interpretation is compatible with evidence that 
overall support for EMU between 1998 and 2007 (Eu-
robarometer) has remained relatively stable in the Eu-
rozone, in spite of the as high-perceived impact of the 
euro changeover on price rises (Deroose et al., 2007). 
and those other policy areas became especially im-
portant in terms of EMU legitimacy and sustain-
ability. The endogenous legitimising mechanisms 
and the prevention and correction mechanisms of 
spillover effects from the economic side that af-
fect monetary policy, provided for by incremen-
tal institutional change and accelerated by market 
and peer pressure and ECB strategic behaviour, 
contribute indirectly and directly to the delivery 
of EMU’s narrow and wider goals and to its sus-
tainability. 
For Jabko (2011: 54), the elaboration of an eco-
nomic governance framework for the European 
Union will take long and it will require a major 
reshufﬂing of power and economic resources 
among the member states and EU institutions. 
In fact, the process has already been taking place 
for a while, mostly since 2008/9 and through in-
stitutional incremental changes, which attempt 
to avoid a ‘major’ re-arrangement and re-distri-
bution among the member states and EU insti-
tutions. The elaboration of the economic gover-
nance framework will certainly continue, as by the 
end of 2012 it had not yet provided a convincing 
answer to the challenges facing both the EMU’s 
institutional architecture and Eurozone member 
states’ economies.
Depending on the path of institutional reforms, 
from minor adjustments, dealing with better sur-
veillance and enforcement mechanisms, to a re-
founding of EMU (namely its economic side), the 
sovereign debt crisis could become a source of 
new input legitimacy for the process of economic 
and monetary integration and the wider process 
of political integration.
In this sense, the steps that have been taken or are 
envisaged in favour of enhanced economic gover-
nance are an open-ended process, associated with 
a new equilibrium between EU institutions and 
member states. While such a response is compat-
ible with the notion of incremental changes and 
new equilibria resulting from an institutional en-
dogenous response to the financial and sovereign 
debt crises, as explained by rational choice institu-
tionalism, it is also compatible with the surge of a 
broader impetus for institutional reform nurtured 
during the crises period. In fact, while institu-
tional reforms have a built-in bias towards incre-
mental change (Salines et al., 2011) the current 
experience of having reached the limits of the in-
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stitutional framework with respect to dealing with 
the level of policy interdependence (but, as in the 
case of the previous EMS learning experience in 
turbulent periods, maintaining in place immate-
rial structures such as codes of conduct and in-
stitutional commitment) may well push for more 
complete reforms towards substantially increased 
economic and political integration. 
5. A higher degree of politicisation of EU 
constraints: domestic dimensions
The negative externalities, rooted in insufficient 
coordination of fiscal and economic policies and 
lack of domestic reforms, which led to the sov-
ereign debt crisis, are now being dealt with by 
means of adjustment programmes subject to con-
ditionality. The conditionality attached to those 
adjustment programmes reflects, on the one hand, 
supply side preoccupations, that is, the appropri-
ate and legitimate incentives to induce reforms 
that sustain EMU and member states’ access to 
financial markets. On the other hand, it depicts a 
demand aspect of the problem, as citizens increas-
ingly call for ownership of reforms that condition 
their everyday lives. The previously agreed upon 
common objectives of fiscal (SGP) and of eco-
nomic and social (Lisbon and Europe 2020 Strate-
gies) governance, which were not internalised by 
most EU countries, have, with the sovereign debt 
crisis, come to encompass increasingly salient po-
litical and distributional issues. This fact contrib-
utes to a much higher degree of politicisation of 
EU constraints.12 Such an increased politicisation 
contributes in turn to EMU’s legitimacy. It may 
well contribute to its efficiency as far as domestic 
reforms (and EMU’s sustainability) are concerned. 
The reason is that a wider and more participated 
debate within better informed (of the challenges 
in question) domestic electorates may lead to bet-
ter internalisation of nationally-compatible objec-
tives and better implementation of domestic re-
forms.
 The fact that there was neither market pressure 
(since financial markets failed to differentiate be-
tween the sustainability of public debt and exter-
nal imbalances among participants) nor binding 
and enforceable rules (Lisbon Strategy and the 
SGP), however, may have contributed to the pro-
12.  As discussed in Torres (2013), there is an optimal de-
gree of politicisation, which parallels Rogoff’s (1985) op-
timal degree of commitment as a means of dealing with 
credibility constraints. Increased politicisation may 
enhance legitimacy, since a democratic polity requires 
contestation for political leadership and over policies. 
See Follesdal and Hix (2006). 
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crastination of some of those reforms. The same is 
true for the announced (and various times voted 
in national and European elections) objectives to 
which various governments and political parties 
had subscribed and that were poorly implement-
ed. This fact contributed to a poor democratic per-
formance and to the lack of trust of citizens in na-
tional and European institutions (in this order, ac-
cording to Eurobarometer polls) and, in the most 
affected countries, in national political structures. 
The crises turned the fact more transparent that 
some domestic policies were not only inconsistent 
with the stated objectives of the respective gov-
ernments but that they were also unsustainable. 
They evidenced that that unsustainability was put-
ting at stake the very functioning of EMU as well 
as the respective welfare states and quality of life 
of current and future generations. As a result of 
the identification of those negative spillovers from 
the economic to the monetary side of the union, 
the conditionality of the adjustment programmes 
for bailed out countries has come to encompass 
(structural) reform in the economic areas.
The failure of financial markets to differentiate 
among participants in terms of the sustainability 
of public debt and external imbalances, together 
with the inexistence of an effective EU-sponsored 
mechanism of economic monitoring, attenuated 
market pressure on national governments to im-
prove fundamentals (Arghyrou and Kontonikas, 
2011: 40). One should also add that the lack of 
market pressure also relaxed the pressure for en-
acting better institutional EU governance frame-
works of economic monitoring and new coordi-
nation mechanisms, aggravating further real di-
vergence within the Eurozone.
However, since the beginning of the crises, in-
stitutional change in the EU – the completion 
of EMU (of its economic pillar) with new gover-
nance mechanisms – does play a role in shaping 
new common rules that are accepted by a major-
ity of member states and eventually by a major-
ity of the European population.13 Increasingly 
new common rules have become the continuous 
subject of multi-level political negotiation, al-
13.  Re-distributional issues further complicate the above-
referred different domestic implications of EMU gov-
ernance responses (incremental institutional changes) 
to the sovereign debt crisis, namely the Transfer-Union 
question, an issue which had been avoided in the (in-
complete) Maastricht blueprint and in the run up to 
EMU.
lowing for greater participation (a fact especially 
potentiated by the European Parliament’s role as 
co-legislator in the ordinary legislative procedure) 
of many different actors. The multi-level politi-
cal negotiation process is taking place through a 
multitude of different channels, including inter-
governmental treaties and the possibility of treaty 
changes (together with referenda and/or changes 
in national constitutions that might be necessary 
in some member states), and the ordinary legisla-
tive procedure (as in the case of most of the ‘six-
pack’ legislation).
With the prospect of a higher level of political in-
tegration for a limited number of countries within 
the Union – the Eurozone and a number of other 
EU member states, like the Euro Plus Pact and the 
TSCG in the Economic and Monetary Union –, 
questions of variable geometry or flexible integra-
tion are bound to arise, as they did in the run-up 
to EMU. In this case, the discussions about the 
type of economic union that is necessary to sus-
tain EMU, involving increased coordination and/
or centralisation of fiscal, financial and other eco-
nomic and social policies in the Eurozone tend to 
raise the political relevance (as compared to the 
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early and mid-nineties) of the EU-wide debate, 
given the felt negative effects of the lack of domes-
tic reforms cum the lack of EU policy coordina-
tion in those areas.
From a domestic perspective, the above-referred 
new EU governance mechanisms already exert an 
important influence and conditionality (through 
the availability of financial funds) on implement-
ing the reforms that for the most part had been 
adhered to by most member states’ political sys-
tems (governments, oppositions and even social 
partners) in the 1990s and gradually, under the 
Lisbon process, during the first ten years of EMU. 
What on the one hand may be branded as unduly 
(undemocratic) market and/or EU (institutions’ 
and/or partners’) imposition of reforms in some 
member states may on the other hand be taken by 
domestic polities as an opportunity to overcome 
unduly (and also undemocratic) blocking of the 
pursuit of the common good in favour of vested 
interests and/or myopic (as non-sustainable) 
short-term and/or electoral concerns.
With market pressure, the domestic political and 
policy process gains transparency.14 The vague 
references to European restrictions in national 
political debates transform into rather concrete 
constraints. Those are better understood by all 
citizens and give rise to clearer policy options, 
and the opacity of the domestic political and 
policy processes gives way to more easily discern-
able alternatives. Still, in the face of economic 
and political uncertainty and amidst the gradual 
but hesitant and/or insufficiently coordinated EU 
intergovernmental action, namely the building 
up of new mechanisms and institutions through 
multi-level political negotiation, it is difficult to 
say whether such a process in the end results in 
a national and European consensus for reform 
(both at the domestic levels and at the EU level) 
or if it leads to political and social disaggregation.
14.  Market pressure and also peer pressure rose with the 
transformation of the global financial and economic 
crisis into the sovereign debt crisis. It implies that the 
Europe 2020 Strategy (or any extensions of it for the Eu-
rozone and some other EU member states such as the 
Euro Plus Pact), although continuing under the same 
soft method of coordination, might bring about differ-
ent results. See Schmieding et al. (2011) for some pre-
liminary evidence.
European institution-building, with more efficient 
and transparent bodies and even transnational 
political parties, may be a way of reinforcing the 
democratic quality of the European integration 
process (and its reach), namely the link between 
participation and “responsible representation” 
of the voters and the guarantee that the existing 
social structures remain open and accessible to 
pressures from below. It can thus enhance both ef-
ficiency and legitimacy.
On the efficiency side, the challenges of the cre-
ation of EMU may have worked as mechanisms 
for economic stabilisation. The current challenges 
of responding to the sovereign debt crisis through 
the completion of the economic side of EMU can 
furthermore foster structural reform and long-
term development. Moreover, a multi-level politi-
cal negotiation process may render policy-making 
more efficient by allowing for a continuous con-
frontation of positions at various levels of govern-
ment, making it possible and easier to converge to 
an acceptable (for all and at the various levels of 
government) common position.
On the legitimacy side, the responses to those 
challenges, together with evolving governance in 
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the EU, imply a more clearly perceived need for 
democratic control of EU and national institu-
tions. By making it clear that national political 
systems are unable to deal with the inherent co-
ordination and reform challenges without shar-
ing sovereignty, the crises may also contribute to 
fostering the debate on the democratic quality of 
EU governance at various levels, starting at the 
national level. It follows that national parliaments, 
the European Parliament and European citizens 
in general, may all become more aware of the need 
for more democratic control. This need applies to 
new European institutions (like the different res-
cue funds and intergovernmental treaties) but also 
to the need for regaining democratic control over 
national governments and institutions (including 
supranational but also intergovernmental institu-
tions, as illustrated by the innovative process of 
economic dialogue in the case of the European 
Parliament), which have become more unaccount-
able through the process of globalization and, in 
some but not in all instances, the process of Euro-
pean integration.15 One can then say that irrespec-
tive of explicit transfers of national sovereignty to 
the Union level (at the time of which the question 
of democracy is discussed both Europe-wide and 
at the level of each member state, in some cases in 
conjunction with a referendum), EU governance 
and incremental institutional changes contribute 
to bringing in new forms of participation, through 
the interaction of different institutions and citi-
zens in a multi-level political negotiation process. 
One of those examples is member state commit-
ment to implement domestic reforms as part of a 
coordination effort. This has been done under the 
Open Method of Coordination in the Lisbon and 
Europe 2020 strategies but was extended to other 
policy areas of the national remit by the Euro Plus 
Pact and the TSCG in EMU, which comprise a 
majority of EU member states.
15.  In regard to the centralisation of monetary policy in 
the Eurozone, with the exception of Germany, there 
has been an increase of accountability or at least in 
responsiveness and in any case of transparency. The 
same is true for various policies under the ordinary 
legislative procedure.
Furthermore, access to all those new common 
mechanisms and institutions goes along with the 
(albeit at times hesitant) pursuit of institutional 
reform and of the achievement of the objectives of 
the Union as laid down in Article 3 of the Treaty 
on European Union, namely sustainable develop-
ment based on balanced economic growth and 
price stability, a competitive social market econ-
omy, aiming at full employment and social prog-
ress, and a high level of protection and improve-
ment of the quality of the environment. In that 
perspective, the frictions created by the need for 
member states to finally internalise previously (at 
the inception of EMU) accepted objectives and a 
higher degree of politicisation of EU constraints 
are an opportunity for the EU to collectively ad-
dress some of the main problems that are also un-
resolved in other parts of the world, (see Sachs’ 
diagnosis of the US, 2012).
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6. Conclusion
During EMU’s first decade, the lack of national 
reforms in some member states and the incapac-
ity of financial markets do distinguish between 
Eurozone sovereigns paved the way for increas-
ing intra-EMU macroeconomic imbalances. At 
the same time, EMU’s incompleteness meant that 
its governance institutions were unable to encom-
pass increasing policy interdependence, let alone 
capable of dealing with the 2008/09 global finan-
cial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis in 2010-12. 
In response to the first crisis, the EU moved to-
wards increased coordinated (albeit not sufficient) 
financial supervision. As a response to the second 
crisis, new mechanisms of economic governance 
and stronger fiscal and macroeconomic surveil-
lance mechanisms have been established in an in-
cremental way in an attempt to sustain EMU and, 
eventually, prepare a leap forward in terms of fis-
cal and political integration.
What presently stands most in the way of a leap 
forward to increased European political integra-
tion, at least in the Eurozone, is the question of 
potential large-scale redistribution, which ex-
plains why re-distributional issues were in the 
end avoided in the Maastricht blueprint. The re-
distribution question is however endogenous to 
the process of domestic internalisation of EMU 
objectives and to the capacity of member states to 
enact enduring political and economic reforms. 
This is because, on the one hand, for net-benefi-
ciary member states it may only be politically fea-
sible to undertake painful reforms if there is some 
more visible immediate reward and, on the other 
hand, for net-contributor member states it may 
only be acceptable if the causes of the problem are 
addressed.
The challenges posed by the European integration 
process determine a continuously evolving sys-
tem of governance in the EU because of the more 
clearly perceived need for democratic control of 
its new institutions and of the way in which poli-
cies are formulated. Furthermore, national politi-
cal systems and, consequently, intergovernmental 
cooperation typically lag behind global market 
developments. This is even more so at the time of 
crisis, which is characterised by dysfunctional in-
stitutional relations. The effectiveness of EU poli-
cies and the quality of democracy in the process 
of European integration can however be enhanced 
through the direct interaction of institutions (the 
European Parliament, national parliaments, the 
Council of the EU, the European Council, nation-
al governments, the European Commission, the 
ECB) at different levels of government and with 
civil society. The modes of governance that char-
acterise mostly the economic side of EMU (under 
construction to complete EMU) interact continu-
ously with the (normal) functioning but also with 
the developing roles of the existing supranational 
institutions. Such a multi-level process and con-
tinuous interaction allow for a better internali-
sation at the domestic level of various common 
objectives, which were accepted by all Eurozone 
member states but whose implementation tends 
to be hindered by national political systems. It 
thereby presents a solution to the problem of se-
quential decision-making stressed by Collignon 
(2010), as multi-level governance may help struc-
ture the politicisation of national debates towards 
common-interest European public goods.
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The faster implementation of the reforms, already 
agreed by the member states at the inception of 
EMU and facilitated by incremental institutional 
change, contributes to making an institutional 
leap forward to complete EMU more likely. In the 
case of the creation of a supranational institution 
with regulatory (of nationally/socially a priori 
non-salient and non-distributional) characteris-
tics such as the incomplete EMU (namely without 
a fiscal union) agreed at Maastricht, no significant 
re-distributional issues had been at stake. With 
the sovereign debt crisis, such redistribution does 
or may take place through public debt bailouts, 
debt restructuring and the sharing of fiscal re-
sponsibilities via Eurobonds, strong ECB support, 
and/or the creation of a fiscal or transfer union on 
a scale not compatible with only incremental in-
stitutional changes. That is why while the success 
of domestic reforms hinges upon institutional 
change at the European level the latter one also 
depends on (it is endogenous to) the capacity of 
member states to implement reforms and coordi-
nate policies with each other.
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1. Introduction
La difficulté des responsables politiques européens 
à s’accorder pour régler la crise de la zone euro a 
renforcé le rôle et le pouvoir de la Banque centrale 
européenne (BCE)1. Impliquée aux côtés de la 
Commission européenne et du Fonds monétaire 
international (FMI) au sein de la Troïka dans la 
définition les «memorandums of understanding» 
des pays sous assistance financière, la BCE a égale-
ment lancé des interventions dites non conven-
tionnelles en vue de venir en aide au secteur ban-
caire. La conditionnalité sociale qu’elle impose en 
contrepartie de son intervention sur les marchés 
de la dette secondaires pour les pays ayant des dif-
ficultés à se financer sur les marchés des capitaux 
n’est pas neutre politiquement et impose une re-
mise en cause profonde des frontières nationales 
des États sociaux. La contradiction entre un rôle 
politique assumé par la BCE et son refus de s’ériger 
1. Ce paper qui avait été initialement préparé pour la 
«EUDO Dissemination Conference» a fait l’objet 
d’une publication en novembre 2012 sur le site 
web de l’Observatoire social européen. Ce Paper 
reflète les opinions de l’auteur, lesquelles ne sont pas 
nécessairement celles de l’Observatoire social européen.
en sauveur de dernier ressort en finançant directe-
ment les gouvernements s’explique par les statuts 
de la BCE et son objectif principal qui consiste à 
maintenir la stabilité des prix.
La «méthode communautaire» a parfois été présen-
tée comme une pièce centrale d’un modèle euro-
péen sui generis à vocation fédérale. En revanche, 
s’inspirant de plusieurs principes du modèle ordo-
libéral allemand, le traité de Maastricht avait in-
troduit le dispositif conduisant à l’UEM, en tant 
que pilier spécifique et échappant à la méthode 
communautaire. Depuis l’application du traité de 
Lisbonne, le Conseil européen est une institution à 
part entière de l’Union. La Commission répond à 
ses demandes de durcissement du pacte de stabil-
ité et de croissance en déposant des propositions 
reposant sur la «méthode communautaire». 
Les modifications introduites dans la gouvernance 
économique mettent ainsi en évidence les failles 
d’un modèle d’Union économique et monétaire 
initialement mal conçumais dont sont renforcés 
les mauvais fondamentaux après l’adoption du 
«paquet législatif», le Six Packdans l’euro jar-
gon, sur la gouvernance économique. Suivant la 
demande de la BCE de passer de la «Fédération 
monétaire» à la «Fédération budgétaire», le Par-
lement européen a durci le bras armé du pacte de 
stabilité et de croissance ainsi que le mécanisme 
de surveillance et de sanctions pour les pays de la 
zone euro. Mais cela ne suffit pas, les propositions 
déposées le 23 novembre 2011, le Two Pack, ren-
forcent le contrôle par des instances européennes 
sur les budgets nationaux. Dans la conception al-
lemande, il s’agit de renforcer les règles et les sanc-
tions, et, pour rassurer les marchés, ces réformes 
doivent être coulées dans le marbre des traités. 
Soutenue par les Pays-Bas et la Finlande, 
l’Allemagne impose sa vision de l’Union euro-
péenne comme «Union de stabilité», basée sur 
une stricte orthodoxie monétaire et budgétaire. 
Elle pèse sur les décisions du «gouvernement 
composé» de l’Union, constitué du Conseil euro-
péen, de la Commission européenne et du Con-
seil ECOFIN/Eurogroupe tandis que la Banque 
centrale européenne se transforme en «arbitre 
de dernierressort» de cet exécutif composite. Il 
s’agit moins de renforcer l’intégration européenne 
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que de s’accorder sur l’avènement technocratique 
d’une «Union de la culpabilitéet des sanctions». 
L’approfondissement de cette Union impliquerait 
de lui ajouter une Union bancaire s’inspirant du 
modèle fédéral des États-Unis d’Amérique sur la 
base des traités existants alors que l’ampleur du 
changement mériterait une discussion plus large 
et surtout le consentement des Européens.
Les économistes dénoncent le refus de la BCE à as-
sumer pleinement son rôle de «prêteur en dernier 
ressort», un rôle traditionnellement exercé par 
les Banques centrales initialement à l’égard des 
banques privées et que la BCE devrait étendre 
au sauvetage des États, comme le font d’autres 
Banques centrales nationales. La première par-
tie de ce paper revient sur les statuts de la BCE, 
des statuts d’inspiration allemande qui ont inscrit 
le monétarisme comme principale boussole de 
la politique monétaire européenne. La seconde 
partie se penche sur le consensus européen sur la 
croissance par la compétitivité et le rôle de la BCE 
invoquant sa mission comme justification d’un 
plaidoyer rigoureux en faveur des réformes struc-
turelles. La troisième présente le rôle politique de 
plus en plus affirmé de la BCE et sa prise d’autorité 
au sein du «gouvernement composé» de l’Union 
européenne. 
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2. La BCE: un pilier spécifique
Au moment de négocier le Traité de Maastricht 
qui précise les conditions de la création de la 
monnaie unique, l’indépendance de la future 
Banque centrale européenne en gestation a été 
accordée comme la contrepartie de l’abandon du 
Deutsch Mark par Helmut Khol, chancelier alle-
mand. Organe indépendant qu’aucune révision 
des traités ultérieurs à celui de Maastricht ne vien-
dra entamer, la BCE est la quasi-copie conforme 
de la Bundesbank. Son indépendance à l’égard des 
autres institutions est présentée comme la garan-
tie d’une politique anti-inflationniste qu’aucune 
révision des traités ultérieurs à celui de Maastricht 
n’amendera. Louée par les uns, cette indépendance 
avait également été analysée pendant les années 
90 comme le symbole du «déficit démocratique» 
de la construction européenne par l’abandon de 
la politique monétaire à une structure technocra-
tique telle la BCE (2). L’économiste américain, Jo-
2.  Entre autres, A. Busch, L. Gormley et J. de Haan, «The 
democratic deficit of the European Central Bank», Euro-
pean Law Review, 1996, Vol. 21, n° 1, pp. 95-112. Philippe 
C. Schmitter «How to democratize the European Union… 
and why bother?» Lanham, MD; Oxford: Rowman & Lit-
seph Stiglitz avait mis en évidence le fait que la 
politique monétaire était «un déterminant-clé de 
la performance macro-économique de l’économie» 
et avait considéré que «[l]e fait que ce déterminant-
clé de ce qui arrive dans la société -cette action-clé 
collective- devrait être soustraite au contrôle de 
responsables démocratiquement élus devrait au 
moins poser questions» (3). D’autres avaient souli-
gné le fait qu’en l’absence de compétences au 
niveau de l’Union dans le domaine des politiques 
macro-économiques, aucune institution politique 
ne pourrait être tenue pour responsable si l’UEM 
conduisait à une propagation injuste des coûts et 
des avantages entre les régions, les États mem-
tlefield, 2000 et Paul Magnette «Democracy in the Euro-
pean Union: why and how to combine representation and 
Participation?» in Stijn Smismans (ed), Civil Society and 
Legitimate European Governance, Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar, p. 23-41, 2006.
3. «Monetary policy is a key determinant of the economy’s 
macroeconomic performance (…). That this key deter-
minant of what happens to society – this key collective 
action – should be so removed from control of the demo-
cratically elected officials should at least raise questions». 
J. Stiglitz, J. «Central Banking in a Democratic Society». 
De Economist, 146 (2), 1998 pp. 199-226.
bres ou même les différents secteurs industriels. 
Dans la conception française, un «gouvernement 
économique» devait contrebalancer le pouvoir 
de la Banque centrale européenne, seule institu-
tion supranationale/fédérale dans le dispositif de 
l’UEM (4). Selon cette vue, la dépolitisation de la 
politique monétaire devait être compensée par un 
rôle accru des chefs d’État et de gouvernement. 
L’opposition persistante entre la France et 
l’Allemagne quant au rôle de la BCE en tant que 
prêteur de dernier ressort révèle la profondeur 
de l’antagonisme initial. Ce rôle n’est simplement 
pas prévu par le traité de Maastricht (5). Jusqu’ici, 
les dirigeants allemands s’en sont toujours tenus 
à leur doctrine ordo-libérale selon laquelle l’État 
définit le cadre juridico-institutionnel permet-
4. Boyer R. et Dehove M. «Du gouvernement économique 
au gouvernement tout court», Critique internationale 
n°11, avril 2001
5. Dès 1992, parmi les nombreuses critiques adressées à 
l’indépendance de la Banque centrale, Michel Aglietta 
avait soulevé la question de prêteur en dernier ressort. 
Selon lui, «Il ne suffit pas de passer le rôle de prêteur de 
dernier ressort sous silence pour résoudre la question». 
Aglietta M. «L’indépendance des banques centrales : 
Leçons pour la banque centrale européenne» In: Revue 
d’économie financière. N°22, 1992. L’indépendance des 
Banques centrales». pp. 37-56.
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tant à l’économie de fonctionner. Cette concep-
tion repose sur l’indépendance de la Banque 
centrale, le maintien de la stabilité des prix et la 
rigueur budgétaire. Cette approche est théorisée 
dans la «Constitution économique». Selon cette 
doctrine, «toute Constitution devrait respecter les 
interdépendances entre un système de libre concur-
rence, de libertés publiques et d’État de droit – plus 
encore, elle devrait s’investir à protéger cet équilibre 
précieux contre toute «ingérence politique» (6).
La «méthode communautaire» a parfois été 
présentée comme une pièce centrale d’un modèle 
européen sui generis à vocation fédérale (7). En 
6. Joerges C. «La constitution économique européenne en 
processus et en procès», Revue internationale  de Droit 
économique, PP 245-284, 2006
7. La «méthode communautaire» s’applique dans le pro-
cessus décisionnel de l’Union européenne entre les in-
stitutions formant le «triangle institutionnel», à savoir 
la Commission européenne, le Conseil des Ministres et 
le Parlement européen. Selon cette méthode, il revient à 
la Commission européenne qui détient le monopole de 
l’initiative législative de présenter les propositions à la 
base de la future législation européenne. Adoptée par le 
Conseil et le Parlement qui sont les deux co-législateurs 
dans les cas prévus par les traités, celle-ci prend la forme 
soit d’une directive (dont le contenu doit être transpo-
sé dans les législations nationales) soit d’un règlement 
(directement applicable dans les Etats membres). La 
revanche, s’inspirant de plusieurs principes du 
modèle ordo-libéral allemand au premier rang 
desquels l’indépendance de la Banque centrale, 
le traité de Maastricht a introduit le dispositif 
conduisant à l’UEM, en tant que pilier spéci-
fique et échappant à la méthode communautaire 
(8). Si, depuis l’application du traité de Lisbonne, 
l’association du Parlement européen en tant que 
co-législateur des règles de la discipline budgétaire 
est juridiquement possible, l’euro est une monnaie 
sans État et sans souverain, gérée par une Banque 
«méthode communautaire» implique le plus souvent le 
vote à la majorité qualifiée au sein du Conseil mais dans 
les domaines les plus sensibles dont la fiscalité et plus-
ieurs aspects des rares dispositions sociales (l’essentiel 
des compétences sociales relève du niveau national), 
le Conseil statue à l’unanimité. On parle de monopole 
«quasi exclusif» du droit d’initiative de la Commission 
dans la mesure où le Conseil et le Parlement peuvent 
lui demander de déposer une proposition. Il faut égale-
ment ajouter le Conseil européen, élevé en institution de 
l’Union par le traité de Lisbonne, dont les conclusions 
sont de plus en plus explicites dans les demandes adres-
sée à la Commission.
8. Cette indépendance se justifie dans la conception 
ordolibérale par le fait que «le pouvoir politique ne 
peut être souverain en matière monétaire et demandeur 
de crédit». E. Dehay, «La justification ordolibérale de 
l’indépendance des banques centrales», Revue française 
d’économie, Volume 10, n° 1, 1995.
centrale dont l’indépendance est élevée à un statut 
quasi constitutionnel. Il en résulte que toute mod-
ification de sa conception nécessite la révision des 
traités européens et l’ensemble des ratifications 
nationales quand, par exemple, une décision du 
Congrès américain ou du Parlement allemand 
suffit (9). Cela signifie que l’indépendance de la 
BCE n’a pas d’équivalent dans le monde. 
L’appréhension de la BCE en tant qu’entité tech-
nocratique supranationale mais quasi fédérale 
par comparaison à la Banque centrale des États-
Unis d’Amérique, la Federal Reserve (FED), tient 
au fait que le Conseil des gouverneurs de la BCE, 
9. En 1957, la Bundesbank succède à la Bank deutscher 
Länder (BdL), créée en 1948 par les Alliés. Selon l’article 
12 de la Loi sur la Deutsche Bundesbank, l’institut 
d’émission allemand n’a pas d’instruction à recevoir du 
gouvernement fédéral. Cette indépendance inscrite dans 
la loi a doté la Bundesbank de l’autonomie nécessaire 
pour assumer sa tâche d’assurer la sauvegarde de la 
monnaie. Elle aussi inscrite à l’article 3 du Bundesbank 
Act de 1957. En 1992, l’article 88 de la Loi fondamentale 
a été modifié de manière à permettre le transfert des 
compétences de la Bundesbank à la BCE, indépendante 
et dont l’objectif principal est d’assurer la stabilité des 
prix. Cela signifie qu’en Allemagne, la stabilité des prix 
et l’indépendance de la Banque centrale n’ont acquis 
une valeur constitutionnelle que le jour de l’entrée en 
vigueur du traité de Maastricht.
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son principal organe, prend ses décisions moné-
taires à la majorité. Cependant, les Banques cen-
trales nationales dans l’UEM disposent de plus de 
pouvoirs que les banques des entités fédérées aux 
États-Unis. Dans l’UEM, celles-ci assurent avec la 
BCE le fonctionnement du système des paiements. 
Mais surtout, dans plusieurs États membres, les 
banques centrales nationales sont responsables de 
la supervision bancaire et du contrôle prudentiel. 
Tel est l’enjeu de la future Union bancaire, une 
étape que les institutions européennes proposent 
de franchir sur la base du renforcement des com-
pétences de la BCE à partir de l’article 127 § 6 du 
traité alors que les changements concernés qui 
proposent de rapprocher le fonctionnement de la 
BCE de celui de la FED comportent une mutation 
institutionnelle non négligeable qui nécessiterait 
à tout le moins d’être présentée pour ce qu’elle est 
(10).
10. «Comme aux États-Unis, la fédéralisation de la 
résolution des défaillances bancaires doit comporter 
tous les instruments nécessaires: une harmonisation 
intégrale des règles, évidemment, mais également 
un ensemble d’outils opérationnels tels que la 
recapitalisation, la restructuration, le démantèlement, le 
transfert des actifs et passifs vers des institutions solides 
et la capacité d’intervenir pour gérer les banques en 
difficulté». Christian Noyer, Gouverneur de la Banque 
de France, «La prochaine étape pour la zone euro est 
l’Union financière», Wall Street Journal, 12 juin 2012.
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2.1 Quelle responsabilité 
démocratique pour la BCE?
Le dispositif institutionnel initial de l’UEM con-
stitue un pilier singulier dans les traités europée-
ns. Dans cette confi guration, aucun rôle signifi -
catif n’était initialement prévu pour le Parlement 
européen en dehors d’une consultation, non obli-
gatoire, notamment en vue de la nomination du 
président de la BCE et des membres du Directoire. 
Dans la pratique, le Parlement européen n’aura 
d’autre solution pour tenter de s’inscrire en tant 
qu’acteur politique de l’Union économique et mo-
nétaire que de greffer certaines des pratiques pré-
valant entre le Congrès nord-américain et la Fed 
pour «demander à la BCEde rendre des comptes». 
Pour justifier cette innovation, le Parlement mobi-
lise alors l’argument qu’il est «la seule institution 
dépositaire d’une légitimité démocratique» au 
niveau de l’UE. Surtout, il s’agissait pour les dépu-
tés de se démarquer du modèle allemand d’une 
banque centrale indépendante responsable devant 
le «public» qui n’est pas envisageableen l’absence 
d’une véritable opinion publique européenne (11). 
11. Jabko N. « Expertise et politique à l’âge de l’euro : 
la Banque centrale européenne sur le terrain de la 
Dans la conception ordo-libérale allemande, la 
gestion de la monnaie relève d’un «principe civ-
ique» et l’indépendance de la Banque centrale 
se justifie par rapport à ce principe difficilement 
transposable au niveau de la zone euro (12). Si la 
FED est statutairement indépendante, le président 
de la Réserve fédérale est «responsable» devant 
le Congrès (accountability) qui peut modifier les 
responsabilités de la FED par la loi. Ainsi, l’in-
dépendance de la FED peut mieux être décrite 
comme une «indépendance à l’intérieur du gou-
vernement» plutôt qu’une «indépendance du 
gouvernement». Concrètement, le président de la 
BCE se présente quatre fois par an devant la Com-
mission économique et monétaire du Parlement 
européen et présente à la plénière son rapport 
annuel. La BCE publie également depuis janvier 
1999 un rapport mensuel, principal élément de 
communication de la politique monétaire de la 
BCE. Si la BCE a accédé à certaines demandes du 
PE, un point important de l’analogie avec la FED 
n’a pu être acquis, à savoir la publication des pro-
cès-verbaux des réunions du Conseil des gouver-
démocratie », Revue française de science politique, 
Année 2001, vol.51, n° 6,  p 914.
12. Cf. Note 7, Ibidem, p. 44.
neurs, un sujet jugé politiquement sensible étant 
donné le caractère multinational de la BCE (13). 
Plus encore, la BCE s’est montrée inflexible dans 
la défense de son mandat principal, la lutte contre 
l’inflation, et a repoussé les tentatives d’intégrer 
les missions dites «secondaires», à savoir la crois-
sance et l’emploi. 
2.2 La transformation de la 
BCE en une institution de 
l’Union
À la suite de l’entrée en vigueur du traité de Lis-
bonne, la BCE est transformée en une institution 
de l’Union mais ses missions ainsi que son statut 
ne figurent pas dans le cadre institutionnel, le trai-
té sur l’union européenne (TUE), mais bien dans 
le traité sur le fonctionnement de l’Union (TFUE). 
Il s’agit d’un élément fondamental que n’avait pas 
modifié le traité constitutionnel ni son avatar, le 
traité de Lisbonne (14). L’article 127 du TFUE con-
13. Cf. Note 10, Ibidem, p. 923.
14. Selon Elmar Brok, ancien président du groupe PPE 
et représentant de ce groupe durant les travaux de la 
Convention européenne, l’enceinte qui avait préparé en 
2002-2003 le traité  constitutionnel, «L’indépendance de 
la Banque centrale européenne est expressément garantie 
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sacre son objectif prioritaire : le maintien de la 
stabilité des prix. La BCE conserve ses spécificités 
initiales au premier rang desquelles figure son in-
dépendance. 
La BCE continue de se distinguer de la plupart des 
grandes banques centrales et principalement la 
FED, à plusieurs niveaux. Si le mandat de la FED 
met sur un même plan «le plein emploi, la stabil-
ité des prix et la modération des taux d’intérêt à 
long terme», l’objectif principal de la BCE est la 
stabilité des prix, un objectif qui figure également 
par le troisième paragraphe de l’article 29, que ce soit 
dans l’exercice de ses pouvoirs (par exemple le pouvoir 
de décision en matière de politique financière) ou en 
ce qui concerne ses finances (par exemple l’utilisation 
des réserves de devises). En outre, la Constitution 
européenne reprend expressément la priorité de la 
stabilité des prix définie dans le Traité de Maastricht 
comme objectif de la politique monétaire et de changes 
(article 29 paragraphe 2, 2ème phrase). En revanche, 
des objectifs de politique sociale ou de politique de 
l’emploi ne sont pas prévu dans ce domaine; la politique 
monétaire demeure avant tout subordonnée à la priorité 
de la stabilité des prix (article III-69, paragraphe 2)». 
«La Constitution européenne et le cadre de la politique 
économique, monétaire et financière», Elmar BROK - 
Martin SELMAYR, article publié en 2004 sur le site web 
du Forum franco-allemand, http://www.leforum.de/
artman/publish/article_179.shtml
parmi les objectifs de l’Union européenne dans 
son ensemble. Selon le critère établi en 2003, il 
s’agit de maintenir le taux d’inflation«inférieur à 
mais proche de 2%» à moyen terme. La BCE se 
distingue de la plupart des grandes banques cen-
trales qui ont entre 1 et 3 % pour cible d’inflation 
(Canada, Australie, Nouvelle Zélande) tandis que 
la FED ne s’est jamais fixée un tel objectif (15).
L’article 127 s’inspire des statuts de la Bundesbank 
de 1957 mais avec une nuance. Là où le statut de 
la Bundesbank prévoit «la sauvegarde de la mon-
naie» et le «soutien au gouvernement fédéral», 
l’objectif assigné à la BCE est «la stabilité des prix» 
et un «soutien aux politiques économiques gé-
nérales de l’Union». 
Selon l’article 127 du traité sur le fonctionnement 
de l’Union, «L’objectif principal du Système eu-
ropéen de banques centrales, ci-après dénommé 
“SEBC”, est de maintenir la stabilité des prix. Sans 
préjudice de l’objectif de stabilité des prix, le SEBC 
15. Au Canada, la Banque centrale et le gouvernement 
fixent ensemble une fourchette d’inflation tandis 
qu’aux Etats-Unis, la FED développe une «politique 
de communication». Ainsi, le 12 janvier 2012, elle a 
annoncé une cible d’inflation de 2 %.
apporte son soutien aux politiques économiques 
générales dans l’Union, en vue de contribuer à la 
réalisation des objectifs de l’Union, tels que définis 
à l’article 3 du traité sur l’Union européenne....». 
L’article 3 du TUE définit ce que l’on peut consi-
dérer comme «les politiques générales». Selon 
cet article, l’Union «œuvre pour le développe-
ment durable de l’Europe fondé sur une croissance 
économique équilibrée et sur la stabilité des prix, 
une économie sociale de marché hautement compé-
titive, qui tend au plein emploi et au progrès social, 
et un niveau élevé de protection et d’amélioration de 
la qualité de l’environnement...». 
La transformation de la BCE en une institution 
de l’Union ne sera pas sans conséquences sur la 
définition tant des réponses en matière de gou-
vernance qu’en matière d’approfondissement de 
l’Union, limité à la finalisation de l’UEM par une 
plus grande fédéralisation consistant à lui greffer 
une Union budgétaire et une Union bancaire. 
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2.3 Le passage de la fédération 
monétaire à la fédération 
budgétaire
L’Union économique et monétaire est un projet 
élitiste «top-down», conçu à la base par des ban-
quiers centraux réunis au sein du comité Delors 
(1989). Après l’entrée en vigueur du traité de Lis-
bonne, le président du Conseil européen, Herman 
Van Rompuy, nouvelle figure institutionnelle, 
avait identifié l’économie comme thème princi-
pal de son mandat. Il avait également innové en 
proposant des réunions thématiques du Conseil 
européen mais surtout c’est au niveau des chefs 
d’État et de gouvernement de la zone euro que s’est 
produite une grande créativité institutionnelle 
avec l’adoption d’une déclaration des Chefs d’État 
et de gouvernement de la zone euro en marge du 
Conseil européen des 25 et 26 mars 2010 (16). Sur 
cette base, la mise en place d’un «groupe de tra-
vail sur la gouvernance économique», ci-après le 
Groupe Van Rompuy, est décidée. Outre les Min-
istres des affaires économiques et financières des 
27, le groupe comprend également le président de 
16. Déclaration des Chefs d’État et de gouvernement de la 
zone euro, 25 mars 2010.
l’Eurogroupe, le Commissaire en charge des af-
faires économiques et financières et le président 
de la Banque centrale européenne. 
L’objectif de ce groupe n’était pas d’évaluer le fonc-
tionnement de l’UEM près de 20 ans après sa créa-
tion ni d’en apprécier la pertinence au XXIème siè-
cle. Il faut rappeler qu’en 2009, les institutions eu-
ropéennes avaient été frappées d’amnésie et, plutôt 
qu’au sauvetage des banques et aux mesures prises 
pour soutenir l’économie en période de crise, elles 
avaient attribué l’accroissement de l’endettement 
des États à la violation des règles du Pacte de sta-
bilité (et de croissance). Or, l’accroissement de 
l’endettement de deux pays respectant la stricte 
discipline budgétaire avant l’éclatement de la crise 
bancaire (Espagne et Portugal) était dû aux dé-
faillances des systèmes de surveillance des dettes 
privées et à l’apparition de bulles immobilières. 
Sur la base de ce diagnostic erroné, qui n’était val-
able que dans le cas grec, il s’est rapidement con-
firmé au sein du groupe Van Rompuy qu’il n’était 
pas question de toucher au logiciel de l’UEM. 
Malgré ses imperfections, il s’agissait au contraire 
d’en confirmer les principes et d’en accroître la dis-
cipline en l’étendant au domaine budgétaire et aux 
politiques macro-économiques. 
Pour le président de la BCE, la nouvelle gouver-
nance est nécessaire car «Nous sommes une fé-
dération monétaire. Nous avons maintenant besoin 
d’avoir l’équivalent d’une fédération budgétaire en 
termes de contrôle et de surveillance de l’application 
des politiques en matière de finance publique» (17). 
En juin 2010, le président de la Commission eu-
ropéenne évoquait à propos de la gouvernance 
économique une véritable «révolution silen-
cieuse» (18). En septembre 2010, le communiqué 
17. Trichet au “Monde” : “Nous avons besoin d’une fédéra-
tion budgétaire”. Le Monde, 31 mai 2010, http://www.
lemonde.fr/economie/article/2010/05/31/trichet-au-
monde-nous-avons-besoin-d-une-federation-budge-
taire_1365339_3234.html
18. Jose Manuel Barroso, président de la Commission eu-
ropéenne : «La conclusione del Consiglio europeo - ha 
concluso - contiene passi piccoli, ma che a volte sono i 
piu’ importanti. E’ una rivoluzione silenziosa, una gov-
ernance economica piu’ forte fatta a piccoli passi’». Una 
governance accettata «in linea di principio » dagli Stati 
membri e che «ora va attuata», 18 juin 2010, http://www.
asca.it/newsUE__BARROSO__POTERE_SORVEGLI-
ANZA_SU_CONTI_PIU__RIGIDO__ORA_ATTU-
ARLO-924834-ORA-.html 
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de la Commission européenne définissait le pa-
quet des six textes législatifs, le Six Pack, comme 
«le plus important renforcement de la gouvernance 
économique de l’UE et de la zone euro depuis le 
lancement de l’union économique et monétaire» 
(19).
Gouvernance économique : quelques 
innovations
Les propositions du Six Pack prennent la forme 
de cinq règlements et d’une directive. Elles ren-
forcent les mécanismes de surveillance budgétaire 
et de sanction en y intégrant l’évolution de la dette 
en plus de l’évolution du déficit. Il s’agit d’une pre-
mière innovation. Le durcissement du Pacte est 
complété d’une procédure permettant l’adoption 
de sanctions spécifiques pour les États membres 
de la zone euro. Deuxièmement, la Commission 
propose d’instaurer un système de surveillance 
des politiques macroéconomiques en ajoutant un 
nouveau volet au Pacte de stabilité et de croissance 
comportant la mise en place d’une procédure pour 
19. «Gouvernance économique de l’UE: la Commission 
présente un ensemble complet de propositions législa-
tives»,  IP/10/1199, 29 septembre 2010.
déséquilibre macro-économique excessif pouvant, 
elle aussi, conduire à l’adoption de sanctions fi-
nancières pour les pays de la zone euro. Sur le plan 
institutionnel, elle innove en proposant un vote à 
la «majorité inversée» pour l’imposition des sanc-
tions. En clair, une sanction sera considérée com-
me adoptée à moins que le Conseil ne la rejette à la 
majorité qualifiée. Il s’agit en fait de l’introduction 
d’une «majorité qualifiée de blocage» en ce que si 
les États membres ne s’opposent pas à la proposi-
tion de la Commission en statuant à la majorité 
qualifiée, celle-ci est réputée adoptée. Cette procé-
dure revient à rendre les sanctions quasi automa-
tiques. Enfin, une directive sur les exigences ap-
plicables aux cadres budgétaires nationaux est 
également proposée afin de compléter la réforme 
du pacte.
Avis de la BCE : un degré 
d’automatisation des sanctions jugé 
insuffisant
Dans son avis sur la gouvernance économique, 
la BCE, qui n’exclut pas une révision ultérieure 
des traités, se disait préoccupée par le fait que les 
propositions de la Commission n’assuraient pas 
un degré d’automaticité suffisant (20). Mais par 
rapport à la situation actuelle, elle appréciait que 
la Commission présente au Conseil des propo-
sitions et non des recommandations mais aussi 
l’introduction du «vote à la majorité inversée». 
Outre la difficulté que comporte l’introduction 
du vote à la majorité inversée (21), l’on pouvait se 
demander si la nouvelle gouvernance était com-
patible, par exemple, avec l’article 126 du TFUE 
définissant la procédure concernant les déficits 
excessifs et les décisions de la CIG-2003-2004 que 
n’avait pas remis en cause le traité de Lisbonne. 
20. Avis de la Banque centrale du 16 février 2011 sur la ré-
forme de la gouvernance économique dans l’Union eu-
ropéenne, OJ C 150 du 20 mai 2011. pt. 7, http://eur-lex.
europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2011:1
50:0001:0041:FR:PDF
21. Le président du Conseil européen, Herman Van Rom-
puy, a reconnu que la majorité inversée ne pouvait 
s’appliquer en début de procédure car cela nécessiterait 
une révision des traités au travers de la convocation 
d’une convention européenne. Cf. « European economic 
governance and the new institutional balance » - Speech 
by President Herman VAN ROMPUY at the 10th an-
niversary of the Association of Former Members of the 
European Parliament, 04 mai 2011, page 4, http://www.
consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/
en/ec/121869.pdf 
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L’article 121 du TFUE portant sur les grandes 
orientations de politiques économiques et la sur-
veillance multilatérale peut être soumis au même 
questionnement, le TFUE ne reconnaissant à la 
Commission européenne qu’un droit de recom-
mandation et non pas un droit de proposition. 
2.4 La conclusion d’«accords 
rapides»: risque 
d’accroissement du déficit 
de légitimité de l’Union
La BCE avait été suivie par le Parlement européen 
dans le durcissement devant conduire à une plus 
grande automaticité des sanctions financières en 
cas de non-respect de la discipline budgétaire. Au 
Parlement européen, les six rapporteurs avaient 
remis leur rapport en janvier 2011. Ceux-ci avaient 
été adoptés par la Commission des affaires écono-
miques et monétaires le 19 avril suivant. Pour les 
propositions relevant de la procédure législative 
ordinaire (ancienne codécision), cela impliquait 
la recherche d’un accord à un «stade précoce» 
du processus législatif et une seule lecture parle-
mentaire. Le 20 avril 2011, les députés de la com-
mission des affaires économiques et monétaires 
avaient décidé d’entamer les négociations sur la 
base de ces rapports et de débuter le jour même 
un premier trilogue. Cette décision a été adoptée 
par 26 voix contre 14, reflétant les tensions appa-
rues au moment de l’approbation des six rapports 
parlementaires. Malgré l’ampleur des enjeux, ces 
négociations n’auront aucune visibilité. Le Parle-
ment européen avait pourtant déjà reconnu «l’ab-
sence potentielle de transparence et de légitimité 
démocratique» dans les «accords rapides» (22). 
Le texte relatif aux modalités de l’application de 
la procédure législative ordinaire n’envisage le re-
cours à ce procédé que pour des textes techniques. 
La réforme du Pacte de stabilité est pourtant un 
dossier politique par excellence en ce qu’elle porte 
sur le pacte quasi constitutionnel de la gouver-
nance économique. Face au consensus des Chefs 
d’État ou de gouvernement au sein du Conseil eu-
ropéen, le processus d’adoption du Six Pack com-
porte le risque d’être interprété comme la tyran-
nie d’une majorité disparate au sein du Parlement 
22. “La construction d’un parlement: 50 ans d’histoire du 
Parlement européen. 1958-2008. Office des publications 
officielles des Communautés européennes”, Collection 
«50ème anniversaire du Parlement européen», 2009. Cf. 
p. 184 sur les «accords rapides».
européen, loin de refléter un choix mûrement ré-
fléchi, assumé et compatible avec le kaléidoscope 
des réalités et identités politiques nationales. Les 
tendances les plus fédéralistes au sein du Par-
lement européen avaient suivi les demandes de la 
BCE malgré les résistances de certains des Minis-
tres des finances au sein du Conseil des Affaires 
économiques et financières (Ecofin) (23). 
Il reste que le Six Pack est adopté en deux votes 
mais dans le cadre d’une lecture unique (première 
lecture), les négociations en trilogue étant organ-
isées entre ces deux votes. La même méthode est 
en cours d’application pour l’adoption des deux 
propositions de la Commission, présentées en 
novembre 2011, le Two Pack. Ces propositions 
répondent, elles aussi, aux demandes du Conseil 
23. En novembre 2011, les 5 règlements du Six Pack sont ce-
pendant adoptés à l’unanimié des membres du Conseil 
Ecofin. Dans une déclaration, l’Autriche considère que 
la codification du Semestre européen et que le règlement 
sur la prévention des déséquilibres macroéconomiques 
n’entraîne pas de nouvelles obligations légales. Elle pré-
cise que «les articles proposés  ne prévoient notamment 
pas la possibilité de sanctions en cas de non réalisation 
des objectifs et mesures arrêtés au titre de la stratégie Eu-
rope 2020 dans les programmes nationaux de réforme». 
DOC 16001/11 ADD 1 REV 2 http://register.consilium.
europa.eu/pdf/fr/11/st16/st16001-ad01re02.fr11.pdf
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européen mais en coulant ces propositions dans 
deux propositions de règlements, la Commission 
recourt à nouveau de manière radicale à la «mé-
thode communautaire» afin d’accroître ses pré-
rogatives dans le contrôle des budgets nationaux. 
Enfin, les propos tenus sur le Six Pack par le pré-
sident de la Commission européenne en février 
2012 lors d’un séminaire organisé sur la méthode 
communautaire sont éloquents «À ma connais-
sance, le transfert de compétences et de pouvoirs du 
niveau national vers le niveau supranational prévu 
sur les plans économique et financier par ce train de 
mesures dit «Six Pack», est unique au monde. Ce 
sont les faits. Je tiens à le souligner car s’il y a résis-
tance, c’est précisément parce qu’il y a mouvement. 
C’est parce que l’intégration progresse qu’on entend 
beaucoup parler de résistance» (24).
24. Séminaire sur la méthode communautaire, organisé 
par Notre Europe et le Bureau des conseillers de 
politique européenne (BEPA), 28 février 2012, Speech 
présidentprésident Barroso, p. 42, http://www.notre-
europe.eu/media/SyntheseMethodeCommunautaire_
Mai2012.pdf
3. Le consensus européen sur la croissance 
et la compétitivité par les réformes 
structurelles 
Le rapportDelors sur l’Union économique et 
monétaire fut présenté en avril 1989. La monnaie 
unique y est présentée comme le prolongement du 
marché intérieur mais aussi comme un instrument 
devant permettre à l’Union européenne d’être un 
acteur de la mondialisation en ce que, selon les 
termes du moment, la mise en place de l’UEM 
«donnerait à la Communauté plus de poids dans les 
négociations internationales et renforcerait son ap-
titude à influencer les relations économiques entre 
les pays industrialisés et les pays en développement» 
(25). En décembre 1993, soit quelques jours après 
l’entrée en vigueur du traité de Maastricht, la Com-
mission publie son rapport «Croissance, compé-
titivité emploi». La compétitivité fait l’objet d’une 
25. Comité pour l’Etude de l’Union économique et 
monétaire, «Rapport sur l’union économique et 
monétaire dans la Communauté européenne», 
avril 1989, point 35, http://www.cvce.eu/content/
publication/2001/11/22/725f74f b-841b-4452-a428-
39e7a703f35f/publishable_fr.pdf
lourde charge par l’économiste Paul Krugman. 
Qualifiant la compétitivité de dangereuse obses-
sion, Krugman réfutait la comparaison d’un État 
à une entreprise et la mesure de la compétitivité 
d’une nation à l’aune de sa balance commerciale et 
donc de ses performances à l’exportation (26). Près 
de 20 ans plus tard, c’est la notion de compétitivité 
étendue à toute l’Union européenne, appréhendée 
de manière fictive comme un tout économique, 
qui est plus que jamais une dangereuse obsession. 
Le consensus européen sur le fait de créer de la 
croissance par la compétitivité avait été réaffirmé 
en 2000 par le Conseil européen de Lisbonne. Le 
consensus européen prévalent alors consiste à 
transformer l’Union européenne en l’économie «la 
plus compétitive du monde». 
26. P. Krugman, «Competitiveness: a dangerous 
obsession», Foreign Affairs, March/April 1994 
(volume 73, number 2).
224The Euro Crisis & the State of European DemocracySection I
Fondé sur la modernisation de l’économie euro-
péenne par les «réformes structurelles», ce con-
sensus est alors suffisamment large entre les États 
membres de l’UE pour laisser l’illusion de la coex-
istence de modèles économiques et sociaux hété-
rogènes mais appelés à davantage de convergence 
dans le cadre du «modèle social européen», tel 
qu’identifié par le Conseil européen de mars 2002. 
Cela impliquera sur le plan institutionnel la mise 
en place du Conseil compétitivité en 2002. Issu 
de la de la fusion des anciens Conseils Marché in-
térieur, Industrie et Recherche, selon le site web, 
le Conseil compétitivité «joue un rôle horizontal 
et veille à ce qu’une approche intégrée soit mise en 
œuvre pour renforcer la compétitivité et la crois-
sance en Europe». Ce Conseil est à l’origine du 
«mieux légiférer» et de la tendance au retrait des 
textes législatifs y compris dans le domaine social.
3.1 La vision de la 
compétitivité de la BCE
S’agissant de la croissance, la conception de la 
BCE s’appuie sur des politiques dites de l’offre, à 
savoir basées sur les «réformes structurelles» (sup-
pression des rigidités du marché de l’emploi, etc.) 
permettant d’augmenter la compétitivité. Otmar 
Issing, ancien membre de la Bundesbank et alors 
membre du directoire de la BCE («économiste 
en chef» jusqu’au 31 mai 2006) en avait fait la 
démonstration en juin 2001 dans un article pub-
lié en réponse aux pressions exercées sur la BCE 
pour qu’elle assouplisse sa politique monétaire 
: «Il est donc important de s’entendre clairement 
sur ce que la politique monétaire peut et ne peut 
pas apporter à la croissance européenne, afin que 
d’autres réformes, indispensables, ne soient pas né-
gligées, même si elles sont malaisées, politiquement 
(…). Les sévères entraves structurelles des marchés 
du travail nationaux de la zone euro conduisent 
à des taux de chômage élevés et intolérables dans 
de nombreux pays. La législation réglementant les 
salaires minimaux et la protection de l’emploi ont 
de puissants effets négatifs» (27). Selon les mêmes 
principes, il se prononcera quelques années plus 
tard contre les euro-obligations au motif qu’une 
obligation commune «serait le premier pas sur la-
27. Issing O. «Politique monétaire et croissance européenne», 
Project Syndicate, 18 juin 2001. Article disponible à 
l’adresse suivante: http://www.project-syndicate.org/
commentary/monetary-policy-and-european-growth/
french 
pente glissante des sauvetages financiers, donc vers 
la fin de la zone euro comme zone de stabilité» (28).
En 2003, l’arrivée de Jean-Claude Trichet, un 
français à la tête de la Banque centrale europée-
nne n’avait pas provoqué le changement craint par 
les Allemands (29). Dans la pratique, Jean-Claude 
Trichet a prolongé le soutien de la BCE au con-
trôle des politiques de réformes structurelles. Pour 
le président de la BCE, «La politique monétaire de 
la BCE a également son rôle à jouer en soutenant 
la mise en œuvre des réformes structurelles. Une 
politique monétaire crédible axée sur le maintien 
28. Issing O. « Contre les obligations européennes 
communes », Project Syndicate, 9 juillet 2009. Article 
disponible à l’adresse suivante: http://www.project-
syndicate.org/commentary/ban-the-common-bond/
french 
29. «Un Allemand à la BCE», Paul Fabra, Les Échos des 19 
et 20 septembre 2003. Jean-Claude Trichet est qualifié 
« allemand », car bien qu’énarque et français,  il est 
proche dans sa pratique sinon de l’ordo-libéralisme du 
moins de la doctrine allemande de la Bundesbank qui 
en découle largement. Paul Fabra rappelle que dans les 
années 1990, certains allemands craignaient de voir 
l’institution européenne tomber dans les mains d’un 
énarque français. En effet, la pratique économique 
d’énarques en particulier et de la France en général, 
était perçue comme étant aux antipodes de l’ordo-
libéralisme.
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de la stabilité des prix à moyen terme contribue 
à la stabilité de l’environnement économique. Un 
environnement macroéconomique stable permet 
de mieux discerner les domaines où les réformes 
sont nécessaires et rend plus perceptibles les avan-
tages qui en découlent, contribuant ainsi à leur ac-
ceptation» (30). De plus en plus, le discours de la 
BCE porte sur les salaires et la remise en cause de 
l’indexation des salaires. Ainsi, le 10 janvier 2008, 
Jean-Claude Trichet avait critiqué l’indexation des 
salaires, responsable d’une spirale inflationniste. 
Début février 2011, le «couple» franco-allemand 
avait mis sur la table un «pacte pour la compétitiv-
ité» demandant notamment, outre l’inscription 
d’une règle d’or budgétaire dans les Constitutions 
nationales, la suppression de l’indexation automa-
tique des salaires. Cette proposition n’apparaît 
plus en tant que telle dans le texte qui sera adopté 
en mars 2011 sous le nom de «Pacte pour l’euro 
plus», un pacte destiné à doper la compétitivité 
européenne et lui permettre de renouer avec la 
croissance. En matière de compétitivité, le pacte 
stipule notamment que les pays «adopteront, 
30. «Structural reforms in Europe», Jean-Claude Trichet, 
Speech by Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the ECB 
OECD Forum, Paris, 22 May 2006.
dans le respect des traditions de dialogue social, 
des mesures destinées à assurer que l’évolution des 
coûts salariaux reste en ligne avec la productivité». 
À cette fin, les gouvernements «passeront en revue 
la fixation des salaires et, si nécessaire, le degré de 
centralisation du processus de négociation collective 
et les mécanismes d’indexation». Dans le cadre du 
Semestre européen, la Commission européenne 
évalue les engagements avancés par tous les États 
participants et formule des recommandations à 
chaque pays, avalisées par le Conseil européen et 
formellement adoptées par le Conseil Ecofin. 
Les différentes formations du Conseil ont procé-
dé à l’évaluation de la mise en œuvre du second 
Semestre européen et l’impact des recommanda-
tions spécifiques formulées aux États membres 
sur la base de l’examen annuel de la croissance, 
le rapport élaboré par la Commission europée-
nne et inaugurant chaque Semestre européen. 
Les divergences portent non pas sur l’objectif, la 
croissance par la compétitivité sur lequel le con-
sensus européen demeure intact malgré la crise 
et les changements politiques nationaux, mais 
bien sur la répartition des tâches entre le Conseil 
de l’emploi et des affaires sociales (EPSCO) et le 
Conseil des affaires économiques et financières 
(ECOFIN). Le débat est quelque peu surréali-
ste car pour les États qui ne sont pas sous «assis-
tance financière», la question porte sur le principe 
de «se conformer ou expliquer» introduit par le 
Six Pack dans le cadre du mal nommé «Dialogue 
macroéconomique» (31). Selon ce principe, issu 
de la gouvernance des entreprises, «le Conseil est 
censé, en principe, suivre les recommandations et 
propositions de la Commission ou expliquer pub-
liquement sa position». Selon les rapports des dif-
férents comités du Conseil Emploi et affaires soci-
ales (Comité de la Protection sociale et Comité de 
l’emploi), cette pratique a considérablement ren-
forcé le rôle de la Commission. Des zones d’ombre 
demeurent quant à la rédaction des recommanda-
tions spécifiques par pays. Mais sur le plan de la 
gouvernance, la note de la présidence chypriote 
(32) met bien en évidence la suprématie des procé-
31. Article 2 bis ter 2), Règlement (UE) n° 1175/2011 du 
Parlement européen et du Conseil du 16 novembre 
2011 modifiant le règlement (CE) n° 1466/97 du 
Conseil relatif au renforcement de la surveillance des 
positions budgétaires ainsi que de la surveillance et 
de la coordination des politiques économiques Journal 
officiel L 306 du 23 novembre 2011 p. 0012 – 0024. 
32. European Semester 2012 - Lessons learned, Note 
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dures du Pacte de stabilité et de croissance sur celle 
de la stratégie économique de l’UE (Europe 2020) 
et souligne l’importance de la procédure pour dé-
séquilibres macro-économiques (PDM) qui n’est 
pas encore effective. Rappelons que cette procé-
dure peut également conduire à l’imposition de 
sanctions quasi automatiques. Basé sur un tableau 
de bord composé de dix indicateurs économiques, 
financiers et structurels forgés pour la détection 
précoce de déséquilibres macro-économiques ap-
paraissant dans les États membres, un premier 
rapport sur le Mécanisme d’alerte européen a pla-
cé en février 2012 douze États sous surveillance 
(France, Royaume-Uni, Italie, Espagne, Belgique, 
Finlande, Slovénie, Chypre, Bulgarie, Danemark, 
Hongrie et Suède). Cette procédure modifie con-
sidérablement la répartition des compétences en-
tre l’Union et les États membres dans la mesure où 
elle porte sur l’évaluation de la concrétisation des 
engagements des États membres dans le cadre du 
Pacte pour l’euro plus qui portent sur les compé-
tences sociales nationales. Cette évaluation peut 
aboutir au déclenchement d’une PDM et donc 
conduire in fine à l’imposition de sanctions aux-
from the presidency, 1st October 2012, http://register.
consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/12/st14/st14210.en12.pdf
quelles un État ne pourrait s’opposer, le cas éché-
ant, qu’en réunissant en sa faveur une «majorité 
de blocage», l’État concerné par la procédure ne 
prenant pas part à ce vote.
3.2 La BCE opte de manière 
résolue pour le modèle 
allemand à la Hartz
Le président de la Banque centrale européenne, 
Mario Draghi, avait également remis la question 
des réformes structurelles à l’ordre du jour en pré-
cisant le 25 avril 2012 devant la Commission des 
affaires économiques et financières du Parlement 
européen qu’il s’agit des réformes qui «heurtent de 
larges intérêts et quifont mal», mais qui «facilitent 
l’entrepreneuriat, l’établissement de nouvelles entre-
prises et la création d’emplois». 
Le Bulletin mensuel de la BCE du mois d’août 
2012 ne laisse pas l’ombre d’un doute sur le main-
tien du cap initial, à savoir le renforcement de la 
compétitivité qui conduira à la croissance mais au 
préalable des «réformes structurelles» sont néces-
saires. Selon ce Bulletin, «des réformes des marchés 
des produits en vue de renforcer la compétitivité 
et la création de marchés du travail efﬁcaces et 
ﬂexibles constituent des conditions préalables à la 
correction des déséquilibres existants et à la réalisa-
tion d’une croissance robuste et durable» (33). En-
fin et malgré l’absence de compétences de l’Union 
dans les politique salariales, le rapport 2012 de la 
BCE sur les politiques structurelles, publié le 9 oc-
tobre 2012, est consacré aux «marchés du travail 
dans la zone euro face à la crise» (34). Sans surprise, 
les réformes souhaitées sont celles introduites par 
les lois Hartz en Allemagne, citées à deux reprises 
dans le rapport, et celles portant sur la flexibilité 
dans les négociations salariales et réduisant les 
protections «excessives» de l’emploi, introduites 
en Grèce, au Portugal et Irlande ou en Espagne et 
en Italie. Il s’agit, pour les trois premiers, de pays 
de la zone euro sous assistance financière et placés 
sous le contrôle de la Troïka, et pour les deux der-
niers, de ceux pour lesquels la BCE est intervenue 
sur les marchés secondaires au cours de l’été 2011, 
deux précisions que ne mentionne pas le rapport. 
Les réformes souhaitées par la BCE sont explic-
33. Bulletin mensuel de la BCE du mois d’août 2012. Edito-
rial, page 7.
34. «Euro area labour markets and the crisis», ECB, 9 Oc-
tober 2012, p.10, http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/
other/euroarealabourmarketsandthecrisis201210en.pdf
?6404370b82a1b6c9b18397323311253f
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tées dans ses «principales conclusions de poli-
tique» («Main policy conclusions») dont la teneur 
évoque des recommandations de nature politique 
(Cf. Encadré 1.)
Encadré 1. Les principales conclusions de politique de la BCE ( 35)
« La rigidité des salaires à la baisse empêche de restaurer la compétitivité (et donc l’emploi), en particulier 
dans les pays de la zone euro qui avaient accumulé des déséquilibres externes avant la crise. 
En la présence d’un taux de chômage élevé, la priorité devrait être de rendre les salaires réactifs (flexi-
bles) aux conditions du marché du travail, de manière à faciliter la nécessaire réallocation sectorielle de 
l’emploi, fondement des créations d’emplois et de la réduction du chômage.
(…) En outre, dans un contexte de déséquilibre croissant sur le marché du travail, une différenciation 
accrue des salaires entre les différents types de travailleurs et d’emplois est nécessaire pour contribuer à 
une bonne adéquation entre l’offre et la demande de travail, et serait de plus particulièrement bénéfique 
à certains des groupes les plus touchés par la crise.
(…) Les politiques actives de lutte contre le chômage (active labour market policies, ALMPs) devraient 
faciliter le retour au travail des jeunes et des salariés les moins qualifiés, y compris au moyen de politiques 
de formation, de combler le fossé entre les compétences des chômeurs et celles demandées par les entre-
prises, en particulier dans les pays les plus touchés par des baisses irréversibles d’effectifs dans certains 
secteurs.
De telles politiques devraient également contribuer à accroître la pression à la baisse sur les salaires ex-
ercée par les chômeurs et à limiter la baisse de la production potentielle qui résulterait d’une hausse du 
chômage structurel».
35. Ibidem, p. 9 et 10.
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4. Le rôle politique de plus en plus 
affirmé de la BCE: de l’indépendance à 
l’ingérence
Depuis l’exportation de la crise des subprimes en 
Europe, la BCE a mené des interventions dites non 
conventionelles pour soutenir le secteur bancaire. 
Par la suite, elle a conduit des interventions de 
rachats de dettes souveraines sur le marché secon-
daire. Rien n’interdit à la BCE d’intervenir sur le 
«marché secondaire» de la dette mais la Bundes-
bank s’y oppose en ce que cela violerait la «clause 
de non-renflouement» introduite par le traité de 
Maastricht. Cette clause, l’article 125 du traité, 
interdit à l’Union et ses États membres de garan-
tir les engagements publics des États membres. Il 
faut préciser que les achats de dettes ou des prêts 
aux autres États membres par les États membres 
ne sont pas interdits. Telle est la philosophie de la 
Facilité de stabilité financière européenne (EFSF, 
European financial stability facility selon l’acro-
nyme anglais souvent appelé fonds européen de 
stabilité financière alors que son fonctionnement 
est basé sur des prêts levés par l’EFSF et prêtés 
à l’État qui en fait la demande). Ces prêts sont 
cependant assortis d’une stricte conditionnalité. 
Quant à la BCE, l’article 123 du traité, lui inter-
dit d’accorder des découverts et autres crédits aux 
institutions publiques tout comme l’achat direct 
de leur dette. Le traité interdit à la BCE d’être le 
prêteur en dernier ressort pour les États membres 
de la zone euro, un rôle que remplissent aussi bien 
la FED que la Banque d’Angleterre. Si le traité est 
opposé au rachat par la BCE de la dette d’un État 
au moment de son émission (marché primaire de 
la dette), il n’en va pas de même sur le marché se-
condaire (opérations dites d’open market). Le 10 
mai 2010, la BCE avait entrepris de racheter direc-
tement sur le marché secondaire des titres privés 
et des titres publics en lançant un «Programme 
s’adressant aux marchés des titres» (Securities 
Markets Programme). La BCE achète des bons du 
trésor des États membres après leur mise en circu-
lation. En septembre 2011, la démission de Jürgen 
Stark, le «chef économiste de la BCE», avait été 
interprétée comme un désaveu de la politique mo-
nétaire de la BCE, considérée comme n’étant plus 
en ligne avec les principes et les traditions de la 
Bundesbank. Cette démission faisait suite à celle 
d’Axel Weber, qui avait décidé le 11 février 2011 
de quitter la présidence de la Bundesbank en rai-
son de son opposition au programme de rachats 
d’obligations de la BCE.
Il convient de rappeler que pour intervenir sur le 
marché secondaire de la dette durant l’été 2011, la 
BCE avait imposé une «stricte conditionnalité» 
dans des lettres secrètes envoyées aux dirigeants 
des gouvernements alors concernés. La lettre en-
voyée au gouvernement italien était cosignée par 
le président de la BCE, Jean-Claude Trichet, et son 
successeur, Mario Draghi. Si cela avait déclenché 
des réactions courroucées en Italie, de son côté 
Mario Rajoy, le vainqueur des élections législatives 
espagnoles avait clairement annoncé en décembre 
2011 qu’il s’inspirerait de la lettre du président de 
la BCE (36). 
36. « Rajoy usará la carta del BCE para justificar sus 
reformas», El Pais, 7 décembre 2011, http://eco-
nomia.elpais.com/economia/2011/12/07/actuali-
dad/1323246781_850215.html
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Selon la lettre adressée au gouvernement ital-
ien, publiée dans la presse italienne et française, 
«Une réforme constitutionnelle visant à durcir la 
législation fiscale serait également appropriée» (37). 
Suite à l’enquête réalisée par le Médiateur euro-
péen à la demande d’un avocat espagnol, l’on sait 
que la lettre adressée au gouvernement espagnol 
n’exigeait pas l’intégration d’une «règle d’or» dans 
la Constitution espagnole, ce qui fut pourtant fait 
début septembre 2011 contre l’avis des syndicats 
37. La lettre comportait également un programme de baisse 
des salaires des fonctionnaires, de privatisations à mar-
che rapide des services publics locaux, de modification 
du droit du travail (flexibilisation des procédures de li-
cenciement, privilégier les accords négociés au niveau 
de l’entreprise aux convention sectorielles négociées à 
l’échelon national. Traduite en français dans l’article 
« L’incroyabe diktat de Trichet à Berlusconi », Chal-
lenges, 29 septembre 2011. http://www.challenges.fr/
economie/20110929.CHA4869/l-incroyable-diktat-de-
trichet-a-berlusconi.html En juillet 2012, la Cour con-
stitutionnelle italienne a déclaré illégale la décision du 
gouvernement Berlusconi de privatiser les services pu-
blics locaux. L’article 4 du décret-loi n° 138 est contraire 
au résultat du référendum organisé en juin 2011 à l’issue 
duquel les Italiens avaient massivement rejeté la privati-
sation de l’eau. Le décret Berlusconi ainsi que les amen-
dements introduits ultérieurement par le gouvernement 
Monti sont déclarés inconstitutionnels. Décision n° 199 
du 20 juillet 2012.
qui demandaient l’organisation d’un référendum 
sur ce sujet. Mais le contenu de la lettre ne sera 
pas diffusé au médiateur. Selon El Pais, «la BCE 
lui en a refusé l’accès, arguant qu’une telle divulga-
tion porterait préjudice à l’intérêt public en ce qui 
concerne la politique économique et monétaire de 
l’Union européenne ou d’un État membre» (38). Il 
faut également préciser que le gouvernement es-
pagnol avait également adopté, le 10 février 2012 
une réforme complète du marché du travail. 
Adoptée par décret, et donc sans consultation des 
syndicats ni de l’opposition parlementaire, la ré-
forme est dénoncée dans la rue et fait l’objet d’un 
recours devant la Cour constitutionnelle le 5 octo-
bre 2012 au motif qu’elle viole les droits sociaux et 
syndicaux garantis par la Constitution espagnole 
(39). 
38. «El BCE confirma que no exigió a Zapatero modificar 
la Constitución española », El País, 31 julio 2012, http://
economia.elpais.com/economia/2012/07/31/actuali-
dad/1343733093_601304.html 
39. «PSOE e IU llevan juntos al Tribunal Constitucional 
la reforma laboral», El País, 5 octubre 2012, http://
polit ica.elpais.com/polit ica/2012/10/05/actua li-
dad/1349428952_767618.html
4.1 Le traité budgétaire comme 
préalable à la poursuite 
des interventions non 
conventionnelles de la BCE
Alors gouverneur de la Banque d’Italie, Ma-
rio Draghi qui est aussi un ancien banquier de 
Goldman Sachs, considère en avril 2011 qu’il est 
primordial que «les pays concernés transposent 
pleinement les nouvelles règles et procédures dans 
leur propre cadre budgétaire, ce qui implique de 
procéder aux adaptations législatives appropriées. 
La mise en œuvre à l’échelon national constituera 
une étape cruciale. En effet, l’un des principaux 
avantages qu’offre l’adhésion à l’UE réside dans la 
possibilité pour les pays aux institutions plus faibles 
d’internaliser plus aisément les structures et les 
actions requises pour parvenir à la stabilité et à 
la croissance durable» (40). Mario Draghi est par 
la suite désigné en tant que successeur de Jean-
40.  «L’Union Economique et Monétaire au lendemain de la 
crise», Mario Draghi, Gouverneur de la Banque d’Italie, 
in L’Euro, les investisseurs et la gouvernance. Actes du 
séminaire en hommage à Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, 
Bruxelles, 4 avril 2011, p. 26, http://www.notre-europe.
eu/uploads/tx_publication/Actes-Euro__investisseurs_
et_gouvernance-FR-web_01.pdf
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Claude Trichet par le Conseil européen des 23 et 
24 juin 2011. Lors de son audition par la Com-
mission des affaires économiques et financières 
le 15 juin 2011, il défend la politique de rigueur 
de la BCE à l’égard de l’inflation. Il souligne que 
la BCE n’a pas perdu son indépendance et qu’elle 
ne dépasse pas son mandat, puisqu’elle n’entre pas 
«dans le domaine politique» (41). 
On le sait, la Chancelière allemande avait fait 
du Pacte budgétaire la condition de son soutien 
au traité établissant le Mécanisme européen de 
stabilité (MES), ce qui est moins connu est qu’il 
s’agissait également d’une condition de la BCE en 
préalable à la poursuite de ses interventions non 
conventionnelles, à savoir le lancement de sa sec-
onde opération de LTRO (Long Term Refinanc-
ing Operation) fin février 2012 (42). La BCE alloue 
alors 529 Md € sous forme de prêt à 3 ans, à 800 
banques à un taux réduit de 1%. Avec la première 
41. Mario Draghi, candidat recommandé à la présidence 
de la BCE, 15 juin 2011, http://www.europarl.europa.
eu/news/fr/pressroom/content/20110614IPR21328/
html/Mario-Draghi-candidat-recommand%C3%A9-
%C3%A0-la-pr%C3%A9sidence-de-la-BCE 
42. «Un traité inutile mais nécessaire», Philippe Maystadt, 
20 avril 2012, Le Vif, p. 50.
opération de LTRO sur trois ans du 21 décembre 
2011, un montant de 1000 milliards d’euros a ainsi 
été injecté dans le système bancaire. La première 
opération avait pour objectif de diminuer le risque 
d’une crise de liquidité et de faillite bancaire, ce 
qui avait rasssuré «les marchés» quant à la survie 
de l’euro, mais après la seconde opération le répis 
fut de courte durée en raison de l’approfondisse-
ment de la crise grecque et des doutes sur la solva-
bilité de l’Espagne.
Lors d’une interview au Wall Street Journal 
quelques jours avant le lancement de la seconde 
LTRO, l’homme qui est incontestablement le 
plus puissant d’Europe, le président de la BCE, 
n’avait pas hésité à déclarer que le «modèle social 
européen était déjà mort» (43). Il présente le pacte 
budgétaire comme un moyen permettant aux 
gouvernements européens de commencer à «se 
libérer de la souveraineté nationale». Il considère 
alors le traité budgétaire comme «une réalisation 
politique majeure, car c’est le premier pas vers une 
union budgétaire». Selon le président de la BCE, 
«Il s’agit d’un traité par lequel les pays perdent une 
part de souveraineté nationaledans le but d’accepter 
43. Q&A: ECB President Mario Draghi, 23 February 2012
des règles budgétaires communes qui sontparticu-
lièrement contraignantes,d’accepter la surveillance 
et d’accepter d’avoir ces règles inscrites dans leur 
Constitution afin qu’elles ne soient pas faciles à 
changer. Donc, c’est le début». Devant la commis-
sion des affaires économiques et monétaires du 
Parlement européen, Mario Draghi, le président 
de la BCE avait estimé en mai 2012 que la «clari-
fication de la vision de l’euro» par les responsables 
européens sera leur «meilleure contribution à la 
croissance» (44). 
Dans le contexte français, le refus du traité budgé-
taire par Europe Écologie-Les Verts (EELV) con-
duit à une double controverse. Le Conseil fédéral 
du parti qui participe au gouvernement Ayrault, 
s’est prononcé contre la ratification du traité bud-
gétaire mais en faveur du vote de la loi organique 
qui transpose l’esprit du traité (la règle d’or) dans 
la législation nationale. L’autre élément de con-
troverse dans ce contexte est la contradiction du 
groupe des Verts/ALE au niveau européen. À la 
suite de l’audition d’experts début de l’année 2012, 
le groupe s’était initialement prononcé contre 
44. «Clarifier la vision” de l’avenir de l’Euro?» La Libre 
Belgique, 31 mai 2012.
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le projet de traité budgétaire, le 9 février 2012, 
notamment en raison de l’incertitude juridique de 
la majorité inversée, prévue par le projet d’article 
7 du traité (45). Il reste que le processus de ratifica-
tion du traité budgétaire et des différents instru-
ments/procédures a également suscité des interro-
gations parmi les Etats membres (Cf. Encadré 2).
Autre particularité, en Belgique, la procédure de 
ratification de la décision du Conseil européen 
modifiant l’article 136 du TFUE est considérée, à 
l’instar des autres traités européens, comme rele-
vant d’un accord mixte. Il requiert par conséquent 
la ratification des sept assemblées parlementaires 
belges (le Sénat a ratifié le 10 mai et la Chambre 
le 14 juin, la notification de la ratification date 
du 16 juillet 2012) mais le gouvernement belge 
a considéré que le traité MES n’était pas un traité 
45. Selon un de ces experts, «Introducing the provisions of 
Article 7 of the Draft into the Treaty by formal amend-
ment would be possible, but imply reshuffling the sys-
tem of Article 126 TFEU considerably». (…) «Neither 
Article 126(14) nor Article 136(1) lit. a), together with 
Article 121(6) TFEU, empower the Council to give 
binding force to proposals or recommendations of the 
Commission or otherwise to reverse the decision-mak-
ing rules for the Council in Article 126 TFEU». Ingolf 
Pernice, «International Agreement on a reinforced Eco-
nomic Union. Legal Opinion», 2012, p. 13.
de la même nature, ce qui a simplifié la procé-
dure d’approbation de ce traité, ratifié par les deux 
seules branches du Parlement fédéral (le Sénat le 
7 juin 2012 et la Chambre le 14 juin suivant). Le 
traité budgétaire doit quant à lui être ratifié par les 
sept assemblées parlementaires concernées.
On notera que le Conseil constitutionnel français 
considère bien que la mise en place de la «majorité 
inversée» (article 7 du traité sur la stabilité, la co-
ordination et la gouvernance, TSCG) est une in-
novation qui comporte «un simple engagement à 
appliquer une règle de majorité plus contraignante 
que celle prévue par le droit de l’Union europée-
nne dans le cadre de l’engagement de la procédure 
concernant les déficits excessifs» (46). Le Conseil 
d’Etat néerlandais avait quant à lui considéré que 
le traité budgétaire contient une procédure déci-
sionnelle, la majorité qualifiée inversée, différente 
de celle inscrite à l’article 126 du traité sur le fonc-
tionnement de l’Union européenne (procédure 
pour déficit excessif) (47).
46. Décision n° 2012-653 DC du Conseil constitutionnel du 
9 août 2012, point 34.
47. Avis  du 9 avril 2012, publié le 25 juin suivant avec la 
réaction du gouvernement néerlandais. http://www.
raadvanstate.nl/adviezen/zoeken_in_adviezen/ zoekresultaat/?advicepub_id=10300
Encadré 2. Ratifications : quelques particularités
Après son adoption au Sénat le 12 juillet 2012,  
le traité budgétaire européen a  été ratifié le 19 
juillet 2012  par la Chambre des députés italiens 
à une très large majorité vu l’accord des princi-
paux partis. La Chambre des députés l’a adopté 
avec 380 “oui”, 59 “non” et 36 abstentions, con-
formément aux souhaits du gouvernement qui 
voulait en finir avec le processus de ratification 
avant la pause estivale début août. Seul le parti 
populiste de la Ligue du Nord, ex-allié du gou-
vernement de Silvio Berlusconi a voté contre, 
tandis que l’Italie des Valeurs (IDV, gauche) s’est 
abstenue. Les députés ont également approuvé le 
mécanisme européen de stabilité (MES), par 325 
voix pour, 53 contre et 36 abstentions. Au 19 juil-
let 2012, l’Italie est le douzième pays européen à 
avoir approuvé le Pacte budgétaire et le huitième 
de la zone euro. Il faut rappeler que la procédure 
de révision de la Constitution italienne en vue 
d’y intégrer une règle d’or budgétaire avait été fi-
nalisée le 17 avril 2012.
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En Allemagne, le président allemand avait décidé d’attendre l’arrêt de la Cour constitutionnelle, prévu pour le 12 septembre 2012 avant de signer les traités 
(Cf. supra).
En France, le Conseil constitutionnel avait été saisi par le président français, François Hollande pour vérifier la conformité du traité budgétaire avec la consti-
tution française et savoir s’il fallait ou non la modifier pour adopter la règle d’or. Début août 2012, le Conseil constitutionnel a répondu par la négative. Cela 
implique que la ratification du traité budgétaire nécessite le vote d’une loi du Parlement français tandis que la transcription de la « règle d’or » requiert une loi 
organique. Une révision de la Constitution aurait pu impliquer l’organisation d’un référendum. 
Il faut également signaler un recours introduit par la Cour suprême irlandaise début août 2012 devant la Cour de justice de Luxembourg pour vérifier la va-
lidité de la décision du Conseil européen de modifier l’article 136 du traité sur le fonctionnement de l’Union. Le 31 juillet, cette Cour avait jugé compatibles le 
traité budgétaire et le traité MES avec la Constitution irlandaise permettant ainsi la validation de la ratifications de ces deux traités. S’agissant du traité MES, 
la Cour suprême irlandaise pose également à la Cour de justice la question de savoir si, dans l’hypothèse où la décision de revoir le traité est considérée comme 
valide, le droit d’un État membre à conclure et ratifier un accord international tel que le traité MES est lié à l’entrée en vigueur de cette décision. Les 27 sont 
tenus de ratifier cette décision. Début novembre 2012, trois ratifications n’ont pas été notifiées au Conseil (Pologne, République tchèque et Royaume-Uni). La 
Cour de Luxembourg a organisé une audition sur le recours irlandais le 23 octobre 2012. Sa décision devrait être connue fin de l’année 2012 (Affaire 370/12, 
Pringle). Entre-temps, le traité MES, qui est entré en vigueur le 27 septembre 2012, a été ratifié par l’ensemble des États membres de la zone euro (le 4 octobre 
2012 étant la date de la notification du dernier État, l’Estonie).
Autre particularité, en Belgique, la procédure de ratification de la décision du Conseil européen modifiant l’article 136 du TFUE est considérée, à l’instar des 
autres traités européens, comme relevant d’un accord mixte. Il requiert par conséquent la ratification des sept assemblées parlementaires belges (le Sénat a 
ratifié le 10 mai et la Chambre le 14 juin, la notification de la ratification date du 16 juillet 2012) mais le gouvernement belge a considéré que le traité MES 
n’était pas un traité de la même nature, ce qui a simplifié la procédure d’approbation de ce traité, ratifié par les deux seules branches du Parlement fédéral (le 
Sénat le 7 juin 2012 et la Chambre le 14 juin suivant). Le traité budgétaire doit quant à lui être ratifié par les sept assemblées parlementaires concernées.
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4.2 Des traités contestés 
compatibles avec 
l’indépendance de la BCE 
En Allemagne, le traité budgétaire et le traité MES 
étaient contestés par plusieurs plaintes dépo-
sées devant la Cour constitutionnelle allemande. 
L’Europe et les marchés financiers étaient par 
conséquent suspendus aux décisions de la Cour. 
Le 12 septembre 2012, la Cour a rejeté les re-
cours en disant un «oui mais». Elle pose comme 
condition la limitation de la participation finan-
cière de l’Allemagne à 190 milliards d’euros et le 
respect des prérogatives du Parlement allemand. 
Tout accroissement de la dotation du MES devra 
être approuvé par le Parlement. La Cour pose 
une autre limite, à savoir que la BCE ne pourra 
pas financer le MES, ce qui signifie que la Cour 
refuse l’octroi d’une licence bancaire au MES. De 
manière éloquente, la Cour considère que ce traité 
ne remet pas en cause «l’indépendance de la BCE», 
ni «l’engagement des États membres d’observer une 
stricte discipline budgétaire» (48). S’agissant du 
48. “Applications for the issue of temporary injunctions to 
prevent the ratification of the ESM Treaty and the Fiscal 
Compact unsuccessful for the most part”,  Federal 
traité budgétaire, elle considère qu’il ne «viole» 
pas la responsabilité du Bundestag. L’argument 
répondant à la contestation de sa durée illimitée 
est remarquable: puisqu’il s’agit d’un traité inter-
national «la démission du traité par un accord mu-
tuel est toujours possible» et «le retrait unilatéral 
est possible en cas d’un changement fondamental 
des circonstances qui étaient pertinentes à propos 
de la conclusion du traité». Il faut ici rappeler que 
la résolution du Parlement européen du 2 février 
2012 insistait «pour que les parties prenantes re-
spectent entièrement leur engagement d’intégrer, au 
plus tard dans un délai de cinq ans, le traité sur la 
stabilité, la coordination et la gouvernance dans les 
traités de l’Union et demand[ait] qu’à cette occa-
sion, on s’attaque aux dernières faiblesses restantes 
du traité de Lisbonne» (point 9).
Selon l’article 16 du traité budgétaire, «Dans un 
délai de cinq ans maximum à compter de la date 
d’entrée en vigueur du présent traité, sur la base 
d’une évaluation de l’expérience acquise lors de sa 
mise en œuvre, les mesures nécessaires sont prises 
conformément au traité sur l’Union européenne 
Constitutional Court, Press release no. 67/2012 of 12 
September 2012, http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.
de/en/press/bvg12-067en.html
et au traité sur le fonctionnement de l’Unioneuro-
péenne, afin d’intégrer le contenu du présent traité 
dans le cadre juridique de l’Unioneuropéenne». Le 
cadre juridique laisse entendre une révision des 
traités mais aussi l’adoption de la législation dite 
secondaire. Ce qui est déjà le cas du Six Pack et 
bientôt du Two Pack (Cf. Encadré 3.). Reste bien 
entendu la question de la majorité inversée. L’in-
troduction du vote à la majorité inversée avait été 
âprement défendue par les pays du Benelux, «l’ob-
jectif étant d’éviter que les grands pays ne puissent 
s’allier pour éviter d’être mis en procédure de défi-
cit excessif par leurs pairs» comme ce fut le cas en 
2003 quand l’Allemagne et la France avaient abou-
ti de facto à la suspension du Pacte. Selon le Pre-
mier Ministre Luxembourgeois, la majorité inver-
sée est un «engagement politique» dans la mesure 
où elle n’est pas prévue dans les traités actuels (49). 
Sollicité par le groupe parlementaire européen de 
la Gauche unitaire européenne, selon cet autre 
juriste, la majorité inversée est illégale (50). Selon 
cette analyse,l’élargissement de la prise de décision 
49. Europaforum, http://www.europaforum.public.lu/fr/
actualites/2012/01/chd-jcj-traite/index.html
50. Andreas Fischer-Lescano : «Le Traité Fiscal et le droit 
européen », Avis juridique. Bremen, 7 septembre 2012.
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via la règle de la majorité inverséene peut inter-
venir que dans le cadre d’une révision du traité. 
Ce constat vaut autant pour la «majorité inver-
sée» du traité budgétaire que celle introduite par 
le Six Pack. Différentes propositions de recours 
sont suggérées. La voie est étroite car aucune des 
institutions de l’Union ne s’est opposée à des pra-
tiques plus que «très limite» dans un système qui 
se dit promouvoir les valeurs de la démocratie et 
de l’État de droit. 
Encadré 3. Le Two Pack
En novembre 2011, la Commission européenne avait proposé un nouveau renforcement du Pacte de 
stabilité en présentant deux règlements, le Two Pack, renforçant le Pacte de stabilité qui venait juste 
d’être révisé (Le Six Pack entrera en vigueur le 13 décembre 2012). La première de ces propositions 
porte sur un renforcement du suivi et de l’évaluation des projets de plans budgétaires des États membres 
de la zone euro et, plus particulièrement, de ceux faisant l’objet d’une procédure de déficit excessif et la 
seconde sur le renforcement de la surveillance des États membres de la zone euro confrontés à de graves 
perturbations financières ou sollicitant une assistance financière. 
Le premier s’inscrit dans la logique de l’inscription dans la législation nationale de freins à 
l’endettement. La proposition initiale de la Commission demandait une telle inscription de préférence 
au niveau constitutionnel(51). Le traité budgétaire aussi mais le contrôle de légalité de cette inscription, 
pour lequel un accord n’avait été trouvé qu’après la signature du traité, pourra être vérifiée par la Cour 
de justice (52). Evidemment, un règlement qui est un acte juridique directement applicable ne peut révis-
er directement les constitutions nationales. Même le traité budgétaire ne parvient pas à cet objectif. Le 
texte du Parlement européen prévoit une inscription de son principe dans la législation nationale.  
Selon la résolution du Parlement, « Les États membres adoptent des règles budgétaires chiffrées, qui 
inscrivent dans le processus budgétaire national l’objectif budgétaire à moyen terme au sens de l’article 
2 bis du règlement (CE) nº 1466/97; ces règles comprennent également la définition des circonstances 
51. «Les États membres adoptent des règles budgétaires chiffrées concernant le solde budgétaire, qui inscrivent dans le pro-
cessus budgétaire national l’objectif budgétaire à moyen terme au sens de l’article 2 bis du règlement (CE) n° 1466/97. 
Ces règles s’appliquent aux administrations publiques dans leur ensemble et revêtent un caractère contraignant, de 
préférence constitutionnel », article 4 premier alinéa, COM (2011) 821, 23 novembre 2011.
52. Le Procès-verbal de signature du traité sur la stabilité, la coordination et la gouvernance au sein de l’Union économ-
ique et monétaire, 2 mars 2012. 
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exceptionnelles et récessions économiques graves qui peuvent amener à s’écarter temporairement de l’objectif budgétaire à moyen terme ou de la trajectoire 
d’ajustement qui doit conduire à la réalisation de cet objectif, pour autant que cet écart ne mette pas en danger la viabilité budgétaire à moyen terme, confor-
mément aux dispositions des articles 5 et 6 du règlement (CE) n° 1466/97. Ces règles devraient inclure un mécanisme qui est déclenché en cas d’écart signifi-
catif par rapport à l’objectif budgétaire à moyen terme ou à la trajectoire d’ajustement qui doit conduire à la réalisation de cet objectif, afin d’assurer un retour 
rapide à l’objectif à moyen terme. Ces règles s’appliquent aux administrations publiques dans leur ensemble et revêtent un caractère contraignant ou leur re-
spect et leur application sans réserve sont du moins garantis dans le cadre de tout le processus budgétaire national.» (53).
Le vote à la majorité inversée est présent dans le règlement sur le renforcement de la surveillance des États membres de la zone euro confrontés à de graves 
perturbations financières ou sollicitant une assistance financière. Par exemple, selon les amendements du Parlement européen, «  La Commission, en liaison 
avec la BCE et, le cas échéant, le FMI, examine avec l’État membre concerné les modifications et les mises à jour qu’il pourrait être nécessaire d’apporter à son 
programme d’ajustement afin de tenir dûment compte, entre autres, de toute disparité significative entre les prévisions macroéconomiques et les chiffres obte-
nus, y compris les éventuelles conséquences liées au programme d’ajustement, des retombées négatives et des chocs macroéconomiques et financiers. La Com-
mission, décide des éventuelles modifications à apporter au programme d’ajustement macroéconomique. Le Conseil peut, dans un délai de dix jours suivant 
l’adoption de cette décision, l’abroger par un vote à la majorité qualifiée. » La Commission pourrait modifier le programme d’ajustement d’un pays en difficulté 
et le Conseil n’aurait qu’un délai de dix jours pour abroger par un vote à la majorité qualifiée la décision de la Commission européenne (54). Il faudrait donc 
que le Conseil soit en mesure d’opposer une majorité de blocage en cas de désaccord avec les modifications proposées. Il s’agissait là d’une demande de la BCE 
(55). 
53. Amendement 46 Proposition de règlement Article 4 - paragraphe 1, Amendements du Parlement européen, adoptés le 13 juin 2012, à la proposition de règlement établissant des 
dispositions communes pour le suivi et l’évaluation des projets de plans budgétaires et pour la correction des déficits excessifs dans les États membres de la zone euro, http://www.
europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=FR&reference=P7-TA-2012-243
54. Amendement 46 Proposition de règlement Article 6 – paragraphe 4, « Amendements du Parlement européen, adoptés le 13 juin 2012, à la proposition de règlement relatif au ren-
forcement de la surveillance économique et budgétaire des États membres connaissant ou risquant de connaître de sérieuses difficultés du point de vue de leur stabilité financière 
au sein de la zone euro », http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=FR&reference=P7-TA-2012-242
55. Dans son avis sur le Two Pack, la Banque centrale européenne considère que « l’article 6, paragraphe 5 du règlement proposé relatif au procédure de surveillance, constitue un cas 
critique dans lequel il est recommandé d’employer la règle du vote à la majorité qualifiée inversée », Avis de la Banque centrale européenne du 7 mars 2012 sur le renforcement de 
la gouvernance économique dans la zone euro, Journal officiel de l’Union européenne, C 141, 17 mai 2012,  p. 11, http://www.ecb.int/ecb/legal/pdf/c_14120120517fr00070024.pdf
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Le 13 juin 2012, le Parlement européen a adopté des amendements à la proposition de règlement relatif au renforcement de la surveillance économique et 
budgétaire des États membres connaissant ou risquant de connaître de sérieuses difficultés du point de vue de leur stabilité financière au sein de la zone - par 
501 voix pour, 138 voix contre et 36 abstentions (Rapport Ferreira). Des amendements à la proposition de règlement relatif au renforcement de la surveillance 
économique et budgétaire des États membres connaissant ou risquant de connaître de sérieuses difficultés du point de vue de leur stabilité financière au sein 
de la zone ont été adopté le même jour  par 471 voix pour, 97 voix contre et 78 abstentions (Rapport Gauzès). Ces questions ont été renvoyées pour réexamen 
à la commission compétente et le vote sur les résolutions législatives a été reporté à une séance ultérieure. Les députés européens ne s’en sont pas tenus aux pro-
jets de règlements initiaux en ajoutant de nombreux éléments aux deux textes. Selon les propos d’Olli Rehn, « Une bonne partie des amendements du PE se 
réfère à la future feuille de route sur la réforme de l’UEM par les quatre présidents » (56). Il s’agit du premier rapport élaboré par les quatre représentants du « 
gouvernement composé de l’Union » à savoir les présidents du Conseil européen, de la Commission européenne, de l’Eurogroupe et de la BCE. Il reste que c’est 
sur la base des deux résolutions du PE qu’a été organisé un premier trilogue le 11 juillet 2012.  Un autre a été organisé en septembre 2012. Le communiqué du 
Conseil  des ministres des affaires économiques et financières du 9 octobre 2012 fait état en fin de communiqué dans une rubrique « other business » du fait 
que le Conseil a été informé par la présidence (chypriote) du développement concernant notamment les propositions sur la « gouvernance économique dans la 
zone euro».
56. Europolitique, 10 juillet 2012.
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4.3 L’agenda institutionnel de 
la BCE : la défense d’une 
monnaie irréversible au nom 
de la survie de l’euro
Face à la poursuite de la dégradation des condi-
tions d’accès aux marchés de plusieurs pays tels 
l’Espagne et l’Italie y compris après le Conseil 
européen de juin 2012, nombreux sont ceux qui 
parient sur la disparition de l’euro en dépit de la 
multiplication des discours sur «l’irréversibilité de 
l’euro» par les dirigeants des institutions europée-
nnes au premier rang desquels figure le président 
de la Banque centrale européenne, Mario Draghi. 
Celui-ci avait annoncé le 26 juillet qu’il ferait tout 
son possible pour sauver l’euro en précisant qu’il 
n’agirait que dans les limites de son mandat. 
En réponse à l’opposition du président de la Bun-
desbank à de nouvelles interventions de la BCE 
sur le marché obligataire secondaire, Mario Dra-
ghi écrit dans la presse allemande que bien que 
n’ayant pas un «rôle politique», la BCE est une 
institution de l’Union (57). Le président de la 
57. «Les États membres adoptent des règles budgétaires 
chiffrées concernant le solde budgétaire, qui inscrivent 
Bundesbank, Jens Weidmann, s’était opposé à de 
nouvelles interventions de la BCE sur le marché 
secondaire au motif qu’elle droguerait les États. 
Parallèlement, Jens Asmussen, membre allemand 
du directoire de la BCE, s’employait le 27 août 
2012 à rassurer la Bundesbank en posant comme 
préalable à tout achat d’obligations émises par les 
pays en difficulté l’implication du Fonds monétai-
re international (FMI) dans la conception de leurs 
programmes de réforme. Dans son message aux 
Allemands, le président de la BCE plante cepen-
dant les limites aux futurs développements de l’U-
nion en considérant que «ceux qui proclament que 
seule une fédération complète peut-être soutenable 
mettent la barre trop haut». Selon le président de 
la BCE, «ce dont nous avons besoin est d’un effort 
graduel et structurel pour compléter l’UEM. Cela 
donnerait à l’euro les fondations stables qu’il méri-
te». Devant la commission des affaires économi-
ques et monétaires du Parlement européen, Mario 
dans le processus budgétaire national l’objectif budgétaire 
à moyen terme au sens de l’article 2 bis du règlement (CE) 
n° 1466/97. Ces règles s’appliquent aux administrations 
publiques dans leur ensemble et revêtent un caractère 
contraignant, de préférence constitutionnel», article 
4 premier alinéa, COM (2011) 821, 23 novembre 
2011 
Draghi, le président de la BCE avait appelé en mai 
2012 les responsables européens à la «clarifica-
tion de la vision de l’euro» (58). D’ailleurs, comme 
il avait été associé à la task force sur la gouvern-
ance économique de l’année 2010, le président de 
la BCE est l’un des quatre présidents chargés de 
rédiger rapport intérimaire sur le renforcement 
véritable de l’Union économique et monétaire. 
En plus de son rôle actif dans la préparation du fu-
tur design de l’Union économique et monétaire, la 
«communication» de Mario Draghi est attendue et 
décryptée par les marchés. Début septembre 2012, 
Mario Draghi annonçait que l’intervention de la 
BCE (Outright Monetary Transactions, OMTs) 
sera illimitée et se fera en concertation avec le 
fonds d’assistance européenne (EFSF/MES), ce 
qui nécessite que les futurs États bénéficiaires (au 
premier rang desquels l’Espagne mais aussi l’Italie 
et Chypre) en fassent la demande avec la «condi-
tionnalité» que cela impliquerait. 
Mario Draghi souhaite également l’implication 
du Fonds monétaire international (FMI) pour 
la définition des conditions spécifiques appli-
58. «Clarifier la vision» de l’avenir de l’Euro ? La Libre 
Belgique, 31 mai 2012.
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quées aux pays concernés et le suivi de leur pro-
gramme d’ajustement. Les deux conditions posées 
par l’Allemagne sont donc remplies, la BCE agit 
dans les limites de son mandat et l’association du 
FMI est souhaitée. Enfin, la BCE pourrait sus-
pendre le programme si la conditionnalité n’était 
pas respectée. Concrètement, il s’agit d’éviter 
l’aléa moral, ou l’abandon des «réformes» à la 
suite de l’intervention de la BCE et de la détente 
sur les taux obligataires qu’elle induit. Après l’été 
2011, Silvio Berlusconi avait été fustigé pour son 
manque de détermination par Angela Merkel et 
Nicolas Sarkozy. Le Premier ministre italien s’était 
en fait montré hésitant à respecter les conditions 
fixées par la BCE. Cela avait conduit à son rem-
placement par Mario Monti à la tête d’un gouver-
nement technique. 
Dans les faits, cette «conditionnalité» est non 
seulement dissuasive, les pays concernés dur-
cissant leur politiques d’austérité dans l’espoir 
de ne pas devoir recourir à l’assistance europée-
nne, elle est également inadaptée à la situation 
des différents pays victimes de la spéculation fi-
nancière. S’agissant de l’Espagne, l’adoption d’un 
plan de sauvetage du secteur bancaire fait l’objet 
d’un accord au sein des ministres des finances de 
l’eurogroupe le 10 juillet 2012 mais en échange de 
conditions financières pour les banques et de la 
promesse de nouvelles mesures d’austérité, per-
çues comme une «thérapie de choc»dans la presse 
espagnole qui voit dans le fait que l’Espagne doive 
se plier aux recommandations de la Commission 
la transformation de ces dernières en de véritables 
exigences (59).
Enfin, les milieux financiers allemands craignent 
quant à eux que les éventuelles interventions de 
la BCE sur le marché secondaire de la dette sou-
veraine ne contribuent à alimenter l’inflation. Le 
président de la BCE se déplace à Berlin pour ren-
contrer les membres de la Fédération des indus-
tries allemandes (DBI) le 25 septembre 2012. Ma-
rio Draghi inscrit le cadre d’action de l’Outright 
Monetary Transactions (OMTs) de la BCE dans 
les limites de son mandat de maintien de la sta-
bilité des prix. Selon Mario Draghi, la fragmen-
tation des marchés financiers dans la zone euro 
traduit des craintes infondées au sujet de l’avenir 
de la zone euro. Il rappelle que les opérations de la 
59.  El País,
BCE interviendront «seulement sur le marché sec-
ondaire, ce qui assure que l’argent passerait aux in-
vestisseurs disposant de bons souverains et pas aux 
gouvernements» (60).
4.4 Le renforcement du rôle de 
la Commission européenne
La Déclaration des chefs d’État de la zone euro des 
28 et 29 juin 2012 affirme qu’il «est impératif de 
briser le cercle vicieux qui existe entre les Banques 
et les États». Elle demande à la Commission de 
présenter une proposition de règlement, fondée 
sur l’article 127 § 6 du traité sur le fonctionnement 
de l’Union européenne (61). L’Espagne venait 
de demander l’assistance européenne pour son 
secteur bancaire. Un montant de 100 milliards 
d’euros devait être fourni via le Fonds d’assistance 
financière (EFSF). Par la suite, le MES serait au-
torisé, après d’une décision ordinaire, donc sans 
révision du traité MES, à recapitaliser directe-
ment les banques. Mais à la condition de réaliser 
au préalable l’Union bancaire. Il s’agit en fait de 
compléter l’UEM et de renforcer les prérogatives 
60. 
61. 
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de la BCE sans passer par une réforme hautement 
risquée des traités. Cependant, la concrétisation 
d’une Union bancaire fixée au 1er janvier 2013 
comme préalable au soutien direct des banques 
par le MES semble elle aussi compromise en rai-
son de l’opposition de l’Allemagne, de la Finlande 
et des Pays-Bas, trois des plus grands partisans 
de la ligne dure de la discipline budgétaire. Dans 
une déclaration conjointe diffusée le 27 septembre 
2012, les Ministres des Finances de ces trois pays 
sont ni plus ni moins revenus sur leurs engage-
ments du Conseil européen de juin 2012 (62). Ces 
trois pays veulent exclure du soutien aux banques 
par le MES, celles déjà en difficulté avant son en-
trée en vigueur. 
Le 18 octobre 2012, la chancelière allemande 
présente au Parlement allemand sa proposition 
de doter l’Union européenne d’un droit de rejet 
des budgets nationaux ne respectant pas la dis-
cipline budgétaire : «Nous pensons, et je le dis au 
nom de l’ensemble du gouvernement allemand, 
que nous pourrions faire un pas en avant en accor-
dant à l’Europe un véritable droit d’ingérence sur 
les budgets nationaux quand ils ne respectent pas 
62. 
les limites fixées pour la stabilité et la croissance» 
(63). La chancelière identifie pour cette tâche le 
Commissaire en charge des affaires économiques 
et financières. Dans un article publié par la suite 
dans Der Spiegel, Mario Draghi soutient le ren-
forcement de ce «super commissaire». Ces prop-
ositions s’inscrivent dans le droit fil des idées de 
l’ancien président de la BCE, Jean-Claude Trichet 
qui avait imaginé lors de la réception du Prix 
Charlemagne début juin 2011 que «les autorités 
européennes aient le droit d’opposer leur veto à cer-
taines décisions de politique économique nationale. 
Cette compétence pourrait en particulier concerner 
les principaux postes de dépenses budgétaires et 
les facteurs déterminants pour la compétitivité du 
pays» (64). 
Il faut rappeler qu’en septembre 2011, la proposi-
tion des ministres des finances néerlandais et fin-
landais avait identifié la Commission européenne 
comme locus du gouvernement économique. Ils 
proposent alors de renforcer les pouvoir du Com-
missaire en charge des affaires économiques et 
financières, Olli Rehn, promu par la suite vice-
63. 
64. 
président de la Commission européenne, et sug-
gèrent en outre l’exclusion de la zone euro des 
États fautifs. Cette dernière proposition n’avait pas 
reçu de traduction dans les deux propositions de 
règlement de la Commission durcissant encore 
le Pacte de stabilité (Two Pack). Pour les pays en 
difficulté ou sous surveillance, le Two Packprévoit 
un nouveau renforcement considérable des pré-
rogatives de la Commission européenne. Dans 
ce schéma, afin d’éviter qu’un pays ne tarde à de-
mander l’assistance financière du FESF (et par la 
suite du MES), la Commission pourrait recom-
mander au Conseil qu’un pays en difficulté finan-
cière et posant un risque pour la zone euro de-
mande officiellement une aide financière. Les pays 
sous assistance financière devraient conclure un 
programme d’ajustement devant permettre le re-
tour du pays sur les marchés financiers. Ces pro-
grammes seraient l’équivalent des programmes 
d’ajustement économiques pour les pays actuelle-
ment sous assistance financière dans le cadre du 
mécanisme européen de stabilisation financière. 
Les États concernés seraient soumis à une surveil-
lance renforcée de la Commission en liaison avec 
la BCE, et le cas échéant du FMI. 
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Les conclusions du Conseil européen des 18 et 19 
octobre 2012, invitent «les législateurs à parvenir à 
un accord en vue de l’adoption du paquet législatif 
relatif à la surveillance budgétaire (le «Two-Pack») 
au plus tard à la fin de 2012.» Le Two Pack est en 
cours d’adoption dans la plus grande discrétion 
alors même que le FMI qui basait ses calculs de 
croissance sur une hypothèse d’impact limité des 
mesures d’austérité revient sur cette conception 
fondée sur ce que les économistes appellent les «ef-
fets multiplicateurs» (65). Le FMI préconise donc 
non pas l’abandon des politiques d’austérité mais 
bien d’accorder plus de temps aux pays dits de la 
périphérie. Selon cette étude du FMI, l’austérité 
réduit davantage que prévu l’activité économique 
et donc les rentrées fiscales, provoquant en fait un 
creusement du déficit. De longue date, de nom-
breux économistes, prix Nobel d’économie outre-
Atlantique, ou se disant «atterrés» en France et ail-
leurs, dénoncent le caractère nocif des politiques 
d’austérité en période de crise et démontrent que 
le seul effet de ces politiques, qui aggravent la situ-
ation économique, est d’augmenter la pauvreté.
65. 
Perspectives
Sans projet au-delà de la discipline et de l’austérité 
budgétaire, l’Union se dote à partir de la zone euro 
d’instruments s’inspirant des méthodes du FMI 
en version dure. En dotant l’Union européenne 
d’un instrument s’apparentant à une organisation 
internationale dépourvue de contrôle démocra-
tique, le traité MES pose sous un angle nouveau 
la question de la légitimité de l’élaboration et de 
la mise en œuvre de procédures produisant une 
hybridation entre le droit international et le droit 
européen (66). Les modifications introduites par 
le traité budgétaire sont également le fruit de la 
transformation du rôle de la BCE, une institution 
dont la prise d’autorité et le rôle tant de concepteur 
que d’arbitre en dernier ressort de l’UEM ne ces-
sent de croître dans les processus en cours. 
Dans les faits, le renforcement du gouvernement 
économique implique une plus grande intrusion 
dans les décisions budgétaires nationales ainsi 
qu’une adaptation des cadres juridiques nation-
aux de manière à les rendre conformes aux règles 
européennes. Avec les limitations à l’action des 
66. Can International Organisations Be Democratic? 
A skeptic’s view
gouvernements nationaux qu’elles impliquent, il 
s’agit de la parfaite illustration de l’action d’une 
«Fédération coercitive» au sein de laquelle les lois 
fédérales limitent les pouvoirs des entités fédérées. 
On peut y apercevoir l’approfondissement du rêve 
hayekien du fédéralisme interétatique en parfaite 
adéquation avec les principes de l’ordo-libéralisme 
allemand (67). 
Tout ceci conforte l’idée que l’horizon du projet 
européen ne peut aller au-delà de l’intégration 
économique et monétaire. Le pilier quasi fédéral 
de l’Union monétaire était censé coexister avec 
la définition au niveau national, et selon les pré-
férences nationales, des politiques sociales et re-
distributives. Les aspects coercitifs du pacte de 
stabilité, réformé et en cours de révision, ainsi que 
le traité budgétaire, en cours de ratification, con-
cernent principalement les États membres de la 
zone euro. Ces instruments visent le durcissement 
d’une approche punitive en cas de non accom-
plissement de «réformes structurelles» ciblant ou-
vertement et sans plus aucun tabou des éléments 
centraux des modèles sociaux nationaux. 
67. TheNew Commonwealth Quarterly, Vol. Individualism 
and Economic Order, 
241The Euro Crisis & the State of European DemocracySection I
Le président du Conseil européen, Herman Van 
Rompuy, dénonce «la tendance à perdre le sens de 
l’urgence des réformes» et que «cela ne devait pas 
arriver» (68). Son remède:»Nous devons continuer 
à réformer nos économies, les rendre plus compé-
titives, leur permettre de créer plus d’emplois». Dans 
ce contexte, il avait resserré les grands thèmes 
du Conseil européen d’octobre 2012, à savoir 
«la discussion de plans concrets pour une Union 
économique et monétaire sans cesse plus étroite, 
ce que cela signifie pour les banques, pour les bud-
gets nationaux, pour les contribuables et pour les 
électeurs». 
La question de la légitimité semble venir à l’ordre 
du jour alors que tout ce qui a été entrepris jusqu’ici 
n’a pas fait l’objet d’un argumentaire ouvert au dé-
bat et à la contestation. Dans les pays sous assis-
tance financière, l’encerclement des Parlements 
nationaux au moment de l’adoption des pro-
grammes d’austérité exprime autant un désespoir 
démocratique qu’un rejet des réformes imposées 
par la Troïka au nom du paradigme monétariste. 
L’octroi de délais supplémentaires à la Grèce et à 
l’Espagne ne changera rien tant le «déficit par les 
68. 
résultats» des réformes en cours et annoncées est 
évident. 
Construire la nouvelle gouvernance économique 
par le droit (Six Pack) et la renforcer (Two Pack) en 
restreignant davantage encore les prérogatives na-
tionales comporte un danger, celui d’imposer des 
règles venues d’un «en haut» européen sur lequel 
les opinions publiques nationales n’ont pas prise. 
La question de la légitimité de la Commission eu-
ropéenne, une institution non élue, pour imposer 
des sanctions et s’immiscer dans la confection des 
budgets nationaux reste entière (69).
Pour être qualifié de démocratique, un système 
politique doit être réversible. Ainsi que l’avait 
analysé Karl Popper, cela suppose qu’il soit pos-
sible de le modifier. Selon sa conception, «[l]a 
démocratie n’est rien d’autre qu’un système de pro-
tection contre la dictature» (70). Qu’il s’agisse du 
traité budgétaire ou de l’avènement du «gouver-
nement économique composé», l’Union europée-
nne demeure plus que jamais confrontée au défi 
de l’irréversibilité de choix idéologiques lourds de 
conséquences et dont on ne peut que redouter les 
69. 
70. 
dégâts politiques et sociaux tant niveau national 
qu’européen.
Récemment, le président de la BCE a appelé à 
la constitution d’un «espace public européen» 
tout en avertissant que: «Les citoyens de l’Union 
ont besoin d’un accord de base, que dans une 
Union économique et monétaire, certains modèles 
économiques ne sont plus possibles. En d’autres 
mots, on a besoin d’un nouveau consensus sur les 
politiques économiques qui rendra vigueur au 
modèle social européen et l’adaptera pour le 21ème 
siècle» (71).
L’Union européenne est peut-être au bord d’une 
«falaise démocratique» en raison du fossé qui 
semble devenir un gouffre abyssal entre les élites 
et les opinions publiques européennes et de la 
rigidification d’un cadre qui rend quasi imprati-
cables les nombreuses alternatives aux politiques 
d’austérité, basées sur une vision de l’avenir dans 
lequel le concept de «compétitivité» n’a plus la pri-
orité.
71. 
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1. Introduction 
The double 2012 elections in Greece brought a 
political earthquake that shook the party system. 
Electoral volatility exploded, the number of effec-
tive parties increased and the party system found 
itself divided not along the traditional left-right 
lines but along the lines of a new division, being in 
favour or against the EU/IMF bailout agreement. 
This paper argues that this division did not appear 
in a political vacuum, but it developed on the basis 
of pre-existing divisions capturing the underdog 
ethnocentric culture versus the cosmopolitan ap-
proach. This dimension was capitalized by smaller 
parties to capture the vote of globalization losers 
(Kriesi et. al. 2008) but its mobilization effect was 
rather insignificant. The crisis created the unique 
circumstances that allowed a marginalized issue 
dimension to dominate the political scene and to 
mobilize voters to the same or even greater extent 
than the until then dominant left-right dimension. 
The paper is divided into five sections. The first 
section discusses the development of the Greek 
party system from 1981 onwards in terms of dom-
inant political dimensions of contestation and the 
emergence of the bailout dimension. The second 
section discusses the rise of the “other dimension” 
referring to the slow but consistent development 
of the ethnocentric versus cosmopolitanism po-
litical division. In this section are also hypoth-
esis formulated about the issue evolution and the 
overlapping of the ethnocentric versus cosmo-
politanism and the EU/IMF bailout dimensions. 
The third section describes the data used and the 
methods employed in this study. The fourth sec-
tion elaborates on the results and the final section 
provides a discussion on the findings. 
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2. The Greek party system and the emergence 
of the bailout dimension 
As in most European democracies the left-right 
dimension is perceived as the main dividing line 
in Greece. As it endurs in society, it determines 
voting behaviour and can explain the divisions 
within the party system (Lyrintzis 2005: 244). In-
dicative of the prominence of the left-right divi-
sion since 1981 is the dominance of the two large 
Greek parties, PASOK and New Democracies, 
which have been alternating in single party gov-
ernments, with a short break in 1989, until the 
seminal 2012 elections (Pappas 2003). PASOK 
that spend twenty two years in government since 
1981 was founded in 1974 becoming the per-
sonification of social democratic programmatic 
trajectories in Greece. New Democracy was also 
founded in the same year presenting a mixture of 
conservative and Christian Democratic policies. 
The two major Greek parties incorporated in their 
organization characteristics of cartel (Katz and 
Mair 1995, Koole 1996) and catch-all parties (Ge-
menis and Nezi 2012). Using state funding, me-
dia regulation and manipulation of the electoral 
system on the one hand (Papatheordorou and 
Machin 2003), they attracted candidates purely 
on the bases of the size of their political clientele, 
instead of ideology (Pappas 2009). In this way 
both parties consolidated their dominance strate-
gically absorbing potential political forces in the 
spectrum between them and in the extremes. New 
Democracy was more successful at it as it man-
aged to completely absorb the extreme right until 
the late 1990s (Pappas and Dinas 2006). PASOK 
occupied the centre-left side of the spectrum as 
the extreme left was dominated by a small pole of 
leftist and communist parties. 
Under these conditions, there was not enough 
space left for political parties to compete in terms 
of left-right. The survival of small new parties 
could only depend on redirecting the political 
competition on more innovative issues (de Vries 
and Hobolt 2012). Apart from the parties belong-
ing to the left pole, the only small party that sur-
vived for more than one legislative period was the 
far right populist LAOS. This New Democracy 
splinter party founded in 2000 introduced new 
politics issues opening the door for a new dimen-
sion of party competition. Gemenis and Dinas 
(2010: 189) demonstrate the emergence of a new 
cleavage with high polarization among Greek par-
ties including issues such as: nationalism, immi-
gration, morality and civil liberties. In this cleav-
age parties belonging to the ideological centre of 
the left-right dimension are found on the progres-
sive/cosmopolitan extreme while parties on the 
extremes of the left-right dimension are found on 
the ethno-centric/authoritarian extreme. 
Halkiopoulou et. al (2012) further defined the 
emerging division demonstrating that it is actual-
ly two different dimensions: on the one hand ‘pro-
gressive/authoritarian’, incorporating issues on 
ethnic and cultural nationalism and moral issues 
where extreme left parties are found on the pro-
gressive end and LAOS is found on the authoritar-
ian side. On the other hand there is a dimension 
of ‘cosmopolitan/ethnocentric’ that incorporates 
territorial and economic nationalism where all 
extreme parties cluster on the ethnocentric side 
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while all mainstream parties on the cosmopolitan 
side. Despite the existence of this dimension it did 
not appear as significant until the debt and budget 
deficit crisis took over the Greek political debate. 
Prime minister Papandreou’s announcement on 
April 23rd 2010 that he had asked for the activation 
of the bilateral European Union and International 
Monetary Fund aid package came unexpectedly to 
the masses considering the October 2009 election 
was won by PASOK under the  promise of a 3 bil-
lion euro stimulus package (Gemenis 2010: 360). 
In fact in the beginning the electorate was expect-
ing the country to get out of the crisis quickly and 
with minimal costs. Following Papandreou’s re-
quest the ‘troika’ (namely representatives of three 
international institutions: the European Commis-
sion, the European Central Bank and the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund) negotiated a bailout agree-
ment which imposed severe budget cuts. The di-
lemma for political parties then was clear: should 
they support the bailout agreement as an interna-
tional commitment of Greece or should they op-
pose it considering the popular dissatisfaction it 
would cause?
Gemenis and Nezi (2012) argue that the choice 
made by political parties was dictated neither by 
consensus nor by ideological constraints. It was 
purely a strategic choice, even though different 
parties chose different goals.  Vote-seeking parties 
opposed government bills implementing the bail-
out agreement considering the public uproar that 
these new policies would bring. Office-seeking 
parties tired to increase their credibility by becom-
ing more responsible and trustworthy in order to 
attain government portfolios. Policy seeking par-
ties did not have the opportunity to negotiate the 
bill, bringing it to a shape they believed more ap-
propriate for the needs of Greece. 
The four key economic bills, the one investiture 
vote for the Papademos government and the two 
elections allowed some Greek political parties to 
change their position in and out of government 
and in and out of parliament, thus to change their 
goals and consequently their strategic choices. 
Table 1 below shows the tactics followed by the 
main political parties across the four bills and the 
one investiture vote covering the period from the 
first memorandum in May 2010 until the third 
Memorandum in November 2012. For almost 
every strategic choice parties had MP losses (eg 
PASOK, ND, LAOS and Democratic Left). Some 
MPs decided to resign the party whip and follow 
their own conscience or in other words to try a 
personal instead of a party strategy. Initially these 
defections resulted in splinter groups1. 
The content of the bailout agreements as negoti-
ated with the ‘troika’ where in line with neoliberal 
ideology. In a nutshell the first memorandum in-
cluded a series of liberal reform requested by the 
‘troika’ in order to ensure short term financial li-
quidity necessary for the country not to default 
on its debts. These reforms were far from social 
democratic traditions represented in the Greek 
parliament by the very party hat negotiated them, 
PASOK. In this way, the government being elected 
on the basis of a large stimulus package (Gemenis 
1.  Two examples: 1. Bakoyannis left ND to found Demo-
cratic Alliance in November 2010 only to resolve it and 
return to New Democracy after the party’s failure to 
enter the parliament in May 2012 election. Samaras ne-
gotiated with Bakoyannis for her to lead the nationwide 
list of New Democracy, and thus secure a place in the 
parliament. 2. As a result of voting against the PASOK 
Party line for the second memorandum ex-minister 
Katseli was expelled from PASOK and founded the 
short-lived Social Agreement party. The May 2012 elec-
tion did not offer a parliament entry to this party.
247The Euro Crisis & the State of European DemocracySection I
2012), ended up going against its ideology and its 
programmatic positions. 
The main opposition party, New Democracy, 
came from the Christian Democratic/ Conserva-
tive traditions. In economic left-right terms lib-
eral reforms were not undesirable by the party. 
However, what dominated was, on the one hand 
the strong focus on national identity of the newly 
elected leader, Samaras, (Nezi, Sotiropoulos and 
Toka 2010) and the strategic consideration of not 
get the blame for the government choice. As retro-
spective evaluations of the economy are expected 
to negatively impact the electoral performance of 
the incumbent (Nezi 2012) Samaras avoided as-
sociating his party with unpopular government 
choices. This approach towards the bailout agree-
ments changed once New Democracy became the 
first party in the parliament after the June 2012 
elections, allowing Samaras to become prime 
minister leading a tripartite coalition. This change 
brought the party closer to its expected liberal po-
sition on the economic left-right scale. 
The main parties of the left pole, KKE and SYRI-
ZA, remained true to their left wing positions by 
not supporting the bailout agreements on the ba-
Table 1: Party lines regarding the bailout agreement legislation. 
Memorandum 1 
(May 2010)
Midterm fiscal Plan
(June 2011)
Investiture Vote for 
Papademos Government
(November 2011)
Memorandum 2
(February 2012)
Memorandum 3 
(November 2012)
PASOK Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
ND No No Yes Yes Yes
SYRIZA No No No No No
KKE No No No No No
LAOS Yes No Yes Not present n/a
Democratic Left n/a No No No Abstain
Independent Greeks n/a n/a n/a n/a No
Golden Dawn n/a n/a n/a n/a No
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sis of the unpopular budget cuts and deeply neo-
liberal policies. SYRIZA’s splinter group, Demo-
cratic Left2, was more moderate than SYRIZA 
itself and became part of the tripartite govern-
ment headed by Samaras in June 2012. Thus, al-
though in the beginning it opposed the bailout 
agreements on ideological basis and potentially 
vote-seeking considerations, in 2012 became of-
fice seeking and although not openly support-
ing, it tolerated the bailout agreement. LAOS, the 
populist right wing party, showed a office-seeking 
approach. Although it is mainly associates with 
ethnic values (Georgiadou 2008) putting the ‘na-
tion’ first in every policy decision (Karatzaferis 
2010) LAOS chose to present itself as a respon-
sible party in times of crises, a trustworthy coali-
tion partner. This strategy led to the participation 
of LAOS in the Papademos care-take government 
with one minister, one deputy-minister and two 
junior ministers. This success was short-lived as 
the double 2012 election did not allow LAOS to 
enter the parliament. Its voters did not appreciate 
the party’s change of values and policies.
2.  Founded June 27th 2010 as a protest against SYRIZA 
anti-EU ideological turn
Figure 1: Left-right and IMF/EU bailout positions of Greek Parties in 2011
Source: Gemenis and Nezi 2012
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As we mentioned above, the party lines were bro-
ken many times in each of these legislative at-
tempts. The MPs resigning the whip either formed 
splinter groups or switched parties. These changes 
may reflect ideological differences within the par-
ties that the cartel system was until then suppress-
ing or a personal strategy of the MP to survive the 
electoral results of the crisis. In any case the crisis 
became the catalyst of change. The left-right divi-
sion became less important and the competition 
in the two elections of 2012 polarized between the 
two extremes of a new dimension: the IMF/EU 
bailout dimension. 
Figure 1 shows the positions of political parties 
on the dominant two dimensional space as it 
developed after the first bailout agreements. 
It is taken from the Gemenis and Nezi (2012) 
technical report of the expert survey run in that 
year introducing for the first time the bailout 
dimension. It places all the relevant parties at 
the time showing also inter-coder reliability 
intervals.  It is clear that more moderate parties 
on the left-right dimension are supporting a 
bailout agreement with the participation of IMF/
EU while the parties located in the extremes 
are against the bailout agreements preferring 
a ethno-centric solution to the crisis. This rule 
has of course exceptions. LAOS Democratic Left 
(DIMAR in the Figure) and the Greens are more 
pro bailout than it would be expected considering 
their position towards the edges of the left-right 
dimension. New Democracy is also a floating party 
at the 2011 period, that is neither for not against 
the bailout, trying not to sound too extreme as to 
lose credibility neither to be too supportive as to 
get the blame for the economic meltdown of the 
country.
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3. The rise of the “other dimension”
The pro- and anti-bailout dimension did not ap-
pear in a political vacuum. Previous studies have 
shown that apart from the dominant left-right 
division in Greece, there was an emerging new 
politics dimension that was structured along the 
lines of centrism vs. radicalism. Gemenis and Di-
nas (2010) show that the Greek party system was 
distinguished along the lines of this new dimen-
sion between the centripetal political forces on the 
one hand and the extreme right and left parties on 
the other. Using an innovative way of coding party 
manifestos they captured the Greek political space 
in the 2004 European election based on three di-
mensions one of which was ‘Cultural Identity’. It 
included issues concerning the cultural identity 
of the EU such as nationalism, immigration, ethi-
cal issues, and civil liberties. The ‘European’ ex-
treme was populated by PASOK and SYRIZA (or 
rather its predecessor party SYN) closely followed 
by New Democracy. The ‘national’ extreme rep-
resented the ‘underdog culture’ (Diamandouros 
1993) occupied by LAOS and KKE. Although not 
claiming to measure post-materialsm the authors 
are convinced they capture party positions on the 
‘libertarian-authoritarian’ division.
Similar findings were reported by Halkiopoulou 
et. al (2012), who identified a new cleavage in 
Greek politics  between mainstream and radical 
parties. This study further refines the content of 
this ‘centrism vs. radicalism’ division by discon-
necting the ‘libertarian-authoritarian’ division, 
which they accept to follow the same lines as the 
left-right division, from the ‘nationalism vs. in-
ternationalism’ division. Radical parties of both 
sides of the left-right spectrum embrace nation-
alist ideals. This nationalism leads them to a eu-
rosceptiscism, together with a mixture of self-rule 
and national self-determination. Radical left and 
radical right parties embrace a similar stance on 
economic and territorial nationalism, but they are 
different when it comes to ethnic and cultural na-
tionalism, hence their difference in the ‘libertari-
an-authoritarian’ division. 
Based on this analysis we 
hypothesize:
Hypothesis 1: The bailout dimension of contesta-
tion is the evolution of the pre-existing ethno-cen-
tric vs. cosmopolitan dimension
Hypothesis 2: Parties that after having chosen a 
position on the old ethno-centric vs. cosmopolitan 
dimension switched sides as it transformed itself 
into the bailout dimension, were punished elector-
ally. 
This ethno-centric protectionist ‘underdog’ cul-
ture incorporates an ideological framework 
combining economic nationalism and a territo-
rial integrity which leads to positions very hos-
tile to the EU. This combination of ideologies is 
not a Greek phenomenon. De Vries and Edwards 
(2009) showed that radical parties across Europe 
both from the right and the left can adopt nation-
alist positions that effectively swing citizens opin-
ions against European integration. This behaviour 
of small challenger parties is well documented 
by theories of issue evolution and manipulation. 
These show that ‘political losers’ in the party sys-
tem can advance their position by introducing a 
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new issue dimension. The theory of ‘issue evo-
lution’ by Carmines and Stimson’s (1986, 1989) 
argues that party-losers that do not stand real 
chances of gaining office promote conflict on new 
issue dimensions. This is a strategic choice that 
can only be successful if the issue is salient and 
if voters are aware of position differences and de-
cide to behave electorally on the basis of the new 
polarization. De Vries and Hobolt 2012 show that 
these strategies are common also in European 
multiparty systems especially among those small 
challenger parties. 
The cartel party system of Greece is a hybrid be-
tween a multi party and a two party system that 
especially promotes entrepreneurial strategies. As 
the two cartel parties occupy the central space and 
monopolize the 80-90% of the popular vote since 
the early 1980s, small parties have huge incentives 
to introduce dimensional conflict. De Vries and 
Hobolt (2012: 257) showed that challenger parties 
are in general those holding losing positions on 
the dominant dimension of political competition. 
The promotion of divisions such as the ‘authori-
tarian-libertarian’ or the ‘nationalism-cosmopol-
itanism’ divisions shifts the competition towards 
the side of values and allows breathing space for 
the losing parties of the left-right dimension. 
These issue entrepreneurial strategies normally do 
not result into large scale realignments within the 
system, but they influence voters alignments and, 
at the end of the day election outcomes. Thus it is 
a matter of electoral survival for small challenger 
parties at the fringes of the party system to mobi-
lize new issues, even if they only appeal to a small 
cohort of voters (Hug, 2001; Kitschelt, 1988). 
The new bailout political division appeared sud-
denly, because of the external to the party system 
events of the crisis. Focusing on the dimensional-
ity of this political division, De Vries and Marks 
(2012) would ask: Is this dimensionality rooted in 
fundamental social conflicts or is it simply being 
founded in strategic considerations of party com-
petition? They define the strategic approach to 
dimensionality as a politicization of ‘a previously 
non-salient event, policy issue, or societal conflict 
and attempt to gear up public attention over this 
controversy’ (De Vries and Marks, 2012: 187). 
Greek political parties embraced the new bailout 
conflict seeing it as an opportunity to fulfil their 
goals. They positioned themselves strategically ex-
pecting that this time the public will not only per-
ceive their difference to the mainstream parties, 
but it will also care about this difference, fulfilling 
the basic assumption for large scale mobilization 
(Carmines and Stimson, 1989: 161). The pro-anti 
bailout dimensionality was, thus, initially found-
ed in strategic considerations of party competi-
tion with clear cut goals of either vote- office- or 
policy- seeking nature (Gemenis and Nezi, 2012). 
This was a clear case of a top-down case of dimen-
sionality.
Their definition of a sociological approach to 
dimensionality requires political parties as pro-
grammatic organizations that mobilize and are 
responsive to ideologically self-selected activists 
and leaders as well as to voters. These voters are 
expected to have durable social characteristics, 
leading them to identify with certain political 
parties and not with others (De Vries and Marks, 
2012: 186).
We argue that this ethno-centric vs. cosmopoli-
tan dimension was initially a strategic choice of 
radical parties in the two extremes of the left-right 
spectrum, but the crisis created the conditions for 
a fully fledged –fundamental social conflict touch-
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ing upon the very financial survival of several so-
cietal groups. As the 2012 elections despite their 
tremendous impact on the Greek party system, 
are only one point in time we hypothesize that we 
are finding ourselves in a transition period mov-
ing from strategic to sociological approach of a di-
mension of conflict. The financial crisis will work 
as the catalyst event that transforms a strategic 
policy division into a political cleavage. Based on 
this analysis we can now hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 3: Voters in the 2012 May and June 
elections mobilized on the basis of the new ethno-
centric vs. cosmopolitan dimension
4. Data and Methods
In order to test the hypothesis this paper uses data 
from different sources measuring party positions. 
Specifically we use expert coding data from the EU 
Profiler (2009) as an indication of the positions of 
political parties around the time of the 2009 Euro-
pean elections. Party positions on 2011 are taken 
from the Gemenis and Nezi (2012) expert survey. 
Finally party positions at the time of the two 2012 
elections are taken by the ‘Choose for Greece’ 
(2012) voting advice application, which adopted 
an innovative coding system increasing intra-
coder reliability. As these data use distinct scales 
we did not attempt to standardize them. Thus we 
need to focus on the clustering of political parties 
and their ranking within a scale. Absolute posi-
tions cannot be compared. 
We place political parties on three dimensions: 
1. European Union 2. Foreign Policy and 3. IMF/
EU Bailout. In this way we try to identify whether 
the bailout dimension of contestation is following 
along the lines of the pre-existing ethno-centric 
vs. cosmopolitan dimension. In conjunction with 
these data we use electoral results from the last 
four Greek elections in order to identify voter mo-
bilization on the left-right and ethno-centric vs. 
cosmopolitan dimension of contestation.
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5. Results
Figure 1: Positions on the Debt and Budget Crisis in 2011 (Source Expert Survey)
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In the first part of the results we focus on the con-
tent and morphology of the bailout dimension of 
contestation. Figure one gives on the x axis the 
positions of political parties in 2011 (source: Ge-
menis and Nezi 2012) given their left-right posi-
tion on the y axis. There are two clear clusters in 
the figure. On the one extreme “strongly in favour 
of a solution outside the EU/IMF framework” 
there are left wing ANTARSYA, KKE, SYRIZA 
and extreme right wing Golden Dawn. On the 
other extreme “strongly in favour of a solution 
within the EU/IMF framework we can find liberal 
DRASSI and Democratic Alliance (short-lived 
splinter group from New Democracy) as well as 
socio-democratic PASOK. Around the middle of 
the scale find themselves the Greens and Dem. Al-
liance (on the anti EU/IMF solution side) and ND 
and LAOS (on the pro EU/IMF solution side). 
254The Euro Crisis & the State of European DemocracySection I
Figure 2: Positions on the Debt and Budget Crisis in 2012 (Source VAA)
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Figure two presents the results on the same di-
mension from 2012 as they were measured by the 
‘Choose for Greece’ VAA coding. As this dimen-
sion is a scale produced by 14 items there is more 
dispersion. We find however similar patterns. On 
the anti-EU/IMF solution extreme of the scale are 
left wing ANTARSYA, KKE, SYRIZA followed by 
the extreme right wing Golden Dawn and the 
populist New Democracy splinter group Inde-
pendent Greeks. Nearer the centre of the scale are 
the Greens, LAOS, Dem. Left and Social Pact 
(short-lived PASOK splinter group). Crossing to 
the pro-EU/IMF solution side of the dimension 
New Democracy is found near the centre, while 
the extreme pro-EU/IMF solution cluster consists 
as before of liberal DRASSI, Democratic Alliance, 
and PASOK with the addition of a short-lived lib-
eral party (Reconstruct Greece). 
In order for this dimension to be an evolution of 
the pre-existing ethno-centric vs. cosmopolitan 
dimension, a similar clustering must be in place 
on the two other indicative dimensions: Foreign 
policy and EU integration/membership. Parties 
positioning themselves as opposing the EU/IMF 
solution to the crisis should position themselves 
as ethno-centric and anti-EU, while the opposite 
must be true for the parties choosing a pro-EU/
IMF solution to the crisis. They are expected to be 
more cosmopolitan and pro-EU. 
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Figure 3: Positions on the European Union in 2009 (Source: EU Profiler) 
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Figures 3 to 6 show the position of political parties 
on the EU dimension (unification and member-
ship) in 2009, 2011 and 2012 taken from our three 
data sources. Figure three presents the positioning 
of political parties on the European Unification 
issue prior to the 2009 European election, when 
only few suspected the crisis to come. On the pos-
itive extreme of the scale (European Unification 
should be strengthened) are clustered PASOK and 
the Greens as well as New Democracy and SYRI-
ZA a bit closer to the centre of the scale. The nega-
tive extreme of the scale (European Unification 
has gone too far) finds KKE and LAOS clustered 
close together even though they come from op-
posite sides of the left-right scale. 
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Figure 4: Positions on the European Union in 2011 (Source: Expert Survey) 
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Figure 4 presents the same scale for 2011. More 
parties have become relevant as the crisis is taking 
its course. We find again PASOK and the Greens 
on the pro European Unification extreme of the 
scale. DRASSI and Dem. Alliance, the two liberal 
parties, join PASOK and New Democracy keeps 
its position closer to the centre of the scale. An 
important entry in the party system is the case of 
Democratic Left, which spitted off SYRIZA in June 
2010 and placed itself on the positive extreme of 
the scale. It is clear that Dem. Left includes all pro 
EU forces of SYRIZA, as SYRIZA now moves his 
position to the anti- European Unification side of 
the scale. SYRIZA and LAOS are moderately anti 
European Unification, and the extreme is again 
occupied by KKE, joined now with ANTARSYA 
and Golden Dawn that have become politically 
relevant due to the crisis.
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Figure 5: Positions on the European Union in 2012 (Source: VAA)
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Figure 5 takes a different stance, presenting this 
time the question whether Greece should remain 
in or leave the European Union. The figure shows 
the positions of political parties at the time of the 
May and June 2012 elections. The positive extreme 
of the scale finds clustered all parties previously 
showing pro-EU positions (PASOK, the Greens, 
New Democracy, DRASSI, Democratic Left, and 
Democratic Alliance). Additional parties to the 
cluster are the new entries Social Pact (short-lived 
PASOK splinter group) and Reconstruct Greece 
(short-lived liberal party), and LAOS that now 
has switched sides on the EU issue. LAOS is in 
2011 member of the Papademos government and 
is trying to present itself as a trustworthy govern-
ment partner. It has put its office-seeking consid-
erations ahead of its vote-seeking considerations. 
This is the case of a party described by Hypothesis 
2. A party that after having chosen a position on 
the old ethno-centric vs. cosmopolitan dimension 
switched sides as it transformed itself into the bail-
out dimension (see also Figure 1). We expect thus 
to see that LAOS is punished electorally. SYRIZA 
and Independent Greeks are placed in the neither/
no position avoiding to truly shaping an opinion. 
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We now move our attention to another aspect of 
the ethno-centric vs. cosmopolitan dimension, 
foreign policy. Figures 6 and 7, show two differ-
ent foreign policy questions, one for 2009 and 
one for 2011. Unfortunately the data could not 
provide the same question across time. The 2009 
EU Profiler data offer a question on whether the 
EU has helped Greece to achieve its foreign policy 
goals. We expect this question to be a mixture of 
a pro-anti EU indicator and a ethno-centric/cos-
mopolitan indicator. Indeed in Figure 6 there is a 
similar pattern as in the other 2009 EU position 
Figure (3). We find PASOK and the Greens clus-
tered on the positive extreme of the scale (EU has 
helped Greece to achieve its foreign policy goals). 
New Democracy follows on the positive side of 
the scale but closer to the centre. SYRIZA is am-
bivalent in the middle of the scale (neither/nor) 
demonstrating perhaps the ideological struggle 
between its two fractions that came to split into 
two parties in 2010. On the negative side of the 
scale we find KKE (EU has not helped Greece) and 
more moderately placed LAOS. 
Figure 6: Positions on Foreign Policy 2009 (Source: EU Profiler) 
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Figure 7: Positions on Foreign Policy 2011 (Source: Expert Survey) 
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Figure 7 shows a different foreign policy approach 
placing parties on a dimension ethnocentric ver-
sus cosmopolitan foreign policy approach. Al-
though the wording is different, practically this 
scale measures the same concept. As we see for 
2011 political parties have similar placements as 
in Figure 6 but also as on the EU dimension (see 
Figures 3-5). On the cosmopolitan extreme of 
the scale we find again PASOK and the Greens, 
accompanied as expected with the liberal forces 
DRASSI and Democratic Alliance and the SYRI-
ZA splinter group, Democratic Left. At the time 
we find also SYRIZA placed moderately on the 
cosmopolitan side while extreme left ANTARSYA 
and main opposition party New Democracy are 
found in the middle of the scale. On the ethno-
centric approach Golden Dawn and LAOS are on 
the extreme of the scale, while KKE because of its 
communist internationalist past is more moder-
ately ethnocentric.
Based on these placements we can be sure that to 
an extent the bailout dimension is the evolution 
of the pre-existing ethno-centric vs. cosmopolitan 
dimension (Hypothesis 1).  We find consistently 
PASOK, and the small liberal parties DRASSI Re-
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construct Greece and Democratic Alliance con-
sistently on the pro-bailout side, as well as the pro-
EU and cosmopolitan side. New Democracy has 
placed itself on the positive side but rather close to 
the centre of the spectrum both on the EU/ethno-
centric-cosmopolitan dimensions as well as on the 
bailout dimensions. We should keep in mind that 
from 2009 until 2012 we are focusing on a more 
conservative period of New Democracy, focusing 
rather on national pride. The other extreme of an-
ti-bailout is consistently populated by parties like 
KKE, ANTARSYA, SYRIZA, Golden Dawn and 
Independent Greeks. All but SYRIZA are consis-
tently placed also on the anti-ethnocentric side. 
This shows that political parties have not invented 
their positions on the bailout agreement but they 
relied on pre-existing ideological positioning on 
the EU/ethnocentric-cosmopolitan division. 
We have however two deviant cases: SYRIZA and 
LAOS. SYRIZA was undergoing a period of ideo-
logical redefinition that coincided with the out-
break of the crisis. After the June 2010 split of the 
party that resulted in the creation of Democratic 
Left, SYRIZA embarked on a journey of radical-
ization until the June 2012 election. Thus what we 
see depicted here is the slow but sure trajectory of 
SYRIZA from a moderate cosmopolitan position 
to a moderate ethnocentric position. This posi-
tional change is not empty of vote-seeking con-
siderations. It is a strategic choice that was greatly 
rewarded making SYRIZA the main opposition 
party after the June 2012 election. 
LAOS on the other hand, despite being placed 
on the anti-EU/ethnocentric side of dimension it 
chose to support the Papademos government and 
put forward its office seeking considerations. Thus 
it is placed in 2011 on the pro EU/IMF solution 
(Figure 1). Despite its swift change in the 2012 
election, showing again an anti EU/IMF solution 
preference (Figure 2), LAOS was electorally pun-
ished. In fact it failed to gain a seat in parliament 
in either the May or the June 2012 elections. We 
see, thus, that switching sides is did not always 
have the same results.  Parties that after having 
chosen a position on the old ethno-centric vs. cos-
mopolitan dimension switched sides as it trans-
formed itself into the bailout/ EU/IMF solution 
dimension where only electorally punished if they 
moved from ethnocentric to cosmopolitan and 
not the other way around. The reason here is not 
ideological, but represents the cost of unpopular 
reforms. Political parties on the cosmopolitan side 
had to bear the weight of budget cuts and struc-
tural changes and for that reason they were pun-
ished electorally. Thus hypothesis 2 is only condi-
tionally accepted. 
Our last hypothesis argues that voters in the 2012 
May and June elections mobilized on the basis of 
the new ethno-centric vs. cosmopolitan dimen-
sion. Based on the above analysis of the ethno-
centric versus cosmopolitan approach we divided 
political parties into two blocks. Table 2 shows 
the traditional Left/Right division as well as the 
division into an ethnocentric block and a cosmo-
politan block. The ethnocentric block consists of 
the parties clustering themselves on the negative 
side of the EU, foreign policy and EU/IMF bail-
out scales. The cosmopolitan block consists of the 
parties clustering on the positive side of the EU, 
foreign policy and EU/IMF bailout scales. Based 
on the party categorization of Table 2 we move 
then to calculate the electoral share of each block 
in the elections from September 2007 onwards 
(Table 3). The results show us that the left-right 
division is still dominant. The electorate is divid-
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ing almost in half between the left and the right 
block in every election. The ethnocentric-cosmo-
politan divide however behaves in a very different 
way. Although it manages to mobilize 17% of the 
voters in 2007 and 18.1% in 2009 the vast majority 
remains on the cosmopolitan side of the cleavage. 
We find though that an explosion of this division’s 
relevance happens in the 2012 May and June elec-
tions, where the voters divide themselves in half 
in the same way they do for the left-right divide. 
This confirms our third hypothesis showing that 
there as a significant mobilization of the popula-
tion in terms of the ethnocentric versus cosmo-
politan division. 
Table 2: Party Blocks
Left/Right Division Nationalist/Cosmopolitan Division
Left Block Right Block Ethno-centric Block Cosmopolitan Block
PASOK ND SYRIZA PASOK
KKE LAOS KKE ND
SYRIZA Dem. Alliance ANTARSYA Dem. Alliance
ANTARSYA Rec. Greece Ind. Greeks Dem. Left
Dem. Left Golden Dawn Golden Dawn Greens
Soc. Pact DRASSI LAOS
Greens Ind. Greeks DRASSI
Rec. Greece
Table 3: Election Results by Party Blocks
Left/Right Division Nationalist/Cosmopolitan Division
Left Block Right Block Ethno-centric Block Cosmopolitan Block
September 2007 52.34 45.64 16.99 80.99 
October 2009 58.57 39.85 18.06 79.91 
May 2012 49.63 45.82 44.98 51.66 
June 2012 51.2 47.26 46.21 52.25
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6. Conclusion
The literature shows that entrepreneur parties 
are more likely to be small parties with nothing 
to lose (De Vries and Hobolt, 2012). The case of 
Greece presents a unique case in point where a 
secondary dimension used by smaller challenger 
parties crossed the boundaries of being a “chal-
lenger issue” and became not only a “mainstream 
issue” bu the main dimension of contestation pro-
ducing a government on the one side of it and an 
the main opposition on the other. The secondary 
dimension of ethnocentric versus cosmopolitan 
was transformed through the major event of the 
Greek crisis into the bailout EU/IMF dimension. 
This increased the people who cared about this 
political issue, and forced many more people to 
incorporate it in their considerations and make 
it relevant to vote choices. Ultimately it was this 
dimension that affected the aggregate electoral 
choices and electoral outcome for the 2012 elec-
tions. This underlying political division became a 
cleavage once the citizens mobilized along these 
lines. Government and opposition were until the 
euro crisis competing along the left-right lines, 
while the crisis brought the old government and 
opposition parties on the one side of the centrism 
vs. radicalism cleavage giving way to a radical, na-
tion-centric, anti-European party to become the 
main opposition party. 
From the perspective of spatial voting theory as 
Enelow and Hinich (1984) put it in a situation 
like this voters should be more likely to vote for 
a party that is closer on that dimension, all other 
things being equal. The open question for research 
remains open: How did citizens shift their voting 
criteria from considerations on the left-right di-
mensions to considerations on the bailout IMF/
EU dimension? In other words, when do ‘chal-
lenger issues’ become ‘mainstream issues’? An-
other consideration for future research is to disen-
tangle the party positions on the IMF/EU bailout 
dimension and the voting behaviour around this 
division from the effect of government and oppo-
sition. Parties with governing potential chose to 
support the IMF/EU bailout agreement and they 
where electorally punished, while those who chose 
to oppose it gained significant shares of votes. The 
question remains to what extent this alignment is 
based on a simple anti-government feeling or if it 
has deeper roots in the ideological ethnocentric 
vs. cosmopolitan dimension, as this paper claims.
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1. Introduction
Fiscal Councils, as technical bodies in charge of 
monitoring and assessing the compliance with 
budgetary, fiscal or even macroeconomic indica-
tors and acting independently from political (and 
thus fiscal) authorities,2 have been established 
since the 1960s, albeit in a minority of countries.3 
2. According to the set of ‘Principles for Independent Fis-
cal Institutions’ drafted within the OECD framework in 
2012, Fiscal Councils are ‘publicly funded independent 
bodies under the statutory authority of the executive or 
the legislature which provide non-partisan oversight 
and analysis of, and/or advice on, fiscal policy and per-
formance’.
3. The most notable example being perhaps the U.S. Con-
gressional Budget Office, in operation since 1975: see 
Nooree Lee (2008), Congressional Budget and Impound-
ment Control Act of 1974, Reconsidered, in Briefing Paper 
no 34, Harvard Law School, University of Harvard, p. 1 
ff. and Philip G. Joyce (2011), The Congressional Budget 
Office: Honest Numbers, Powers, and Policy Making, 
Washington D.C., Georgetown University Press, p. 207 
ff. In Europe, most Fiscal Councils have been estab-
lished since 2009, thus in connection with the financial 
crisis. See OECD, Parliamentary Budget Officials and 
Independent Fiscal Institutions, 4th annual meeting, 
Background document no 3 for the Session on Discus-
sion on Draft Principles for Independent Fiscal Institu-
tions, Paris, 23-24 February 2012, p. 2.
Although scholars and international and suprana-
tional organisations have always underlined the 
importance of such institutions for having sound 
public accounts and sustainable growth, it was 
only in the new century that the financial and the 
Euro crises gave the most significant input for the 
setting up of Fiscal Councils, in particular in the 
European Union (EU) Member States.4
4. See Lars Calmfors (2011), What should Fiscal Councils 
do?, CESifo Working Paper No. 3382, March 2011, avail-
able at: www.cesifo.org/wp and Sergio Fabbrini (2012), 
I quattro doveri della politica verso i cittadini, in Il So-
le24Ore, 19 September, p. 1. As for the position of the 
International Monetary Fund, see Anthony Annett et 
al. (2005), Reforming the Stability and Growth Pact, in 
IMF Policy Discussion Paper, 05/2, available at: http://
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/pdp/2005/pdp02.pdf, 
and Manmohan S. Kumar and Teresa Ter-Minassian, 
eds. (2007), Promoting Fiscal Discipline, Washington 
D.C., International Monetary Fund; the OECD recom-
mended the establishment of Fiscal Councils in several 
Economic Surveys by Country, available at: http://www.
oecd.org/eco/surveys; in the EU the European Central 
Bank and the European Commission have always sup-
ported the setting up of such institutions: see, for exam-
ple, European Central Bank (2010), Reinforcing Econom-
ic Governance in the Euro Area, 10 June, p. 7 ff., and Eu-
ropean Commission (2010), Enhancing Economic Policy 
In the last few years both national governments 
and EU institutions have made the establishment 
of Fiscal Councils in the Member States compul-
sory. Indeed, Fiscal Councils have been identified 
as one of the tools for limiting the growth of pub-
lic deficits and debts, favouring the adoption of 
more responsible and technically-meditated po-
litical decisions.
To date, the literature has mainly focused on the 
impact of Fiscal Councils for maintaining tight 
fiscal discipline and on the effectiveness of their 
role as ‘watchdogs’, examining their independence 
from the fiscal authorities, namely, the parlia-
ment and the executive. However, this debate 
seems vitiated by the bias of treating these two 
branches of government as though they under-
took the same role within the budgetary and fiscal 
decision-making process. Instead, a more care-
ful look at the relevant national discipline reveals 
that, in parliamentary forms of governments, such 
as those of most EU Member States, the national 
parliaments are usually less influential on fiscal 
decisions and less equipped with information on 
Coordination for Stability, Growth and Jobs – Tools for 
Stronger EU Economic Governance, COM(2010) 367/2, 
Brussels.
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fiscal policy than the executives.5 This evidence is 
further strengthened by the fact that the European 
measures of the new economic governance, urg-
ing tighter fiscal discipline, in principle reduce the 
room that national parliaments have for manoeu-
vre and, instead, increase the degree of inter-gov-
ernmentalism of the decision-making process.6
Moreover, the position of Fiscal Councils needs 
to be framed within the particular context of the 
EU and of its Member States, in which national 
parliaments have normally been considered as the 
‘latecomers’ or the ‘losers’ of the European integra-
tion process.7 Since the Treaties of Maastricht and 
5. See, for example, Riccardo Pelizzo et al (2005), The Role 
of Parliaments in the Budget Process, Washington DC, 
World Bank Institute.
6. On the ‘new wave’ of inter-governmentalism brought 
by the new economic governance, see Paolo Ponzano 
(2011), Méthode intergouvernementale ou méthode com-
munautaire: une querelle sans intérêt?, in Les Brefs the 
Notre Europe, n. 23, p. 2-3, Uwe Puetter (2012), Europe’s 
deliberative intergovernmentalism: the role of the Coun-
cil and European Council in EU economic governance’, 
in Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 19, n. 2, p. 161-
178, and Sergio Fabbrini (2013), Intergovernmentalism 
and Its Outcomes: The Implications of the Euro Crisis 
on the European Union, in LUISS School of Government 
Working Paper Series, n. 1, forthcoming.
7. The expressions ‘losers’ and ‘latecomers’ referred to 
Amsterdam, and most evidently since the Treaty 
of Lisbon, however, national parliaments have 
gradually experienced an upgrade of the their role 
in the EU. National parliaments have constantly 
transformed and adapted themselves, from their 
marginalisation,8 then Europeanisation,9 and fi-
nally to their rehabilitation and strengthening in 
the EU.10 The establishment of Fiscal Councils, 
independent of, but accountable to, parliaments, 
can possibly enhance the role of parliamentary in-
stitutions in the European framework and in the 
economic governance. Fiscal Councils can pro-
vide parliaments with a further source of infor-
mation, independent from the executive, whose 
national parliament in the EU are taken from Andreas 
Maurer & Wolfgang Wessels, eds. (2001), National Par-
liaments on their Ways to Europe. Losers or Latecomers?, 
Baden Baden, Nomos Verlag.
8. See Philipp Kiiver (2006), The National Parliaments in 
the European Union: a Critical View on EU Constitution 
building, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, p. 15 ff.
9. See, for example, Katrin Auel (2005), Introduction: The 
Europeanization of Parliamentary Democracy, in Jour-
nal of Legislative Studies, vol. 11, n. 3-4, p. 303-318.
10. On the rehabilitation, in prospects, of national Parlia-
ments in the EU, see John O’Brennan & Tapio Raunio, 
eds. (2007), National Parliaments within the enlarged 
European Union: from Victims of Integration to Com-
petitive Actors?, London-New York, Routledge.
legitimacy relies on the technical competence and 
the merit of its members. By monitoring the ex-
ecutive on the grounds of the financial effects of 
its policy options, by providing macroeconomic 
forecasts, and by making the results of their analy-
ses publicly available, Fiscal Councils are not only 
able to improve the credibility and the transpar-
ency of fiscal decisions, but they can also re-in-
force parliamentary ex ante scrutiny and oversight 
on budgetary matters, and, ultimately, the weight 
of the parliaments in European economic gover-
nance. In other words, depending on the consti-
tutional system and on the political culture of the 
Member State concerned, an independent Fiscal 
Council can also affect the parliament-executive 
relationship, in terms of inter-institutional bal-
ance and in terms of the outcomes of the current 
euro-national fiscal procedures.
Thus, set within the present debate on the chang-
ing role of national parliaments in the EU, the pa-
per is intended to examine, by means of a com-
parative analysis, the setting up of Fiscal Councils 
under the perspective of national representative 
assemblies, and tries to answers the following re-
search question: To what extent and under what 
conditions can Fiscal Councils contribute to im-
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prove the position of national parliaments within 
the framework of the European economic gover-
nance, in particular in their relationship with na-
tional executives?
In the end, the establishment of a re-inforced co-
operation between the parliament and the Fiscal 
Council can contribute to strengthen the inde-
pendence of the latter and to promote a more ef-
fective implementation of fiscal rules.
The paper is devised as follows. Section 2 consid-
ers the crucial feature of the independence of Fis-
cal Councils, to be assessed differently when look-
ing at the parliaments or at the executives; Section 
3 refers to the theoretical framework of the paper, 
the tension between the marginalisation and the 
enhancement of national parliaments in the EU, 
and how it is affected by the setting up of Fiscal 
Councils; Section 4 analyses how the European 
measures, either those in force or those whose 
adoption has been almost completed, can connect 
Fiscal Councils to national parliaments; Section 5 
analyses the setting up of Fiscal Councils in five 
case-studies, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and 
the UK, selected upon the basis of the institutional 
architecture in the national systems, of the rela-
tionship between the Fiscal Council and the par-
liament, and of the moment of creation of inde-
pendent fiscal agencies. Finally, Section 6 tries to 
draw the first conclusions about the effects of the 
establishment of Fiscal Councils on the position 
and the powers of national parliaments in the EU.
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2. Fiscal Councils... Independent from the 
Government or from the Parliament?
In describing the institutional features that Fis-
cal Councils, across countries, have in com-
mon, the literature has usually cast its attention 
on those fundamental rules which tend to grant 
such institutions a consistent degree of autonomy 
from the political bodies and non-partisanship. 
In particular, what has been clearly pointed out 
is that the mandate of the Councils must satisfy 
several criteria,11 concerning the nature of the 
agency’s mandate (which should be ‘unambigu-
ous and achievable, and the delegated responsibil-
ity should have an economic rationale’), the way 
in which the Council fulfils its tasks (it must be 
granted complete autonomy in carrying out its 
mission), and, above all, its relationship with the 
political sphere (which should make the Council 
fully independent of the governing institutions). 
The pre-requisite of the independence from po-
11. See Robert Hagemann (2010), Improving Fiscal Perfor-
mance through Fiscal Councils, in OECD - Economic De-
partment Working Paper n. 829, 9 December, available 
at: www.oecd.orf/Working_Papers, p. 14; Lars Calm-
fors (2011), What should Fiscal Councils do?, cit., p. 16 ff.
litical influence, in its turn, has been reflected in 
a variety of rules (the so-called ‘firewalls’), invest-
ing: the autonomy from politics in the Council’s 
appointment of members and staffing (which can 
be evaluated by looking at the nature of the ap-
pointees, at who makes the appointment, at the 
relationship of the appointees from politics and at 
the staffing rules and procedures);12 the formal in-
fluence exercised by the agency in the budget and 
fiscal process (in this field, what should be taken 
into consideration is the nature of the agency’s 
mandate, its policy objectives and its area of ac-
tivities, its influence on government activity and 
12. Lars Calmfors (2011), The Role of Independent Fiscal Pol-
icy Institutions, in CESifo Working Paper n. 3367, Febru-
ary 2011, available at: www.cesifo-group.org/wp, p. 19-
20; Lars Calmfors (2011), What Should Fiscal Councils 
Do?, cit., p. 16 has insisted on the possibility of achieving 
the independence of a Fiscal Council through: appoint-
ment procedures that seek to guarantee professionalism 
and the ground for appointment; long and non-renew-
able periods of office for the institution’s decision-mak-
ing body; restrictions on the government’s freedom to 
fire the members of the institution’s decision-making 
body.
its formal role in the budget process carried out 
by the parliament); the Council’s funding (which 
is supposed to grant the agency its own revenues 
and degree of autonomy in the management of its 
accounts), and the accountability rules (invest-
ing, above all, the ‘collective’ accountability of the 
Council in the face of the government and of the 
parliament).13
Most investigations of the functional and struc-
tural features which should characterise all Fiscal 
Councils are based upon a basic assumption: that 
a Council can potentially contribute to improved 
fiscal performance only if it is granted effective 
independence from both the government and the 
parliament. The main reason behind the creation 
of such an agency is, in fact, to be found in the op-
portunity to limit the political influence regarding 
the technical aspects of fiscal-policy formulation 
or monitoring, and to provide for macroeconomic 
forecasts free of any significant bias which, in their 
turn, may contribute to improve the transparen-
13. According to Lars Calmfors (Ibidem), ‘a council which 
is not held accountable in the short run may risk its in-
dependence in the long run’, as it may get into conflict 
with the government which may then want to restrict its 
independence or reformulate its tasks.
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cy of fiscal decisions and to increase the public 
awareness of the budgetary performance.14 In oth-
er terms, the creation of a Fiscal Council is justi-
fied by the decision to delegate some aspects of fis-
cal policy to an unelected, but accountable, body, 
thus creating an antidote to deficit bias;15 this does 
not imply a delegation of authority - with regard 
to the fiscal policy - to the fiscal agency, whose 
mandate is usually limited to the analysis and as-
sessment of fiscal developments and policies.16
14. Among other, see Robert Hagemann (2010), Improving 
Fiscal Performance through Fiscal Councils, cit., p. 10-11; 
Xavier Debrun & Manmohan S. Kumar (2007), The Dis-
cipline-Enhancing Role of Fiscal Institutions: Theory and 
Empirical Evidence, in J. Ayuso-i-Casals, S. Deroose, 
E. Flores & L. Moulin (eds.), European Economy - Eco-
nomic Papers, n. 275, April 2007, p. 32, and Tatiana Kir-
sanova, Campbell Leith & Simon Wren-Lewis (2007), 
Optimal Debt Policy, and an Institutional Proposal to 
Help its Implementation, ivi, p. 288 ff. Among the Italian 
literature, see Daniele Cabras (2012), Un Fiscal Council 
in Parlamento, in Federalismi.it, 17 October.
15. Xavier Debrun & Manmohan S. Kumar (2007), Fiscal 
Rules, Fiscal Councils and All that: Commitment De-
vices, Signaling Tools or Smokescreens?, in IMF Work-
ing Papers Series, 29 March, p. 479 ff., available at: www.
ssrn.com.
16. Xavier Debrun, David Hauner & Manmohan S. Kumar 
(2007), The Role for Fiscal Agencies, in M.S. Kumar, T.T. 
Minassian (eds.), cit., p. 107.
For these reasons, the so-called ‘independence’ 
factor is considered to be the necessary premise for 
enabling the agency to affect fiscal-policy choices, 
and, according to part of the literature, to contrib-
ute to improved fiscal performances.17 There are 
two ways to endow a Fiscal Council with effective 
independence:18 by building up a solid reputation 
for impartial and competent analysis; and by set-
ting up formal rules which protect the Council 
from external interference. As the first solution, 
based upon the technical reputation of the agency, 
is likely to take time, the second option is the one 
most often adopted when first establishing a Fiscal 
Council.
The above-described approach, which clearly in-
terprets the interaction of Fiscal Councils-elected 
bodies as a possible vulnus in the guarantee of the 
agency’s independence and seems to find wide-
spread favour in the literature, would need more 
cautious reflection. There is no doubt that any 
agency in charge of evaluating fiscal-policy formu-
lation and implementation requires full autonomy 
17. Xavier Debrun & Manmohan S. Kumar (2007), Fiscal 
Rules, Fiscal Councils, cit., p. 485 ff.
18. Lars Calmfors (2011), What should Fiscal Councils do?, 
cit., p. 13.
from the subject in charge of the policy-making 
process in parliamentary forms of government, 
i.e., the government: an adequate level of separa-
tion between the two institutions would turn the 
monitoring mechanism into a self-control activity 
devoid of real utility. This observation, however, 
cannot be completely applied to the relationship 
between Fiscal Councils and parliaments. From 
the functional point of view, the fiscal policy-mak-
ing does not fall completely within the domain of 
the legislative body, which, in this field, is usually 
invested with more control than decision-making 
power. At the same time, from a structural point 
of view, it is unequivocal that the parliament does 
not embody a single political position, as is the 
case of the government, but, through the confron-
tation between the majority and the opposition, is 
able to offer those democratic checks and balances 
which represent, in themselves, a guarantee of in-
dependence.19
19. See Petr Hedbávný, Ondřej Schneider, Jan Zápal (2005), 
A Fiscal Rule that Has Teeth: a Suggestion for a ‘Fiscal 
Sustainability Council’ Underpinned by the Financial 
Markets, in CESifo Working Paper n. 1499, July, p. 17 
ff., available at: www.ssrn.com. The authors, in fact, 
propose the creation, at the European Union level, of a 
Fiscal Sustainability Council (FSC) in order to contrib-
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For all these reasons, the present paper embraces 
a different approach to the relationship between 
Fiscal Councils and representative assemblies, 
based upon the idea that such interaction would 
not invalidate the fulfilment of the Fiscal Council’s 
mandate, but would, instead, enrich the overall 
functioning of the ex ante and ex post scrutiny20 
circuit.21 This perspective implies that the pre-req-
uisite of the Fiscal Council’s independence should 
ute to solve the bias of national governments excessive 
deficits. To work properly, the FSC ‘must be independ-
ent from regular political-cycle considerations, i.e., it 
must be shielded from member countries’ national gov-
ernments’. This remark does not prevent the authors 
from considering as recommended a close relationship 
between the FSC and the national Parliaments of the 
EU, which for instance should select and appoint FSC 
members.
20. In the present paper we use ‘oversight’ and ‘ex post scru-
tiny’ as synonym, when describing the control put in 
place by Parliaments on the implementation of the Ex-
ecutive’s policies.
21. Many Fiscal Councils exercise, at the same time, both 
a forecasting and a monitoring activity, which respec-
tively occupy the ex ante and the ex post stage. As ob-
served by John Kay (2010), A fiscal watchdog has no need 
of a crystal ball, in The Financial Times, 22 September, 
‘governments cannot be relied on both to set targets and 
to monitor compliance with these targets’; as a conse-
quence, the job which Fiscal Councils have, or should 
have, ‘is therefore more akin to audit than to forecasting’.
instead be described in terms of co-operation and 
mutual support between the agency and the par-
liament. In this regard, it can be argued that Fiscal 
Councils, particularly when they have strong ties 
with parliaments, can re-inforce the position of 
the latter – traditionally seen as weak actors – in 
national decision-making processes dealing with 
the EU and fiscal matters (Section 3).
The soundness of such a thesis is assessed by con-
sidering two different levels of analysis as relevant. 
First of all, attention is brought to the European 
norms concerning the establishment of fiscal 
agencies, evaluating whether the functional and 
structural requirements concerning the creation 
of such bodies take (and in what ways) the rela-
tionship with the parliament into consideration 
(Section 4). 
Secondly, some national experiences are deep-
ened, with the purpose of empirically assessing 
what the (formal and informal) interaction be-
tween the existing (and the forthcoming) Fiscal 
Councils and respective legislatures actually is 
(Section 5). In order to isolate the different fac-
tors which influence such a relationship, five na-
tional cases have been selected, representing, re-
spectively: two Fiscal Councils established long 
before the present the economic and financial cri-
sis, and characterised by a solid relationship with 
the executive (Germany and Belgium); the United 
Kingdom’s Office for Budget Responsibility, a fis-
cal agency created during the Eurozone crisis (but 
formally not as an adaptation to EU law) which is 
closely-related both to the parliament and to the 
government; and two newly-established fiscal in-
stitutions (Italy and France), created in order to 
comply with the EU requirements.
With the purpose of evaluating the relationship 
linking such fiscal institutions with the legislative 
branch, four elements are taken into account in 
considering national experiences: the role exer-
cised by the parliament in the appointment proce-
dures; the capacity of the Fiscal Council to inter-
act with the legislative process carried out at par-
liamentary level, and the procedures accompany-
ing the submission and discussion of the agency’s 
fiscal reports within the representative assemblies; 
the dependence of the Council’s funding on a de-
cision to be taken at parliamentary level; and the 
accountability rules which assure an evaluation 
of the elected assemblies with regard to the Fiscal 
Council’s activity.
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3. National Parliaments in the European 
Union: Marginalisation, Europeanisation, 
Revival?
Since the inception of the European Communi-
ties (EC), national parliaments have not fulfilled a 
primary role in the integration process. They have 
not been placed in the position in which they have 
real weight and actually count: when they were di-
rectly represented in the Parliamentary Assembly 
of the EC, this inter-parliamentary institution was 
simply a consultative body; after the first election 
of the European Parliament (EP) and, at least, un-
til the 1990s, national parliaments were kept apart 
from the new decision-making powers assigned 
to the ‘Assembly for Europe’.22 National legisla-
tures could prove to be effectively influential only 
22. The expression here is drawn from David Marquand 
(1979), Parliament for Europe, London, Jonathan Cape, 
p. 64-66, who advocated for the EP’s direct elections 
and empowerment. Yves Mény (2011), Can Europe be 
Democratic? Is it Feasible? Is it Necessary? Is the Present 
Situation Sustainable?, in Fordham International Law 
Journal, vol. 34, n. 5, p. 1297, affirms that the EP ‘plays a 
role that many national Parliaments could envy’.
at the moment of voting the authorisation to ratify 
European treaties and their revisions.23
However, in the early 1990s, it was argued that 
the position of national parliaments in the EU 
was extremely weak.24 Because of the principles 
of supremacy and of direct effect, the laws at first 
approved by national parliaments can be super-
seded by European norms,25 provided that they 
23. This was the case of the veto opposed by the French As-
semblée Nationale to the Treaty on the European De-
fence Community in 1954. Such veto led to the failure 
of the project of a European Defence Community in the 
years to come.
24. For instance, before the Treaty of Maastricht was draft-
ed, at the end of 1991, Joseph H.H. Weiler (1991), The 
Transformation of Europe, in The Yale Law Journal, 
vol. 100, n. 8, Symposium: International Law, p. 2430, 
affirmed that ‘the executive branches of the Member 
States often act together as a binding legislator outside 
the decisive control of any parliamentary chamber’.
25. See the ‘Factortame saga’ and its impact on the UK prin-
ciple of parliamentary sovereignty: in particular the de-
cision of the Court of Justice on The Queen v Secretary 
fall within the remit of the EU. Moreover, when 
European legislative acts were enacted, the par-
liaments in the Member States ‘could not have 
second thoughts or control their content at the 
national, implementing level’, nor was a ‘tight ex 
ante control by national Parliaments on the activi-
ties of ministers in Community fora’26 effectively 
in place at that time. However, some parliaments 
were (and possibly are) less marginal than oth-
ers: an exception was, for instance, the Danish 
parliament.27 Its model of binding mandate to the 
executive before the adoption of decisions in the 
Council of Ministers of the EC has inspired sev-
of State for Transport, ex parte: Factortame Ltd and oth-
ers, Case C-213/89 of 19 June 1990, ECR I-2433; the sub-
sequent decision of the House of Lords of 11 October 
1990, 2 LLR 365 and the following decision of the Court 
of Justice, Case C-221/89 of 25 July 1991, ECR I-3905.
26. See Joseph H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 
cit., p. 2430.
27. Françoise Mendel (1980), The Role of Parliament in 
Foreign Affairs in Denmark, in A. Cassese (ed.) Parlia-
mentary Control over Foreign Policy, Verlag-New York, 
Springer, p. 53-57 and, more recently, Finn Laursen 
(2001), The Danish Folketing and Its European Affairs 
Committee: Strong Players in the National Policy Cycle, 
in: A. Maurer & W. Wessels (eds.), National Parliaments 
on their Ways to Europe. Losers or Latecomers?, cit., p. 
99-116.
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eral other parliaments, although this mechanism 
was not exactly replicated in other Member States.
It is widely-acknowledged that parliaments are 
probably the most adaptable institutions to the 
changes in constitutional arrangements.28 In spite 
of the century-old thesis of their institutional 
decline,29 not only do parliaments exist in any 
democratic system, within or beyond the national 
level of government,30 but they have also been able 
to undertake a variety of functions that has never 
been matched by any other institutions,31 thus re-
28. On the factors that favour and limit the institutional 
change, see Douglass C. North (1990), Institutions, In-
stitutional Change and Economic Performance, Cam-
bridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 27 ff.
29. See James Bryce (1921), Modern democracies, vol. II, 
New York, Macmillan, p. 367.
30. The Inter-parliamentary Union, the international or-
ganization of Parliaments established in 1889, is com-
posed of 190 member Parliaments, of the United Na-
tions Member States, plus 10 associate members, which 
are regional or supranational Parliaments. See http://
www.ipu.org.
31. See Charles H. McIlwain (1947), Constitutionalism An-
cient and Modern, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 
rev. ed., p. 93 ff. and Phillip Norton (2010), La nature du 
contrôle parlementaire, in Pouvoirs, n. 134, p. 5. Parlia-
ments have acted as courts, as comptrollers and as leg-
islators and, under exceptional circumstances, such as 
inventing themselves at any time. With regard to 
the participation of national parliaments in the 
EU, again, a never-ending process of institutional 
adaptation has taken place, particularly when, af-
ter 1979, the parliaments lost their physical link-
age to European institutions through the Euro-
pean Parliament.32 This process, which has been 
described as ‘Europeanisation’, can be understood 
as a reaction to the national parliaments’ self-
perception of ‘marginalisation’ in the European 
decision-making process.33
revolutions, also as executive authorities. Recently, even 
an ‘international networking function’ has been recog-
nised to national Parliaments: see Tapio Raunio (2012), 
From the Margins of European Integration to the Guard-
ians of the Treaties? The Role of National Parliaments in 
the EU, in: S. Kröger & D. Friedrich, The Challenge of 
Democratic Representation in the European Union, Lon-
don, Palgrave MacMillan, p. 180. 
32. See Phillip Norton (1996), Introduction: Adapting to Eu-
ropean Integration, in P. Norton (ed.) National Parlia-
ments and the European Union, London, Routledge, p. 
1-11.
33. See Katrin Auel (2005), Introduction: The Europeaniza-
tion of Parliamentary Democracy, cit.; Robert Ladrech 
(2010), The Europeanisation of National Politics, Lon-
don, Palgrave Macmillan; Tapio Raunio & Matti Wiberg 
(2010), How to Measure the Europeanisation of National 
Legislature?, in Scandinavian Political Studies, vol. 33, n. 
1, p. 74-92; Astrid Spreitzer (2011), Measuring the Euro-
Thus, the ‘Europeanisation’ of national parlia-
ments, on the one hand, entails a form of emula-
tion of the most active legislatures – for example, 
the Danish Folketing and the UK House of Com-
mons and House of Lords; interestingly enough, 
in two traditionally Eurosceptic countries – for 
what concerns, for instance, the relationship be-
tween the parliament and the government in EU 
matters (conferral of a mandate, scrutiny of Eu-
ropean documents for addressing the executive’s 
conduct in the EU, and introduction of parlia-
mentary scrutiny reserve). Although, in principle, 
leading to a sort of convergence with regard to 
the model of parliamentary participation in EU 
affairs, in practice, ‘Europeanisation’ can also de-
termine differentiation amongst national systems. 
On the other hand, this phenomenon results in 
the attempt pursued by each parliament, strictly 
under the national perspective, to adapt its proce-
peanisation of national parliaments, paper presented at 
the International Workshop ‘Changing Modes of Par-
liamentary Representation’, organized by IPSA RCLS 
and RECON WP3, 14-15 October, Prague; and Ulrich 
Sedelmeier (2012), Europeanisation, in: E. Jones, A. 
Menon & S. Weatherill, (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of 
the European Union, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
p. 825-839.
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dures and organisation to the EU decision-mak-
ing process in the most suitable way to control 
and influence it. Throughout this adaptation pro-
cess, the procedures and the organisation adopted 
could also differ a great deal from one parliament 
to another, taking the institutional, the political 
and the social features of the Member State con-
cerned into account. This implies, for example, 
the choice of the shape and the composition of the 
parliamentary committee on European affairs or 
the preference for the schedule of parliamentary 
business that best accommodate the schedule of 
the European legislative process with the needs of 
the national context.34 Parliaments can be more or 
34. There is one further dimension of ‘Europeanisation’, 
concerning the impact of European Union on nation-
al policies, that is not analysed here, since the present 
paper, although focused on fiscal and budgetary poli-
cies, is intended to examine the setting up of Fiscal 
Councils in terms of institutional balance and of pos-
sible strengthening of national Parliaments rather than 
dealing with the effects of national Fiscal Councils on 
the actual implementation of those policies. On the ‘Eu-
ropeanisation’ of national policies, see Adrienne Héri-
tier, Dieter Kerwer, Christoph Knill, Dirk Lehmkuhl, 
Michael Teutsch & Cécile Douillet (2010), Differential 
Europe: The European Union Impact on National Policy-
making, Lanham, MD, Rowman & Littlefield, and Syl-
vain Brouard et al., eds. (2012), The Europeanization of 
less successful in their ‘Europeanisation’, depend-
ing on national constraints: thus, different levels 
of parliamentary ‘Europeanisation’ do exist.
These two dimensions of the ‘Europeanisation’ 
of national parliaments, i.e., emulation and dif-
ferentiation, both inherent to this process of ad-
aptation, have been consolidated, while a gradual 
re-habilitation of the role of national parliaments 
in the EU has been fostered by the revisions of 
the Treaties, under the pressure of addressing the 
democratic problems of the European architec-
ture.35 Two Declarations (n. 13 and 14) annexed 
to the Treaty of Maastricht (1993), firstly, and the 
protocols on the role of national parliaments and 
on the application of the principle of subsidiar-
ity and proportionality annexed to the Treaty of 
Amsterdam (1999), subsequently, provided for 
the first recognition – by European sources of 
law – of the involvement of national parliaments 
Domestic Legislatures: The Empirical Implications of the 
Delors’ Myth in Nine Countries, New York, Springer.
35. See, for example, the decision of the German Constitu-
tional Court on the Treaty of Maastricht of 12 October 
1993, Cases 2 BvR 2134/92, 2 BvR 2159/92, when it was 
stressed that ‘the German Federal Parliament must re-
tain functions and powers of substantial importance’.
in EU procedures, albeit indirectly, through their 
relationship with national executives. A few years 
later, national parliaments directly participated in 
the procedure for drafting European Treaties, al-
though this procedure, ‘the convention method’, 
was not codified at that time: compared to the 
other components (national governments, the EP, 
the Court of Justice, etc.) of the Conventions in 
charge of elaborating a first draft of the EU Charter 
of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms and of the 
Constitutional Treaty, MPs were the largest com-
ponent, although possibly not the most promi-
nent in terms of decision-making capacity, even 
considering the amendments pushed forward by 
the subsequent inter-governmental conferences.36
The failed Constitutional Treaty and finally the 
Treaty of Lisbon, in particular, seemed to support 
36. See Bruno de Witte (2005), European Treaty Revision: a 
Case of Multilevel Constitutionalism, in: I. Pernice & J. 
Zemanek (eds.), A Constitution for Europe: The IGC, the 
Ratification Process and Beyond, Baden Baden, Nomos, 
Verlag, p. 59-76 and Florence Deloche-Gaudez (2007), 
La convention européenne sur l’avenir de l’Europe: rup-
tures et continuités, in: G. Amato, H. Bribosia & B. De 
Witte (eds.) Genèse et destinée de la Constitution euro-
péenne: commentaire du traité établissant une constitu-
tion pour l’Europe à la lumière des travaux préparatoires 
et perspectives d’avenir, Bruxelles, Bruylant, p. 47-86.
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an effective revival of the role of national parlia-
ments in the EU compared to the past.37 Many 
provisions of the Treaties, as modified by the 
Treaty of Lisbon, are promising in terms of the na-
tional parliaments’ redemption from their previ-
ous marginalisation, starting from Article 12 TEU 
and from Protocols 1 and 2. For instance, national 
parliaments now receive a direct flow of informa-
tion, documents and draft legislative acts from the 
European Commission (Protocol 1, Articles 49 
TEU and 352 TFEU), control the compliance of 
legislative proposals with the principle of subsid-
37. See Paolo Ridola (2006), The parliamentarisation of the 
institutional structure of the European Union between 
representative democracy and participatory democra-
cy, in H.-J. Blanke & S. Mangiameli (eds.), Governing 
Europe Under a Constitution, Heildeberg-New York, 
Springer, p. 415 ff.; Marta Cartabia (2007), Prospects for 
national parliaments in EU affairs - What should and 
could be saved in the case of non-ratification?, in G. Am-
ato, H. Bribosia and B. de Witte (eds.), Genèse et destinée 
de la Constitution européenne, cit., p. 1081-1104; Gavin 
Barrett (2008) ‘The King is dead, long live the King’: The 
Recasting by the Treaty of Lisbon of the Provisions of the 
Constitutional Treaty concerning National Parliaments, 
European Law Review, vol. 33, n. 1, p. 66-84; and Andrea 
Manzella (2009) The Role of Parliaments in the Demo-
cratic Life of the Union, in: S. Micossi & G. L. Tosato 
(eds.) The European Union in the 21st century. Perspec-
tives from the Lisbon Treaty (Brussels: CEPS), p. 257-270.
iarity, can challenge the validity of legislative acts 
before the Court of Justice through their govern-
ments (Protocol 2),38 participate in the revision of 
38. Maybe the participation of national Parliaments in 
the early warning mechanism has been the subject of 
most contributions on legislatures in the EU after the 
Treaty of Lisbon, since the procedure raises several is-
sues (individual-collective participation of national 
Parliaments, their role vis-à-vis national Executives, the 
Commission and the European Parliament, the condi-
tions and the suitability for triggering the thresholds 
of the so-called ‘yellow and orange cards’). However, 
the assessment given to the early warning mechanism 
in terms of national Parliaments’ empowerment in the 
EU varies a lot: Pieter De Wilde (2012), Why the Early 
Warning Mechanism does not Alleviate the Democratic 
Deficit, in OPAL Online Paper n. 6, p. 6, considers the 
mechanism as useless; by contrast, some others, such as 
Ian Cooper (2006), The Watchdogs of Subsidiarity: Na-
tional Parliaments and the Logic of Arguing in the EU, in 
Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 44, n. 2, p. 281-
304, presents it in very positive terms; finally, others (see 
Philipp Kiiver (2012), The Early Warning System for the 
Principle of Subsidiarity: Constitutional Theory and Em-
pirical Reality, London, Routledge, p. 71 ff. and Federico 
Fabbrini & Katarzyna Granat (2013), ‘Yellow Card, but 
Not Foul’: The Role of the National Parliaments Under 
the Subsidiarity Protocol and the Commission Proposal 
for an EU Regulation on the Right to Strike, in Common 
Market Law Review, vol. 50, p. 115-144, forthcoming), 
although recognising the revolutionary significance of 
the mechanism, argue that enabling political bodies, 
such as Parliaments, to carry out a legal control on the 
the Treaties (Article 48 TEU), can veto the use of 
the ‘passerelle clause’ (Article 48.7 TEU) and the 
adoption of European measures in family matters 
which have transnational implications (Article 
81.3 TFEU), are involved in the political monitor-
ing of Europol and in the evaluation of Eurojust 
(Articles 12 TEU and 85 and 88 TFEU), and also 
take part in the inter-parliamentary co-operation 
with the EP (Article 12 TEU and Protocol 1).
Thus, Europeanisation and the strengthening of 
national parliaments have progressed side by side, 
and the two main features of Europeanisation, dif-
ferentiation and emulation, are still the two sides 
of the same coin. On the one hand, although Eu-
ropean Treaty provisions set a common frame-
work for the national parliaments of all the Mem-
ber States, national implementation has achieved 
different results. For example, in Germany, under 
compliance with the principle of subsidiarity could be 
problematical in practice. However, as for the institu-
tional influence of national parliaments in the EU, it 
should be mentioned that the first yellow card raised by 
national legislatures ever, on the draft regulation on the 
right to take collective action in the field of the freedom 
of establishment and of the freedom to provide services, 
led to the withdrawal of the proposal on the part on the 
Commission in September 2012.
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the auspices of the Federal Constitutional Court, 
the Bundestag and the Bundesrat have been sig-
nificantly strengthened by the enactment (on 
the input of the constitutional jurisprudence) of 
a series of measures which enable them to delay 
or even to block the participation of the national 
government in EU decision-making procedures 
(even up to the point of threatening to block the 
entire decision-making process, and not just for 
Germany), whenever the parliamentary assent is 
lacking.39 By the same token, in the UK, the ap-
39. This has been the position taken by the German Con-
stitutional Court, in particular, in its judgment of 30 
June 2009 on the Treaty of Lisbon (2 BvE 2/08, 2 BvE 
5/08, 2 BvR 1010/08, 2 BvR 1022/08, 2 BvR 1259/08 and 
2 BvR 182/09). See the Special Issue of the German Law 
Journal on The Lisbon Judgment of the Federal Consti-
tutional Court, vol. 10, n. 8, 2009; Arndt Wonka (2010), 
Accountability Without Politics? The Contribution of 
Parliaments to Democratic Control of EU Politics in the 
German Constitutional Court’s Lisbon Ruling, and Ul-
rike Liebert (2010), More Democracy in the European 
Union?! Mixed Messages from the German Lisbon Rul-
ing, in: A. Fischer-Lescano, Ch. Joerges & A. Wonka 
(eds.), The German Constitutional Court’s Lisbon Rul-
ing: Legal and Political-Science Perspectives, ZERP Dis-
cussion Paper 1/2010, Zentrum Für Europäische Recht-
spolitik, Universität Bremen, respectively, p. 55 ff. and p. 
71 ff; Matthias Wendel (2011), Lisbon Before the Courts: 
Comparative Perspectives, in European Constitutional 
proval of the European Union Act 2011 has led 
to the conferral of veto powers to the UK parlia-
ment (in addition to those already introduced by 
the Treaties), in particular to the House of Com-
mons, as well as some clauses that provide for the 
combination of passing legislation or motions by 
the parliament and of the positive result of a ref-
erendum in order for the executive to take action 
at EU level.40
On the other hand, on the part of other national 
parliaments, the will to emulate the position of 
the ‘most protected’ legislatures, with regard to 
the prerogatives acknowledged at national level 
for the participation in the EU decision-making 
process, induced the adoption of provisions which 
resemble – as much as possible – those in place 
in the ‘leading Parliaments’.41 Indeed, a clear trend 
Law Review, vol. 7, n. 1, p. 96-137; and Christian Calliess 
(2012), The Future of the Eurozone and the Role of the 
German Constitutional Court, in Yearbook of European 
Law, vol. 31, n. 1, p. 402-415.
40. See Paul Craig (2011), The European Union Act 2011: 
Locks, Limits and Legality, in Common Market Law Re-
view, vol. 48, n. 6, p. 1915-1944.
41. This was the case of Spain and of the approval of Law 
no 24/2009 and the case of Italy, which has recently en-
acted Law no 234/2012.
can be identified among the national parliaments: 
the process of European integration and particu-
larly the revisions obtained by means of the Treaty 
of Lisbon have promoted the re-inforcement of 
the parliamentary function which deals with the 
ex ante scrutiny and with the oversight, at the ex-
pense of other functions, in primis the legislative 
one, which has been increasingly absorbed by the 
EU legislators.42
Is the picture of the progressive emancipation of 
national parliaments in the EU overturned by the 
present reform of the economic governance? The 
hypothesis of the national parliaments’ regression 
towards marginalisation appears to be taken for 
granted, because of the constraints placed upon 
the budgetary authority of national parliaments, 
which disallow them from stepping in directly at 
EU level during the Euro-national fiscal proce-
dures. The only opportunity for the direct involve-
42. See Olivier Costa O., Eric Kerrouche & Paul Magnette 
(2004), Le temps du parlementerisme désenchanté, in: O. 
Costa, E. Kerrouche & P. Magnette (eds.), Vers un re-
nouveau du parlementerisme en Europe?, Brussels, ULB, 
p. 17, and Cristina Fasone (2011) Gli effetti del Trattato 
di Lisbona sulla funzione di controllo parlamentare, in 
Rivista italiana di diritto pubblico comunitario, n. 2, p. 
353-391
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ment of national legislatures, according to the new 
measures, is provided by the setting up of a ‘con-
ference of representatives of the relevant commit-
tees of the European Parliament and representa-
tives of the relevant committees of national Parlia-
ments in order to discuss budgetary policies and 
other issues covered by’ the Treaty on Stability, 
Co-ordination and Governance in the economic 
and monetary Union (TSCG).43 Although it has 
become increasingly important,44 the formula of 
the inter-parliamentary co-operation does not 
entail the conferral of decision-making powers to 
legislatures, nor does it guarantee their effective 
influence.
Once more, the ability of national parliaments to 
institutional adaptation is challenged: they have 
to follow the deadlines of the European Semes-
ter, the substantial standards fixed at EU level 
43. See Article 13 TSCG, which refers to Protocol 1 on the 
role of national Parliament in the European Union an-
nexed to the Treaty of Lisbon.
44. See Andrea Manzella (2012), Is the EP Legitimate as a 
Parliamentary Body in EU Multi-tier Governance?, in 
Challenges of Multi-tier Governance in the EU, Work-
shop organised by the Policy Department of the EP on 
Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, Brussels, 4 
October.
on the budget and on macroeconomic indica-
tors, and the European-driven balanced-budget 
clause when passing legislation.45 The impairment 
of the position of the national parliaments is po-
tentially much more serious that that triggered by 
the establishment of the Economic and Monetary 
Union and by the first version of the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP) in the 1990s. As shown by 
the soft implementation of the first SGP (Section 
4), the role of national fiscal authorities, includ-
ing parliaments, was limitedly affected, since they 
were not bound, as they are now, to negotiate the 
content of the budgetary and fiscal decisions with 
the EU institutions, and nor was the budget cycle 
shaped through a Euro-national process.
45. As underlined by Giacomo Delledonne (2012), Finan-
cial Constitutions in the EU: From the Political to the 
Legal Constitutions?, in STALS Research Paper, n. 5, p. 
4, the (preferable) constitutionalisation of the balanced 
budget clause seems to cause a ‘shift from a (prevailing) 
political to a (would-be) legal notion of financial con-
stitutions’, thus implying a diminished role for political 
institutions, in particular for Parliaments, in favor of 
judicial or more technical actors (according to the exist-
ing tension between political and legal constitutional-
ism: see Richard Bellamy (2007), Political Constitution-
alism: A Republican Defence of the Constitutionality of 
Democracy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 
1-12.
However, at present, the national executives room 
for manoeuvre has also been limited by the new 
European measures, in a much more severe way 
compared to the former SGP, particularly because 
of the semi-automatic implementation of the 
system of warnings and sanctions.46 The institu-
tional balance between fiscal authorities, namely, 
the parliaments and the governments, is likely to 
change in the light of the new economic gover-
nance mechanisms, although the ‘losers’ and the 
‘winners’ are not the same everywhere. Again, the 
features of the national constitutional systems are 
extremely significant, as the case of Germany and 
of its federal parliament shows. The disclosure and 
the transmission to the Bundestag of the informa-
tion gained by the executive in this field, in par-
ticular in the EU, and the power of the parliament 
to bind the position of the executive concerning 
the most significant decisions on fiscal policy 
46. See Nicola Lupo (2012), La revisione costituzionale della 
disciplina di bilancio e il sistema delle fonti, in V. Lippo-
lis (ed.), Costituzione e pareggio di bilancio, Il Filangieri 
– Quaderno 2011, Napoli, Jovene, p. 89-144 and Elena 
Griglio (2012), Parliamentary oversight of national bud-
gets: recent trends in EU Member States, paper presented 
on the occasion of the Tenth Workshop of Parliamenta-
ry Scholars and Parliamentarians, 28-29 July, Wroxton 
College, UK.
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within European institutions and summits, have 
been made mandatory by the German Constitu-
tional Court in order to preserve the link between 
democratic representation and the legitimacy of 
financial decisions.47 At the same time, even at 
European level, some prospective tools have been 
introduced in order to enhance the position of the 
national parliaments: perhaps the most important 
of them is the Fiscal Council. The effectiveness 
of the parliamentary action on these matters de-
pends on the ability of each national parliament 
to ‘exploit’ the independent source of information 
47. See, for example, the latest judgment of the federal Con-
stitutional Court of Germany issued on 12 September 
2012 (2 BvR 1390/12, 2 BvR 1421/12, 2 BvR 1438/12, 2 
BvR 1439/12, 2 BvR 1440/12, 2 BvE 6/12, anticipated 
by other judgments of 7 September 2011, of 27 Febru-
ary 2012 and of 19 July 2012), on the constitutionality 
of the ESM and the TSCG. See also Antje von Ungern-
Sternberg (2012), Parliaments - Fig Leaf or Heartbeat 
of Democracy? German Federal Constitutional Court 
(Judgment of 7 September 2011 - European Rescue Pack-
age), in European Constitutional Law Review, vol. 8, n. 
2, p. 304-322; Daniel Thym (2012), The German Con-
stitutional Court – or: the Emperor’s New Clothes, and 
Peter L. Lindseth (2012), Karlsruhe Capitulates? Hardly 
– Understanding the ESM Ruling of September 12, both 
published in EutopiaLaw, on 17 September 2012, avail-
able at: www.eutopialaw.com.
of the Fiscal Council and to establish a mutually 
co-operative relationship.
As has been argued, if the financial and fiscal cri-
sis in the European Union is, indeed, a crisis of 
democracy,48 assessing whether national parlia-
ments are further limited as fiscal authorities or 
whether they can instead contribute to the new 
European economic governance mechanisms, 
thus finding a new impetus in the mutual co-op-
eration with Fiscal Councils, appears crucial.49
48. See Miguel Poiares Maduro (2012), A New Governance 
for the European Union and the Euro: Democracy and 
Justice, RSCAS Policy Paper 2012/11, p. 3 ff., and Chris-
tian Joerges (2012), A European Union of, by and for the 
citizens. How can Europe provide better possibilities for 
the participation of its citizens?, Contribution to the Eu-
ropean Parliament – Committee on Constitutional Af-
fairs – Hearing on citizen participation, 18 September 
2012.
49. Miguel Poiares Maduro, Bruno de Witte & Mattias 
Kumm (2012), The Euro Crisis and the Democratic Gov-
ernance of the Euro: Legal and Political Issues of a Fiscal 
Crisis, in M. Poiares Maduro, B. de Witte & M. Kumm 
(eds.) The Democratic Governance of the Euro, RSCAS 
Policy Paper 2012/08, p. 3 stress the fact that the fun-
damental problem deals with ‘the democratic quality of 
the euro governance’.
280The Euro Crisis & the State of European DemocracySection I
4. Fiscal Councils and National Parliaments 
in the Economic Governance: The European 
Union Framework
The need to face the financial crisis and the fail-
ure of the system built up on the 1997 SGP (EU 
Regulations n 1466 and 1467/1997), has created 
the urgent need of the introduction of stricter rules 
for controlling compliance with the new economic 
regulatory framework, limiting the ‘connivance’ 
amongst Member States in the event of a violation of 
fiscal standards. Such a result has been pursued by:
•	 empowering the Commission as the general 
guardian of compliance with fiscal rules and 
against macroeconomic imbalances and mak-
ing the adoption of warnings and sanctions 
semi-automatic;
•	 strengthening the judicial control on fiscal 
rules. On the one hand, the Court of Justice of 
the European Union, which adopted a very cau-
tious position when dealt with the misapplica-
tion of the previous Stability and Growth Pact,50 
50. See the judgment of the Court of Justice in the Case 
has become entitled to judge on the correct in-
troduction of the balanced-budget clause (and 
possibly also of its enforcement) in the national 
legal systems,51 according to Articles 3(2) and 8 
C-27/04 of 13 July 2004, Commission v Council, ECR 
I-06649, and the comments by the Common Market 
Law Review editorial board (2004), Whither the Stability 
and Growth Pact?, in Common Market Law Review, vol. 
41, n. 5, p. 1193; Dimitrios Doukas (2005), The Frailty 
of the Stability and Growth Pact and the ECJ: Much ado 
about Nothing?, in Legal Issues of Economic Integration, 
vol. 32, p. 293; Barbara Dutzler and Angelika Hable 
(2005), The European Court of Justice and the Stabil-
ity and Growth Pact – Just the Beginning?, in European 
Integration online Papers, vol. 9, n. 5, http://eiop.or.at/
eiop/texte/2005-005a.htm; Guido Rivosecchi (2007), 
L’indirizzo politico finanziario tra Costituzione italiana 
e vincoli europei, Padova, Cedam, 2007, p. 410 ff. The re-
form of the Stability and Growth Pact by Regulations n. 
1055 and 1056/2005 has not substantially changed the 
picture: see Jean Victor Louis (2006), The Review of the 
Stability and Growth Pact, in Common Market Law Re-
view, vol. 43, n. 1, p. 85.
51. See Bruno de Witte (2012), European Stability Mecha-
nism and Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Govern-
TSCG. On the other hand, after the (preferable) 
constitutionalisation of the balanced-budget 
clause, the jurisdiction of Constitutional Courts 
has been extended, too; and by
•	 introducing, by means of Fiscal Councils, a 
more technical control on the compliance with 
new provisions on the part of national execu-
tives.52
Thus, although Fiscal Councils were already in 
function in 11 Member States in 2011,53 it was 
only at the apex of the financial and of the fiscal 
crises that the EU has made the establishment of 
Fiscal Councils in national systems mandatory. 
ance: Role of the EU Institutions and Consistency with 
EU Legal Order’, in Challenges of Multi-tier Governance 
in the EU, Workshop organized by the Policy Depart-
ment of the EP on Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional 
Affairs, Brussels, 4 October.
52. See Giacomo Delledonne (2012), Financial Constitu-
tions in the EU: From the Political to the Legal Constitu-
tion?, cit., p. 5.
53. The Member States where Fiscal Councils operated be-
fore the reform of the economic governance are: Aus-
tria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, The Nether-
lands, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Sweden, and 
the United Kingdom.
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All Member States are now bound to the duty to 
set up this independent institution.54
From the functional point of view, the ‘mandate’ 
of Fiscal Councils on the part of the EU is quite 
broad, since only the drafting of macroeconomic 
forecasts and plans can ‘escape’ from their ‘juris-
diction’, depending on the choice of each Mem-
ber State, which can split tasks amongst different 
institutions or concentrate them on the Fiscal 
Council as well. According to Directive 2011/85/
UE, on the requirements for the budgetary frame-
works of the Member States, this institution is 
to be in charge of the independent, effective and 
timely monitoring of country-specific fiscal rules 
and ‘to enhance the transparency of elements of 
54. See Paul Craig (2012), The Stability, Coordination and 
Governance Treaty: Principles, Politics and Pragmatism, 
in European Law Review, n 37, p. 236. Also the UK, al-
though it is not part of the TSCG and it is not subject 
to the provisions of Directive 2011/85EU regarding Fis-
cal Councils, seems bound to guarantee the operation 
of such institution (which is already in function in the 
UK under the name of Office for Budget Responsibility). 
Indeed, according to the European Commission Com-
munication COM (2012) 342, the existence of a Fiscal 
Council has to put in relation with the functioning of 
the correction mechanism in case of deviation from the 
medium-term objective, which concerns also the UK.
the budget process (Article 2.2, lit. f)’. The TSCG, 
an international agreement signed by all Member 
States except the UK and the Czech Republic on 
2 March 2012, and which entered into force on 1 
January 2013, establishes a link between the func-
tioning of the correction mechanism and the Fis-
cal Councils (Article 3.2). Indeed, Fiscal Councils 
are held responsible at national level for monitor-
ing the compliance of the Member State concerned 
with the balanced-budget clause and with the con-
vergence towards the country-specific medium-
term objective. It is evident that Fiscal Councils 
are not deemed to be decision-making authorities 
and that, in any event, they could not endanger 
or ‘compete with’ national parliaments. However, 
what remains unsolved in the TSCG with regard 
to Fiscal Councils is whether the Court of Justice 
is entitled, according to Article 8 TSCG, to review 
also issues related to these bodies. With regard to 
the wording of Article 8(1) TSCG, which simply 
mentions Article 3(2) TSCG, the jurisdiction of 
the Court of Justice, relying on Article 273 TFEU, 
in principle also seems to affect the correct estab-
lishment of Fiscal Councils and probably their 
functioning.
According to the TSCG, the Commission has pro-
vided a set of common principles for Fiscal Coun-
cils, by defining their ‘core functions’ (Principle 
7, Annex to the Communication of the Commis-
sion of June 2012 (COM (2012) 342). They have 
to oversee the appropriate functioning of the cor-
rection mechanism in each Member State, in case 
of deviation from the medium-term objective. 
In particular, Fiscal Councils are responsible for 
controlling at national level whether the circum-
stances which might warrant the activation of the 
correction mechanism occur; whether the cor-
rection mechanism, when activated, is correctly 
implemented in the Member State; and whether 
the escape clauses, under special conditions (for 
example, in order to face natural disasters), are 
properly used. Thus, Fiscal Councils are entitled 
to carry out both the ex ante and the ex post con-
trol on budgetary matters. However, what is more 
important is the power which, according to the 
Communication, has to be acknowledged to Fis-
cal Councils: their recommendations bind the 
Member States. Indeed, if the latter do not comply 
with the assessment of the relevant Fiscal Coun-
cil, the Member States must ‘explain publicly why 
they are not following’ them. Although the Com-
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munication is not formally binding on the Mem-
ber States, the fact that it contains the common 
principles on the correction mechanisms seems 
to recognise a specific legal value to Principle 7, 
which cannot be neglected.
With regard to the structural features of Fis-
cal Councils, their setting up has to fit within 
‘the already existing institutional setting and the 
country-specific administrative structure (Article 
3.2 TSCG)’. In terms of the prospective impact 
of Fiscal Councils on national parliaments, the 
reference to the existing institutional setting ap-
pears extremely important. Not only must effec-
tive Fiscal Councils be set up in ways which are 
consistent with the institutional arrangements, 
the legal culture and the tradition of the state con-
cerned, regardless of benchmarks provided by 
other countries, but the establishment of the Fis-
cal Councils must not jeopardise the position of 
national parliaments. Thus they can maintain or 
even strengthen the role of the parliaments.
Moreover, the basic structural requirement intro-
duced by the EU for Fiscal Councils is their ‘func-
tional autonomy’ vis-à-vis the budgetary authori-
ties of the Member States (Article 6, Directive 
2011/85 CE). If, looking at the wording of the new 
measures, it seems that the requirement of ‘func-
tional autonomy’ is possibly less demanding than 
that posed by other European norms for supervi-
sory authorities and for establishing the condition 
of the ‘complete independence’.55 However, it has 
to be taken into account that the Court of Justice 
has already sanctioned some Member States, and 
in particular Germany, on this issue, interpreting 
the independence of supervisory authorities in 
strict terms, aiming to protect them against any 
political pressure.56
In detail, the list of the conditions for guarantee-
ing the functional autonomy of Fiscal Councils 
are contained in the Communication on national 
fiscal correction mechanisms (COM (2012) 342) 
and are about to be codified in one of the draft 
regulations of the ‘two-pack’, the proposal on 
common provisions for monitoring and assessing 
55. See, for example, Article 28 of the Directive 95/46 EC of 
24 October 1995, on the protection of individuals with 
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data.
56. See the decisions of the Court of Justice in Commission 
v Germany, Case C-424/07 of 3 December 2009, ECR 
I-11431, and Commission v. Germany, Case C-518/07 of 
9 March 2010, ECR I-1885.
draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction 
of the excessive deficit of the Member States in the 
euro area (COM (2011) 821).57
‘A statutory regime grounded in law’. Fiscal Coun-
cils can be regulated not only at constitutional, 
but also at statutory, level, given the broad mean-
ing assigned to the word ‘law’ in the European 
Union.58 However, it can be argued that, aiming 
at protecting the independence and even the ex-
istence of Fiscal Councils, the strongest guarantee 
would have consisted in having their basic disci-
pline contained in the Constitution or in an or-
ganic law.59
57. For the time being, after long negotiations, the Coun-
cil and the European Parliament have just reached a 
compromise at the first reading on this draft Regula-
tion, originally presented on 23 November 2011. If the 
amendments of the EP of 13 June 2012 had been accept-
ed by the Council, the ties between national Parliaments 
and Fiscal Councils would have been much stronger in 
terms of accountability than in the current final text.
58. See Alexander H. Türk (2006), Concept of Legislation in 
European Community Law: A Comparative Perspective, 
Alphen, Kluwer Law International, p. 11 ff. and Mark 
Dawson (2011), New Governance and the Transforma-
tion of European Law: Coordinating EU Social Law and 
Policy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 92 ff.
59. On the importance of having Fiscal Councils regulated 
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‘Freedom from interference’, which involves the 
autonomy of the Fiscal Councils from instruc-
tions imposed by other institutions and the pos-
sibility of disclosing information both promptly 
and whenever it is deemed necessary.
‘Nomination procedures based on experience 
and competence’, which underlines the technical 
nature of Fiscal Councils, whose members are se-
lected upon the basis of their merit and expertise 
with the participation of the parliaments in the 
appointment procedure.
‘Adequacy of resources and information’, accord-
ing to which the size of the staff and the stock of 
financial resources is to be proportionate to the 
scope of the mandate attributed to Fiscal Councils.
Although the legal acts examined do not explic-
itly bind Member States to set up Fiscal Councils 
within the executive or within the parliament, 
preferably at constitutional level, see Daniele Franco 
(2011), Comments on ‘The Role of Fiscal Policy Councils 
in Theory’ by Xavrier Debrun, Presentation held at the 
Conference on ‘Fiscal Policy Councils: Why do we need 
them and what makes them effective’, Vienna, 31 Janu-
ary 2011, available at: http://www.staatsschuldenauss-
chuss.at/en.
given that it is taken for granted that Fiscal Coun-
cils are independent institutions, they do, howev-
er, intend to emphasise that these bodies enjoy a 
special relationship with parliaments. On the one 
hand, national legislation is requested to introduce 
the most suitable tools for making Fiscal Councils 
accountable to parliaments; on the other, national 
measures have to prevent any ‘unwarranted inter-
ference’ on the part of the Fiscal Councils’ man-
date with that of the fiscal authorities (or vice ver-
sa), which might limit the prerogative of national 
parliaments. The new European measures design 
Fiscal Councils which are able to provide national 
parliaments with independent information, to 
make the budgetary process and the approval of 
fiscal decisions more transparent and understand-
able, and to enhance parliamentary scrutiny and 
oversight on the complex Euro-national decision-
making process. With this regard, looking at the 
European framework, Fiscal Councils can be 
deemed to support national parliaments in facing 
the risk of a ‘new marginalisation’ within the eco-
nomic governance.
The real arrangement of the relationship between 
Fiscal Councils and parliaments, however, is 
strongly influenced by the national legal system 
and by the duties posed upon the Member States 
to implement the new provisions. Indeed, a possi-
ble differentiation in the relationship between the 
parliaments and the Fiscal Councils across the EU 
countries is likely to emerge not simply because 
of the different constitutional architecture and 
identity of the Member States, but also because 
a multi-speed Europe does exist when looking 
at the EU economic governance.60 Given the fact 
that some measures are addressed to all the Mem-
ber States, others to all the Member States, with 
the exception of Czech Republic and the UK, oth-
ers to 23 countries,61 and finally others only to the 
countries of the Eurozone, different legal and eco-
60. See Nicolas de Sadeleer (2012), The New Architecture Of 
The European Economic Governance: A Leviathan Or 
A Flat-Footed Colossus?, in Maastricht Journal of Euro-
pean and Comparative Law, vol. 19, n. 3, p. 380-381; J-C. 
Piris (2012), The Future of Europe: Towards a Two-Speed 
EU?, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 106 
ff.; Dirk Leuffen, Berthold Rittberger & Franck Schim-
melfenning (2013), Differentiated Integration. Explain-
ing Variation in the European Union, London, Palgrave 
MacMillan, p. 142-183.
61. Indeed, all the Member States have been committed to 
comply with the Europe Plus Pact agreed by the Europe-
an Council on 25 March 2011, except Sweden, Hungary, 
Czech Republic and the UK.
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nomic constraints can produce a further differen-
tiation in the reaction of national parliaments, in 
the tasks assigned to Fiscal Councils and in their 
reciprocal relationship. Moreover, as the serious-
ness of the fiscal crisis also varies across countries 
– i.e., there are debtors and creditors countries – 
a single and common model of Fiscal Council in 
the EU cannot be easily found at present, although 
the EU measures encourage a sort of convergence 
towards independent fiscal institutions account-
able to parliaments.
5. Assessing the Relationship between Fiscal 
Councils and Representative Assemblies at 
National Level
The comparison of selected case studies is based 
upon the assumption that the relationship between 
Fiscal Councils and their respective parliaments 
is influenced by two main factors: the economic, 
political and legal context in which the fiscal in-
stitutions have been established; the capacity of 
the legislature to develop a budgetary and finan-
cial scrutiny autonomously of the performance of 
the executive. These two factors will be separately 
considered in the following sub-sections.
5.1 The Influence of the 
Economic, Political and 
Legal Context on the Role 
and the Position of Fiscal 
Councils
As briefly explained in Section 2, the five national 
Fiscal Councils considered in the present contri-
bution have been established in very different eco-
nomic, political and legal contexts. This external 
factor seems to have influenced the rules concern-
ing the overall position of the independent body 
in the relationship with the other institutional 
bodies, and in particular with the executive and 
the legislative branches.
5.1.1 The Long-established Fiscal 
Councils: the German and 
Belgian Cases
Germany and Belgium experienced the creation 
of fiscal agencies long before the current econom-
ic and financial crisis. In particular, the German 
Council of Economic Experts was set up by law 
in 1963 as an academic body which could serve 
public- and economically-relevant institutions 
in making informed judgements on questions of 
economic policy. The two Belgian fiscal institu-
tions, the High Council on Finance and the Na-
tional Auditing Office, were set up respectively in 
1936 and in 1994, but their aptitude for acting as 
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fiscal councils has gradually grown with the evo-
lution of the Belgian constitutional system over 
the last few decades.62 In particular, two processes 
have impacted upon the role of the above-men-
tioned organisms: the regionalisation of the Bel-
gian state, which began at the end of the 1980s and 
formally concluded with the constitutional reform 
of 1994, when the country became a federal state 
with three Regions and three Communities;63 and 
62. The Council was created with the Royal Decree of 31 
January 1936 whose purpose was to unify within a sin-
gle advisory body the different consultative committees 
created within the Minister of Finance. The Council, 
which after the second World War ceased to function, 
was rediscovered at the end of the 1960s, thanks to the 
Royal Decree n. 17 dated 23 May 1967, and was then pe-
riodically reformed in order to adjust it to the emerging 
institutional needs and reduce the risk of political inter-
ference. With the reform of 1981, in particular, the area 
of intervention of the Council, originally referred to the 
fiscal, economic and financial policy-making, was ex-
tended also the budgetary decision-making. See Henry 
C. Wallich (1968), The American Council of Economic 
Advisers and the German Sachverstaendigenrat. A Study 
in the Economics of Advice, in The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, vol. 82, n. 3, p. 349 ff.
63. The regionalisation of the Belgian State created the 
premises for the reform of the High Council of Finance, 
occurred in 1989 with the aim of entrusting the Coun-
cil with the task to monitor the fiscal policy of regional 
governments and to formulate medium-term financial 
the entry of Belgium into the European Monetary 
Union, which meant that it had to respect the 
Maastricht targets.64
Both in Germany and in Belgium, the above-
mentioned fiscal agencies are clear examples of 
government-centred institutions; this feature 
emerges from the rules concerning the internal 
structure of the body, and, in particular, from 
those concerning the appointment procedures.
objectives for the federated entities. See Aloïs Van de 
Voorde & Georges Stienlet (1995), Le Budget de l’État 
dans la Belgique fédérale, 5e éd., Bruxelles, CEPESS, 
passim.
64. The establishment of the European Monetary Union 
urged the creation, in 1994, of the National Accounts 
Institute (law of 21 December), as an independent body 
which could exercise a general oversight of budget and 
test the reliability of the economic statistics and macro-
economic forecasts upon which the budget was based. 
See Henri Bogaert, Ludovic Dobbelaere, Bart Hertveld 
& Igor Lebrun (2006), Fiscal Councils, Independent 
Forecasts and the Budgetary Process: Lessons From the 
Belgian Case, Federal Planning Bureau, Working paper 
n. 4-06, p. 1-2, available at: www.plan.be (also published 
by Igor Lebrun (2007), Fiscal councils, independent fore-
casts and the budgetary process: lessons from the Belgian 
case, in: J. Ayuso-i-Casals, S. Deroose, E. Flores & L. 
Moulin, European Economy - Economic Papers, n. 275, 
April, p. 337 ff.)
The German Council of Economic Experts is en-
dowed with complete independence in the perfor-
mance of its work (it is only bound by the man-
date set forth in the Act on the Appointment of 
a Council of Experts on Economic Development, 
dated 14 August 1963), but the agency’s main in-
stitutional point of reference is to be found in the 
government. According to Article 7 of the Ap-
pointment Act, the five members of the Council 
of Economic Experts are selected among special-
ists in the field of economic theory and economic 
policy,65 and are appointed by the Federal Presi-
dent on recommendation of the Federal govern-
ment.66
65. The independence of the agency from other institution-
al bodies is guaranteed also by the rules banning the 
appointment of members exercising institutional duties 
or in a position of conflict of interest disciplined by Ar-
ticle 1.3 of the Act on the Appointment of a Council of 
Experts on Economic Development.
66. Their mandate lasts five years and they can be reap-
pointed; in order to assure full independence to the 
advisory body, the Federal Government must hear the 
members of the Council of Experts before nominating a 
new member; the Chairperson is chosen by the Council 
among one of its members for three years. See Norbert 
Kämper (1989), Der Sachverständigenrat zur Begutach-
tung der Gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwiklung, Berlin, 
Duncker & Humblot.
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The Belgian National Accounts Institute (NAI) 
is a compound institution, whose duties are del-
egated to three associated institutions67 and whose 
multifaceted composition68 is meant to represent 
at the same time the institutions associated and 
the Belgian linguistic groups.69 The High Council 
67. The Statistics Belgium (collecting the data to be used for 
the production of statistics), the National Bank of Bel-
gium (responsible of the production of statistics for the 
national and regional accounts, the foreign trade statis-
tics, the financial accounts) and the Federal Planning 
Bureau (in charge of the short-term macroeconomic 
forecasts); these last two institutions are jointly respon-
sible for the general governmental account.
68. The most significant decisions, in fact, are adopted by 
the board of directors, composed of seven members, 
four appointed in compliance with the law and the oth-
er three members (the General Secretary of the Ministry 
for economic affairs, who represents the Minister and is 
in charge of the Chair of the Board; the Governor of the 
National Bank of Belgium, the Administrator and the 
Director of the National Institute of statistics) appoint-
ed by the King (Article 113 of the law of 21 December 
1994).
69. The mandate of the board’s members lasts four years 
and re-appointment is permitted. According to Article 
115 of the law of 21 December 1994, moreover, a Coun-
selling committee, composed of representatives of the 
Federal Government, of the National economic or fiscal 
agencies and of the regional Governments, appointed by 
the King (for the Federal level), is in charge of address-
of Finance70 is, instead, composed of the Plenary 
Council,71 of two sections and a Working group 
on ageing. Its membership reflects its close rela-
tionship with the government.72
Both the NAI and the High Council of Finance, 
therefore, tend to find their institutional referent 
not only in the Federal government, but also in 
the governments of the other federated entities. 
The result is thus a plurality of institutional inter-
locutors, which makes political intervention quite 
difficult, as the credibility of all the institutions in-
volved is at stake.
ing every year some recommendations to the Board of 
Directors in order to ameliorate the fulfilment of the 
Council’s duties.
70. As disciplined by the Arrêté royal of the 3 April 2006.
71. The Plenary Council is chaired by the Minister of Fi-
nance, it includes two vice-Presidents appointed by the 
Minister of Finance and by the Minister of Budget and 
is composed of 24 experts in economic and budgetary 
subjects, representing either the Federal Government or 
the regional Governments and appointed on five-years 
renewable terms by the King.
72. The Secretariat of the Council is ruled by officials of the 
Federal Ministry of Finance.
5.1.2 The British Office for Budget 
Responsibility: A Recent 
Fiscal Council Created on a 
Voluntary Basis
If the German and Belgian fiscal independent 
bodies can be inscribed within the government-
oriented agencies, a different model is given by the 
British Office for Budget Responsibility, created in 
2010 and disciplined by the Budget Responsibility 
and National Audit Act 2011, as an independent 
agency entitled to provide authoritative analysis of 
UK’s public finance.
Endowed with a high degree of autonomy from 
other institutions,73 the Office’s independence op-
73. The Office’s independence in performing its mandate 
is in particular guaranteed by the fact that the agency 
is subject only to its statutory duties and to the guid-
ance of the Charter for budget responsibility, presented 
by Government to Parliament pursuant to Section 1 of 
the Budget Responsibility and National Audit Act 2011 
and related to the formulation and implementation of 
the fiscal policy and of the policy for the management of 
national debt. HM Treasury (2011), Charter for Budget 
Responsibility, April 2011, available at: http://budgetre-
sponsibility.independent.gov.uk/wordpress/docs/char-
ter_budget_responsibility040411.pdf
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erates in particular with regard to the government,74 
but it does not prevent it from maintaining strong 
ties with the parliament. The first tie comes from 
the internal composition of the body: the Chair of 
the Office (according to Schedule 1 of the Budget 
Responsibility and National Audit Act 2011), in 
fact, is appointed by the Chancellor of Exchequer, 
but with the consent of the Treasury Commit-
tee of the House of Commons (HoC); a further 
two members are appointed by the Chancellor of 
Exchequer, but after consultation with the Chair 
and with the consent of the Treasury Commit-
74. A specific Memorandum of Understanding, published 
in April 2011, for instance, sets out the agreed working 
relationship between the Office, HM Revenue and Cus-
toms, the Department for Work and Pensions, and HM 
Treasury (Office for Budget Responsibility - HM Treas-
ury (2011), Memorandum of Understanding between Of-
fice for Budget Responsibility, HM Treasury, Department 
for Works and Pensions and HM Revenues & Customs, 
April, available at: http://86.54.44.148/wordpress/docs/
obr_memorandum040411.pdf). As part of the Office’s 
commitment to transparency, moreover, the institu-
tional website of the agency publishes, among other in-
formation, also the list of contacts held by Office mem-
bers with ministers, special advisers, private offices and 
opposition MP’s. Available at: http://budgetresponsibil-
ity.independent.gov.uk/transparency/disclosures.
tee of the HoC;75 these three members constitute 
a committee, known as the Budget Responsibility 
Committee. The rest of the Office (not fewer than 
two members) are nominated by the Office and 
appointed by the Chancellor of Exchequer; these 
members constitute a committee which is known 
as a non-executive committee. This composition 
assures the Treasury Committee control of at least 
three of the Office’s members, of which one acts 
as Chair. It is important to underline that only the 
three members appointed with the consent of the 
Treasury committee are members of the executive 
committee of the Office – the Budget Responsibil-
ity Committee – to whom the exercise of most of 
the relevant assessment duties is reserved, as dis-
ciplined by Section 4 (3) and (4) of the Act; the 
Non-executive committee, in contrast, must re-
view the way in which the Office’s duties are per-
formed.
75. The consent of the HoC Treasury Committee is not re-
quired for the appointment in some cases, disciplined 
by par. 3 (1) of Section 1 of the Budget Responsibility 
and National Audit Act 2011.
5.1.3 The ‘Latest’ Fiscal Councils, 
Established in Italy and in 
France in order to comply 
with EU Obligations
If the Office for Budget Responsibility can be 
considered an example of a Fiscal Council cen-
tred both on the Parliament and on the govern-
ment, the last two fiscal institutions created by EU 
Member States – the Italian Parliamentary Budget 
Office and the French High Council of Public Fi-
nances – reveal an even stronger relationship with 
the legislative branch.
In particular, the Italian Parliamentary Budget 
Office represents a unique example (at least in 
Europe) of Fiscal Council strongly parliamentary-
centred. The new agency was formally introduced 
by Article 5, Section 1, (f) of the Constitutional 
Law no 1/2012 in April 201276 as an indepen-
76. The reform introduced in the Italian Constitution the 
balanced budget rule; for further details, see Antonio 
Brancasi (2012), L’introduzione del principio del cd. pa-
reggio di bilancio: un esempio di revisione affrettata della 
Costituzione, in Quaderni costituzionali, n. 1, p. 108 ff. 
and Daniele Cabras (2012), Il pareggio di bilancio in Co-
stituzione: una regola importante per la stabilizzazione 
della finanza pubblica, ivi, p. 111 ff.; Renzo Dickmann 
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dent body to be created by the Chambers, with 
due respect of their constitutional autonomy; and 
entitled to analyse and assess the public-finance 
trends and to monitor the respect of budgetary 
rules.77 The Office’s internal composition and or-
(2012), Legislazione di spesa ed equilibrio di bilancio tra 
legittimità costituzionale e legittimità europea, 16 May, 
in Federalismi.it; Paola Bilancia (2012), Note critiche sul 
cd. ‘pareggio di bilancio’, in Rivista AIC, 17 April, avail-
able at: www.associazionedeicostituzionalisti.it); Nicola 
Lupo (2012), La revisione costituzionale della disciplina 
di bilancio e il sistema delle fonti, cit., p. 89 ff. and Tania 
Groppi, Irene Spigno & Nicola Vizioli (2012), The Con-
stitutional Consequences of the Financial Crisis in Italy, 
available at: www.astrid.eu. The Italian Fiscal Institu-
tion could be therefore classified within the fiscal agen-
cies with a solid, constitutional basis and a defined area 
of intervention, due to the fact that, at the same time, it 
enjoys a constitutional status and it operates with a fis-
cal rule set on a constitutional basis. See Daniele Franco 
(2011), Comments on ‘The Role of Fiscal Policy Councils 
in Theory’, cit., 31 January. On the importance that fiscal 
rules have in order to make the model based on the ad-
visory role of Fiscal Councils really work, see also Chi-
ara Goretti (2012), Pareggio di bilancio e credibilità della 
politica fiscale: il ruolo del fiscal council nella riforma 
costituzionale italiana, 20 January, available at: www.
astrid-online.it.
77. According to Paolo De Ioanna (2012), La nuova cornice 
costituzionale apre nuove dinamiche tra le forze politi-
che e nella cornice delle interpretazioni, economiche e 
giuridiche , dei fenomeni di finanza pubblica, Presenta-
ganisation have recently been disciplined by the 
re-inforced law no 243/2012 of 24 December 
2012; Art. 16 of the law, in particular, provides 
that the Council is made up of three members ap-
pointed upon the basis of common agreements by 
the Chairs of the two Houses within a list of ten 
persons drawn up by competent parliamentary 
committees (upon the basis of agreements adopt-
ed by a two-thirds majority) from the experts in 
public finances. Also from the point of view of the 
Office’s staff and funding,78 the newly-established 
Italian Fiscal Council reveals itself to be firmly 
rooted in the parliamentary administration.
tion held at the Conference ‘La nuova governance fiscale 
europea. Fiscal Compact, cornice europea e modifiche 
costituzionali in Italia’ - Rome, Luiss Guido Carli, 9 
November) the reasons behind the creation of the In-
dependent Fiscal Body are to be found not only in the 
drives coming from the European Union, but also in the 
increasing unsatisfaction of politicians for the low level 
of transparency of the budgetary and fiscal policy-mak-
ing and in their ambition to participate in a less critical 
way to such decisional process. See also Daniele Cabras 
(2012), Un Fiscal Council in Parlamento, in Federalis-
mi.it, 17 October.
78. See, in particular, Articles 17 and 19 of the Law n. 
243/2012.
France has also recently provided for the imple-
mentation of the Fiscal Compact through the Loi 
organique no. 2012-1403 of 17 December 2012 on 
the planning and governance of public finances,79 
which (Art. 11), among other things, disciplines 
the establishment of the High Council of Public 
Finances, an independent body set by the Cour des 
comptes, chaired by the President of the accounts 
authority and composed of ten members, of which 
four are judges of the Cour des comptes and four 
are members appointed by the relevant represen-
tatives of the two Houses.80 The peculiarity of the 
79. Following the Decision of the Conseil constitutionnel n. 
2012-653 DC of the 9 August 2012 (on which see Rino 
Casella (2012), Il Consiglio costituzionale francese e il 
trattato sul Fiscal compact, 26 October, available at: 
www.forumcostituzionale.it), the French strategy can 
be defined as an example of a ‘minimal’ adaptation to 
the TSCG (on this point, see Henri Sterdyniak (2012), 
Gouvernance des finances publiques: du Pacte budgé-
taire à la loi organique, 15 October, available at: http://
www.ofce.sciences-po.fr/blog/?p=2637), based on the 
recourse not to a constitutional law, but rather on a re-
inforced law, as the loi organique. 
80. Before being formally approved, the French loi orga-
nique was submitted – in compliance with the proce-
dure of Articles 46 (5) and 61 (1) of the French Constitu-
tion – to the Conseil constitutionnel for an assessment of 
its conformity to the Constitution. With the Decision n. 
2012-568 of the 13 December 2012, the Conseil, among 
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French model is, therefore, given by the strong in-
teraction provided not only with the parliament 
but also with the Cour des comptes, thus widening 
the classic dichotomy between government-cen-
tred and parliament-centred institutions (which 
had already been affected, but not fully overcome, 
by the hybrid Office for Budget responsibility).81
others, judged as being unconstitutional the provisions 
(Articles 11. 1 and 11.3) binding the appointment of the 
four judges selected by the Cour de comptes and of the 
single member nominated by the President of the Con-
seil économique, social et environnemental to an ‘audi-
tion publique par les commissions des finances et les com-
missions des affaires sociales de l’Assemblée nationale et 
du Sénat’ (par. 39). The decision was motivated on the 
basis of the principle of the separation of powers. The 
same procedural obligation was instead ‘saved’ by the 
Conseil in the part referred to the appointment of the 
four members in representation of the two Chambers, 
but the provision was judged as not having the legal sta-
tus of ‘organique’ rule (par. 40).
81. On the atypical nature of the French Haut Conseil aux 
finances publiques, which can be assimilated neither 
to the model of parliamentary Fiscal Councils (as the 
Congressional Budget Office in the USA), nor to the 
fiscal agencies derived from the government, see Sam-
uel-Frédéric Servière (2012), Haut Conseil des finances 
publiques: les propositions de la Fondation iFRAP, 13 
September, available at: www.ifrap.org.
This comparative overview reveals how, in the Eu-
ropean context, it is only the ‘last generation’ Fis-
cal Councils that are imagined from the structural 
point of view as having a solid and direct relation-
ship with the parliament. A partial justification 
of this general trend can be found in the newly-
emerged need to conform to EU requirements, 
which clearly force the setting up of a more direct 
contact in between national legislatures and fiscal 
agencies.
Notwithstanding these formal institutional as-
pects, one could expect the crisis to have encour-
aged the research of a democratic legitimation for 
the mandate of Fiscal Councils based upon the 
development of a direct channel of interaction 
with national parliaments.
5.2 The Relationship ‘Fiscal 
Councils – Parliaments’ 
and its Interaction with 
the Parliamentary Scrutiny 
and Oversight Function on 
the Budgetary and Fiscal 
Matters
A second potential factor which influences the in-
teraction established by national parliaments with 
Fiscal Councils can be found in the capacity of the 
legislature itself to structure and autonomously 
develop budgetary and financial scrutiny of the 
activity of their government.
To isolate this factor, it necessary to consider the 
main features of the most relevant models of par-
liamentary budget scrutiny. Given that the parlia-
mentary oversight of budgets is mainly carried out 
at committee level,82 it is important to distinguish 
82. In the budgetary oversight, the availability of a proac-
tive and powerful committee becomes strategic for 
assuring a constant parliamentary watch over govern-
mental expenses. Committee involvement in the budg-
et, in fact, tends to favour the prevalence of technical 
engagement over political posturing, while the opposite 
happens when the subject involved is the House, which 
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between two different types of committee exper-
tise in the budget sector. The first type is that of 
specialised budget committees operating during 
ex ante scrutiny, whose task is mainly that of ana-
lysing and of approving the governmental draft 
budget. The second type is that of ex post scrutiny 
committees, which finds its most relevant example 
in the Public Accounts Committees (PAC) of the 
Commonwealth system. The modern PACs repre-
sent specialised audit committees which interact 
closely with the supreme auditor and are entitled 
to scrutinise governmental accounts.
These two types of committee expertise do not al-
ways come together: as is evidenced by compara-
tive studies,83 the so called ‘Westminster system’, 
rather tends to linger on broad criticism. On this point, 
see Warren Krafchik & Joachim Wehner (2004), Legis-
latures and Budget Oversight: Best Practices, Paper pre-
sented at the Open Forum held in Almaty on 8 April, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/docs/2005/050404oversight.
pdf, p. 7 and Joachim Wehner (2006), Legislative institu-
tions and fiscal policy, in PSPE working papers, n. 08, De-
partment of Government, London School of Economics 
and Political Science, London, UK, p. 17 ff.
83. As explained by Joachim Wehner (2005), Legislative 
arrangements for financial scrutiny: Explaining cross-
national variation, in R. Pelizzo, R. Stapenhurst & D. 
Olson (eds.), The Role of Parliaments in the Budget 
which characterises Commonwealth parliaments, 
represents a combination of low ex ante capacity 
(also due to the absence of the involvement of ex 
ante committees) and a highly-developed ex post 
capacity.84 The opposite occurs in parliaments 
outside the Commonwealth, such as the French 
parliament, where the oversight of budget is car-
ried out by standing committees charged, at the 
same time, both with the legislative power with 
regard to the approval of the budget and with the 
scrutiny of its execution.85 The oversight archi-
Process, Washington DC, World Bank Institute, p. 13, 
the differences in the legislatures’ approach to budget 
cycle and budget issues are explained by a number of 
variables, including not only the parliamentary or pres-
idential nature of the system of government, but also 
the internal design of parliamentary powers to amend 
the budget, the party political dynamics, the legislative 
budget research capacity, the access to relevant infor-
mation, and so forth.
84. Edward Davey (2000), Making MPs work for our mon-
ey: reforming Parliament’s role in budget scrutiny, in 
Centre for Reform Paper n. 19, London, Centre for Re-
form.
85. Such committees are endowed with dedicated proce-
dures and parliamentary tools, including the assignment 
of a specific oversight mission to a rapporteur special, 
the assignment of cross-sectional controls to the whole 
of the rapporteurs speciaux, the development of cross-
sectional oversight mission, coordinated by the Chair 
tecture adopted (either based upon a specialised 
committee or upon legislative committees also 
entitled to perform budgetary scrutiny) does not 
seem to influence either the intensity or the de-
of the committee and/or by the rapporteur general. The 
Finance committee of the National Assembly, in par-
ticular, exercises the oversight function mainly through 
the Mission d’évaluation et de controle (MEC), whose 
main task is to interrogate political and administrative 
officials on the management of their resources and to 
inquiry on sectorial public policies, using the variety of 
parliamentary tools disciplined by Articles 57, 59 and 60 
of the LOLF, including the dispatch of questionnaires 
to government officials, in loco controls and hearings. 
Apart from the scrutiny activity carried out in stand-
ing committees, the French model (as the Italian one) 
is characterised also by the intervention of the assembly 
in the budgetary oversight, which, through the approval 
of the loi de règlement, is given an important chance of 
judging governmental budgetary performances. These 
two profiles of the oversight function occur at different 
institutional stages: in particular, the committee over-
sight occupies the stage of the budget execution; the as-
sembly control, instead, is limited to the final stage of 
the budget execution. For further details, see Paul Am-
selek (1998), Le budget de l’État et le parlement sous la V 
République, in Revue du Droit Publique, n. 5-6, p. 1449; 
Irène Bouhadana (2007), Les commissions des finances 
des assemblées parlementaires en France: origines, évo-
lutions et enjeux, Paris, LDGJ, p. 273 ff.; Aurélien Baudu 
(2010), Contribution à l’étude des pouvoirs budgétaires 
du Parlement en France: éclairage historique et perspec-
tives d’évolution, Paris, Dalloz. 
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gree of the parliamentary scrutiny function: this 
is confirmed by the fact that not only in the UK, 
but also in France, the parliament has eventually 
developed a well-structured scrutiny architecture, 
which enables daily control of the governmental 
budgetary policy. In Belgium,86 Germany,87 and 
86. The Budget and Finance Committee of the Chamber of 
representatives mostly depends on the budgetary infor-
mation and data provided by the government for assess-
ing its performances; also in the approval of the lois the 
comptes, which definitely consolidates the budget of the 
previous year, the role of the assembly is often limited 
to a mere ratification of what proposed by the govern-
ment. During the budget execution, this latter has in 
fact many possibilities to modify its original propos-
als, adjusting budgetary provisions to incoming insti-
tutional needs; these variations must be submitted to 
Parliament, which can take the initiative to interrogate 
the government on the budget execution.
87. In Germany the scrutiny of budget execution and 
budgetary management is carried out by the Bundestag 
mainly basing on the activity of a specific subcommit-
tee created within the Budget committee and known as 
Auditing committee. The Auditing committee is closely 
linked to three independent specialised bodies provided 
by the Federal law (the ‘Financing Body’; the ‘Confiden-
tial Committee’; the ‘Financial Market Body’) and is di-
rectly supported by the Federal Court of Audit. The co-
operation with these independent agencies contributes 
to fill in some of the most striking gaps of the ex post 
scrutiny activity of the budget committee: also due to 
the absence of dedicated budgetary oversight tools, the 
Italy,88 too, parliamentary oversight is carried out 
committee, in fact, does not get involved in the review 
of the economic assumptions used by the government in 
the budget drafting and does not extend its intervention 
to the scrutiny of specific government programs. See 
M. Schattenmann (2009), The Secretariat of the Budget 
Committee of the German Bundestag, Prepared for the 
Meeting of OECD Parliamentary Budget Officials – 
Rome, 26-27 February, available at: http://www.oecd.
org/dataoecd/52/28/42466837.pdf. 
88. The intervention of the parliament in the budget-
ary and fiscal policy-making has not fully evolved yet 
from its original focus on the governmental expenses’ 
authorisation perspective (see Elisabetta De Giorgi & 
Luca Verzichelli (2008), Still a Difficult Budgetary Pro-
cess? The Government, the Legislature and the Finance 
Bill, in South European Society & Politics, vol. 13, n. 1, 
p. 87 ff.), which found in the ‘dualistic’ scheme of the 
Financial law its main expression (see Andrea Manzella 
(2003), Il Parlamento, Bologna, Il Mulino, p. 344). This 
fact, in its turn, has inhibited the development of a ‘real’ 
model of budgetary and fiscal oversight, which is only 
one symptom of the general unsatisfactory development 
of the control function in the Italian parliamentary 
tradition (see Andrea Manzella (2001), La funzione di 
controllo, in Associazione italiana dei costituzionalisti, 
Annuario 2000. Il Parlamento, Atti del XV Convegno 
annuale, Firenze, 12-13-14 October 2000, Padova, Ce-
dam, p. 213). Th e lack of a mature approach to budg-
etary and fiscal oversight is confirmed by the absence 
of dedicated budgetary scrutiny tools, at least for what 
concerns the budget execution stage: the control carried 
out at this stage, in fact, is developed by parliamentary 
by hybrid committees involved both in the ex ante 
bodies and parliamentarians through the ordinary and 
generic control tools and procedures disciplined by the 
two Rules of procedure. The only ‘typical’ budgetary 
oversight tool is represented by the assembly’s approval 
(in line with the French experience) of the rendiconto, 
which nevertheless in the Italian experience has never 
given the legislature the opportunity of an effective con-
trol of budgetary trends; in any case, such a control tool 
invests the final stage of budget execution (Carlo Chi-
appinelli (2009), La evoluzione del sistema dei controlli e 
la relazione sul rendiconto generale dello Stato, in Rivista 
della Corte dei conti, n. 2, p. 256 ff.). On the most recent 
attempts to invert the relationship between the ex ante 
and the ex post budgetary scrutiny function by limiting 
the content of the financial law as to reduce the parlia-
mentary bargaining on the governmental proposals, see 
Guido Rivosecchi (2007), I poteri ispettivi e il controllo 
parlamentare dal question time alle Commissioni di in-
chiesta, in E. Gianfrancesco & N. Lupo (eds.), Le regole 
del diritto parlamentare nella dialettica tra maggioranza 
e opposizione, Roma, LUP, p. 181; Nicola Lupo (2009), 
Le sessioni di bilancio, ieri e oggi, in G.. Carboni (ed.), 
La funzione finanziaria del Parlamento. Un confronto 
tra Italia e Gran Bretagna, Torino, Giappichelli, p. 36 ff.; 
Daniele Cabras (2010), I poteri di informazione e con-
trollo del Parlamento in materia di contabilità e finanza 
pubblica alla luce della legge 31 dicembre 2009, n. 196, 30 
April, available at: www.forumcostituzionale.it; Chiara 
Goretti & Luca Rizzuto (2011), Il ruolo del Parlamento 
italiano nella decisione di bilancio: evoluzione recente e 
confronto con gli altri paesi, in Rivista di politica econo-
mica, n. 1-3, p. 51-52.
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stage and in the ex post scrutiny; however, these 
three parliamentary experiences have not yet de-
veloped specific budgetary-scrutiny tools and 
procedures. Probably as a result of this, the degree 
of the national parliament’s involvement in the 
oversight of budget execution remains weak.89
Once the different features of the parliamentary 
oversight models have been clarified, it is possible 
to consider the basic characteristics of the interac-
tion between the national legislature and the fiscal 
agency, by focusing on the functional profiles of 
this relationship, analysed according to the crite-
ria presented in Section 2.
89. For a detailed comparison among the main models of 
parliamentary budgetary oversight and on their impact 
in terms of the intensity of the parliamentary scrutiny 
function, see Elena Griglio (2012), Parliamentary over-
sight of national budgets. Recent trends in EU Member 
States, Paper presented at the Tenth Workshop of Par-
liamentary Scholars and Parliamentarians, cit.
5.2.1 The German and Belgian 
Experiences as Two Examples 
of Weak Interaction between 
Fiscal Councils and 
Parliaments
In Germany and Belgium, the co-operation be-
tween the existing Fiscal Councils – classified, in 
Section 5.1., within the more general category of 
government-oriented agencies – and the legisla-
tive branch reveals itself to be extremely weak.
With regard to what concerns the German Coun-
cil for Economic Experts, the main duty of this 
body consists of compiling and publishing an 
Annual Economic Report which is submitted to 
the Federal government by 15 of November every 
year.90 Apart from the Annual Report, the Coun-
90. According to Article 2 of the Appointment Act, in fact, 
in the Annual Report the Council of Experts draws the 
fundamental features of the current economic situation, 
pointing out its foreseeable developments and the pos-
sibility of avoiding or suppressing such developments, 
without, however, recommending any specific meas-
ures of economic and social policy. Each member of the 
Council is assured full autonomy in the preparation of 
the Report: according to Article 3 of the Appointment 
Act, in fact, if a minority differs on specific questions, it 
cil also prepares ad hoc special reports, depending 
on the mandate issued by the government, which 
usually refer to specific current problems.
The strictly advisory nature of the Council’s du-
ties, together with the narrowness of the formal 
powers attributed to it, are in line with the funda-
mental feature which characterises the Council’s 
interaction with other institutional bodies, i.e., 
its dependence on the government. The Council 
does not seem to develop direct contacts with the 
Bundestag, as most of this interaction is mediated 
by the intervention of the government.91 This im-
plies that the relationship between the Council of 
economic experts and the parliament is not a di-
rect one, but is, instead, one which is constantly 
arbitrated (both from the procedural and from the 
substantial point of view) by the government.
has the right to express its disagreement in the Report.
91. Article 6 of the Appointment Act provides that the An-
nual Report is promptly submitted by the Federal Gov-
ernment to the legislative bodies and is published by the 
Council at the same time. Within eight weeks the Fed-
eral Government presents its comments on the report 
to the legislative bodies. In this statement, the Federal 
Government presents the conclusions to which it has 
come with regard to economy policy.
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The filtering role of the Federal government in the 
interaction between the Council of economic ex-
perts and the Federal parliament is to be found 
first of all in the presentation to the Bundestag and 
the Bundesrat, every January, of the Annual Eco-
nomic Report, drafted by the Federal government 
itself.92
From the point of view of the funding, the Coun-
cil is endowed with financial autonomy and its 
remuneration and expenses are borne directly by 
the Federal government.93
92. The governmental Report, which among other things 
describes the government’s economic and financial 
goals for the year as well as the fundamentals of its 
economic and financial policy, in its Part I includes 
detailed comments on the Annual Report of the Ger-
man Council of Economic Experts. The reference to the 
Council’s Report is formally provided by Article 2 of the 
West German Law to Promote Economic Stability and 
Growth, dated 8 June 1967.
93. In particular, according to Article 11 of the Appoint-
ment Act, the amount of the remuneration to be paid is 
determined jointly by the Federal Minister of Econom-
ics and Technology and the Federal Minister of the In-
terior. No intervention of the Federal parliament, in line 
with the ‘governmental’ nature of the body, is therefore 
provided by law in this relevant aspect of the Council’s 
institutional profile.
Finally, the fact that the Council of economic ex-
perts is strongly centred on the executive branch 
influences the accountability rules, which make 
the Council responsible only to the government. 
The Appointment Act, also considered in its ap-
plication over the decades, clearly gives the idea 
that the role of political advisor prevails over that 
of scientific advisor; this consideration has raised 
some criticism in the literature, supporting the 
idea of the Council of experts being seen as a ‘par-
allel government’.94
In conclusion, the German Council for Economic 
Experts can be considered as a typical example 
of a ‘governmental’ Fiscal Council, which reveals 
only weak and indirect ties with the parliament; 
the possibility of the Council playing a strategic 
informative and advisory role with regard to the 
94. Uwe Andersen & Wichard Woyke (eds.) (2003), Sach-
verständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaft-
lichen Entwicklung, in Handwörterbuch des politischen 
Systems der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. 5., aktual. 
Aufl. Opladen: Leske+Budrich 2003. Lizenzausgabe 
Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, available 
at: http://www.bpb.de/nachschlagen/lexika/handwo-
erterbuch-politisches-system/40367/sachverstaendi-
genrat-zur-begutachtung-der-gesamtwirtschaftlichen-
entwicklung?p=all.
parliament reveals itself to be quite weak, due to 
the constant intermediation of the government 
in the relationship between the Council and the 
legislative branch. The narrowness of the tasks at-
tributed to the Council, which mainly exercises an 
advisory function on matters of economic and fis-
cal policies, are also attributed to the fact that the 
origin of the body dates back to a period in which 
the institutional space now recognised to the Fis-
cal Council was still lacking.
In Belgium, too, the government-centred nature 
of the NAI and of the High Council of Finance re-
flects itself also in the rules concerning the overall 
functioning of these two fiscal bodies.
Both Councils intervene in the fiscal and budget-
ary policy-making,95 but the National Audit Of-
95. The process starts in May when medium and long-term 
projections are presented by the government, followed, 
in June and July respectively by the recommendations of 
the High Council of Finance and by the release of provi-
sional short-term macroeconomic forecasting exercised 
by the National Audit Office (adjourned in September). 
The federal budget is submitted to the Parliament in 
October; after the presentation of the new budget, an 
updated version of the Stability Programme is made 
public. The process ends in February, with the reassess-
ment of the economic budget, and then in March, with 
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fice intervenes mainly in the ex ante stage, while 
the contribution of the High Council of Finance 
is focused both on the ex ante and on the ex post 
stage. In particular, the intervention of the NAI in 
the budgetary process is mainly due to the activ-
ity of the Federal Bureau for Planning,96 whose 
most relevant task is related to the production of 
macroeconomic forecasts upon which the bud-
get drafted by the Federal government is based;97 
however, the legislative chambers may also apply 
to the Bureau in order to assess policy measures 
the control of budget execution. See Igor Lebrun (2007), 
Fiscal councils, independent forecasts and the budgetary 
process, cit., p. 342 and 354.
96. For further details, see Aude Rousselot (2006), Présen-
tation du Centraal Planbureau néerlandais et du Bureau 
fédéral du Plan belge, Actualités du WRR néerlandais et 
de la Strategy Unit britannique, in Horizons stratégiques, 
n. 2 p. 122 ff.
97. The Bureau, moreover, releases the medium-term eco-
nomic outlook for the Belgian economy used by the gov-
ernment in order to elaborate the stability programme. 
The government does not seem to have a formal duty to 
take into account the Bureau’s forecasts in the drafting 
of the budget; however, up to this moment, this is usu-
ally happened: a striking dissociation from the NAI’s 
forecasts would in fact determine a loss of credibility for 
the government.
(which, however, can never end in policy recom-
mendations).
The intervention of the High Council of Finance 
in the budgetary policy-making, in contrast, is 
bound to the publication of two annual reports 
(drafted by the Council’s ‘Public-sector borrowing 
requirement’ section),98 the first report refers to 
the ex post stage, the second to the ex ante stage.99
98. For further details, see Paul Bernd Spahn (2007), Inter-
governmental Fiscal Relations, and Structural Problems 
of Federalism in Belgium, Washington DC, Internation-
al Monetary Fund, par. 56 ff., available at: www.wiwi.
uni-frankfurt.de.
99. The first report, released around March, presents a gen-
eral assessment of past and present budgetary policies, 
in particular those implementing the budget and the 
stability programme; such report can be at times quite 
critical. The second report, presented in June/July, anal-
yses the borrowing requirements of each government 
and makes recommendations concerning the respect 
both of short, medium and long-term fiscal targets and 
of budget balances (for general government, its sub-
sectors and federated entities). The distinction between 
the two reports (and therefore between the intervention 
in the ex ante and in the ex post stage) reveals itself a 
bit blurred, also due to the fact that some changes in 
the timing of the stability programme have recently oc-
curred.
The funding of the two bodies confirms their ex-
clusive dependence on a decision of the govern-
ment. In compliance with Article 118 of the Law 
of 21 December 1994, the NAI is financed by an 
annual grant from the Federation, to be included 
within the budget section of the Ministry for Eco-
nomic Affairs.100 With regard to the High Council 
of Finance, according to Article 13 of the Arrêté 
royal of the 3 April 2006, the agency’s internal fi-
nancial regulation (which can provide for the al-
location of allowances and other forms of remu-
neration to the members of the Council, to staff 
members and to external advisors) is approved by 
the Ministry of Finances.
On the accountability side, the government-cen-
tred nature of the two institutions does not pre-
vent them from enjoying full independence: both 
agencies, as public institutions, have ministers 
overseeing their activities and budgets, but, at the 
same time, mainly due to the specific nature of 
their tasks, they can also act on their own initia-
tive.
100. The secretariat of the Institute is covered by the 
official of the Ministry for economic affairs, in co-oper-
ation with the services of the National Bank of Belgium.
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In conclusion, the twofold Belgian model of Fiscal 
Councils is characterised by its proximity to the 
executive branches at both national and regional 
level, which, however, has not prevented the two 
bodies from consolidating their independence. 
The impact of the two Councils on fiscal and 
budgetary policies is not, in fact, very formalised 
or transparent, and it seems to have waned after 
adoption of the euro, becoming more and more 
independent from government plans, also thanks 
to the growing interaction with Federated Enti-
ties and to the increased budget co-ordination be-
tween the Federal government and the Regional 
governments.101
101. See Paul Van Rompuy (2008), La coordination des 
politiques budgétaires en Belgique: 15 ans d’expeérience 
du Conseil supérieur des Finances, in M. Mignolet (ed.), 
Le fédéralisme fiscal. Leçons de la théorie économique et 
expérience de 4 États fédéraux, Brussels, De Boeck Uni-
versité, n. 4, p. 33 ff. and Luc Coene & Geert Langenus 
(2011), Promoting fiscal discipline in a federal country: 
the mixed track record of Belgium’s High Council of 
Finance, Presentation held at the Conference on ‘Fis-
cal Policy Councils: Why do we need them and what 
makes them effective’, Vienna, 31 January 2011, avail-
able at: http://www.staatsschuldenausschuss.at/de/img/
s23_langenus_tcm163-221976.pdf.
5.2.2 The Office for Budget 
Responsibility: a Fiscal 
Councils which Interacts both 
with the Government and with 
the Parliament
The structural ties developed by the Office for 
Budget Responsibility with both the government 
and the parliament are confirmed by the func-
tional links established by the Office with both 
branches.
In particular, with regard to the relationship with 
the legislative branch, the Office has shown a clear 
aptitude for serving as a source of information and 
analytical studies to parliamentary committees.102
The tasks attributed to the Office involve the agen-
cy in a general surveillance of public finances and 
budgetary policies; the nature of such activities 
implies that the government is constantly under 
the Councils’ trial, which, in its turn, can serve the 
parliament with some relevant elements for politi-
102. According to Section 8 (2) b) of the Act and to Sec-
tion 16 (6) of Schedule 1 of the Act, in fact, every report 
prepared by the Office in pursuance of its duties must be 
laid before Parliament.
cal judgment. The Office has four main tasks: to 
produce forecasts for the economy and public fi-
nances; to judge the progress towards the govern-
ment’s fiscal targets; to assess the long-term sus-
tainability of the public finances; and to scrutinise 
the Treasury’s costing of budget measures. Each of 
these tasks is associated with specific publications 
which are made available to the parliament.103
Moreover, the agency is actively involved in par-
liamentary works as it has to answer parliamen-
tary questions (especially those concerning its 
103. For instance, the Economic and Fiscal Outlook 
publication is produced twice a year by the Office and 
it incorporates both the five-year forecasts for the 
economy and public finances and the assessment of the 
government’s progresses towards medium-term fiscal 
targets; the spring Economic and Fiscal Outlook publi-
cation incorporates the impact of tax and spending pol-
icy measures announced in the Budget Bill. Moreover, 
the Fiscal sustainability report, produced once a year, 
is meant to evaluate, for each category of spending and 
revenue, the long-term sustainability of the public fi-
nances. Finally, in the Treasury’s costing documents, the 
Office scrutinises Treasury’s costing of budget measures 
in order to test whether costing proposed by the gov-
ernment in the Treasury documents corresponds to rea-
sonable estimates. See Office for Budget Responsibility, 
Fiscal Sustainability Report, published on 13 July 2011 
and available at: http://budgetresponsibility.independ-
ent.gov.uk/fiscal-sustainability-report-july-2011.
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forecasts) and has to give evidence to parliamen-
tary committees (mainly with the Treasury Select 
Committee and linked to the reports produced by 
the Office in the exercise of its scrutiny function) 
through committee hearings. From the point of 
view of the funding, the agency interacts both 
with the Treasury and with the parliament.104
Finally, the Office’s collective accountability105 is 
assessed through two different types of control: 
the ‘institutional’ control made by both the Trea-
sury and the parliament upon the basis of the 
Annual Report of the performance of the Office’s 
tasks drafted in each financial year (Section 15 of 
the Schedule 1 of the Act); and the ‘external’ re-
view exercised by the person or body appointed, 
104. See Sections 17 and 18 of Schedule 1 of the Act.
105. An individual accountability applicable to each 
Office member is moreover provided by Section 6 of the 
Schedule 1 of the Budget Responsibility and National 
Audit Act, which in particular disciplines the termi-
nation of appointment made by the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer in case of malpractice or misconduct of the 
appointee. Even if the law determines the cases justify-
ing the anticipated termination of mandate, according 
to Section 6 (3) of Schedule 1 of the Act, the appoint-
ment of an Office member is not to be terminated with-
out the consent of the Treasury Committee of the House 
of Commons.
at least once in every relevant five-year period, by 
the non-executive Committee in compliance with 
Section 16 of Schedule 1 of the Act and entrusted 
to review reports made in pursuance of the Of-
fice’s duty.
In conclusion, the main features of the Office for 
Budget Responsibility can be found in the mixed 
nature of the agency (governmental and parlia-
mentary) which, associated with a consolidated 
tradition of parliamentary oversight of budget-
ary and fiscal policies, enables the establishment 
of close interaction and co-operation between the 
parliament and the fiscal institution.
5.2.3 Towards the Development of 
New Models of Interaction 
between Fiscal Councils 
and Parliaments: The Recent 
Italian and French Reforms
If, up until the latest national reforms, the only 
European case of a parliament-centred fiscal 
agency was represented by the Hungarian Fiscal 
Council,106 the new independent bodies created 
106. The Hungarian Fiscal Council was created in 
in Italy and France seem to add some significant 
novelties to this comparative framework.
2009 under the Act LXXV of 2008 on Cost-efficient 
State Management and Fiscal Responsibility. A detailed 
analysis of the background which accompanied the in-
stitution of the Hungarian Fiscal Council, of its func-
tions and basic modus operandi is offered by George 
Kopits (2011), Independent Fiscal Institutions: Develop-
ing Good Practices, Presentation prepared for the 3rd 
Annual Meeting of OECD Parliamentary Budget Of-
ficials, Stockholm - Sweden, 28-29 April, available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/governance/budgetingandpub-
licexpenditures/48089510.pdf. Especially after the ap-
proval of Act CXCIV of 2011 on the Economic Stability 
of Hungary, which assigned new tasks to the Council, 
the body has developed a strong and direct relationship 
with the General Assembly which emerges in particular 
in the parliamentary proceeding for the approval of the 
Act of the Central Budget: according to Art. 24 (3), in 
submitting the draft Act to the National Assembly, the 
government must follow the receipt of the comments of 
the Council; if the Council has communicated its disa-
greement by the deadline,  the government shall again 
discuss the draft and submit the same to the National 
Assembly afterwards. For a concrete example of how the 
Council exercises this function, see the opinion of the 
Fiscal Council ‘on the major characteristics of the budg-
etary and economic processes of Hungary in the period 
of January-September, 2012’, adopted by the Resolution 
11/2012.10.29. of the Fiscal Council of Hungary KVT-
67/2012.
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The recent approval of such reforms does not en-
able us to deepen the functional profiles of the 
relationship with the legislative branch (also due 
to the fact that the two bodies have not yet been 
installed). However, upon the basis of regulatory 
norms, it is possible to develop some reflections 
on their future interaction with legislative assem-
blies.
With regard to the Italian experience, it is impor-
tant to underline that the parliamentary nature 
of the upcoming fiscal institution (created, as 
already mentioned in Section 5.1.3, ‘by’ the two 
Chambers) implicitly seems to encourage the 
parliament to develop strong bicameral synergies 
in the development of parliamentary budgetary 
oversight. Article 5, Section 4 of the Constitu-
tional Law n. 1/2012, clearly states that the two 
Chambers, in compliance with their own rules of 
procedure, must exercise the oversight function 
on the public finance, with specific regard to the 
balance between expenditure and revenue, and to 
the quality and effectiveness of the spending of the 
public administration. If this provision apparently 
seems to enable the two Chambers to operate in-
dependently in the exercise of the oversight func-
tion, the presence of an internal office devoted to 
the analysis of the economic and financial data 
and trends will not be neutral for the strengthen-
ing of the overall involvement of the parliament in 
the budgetary and financial oversight.
This instrumental body will therefore serve as a 
research unit for the whole parliament, thus fa-
vouring the budgetary and fiscal specialisation of 
the latter in the exercise not only of the ex post 
scrutiny, but possibly also of the ex ante scrutiny. 
For these reasons, the well-functioning of such an 
organism will be crucial in order to ensure the ef-
fective respect of the new principle of the parlia-
mentary responsibility on the financial and bud-
getary control, introduced by Article 5, Section 4 
of Constitutional Law no. 1/2012.107 In the long-
term, as correctly observed,108 budgetary control 
107. On the prospective implementation of Article 5 of 
Constitutional Law no. 1/2012, see Giustino Lo Conte 
(2012), L’organismo indipendente di monitoraggio della 
finanza pubblica, in Giornale di diritto amministrativo, 
n. 10, p. 939 ff.
108. Raffaele Perna (2008), Le procedure di bilancio, fra 
Governo e Parlamento, in una democrazia maggiorita-
ria, in Il Filangieri, Quaderno 2007, Il Parlamento del 
bicameralismo. Un decennio di riforme dei regolamenti 
delle Camere, 2008, p. 175.
based exclusively upon the voluntary behaviour 
of parliamentary bodies and actors does not seem 
able to offer structural solutions, given the institu-
tional call for empowered budgetary information 
to be available to parliaments.
It is not easy to predict whether such an organism 
will have a decisive role in the improvement of the 
fiscal and budgetary governance, and, in particu-
lar, if it will contribute to shift the influence of the 
parliament from the budgetary decision-making 
stage to the ex ante and ex post stages. The lack of 
a solid tradition of co-operation between the par-
liament and the government both before the bud-
get is approved and during its execution could, in 
fact, either compromise the success of the upcom-
ing fiscal institution or make it strategic for assur-
ing better governance for the whole sector.
Finally, the recent French reform introduced with 
the loi organique relative à la programmation et à 
la gouvernance des finances publiques created the 
Haut Conseil des finances publiques as an advisory 
body endowed with strong independence from 
fiscal authorities, but, at the same time, established 
its stable and prompt intervention at all relevant 
stages of the budgetary and financial decision-
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making. In particular, the Council is required to 
formulate its advice on the governmental macro-
economic and financial forecasting upon which 
the annual law for the public finances planning (loi 
de programmation des finances publiques) and the 
annual financial law (loi des finances)109 are based. 
This advisory activity – formally disciplined as an 
autonomous function – will undoubtedly con-
tribute to offer the parliament a strengthened 
technical informative basis and analytical capac-
ity which will prove particularly useful for the re-
inforcement of parliamentary ex ante scrutiny.
The possibility for parliamentary bodies to estab-
lish direct interaction with the Council is, more-
over, explicitly recognised by Article 20 of the loi 
organique n. 2012-1403, which provides that the 
Chair of the Haut Conseil must be heard at any 
time on request of the committees of the National 
Assembly and of the Senate.110
109. See Articles 12-17 of the loi organique n. 2012-
1403.
110. The Decision n. 2012-568 of 13 December 2012 of 
the Conseil constitutionnel determined that the provi-
sion of Article 20 does not violate the Constitution, but 
at the same time does not share the legal status of ‘orga-
nique’ rule (par. 59)
Upon the basis of such premises, the likelihood 
that the Haut Conseil des Finances will operate 
as a functional interface for the parliament can 
be considered as a continuation of the more gen-
eral trend directed towards a re-inforcement of 
the parliamentary involvement in the budgetary 
decision-making process.111 This trend, launched 
by the approval of the Loi organique relative aux 
loi de finances in 2001, contributed to a significant 
renewal of the parliamentary scrutiny of the bud-
get, characterised not only by the strengthening 
of parliamentary dedicated oversight tools,112 but 
111. For an overview of this trend, see Aurélien Baudu 
(2010), L’incertaine renaissance parlementaire en ma-
tière budgétaire et financière, in Revue du droit public 
et de la science politique en France et à l’étranger, n. 5, p. 
1423 ff.; Pauline Türk (2011), Le contrôle parlementaire 
en France, Paris, LGDJ, p. 176 ff. 
112. In particular, the 2009 French modification of the 
National Assembly Rules of procedure (adopted after 
the Constitutional reform of 2008) which created the 
Comité d’èvaluation et de contrôle, as well as the Petit 
loi approved by the French Parliament on 13 July 2011 
(which introduced the ‘Lois cadre’ on the balance of 
public finances), can be interpreted as an attempt to fa-
vour a more structural control of the parliament on the 
budgetary and financial assets, anticipating the budget 
bill. See Jean Arthuis Le Seuil (2010), La dégradation des 
finances publiques: la loi en échec, le contrôle et l’évalua-
tion en recours, in Pouvoirs, n. 3, p. 83 ff. and Laurence 
also by the promotion of a new partnership with 
the court of auditors.113 In this sense, the devel-
opment of a constructive interaction between the 
independent body and the two representative as-
semblies can be said to be favoured by the long-
established co-operation which, in the French tra-
dition, has marked the relationship between the 
Cour des comptes and the parliament.114
The comparative overview presented in this sec-
tion has revealed that the variety of parliamentary 
models of budgetary scrutiny is likewise accom-
Baghestani (2011), A propos de la loi tendant à renfor-
cer les moyens du Parlement en matière de contrôle de 
l’action du Gouvernement et d’évaluation des politiques 
publique, in Les Petites affiches, La Loi, Le Quotidien 
juridique, n. 78, April, p. 3).
113. On this point, see Alain Lambert (2010), Vers un 
modèle français de contrôle budgétaire, in Pouvoirs, n. 
134, p. 47-48.
114. On the origins of this inter-institutional co-ope-
ration, see Guy Carcassonne (1997), Les relations de la 
Cour et du Parlement: ambuiguïtés et difficultés, in Re-
vue français de finances publiques, n. 59, p. 131 ff. On 
the effects of the most recent reforms on the interaction 
between the parliament and the Cour des Comptes, see 
Michel-Piere Prat & Cyril Janvier (2010), La Cour des 
comptes, auxiliaire de la démocratie, in Pouvoirs, n. 134, 
p. 97 ff., which defines the French Supreme Audit Au-
thority an ‘auxiliaire de la démocratie’. 
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panied by a variety of patterns of interaction be-
tween the fiscal institution and the representative 
assemblies. The combination of these two factors 
does not always offer conclusive data on the exis-
tence of a direct relationship between the intensity 
of the parliamentary involvement in the budgetary 
scrutiny and the establishment of close co-opera-
tion with the fiscal agency. However, the British 
case confirms that, where parliament has matured 
a consolidated praxis in the scrutiny of the budget, 
interaction with the fiscal agency tends to evolve 
spontaneously. In other words, well-established 
parliamentary scrutiny will undoubtedly encour-
age such inter-institutional co-operation. But the 
existence of unstable parliamentary oversight of 
the budget does not preclude the fulfilment of 
this purpose; in this perspective, the Italian case 
will be strategic in proving the opposite thesis, 
confirming how a weak parliament (in the ex post 
scrutiny stage) can take advantage from the cre-
ation of a fiscal agency in the development of its 
oversight function.
6. Conclusions: The Setting-up of Fiscal 
Councils and its Implications on the 
Parliamentary Scrutiny in the new 
European Economic Governance
The current crisis, which the European Union 
Member States are also facing, has been regarded 
as both a financial and a democratic crisis at the 
same time.115 It is primarily a crisis of the cred-
ibility and of the accountability of political institu-
tions, and, in particular, of fiscal authorities for not 
having been able to comply with the basic stan-
dards of sound public accounts in a responsible 
way. Fiscal Councils are one of the tools provided 
by the European Union to counteract the present 
degeneration and to maintain fiscal responsibility 
in the long term.
Directive 2011/85/EU, the TSCG, the Com-
munication from the Commission defining the 
common principles on national fiscal correction 
mechanisms (COM 2012) 342) and the draft reg-
115. See Miguel Poiares Maduro (2012), A New Gov-
ernance for the European Union and the Euro: Democ-
racy and Justice, cit., p. 3 ff.
ulation on common provisions for monitoring 
and assessing draft budgetary plans (COM (2011) 
821) represent the legal basis for national, albeit 
European-oriented, Fiscal Councils, which now 
have to be established in every Member State. The 
setting up of Fiscal Councils, however, not only 
poses challenges to national institutions, but also 
offers remarkable opportunities, particularly for 
national parliaments.
Amongst the challenges to address, there is, for 
instance, the relationship between Fiscal Councils 
and the existing institutions, both at national and 
at European level. For example, especially in the 
light of the Commission Communication which 
entitles Fiscal Councils to perform even the ex post 
assessment, the powers of Fiscal Councils could 
clash with the existing prerogatives of Courts of 
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Auditors, where established.116 Moreover, accord-
ing to some scholars, a clear link could be estab-
lished between Fiscal Councils and Constitutional 
Courts, for instance, in Germany, after the adop-
tion of the new national fiscal rules.117 In addition, 
the relationship between the Fiscal Councils and 
the European Commission, both acting as ‘fiscal 
watchdogs’, albeit at different levels of govern-
ment, or the role of the Court of Justice of the Eu-
ropean Union in evaluating the correct establish-
ment of Fiscal Councils at national level, continue 
to remain unclear.
Another challenge derives from the difficulty of 
adapting the existing national Fiscal Councils, 
such as those examined in Section 5.2.1, to the re-
116. On the need to accommodate the activity of the 
new Fiscal Councils with existing institutions, especial-
ly the Court of Auditors, see Daria Perrotta (2012), Il 
rafforzamento della vigilanza sui conti pubblici e l’evolu-
zione della fisionomia delle istituzioni fiscali indipenden-
ti, in Le autonomie in cammino. Scritti dedicati a G.C. 
De Martin, Padova, Cedam, p. 539-540.
117. According to Daniele Franco (2011), Comments on 
‘The Role of Fiscal Policy Councils in Theory’, cit., ‘the 
new German fiscal rule implicitly defines a clear man-
date for a possible German independent Fiscal Council: 
to provide the economic analysis on which the constitu-
tional court can deliver its judgments.’
quirements established at European Union level. 
The notion of ‘functional autonomy’ or ‘indepen-
dence’ is likely to be ‘filtered’ by the national con-
stitutional tradition (again, the German case is 
particularly telling). In particular, the powers and 
the issue of the inter-institutional accountability 
of Fiscal Councils require some significant adap-
tations in the Member States. For instance, the 
Commission Communication assigns to Fiscal 
Councils the power to issue policy recommenda-
tions towards the national fiscal authority, which, 
in principle, is bound by them and has to justify 
publicly any deviation from the path laid down by 
the Fiscal Council. However, this power is provid-
ed in a minority of the existing Fiscal Councils in 
the European Union and is likely to produce sig-
nificant effects in terms of the inter-institutional 
balance, thereby aiming at limiting the discretion 
of the fiscal authority, especially of the executive.
By contrast, perhaps the institution that will ben-
efit most from the establishment of a Fiscal Coun-
cil will be the parliament. Since both the Commu-
nication and the draft regulation state that Fiscal 
Councils are accountable to parliaments, the na-
tional solutions, like that of Germany, in which 
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the Fiscal Council does not enjoy direct contact 
with the parliament can be problematical and will 
probably require some reforms.
The enhancement of the relationship between the 
parliaments and the Fiscal Councils would seem to 
be particularly coherent with the approach taken 
by the German Constitutional Court in preserv-
ing the role of the parliament when dealing with 
European Union affairs and budgetary matters, as 
well as with the general framework provided by 
the Treaty of Lisbon. Indeed, the special relation-
ship enjoyed by the parliaments and the Fiscal 
Councils, according to the Communication and 
the draft regulation, seems also to reconcile the 
problematical disconnection between the Treaty 
of Lisbon, which places national parliaments at 
the centre of representative democracy in Europe 
and lets them participate directly in the European 
decision-making process, and the new European 
economic governance that only marginally or in-
directly considers the national parliaments. The 
suspect ‘new marginalisation’ of the national par-
liaments, which the European measures adopted 
in the aftermath of the reform of the economic 
governance framework are likely to produce – 
for example, the time-constraints imposed by the 
European semester and the European-driven bal-
anced-budget clauses introduced at constitutional 
level – could be, at least partially, hindered by the 
setting up of Fiscal Councils which have strong 
ties with their legislatures.118 Providing indepen-
dent information, Fiscal Councils can improve 
the effectiveness of parliamentary scrutiny and 
oversight as well as the quality of the parliamen-
tary output. In other words, thanks to the ‘alliance’ 
with Fiscal Councils, the position of parliaments 
towards the executives will be enhanced in the 
control on budgetary and fiscal matters at national 
level within the European Semester and within the 
procedures for the surveillance of the compliance 
with the medium-term objectives. Therefore, the 
mandatory creation of Fiscal Councils could pos-
sibly induce a further Europeanisation of national 
parliaments, which would reproduce the tradi-
tional tension between the emulation of the most 
developed national experiences of Fiscal Councils 
118. If, as pointed out by Philip Norton (2010), La na-
ture du contrôle parlamentaire, cit., p. 6, the perception 
of a possible ‘decline’ of parliaments conceals the mul-
tifunctional nature of legislative assemblies, such mul-
titasking  parliamentary identity can take great advan-
tage from the co-operation with the Fiscal Councils.
(for example, the UK Office for Budget Responsi-
bility) and differentiation. Indeed, differentiation 
reflects, on the one hand, the specificities of the 
institutional landscape of each Member State, its 
form of government, its political and economic 
culture, and the features of parliamentary over-
sight on budgetary matters; on the other, it is the 
result of the differentiated integration of Member 
States in the Economic and Monetary Union and 
of the diverse impact of the Euro crisis across the 
countries.
The development of a solid relationship between 
the parliaments and the Fiscal Councils does not 
seem to impair the respect of the independence of 
Fiscal Councils, as a basic condition for their ef-
fective performance. Notwithstanding the existing 
differences in the classification of the Fiscal Coun-
cils and in the interpretation of their role with re-
gard to fiscal and budgetary policy-making, the 
literature has usually shared the idea that the main 
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threat affecting the role of Fiscal Councils is to be 
found in the difficult equilibrium ‘between Scylla 
and Charibdis’,119 i.e., between acting in full inde-
pendence (and political irrelevance) and merely 
legitimising government plans. An ideal Fiscal 
Council is expected to steer a middle course.
These remarks explain why this paper adopts, as a 
starting-point, the idea that Fiscal Councils should 
be granted full independence from their govern-
ments, but not necessarily from their parliaments. 
The creation of co-operative patterns with the 
legislative branch represents a valuable target 
both from the point of view of the Fiscal Council 
(which is thus strengthened in its institutional role 
and can consolidate its capacity to interact with 
all political parties without becoming partisan), 
and from the point of view of the parliament itself 
(which can thus gain new sources of information 
and analytical data which will enable effective con-
trol of the activity of the government).120 Strength-
119. Luc Coene & Geert Langenus (2011), Promoting 
fiscal discipline in a federal country, cit., p. 20.
120. On ‘the value that an independent budget capacity 
located in the legislature can have for expanding the leg-
islature’s role in budgeting and for holding the executive 
accountable’, see Barry Anderson (2009), The changing 
ening the relationship with the parliament would, 
therefore, offer Fiscal Councils the opportunity to 
be impartial without staying outside the political 
arena: if fiscal institutions ‘must work at the core 
of the democratic process and be fully owned’,121 
the relationship with the parliament reveals itself 
as a strategic one. Such a perspective – consisting 
in the promotion of procedures of direct interac-
tion in between Fiscal Councils and their respec-
tive representative assemblies – constitutes a chal-
lenge, above all, for those Fiscal Councils which 
are loosely tied to respective parliaments.
The development of this idea has required us to 
widen our original plan of analysis, involving - in 
the comparative survey - a confrontation based 
not only upon the identity and role of the Fiscal 
role of Parliament in the budget process, in OECD Jour-
nal on Budgeting, vol.1, p. 3.
121. Daniele Franco (2011), Comments on ‘The Role of 
Fiscal Policy Councils in Theory’, cit.; Xavier Debrun 
(2011), The Theory of Independent Fiscal Agencies: 
What Do We Have? What Do We Need? And Where 
Does This Leave Us, Presentation held at the Conference 
on ‘Fiscal Policy Councils: Why do we need them and 
what makes them effective’, Vienna, 31 January 2011, 
available at: http://www.staatsschuldenausschuss.at/en/
img/s16_debrun_tcm164-221973.pdf.
Councils, but also upon their relationship with 
the parliament, which is considered as a part of 
the budgetary and fiscal policy-making.
Interfacing these perspectives of analysis has en-
abled the traditional distinction between ‘govern-
ment’ and ‘parliament’-centred Fiscal Councils to 
be enriched. The comparative survey has revealed 
that the relationship between these two bodies is 
sometimes entirely mediated by the government 
(as the case of Germany clearly reveals); in other 
contexts (the experience of Belgium is emblem-
atic at this regard), the parliament is not consid-
ered as a due interlocutor for the fiscal authori-
ties, whose main institutional reference is instead 
represented by the executive branches, at national 
or at regional level; the British Office for Budget 
Responsibility offers a good example of a Fiscal 
Council which, although closely-linked to the 
government, has developed close co-operation 
with the parliament; the forthcoming Italian Par-
liamentary Budget Office will add to the com-
parative framework a rather unique example of a 
Fiscal Council strongly centred in the parliament, 
both from the structural and from the functional 
point of view; finally, the creation of the French 
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Haut Conseil de finances will offer a new model of 
a fiscal agency which, mainly due to its structural 
ties with the Cour de comptes, is endowed with a 
strong external legitimation, but, at the same time, 
is supposed to act as a functional interface of the 
parliament.
Upon the basis of this multi-faceted framework, it 
is possible to affirm that the relationship between 
the Fiscal Councils and the parliaments tends to 
be shaped by two factors. The first factor is re-
lated to the influence exercised by the economic, 
political and legal context over the role and posi-
tion of Fiscal Councils: in the European context; 
in fact, only the ‘last generation’ of Fiscal Councils 
are imagined, from the structural point of view, 
as having a solid and direct relationship with the 
parliament. If this trend is strongly conditioned 
by the newly-emerged need to meet EU require-
ments, the crisis itself seems to have encouraged 
the search for a stronger democratic legitimation 
for the mandate of Fiscal Councils based upon the 
development of a privileged interaction with the 
national parliaments as the authentic exponents 
of popular legitimacy.
The second factor influencing the relationship 
between the parliament and the fiscal institution 
is instead to be found in its connection with the 
development of an autonomous capacity of the 
parliament to scrutinise the budget. The empirical 
data available reveal that the interaction between 
these two elements is a complex one: when the 
parliament is strong in the exercise of the bud-
getary scrutiny, close co-operation with the fis-
cal institution spontaneously tends to take place 
(see the British case);122 but when this condition 
is not satisfied, the same result can, however, be 
obtained through formal legal provisions which 
encourage the creation of a direct connection be-
tween the Fiscal Councils and the representative 
assemblies (as in the recent Italian constitutional 
reform). In this latter hypothesis, the setting up of 
a fiscal authority can, therefore, affirm itself as an 
122. The legislature tends to be more interested in the 
informative and analytical support of the Fiscal Council 
when its daily activities involve the scrutiny of govern-
mental choices and performances in the budgetary and 
fiscal policy field.
independent variable which can contribute to re-
invigorate the parliamentary scrutiny function on 
budgetary and fiscal matters.
The above-mentioned consideration on the re-
lationship between Fiscal Councils and national 
legislatures does not challenge the importance 
that the economic literature usually attributes to 
the creation of a fiscal institution as a useful mea-
sure capable of providing improved fiscal perfor-
mance. In particular, it does not condition the 
possibility of Fiscal Councils promoting a more 
effective use of public resources,123 but it should, 
instead, be interpreted as a warning that demon-
strates that the implementation of such an objec-
tive is also dependent on the relationship that the 
Fiscal Council develops with all the institutions 
which have an impact on budgetary policy-mak-
ing. To date, the literature has deeply investigated 
the correlation between the effectiveness of fiscal 
institutions and the various elements of the fiscal 
123. On the conditions influencing this result, see Lars 
Jonung & Martin Larch (2006), Improving fiscal policy 
in the EU. The case for independent forecasts, in Econom-
ic Policy, n. 47, July, p. 491 ff., who in particular under-
line how ‘the establishment of an independent forecaster 
as such may not necessarily guarantee more caution in 
drawing up the budget’ (p. 524).
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framework, from the formal frameworks (such as the constitutional rules on excessive deficits) to the informal ones (for instance, the motivation of policy-
makers).124 All these features undoubtedly influence the design of fiscal institutions and their capacity to discourage deviations from desirable policies; but, 
if we want to make Fiscal Councils work effectively, it seems that the internal architecture of the form of government, in its general functioning and in its 
specific manifestations within budgetary and fiscal policy-making, should also be taken into consideration. Only by considering the overall interaction of 
such agencies with both the government and the parliament – in their role as bodies in charge of the political decision-making in the budgetary and fiscal 
field – can we establish the premises for a fiscal architecture capable of increasing the contribution of all the institutions involved.125
Figure 1 - Features of the Fiscal Councils in the UK, Belgium and Germany with regard to the nature of parliamentary oversight of budget
Nature of the parliamentary oversight of budget Criteria for assessing the Council’s independence (firewalls) 
Type of parliamentary 
oversight of budget 
Extension of 
parliamentary oversight of 
budget 
Council’s members 
appointment and staffing 
Formal influence of the 
Council in the budget and 
fiscal process 
Council’s funding Accountability rules 
(in face of the 
Government - of the  
Parliament) 
UK - Office 
for Budget 
Responsibility 
Parliamentary oversight 
of budget carried out 
by the Public Account 
Committee together with 
National Audit Office 
Intense and consolidated 
parliamentary scrutiny 
HoC’s Treasury 
Committee  must 
give its consent on 
the appointment (and 
termination of mandate) 
of 
three members of the 
Office 
The government is 
constantly under the 
Councils’ trial 
Aptitude of the Office 
for serving as a source 
of information and 
analytical studies to 
parliamentary committees 
The Office depends from 
both the Treasury and 
the Parliament for its 
revenues as well as for 
the certification of its 
accounts (subject also 
to the validation of the 
Controller and Auditor 
General)
Collective accountability 
assessed:
a) by institutional bodies 
(the Treasury; the 
parliament) every year, 
b) by an external 
reviewer (person or body 
appointed by the non-
executive committee 
at least once in every 
relevant 5-year period
124. See, in particular, Xavier Debrun & Manmohan S. Kumar (2007), The Discipline-Enhancing Role of Fiscal Institutions, cit., p. 31 ff.
125. As observed by Andrea Manzella (2012), Il governo democratico della crisi, Presentation held at the 58th Conference on Administrative Studies - Varenna, 20-21 September, in 
fact, the entrustment of power on technical bodies does not bar the essence of politics, as the role of democratic institutions can in any case be safeguarded through the appointment 
procedures, the introduction of transparency duties for independent agencies and the development of cooperative patterns in between such agencies and political decision-makers.
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Belgium – 
National 
Accounts 
Institute and 
High Council 
on Finance 
The parliamentary 
oversight of budget 
involves both the Budget 
and Finance committee 
and the Assembly 
of the Chamber of 
representatives 
Low-Medium 
development of budgetary 
oversight 
NAI and HIC as 
‘government-oriented’ 
agencies: relationship with 
both the Federal and the 
Regional governments) 
(plurality of institutional 
interlocutors) 
- NAO intervenes mainly 
in the ex ante stage;
 HCF’s contribution is 
focused both on the ex 
ante and on the ex post 
stage. 
NAI is financed by an 
annual grant from the 
Federation, inscribed 
within the budget section 
of the Ministry for 
economic affairs (art. 118 
of the law 21st December 
1994)
According to art. 13 of 
the Arrêté royal of the 3rd 
April 2006, HIC adopts 
its own internal financial 
regulation, which is 
approved by the Ministry 
of finances. 
Both agencies, as public 
institutions, have 
ministers overseeing 
their activity and budget; 
this does not prevent 
them from enjoying 
full independence (they 
respond to government 
requests, but at the same 
time can also act on their 
own initiative). 
Germany - 
Council for 
Economic 
Experts 
Parliamentary scrutiny of 
budget mainly carried out 
by the Budget committee 
of the Bundestag (and in 
particular by Auditing  
subcommittee) - 
Medium development of 
budgetary oversight 
The five members of 
the Council are selected 
among specialists in the 
field of economic theory 
and policy and appointed 
by the Federal President 
on the recommendation 
of the government. 
The Council’s main 
duty is to compile the 
Annual Economic 
Report, presented to the 
Federal Government by 
November 15th, which 
in its turn submits it to 
legislative bodies. Within 
eight weeks the Federal 
government presents its 
comments on the report 
to the legislative bodies. 
The Council is endowed 
with financial autonomy 
and its remuneration 
and expenses are borne 
directly by the Federal 
government
The government-centered 
nature of the body makes 
the Council responsible 
only in face of the 
government. The role of 
political advisor prevails 
over that of scientific 
advisor, thus supporting 
the idea of the Council 
of experts as a ‘parallel 
government’. 
Figure 2 - A comparison between the degree of the national Parliaments’ involvement in the budgetary oversight (ex post scrutiny) and their relationship with Fiscal councils
Country Parliamentary involvement in the 
budgetary oversight (ex post scrutiny) 
Reference institution of the Fiscal Council Interaction Fiscal council -Parliament** 
UK
(Office for budget responsibility) High involvement
parliament 
government Intense 
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1. Introduction
Following the banking collapse in the US and 
shortly after the beginning of the Greek sover-
eign debt crisis in the first quarter of 2010, Por-
tugal was pin-pointed as a high-risk investment: 
demands for bonds issued by government shrank 
and the interest rate shot up. The Prime Minister 
(PM) José Sócrates kept insisting that the country 
would not have be bailed out on the grounds that 
the minority Socialist government was success-
fully approving austerity packages with the help 
of the main opposition party – the Social Demo-
cratic Party (PSD). However, in March 2011, the 
government proposed an additional fourth pack-
age that was rejected by all the opposition par-
ties. This led to Sócrates’ resignation and shortly 
after the international lenders were called in. In 
the election of June 2011, a centre-right coalition 
composed of the PSD and the CDS-PP  obtained 
an absolute majority and started to implement a 
series of painful austerity measures, most of which 
were conditioned by the international lenders, 
provoking recession and social unrest. Despite 
their very liberal and, for many, unfair repercus-
sions, the Socialist Party (PS) in opposition voted 
in favour or abstained from voting on the most 
important packages during the first 15 months of 
the current legislature, finally shifting strategy and 
voting against the 2013 budget in November 2012. 
This narrative implies several puzzles for research-
ers of Portuguese politics: why have first the PSD 
and then the PS supported unpopular and liberal 
measures for so long? What made them shift from 
support to opposition? More broadly, what impact 
has the crisis had on the Portuguese opposition’s 
behaviour? Is there any difference among the op-
position parties? How is their behaviour affected 
by the presence of a majority or minority govern-
ment? 
The Portuguese case gives a unique opportunity 
to address these questions. It offers an insight into 
the impact of the financial crisis on the opposi-
tion’s behaviour with both a minority government 
– during which non-collaboration could have dra-
matic consequences – and a majority one – when 
such a choice rarely has major political or policy 
implications. It also enables us to study the effect 
of additional external actors - that is, the Euro-
pean Union (EU) and later the European Central 
Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) – on the opposition’s conduct. These actors 
constrain both the majority and opposition, but 
also represent the precious ally of political entre-
preneurs who would like to push ahead with liber-
al measures – in our case, clearly in disagreement 
with both the moderate and radical left parties’ 
programmes.
Our main argument is that the financial crisis, 
which jeopardizes national interest but also trig-
gers extremely radical socio-economic measures, 
has an important effect on the opposition’s behav-
iour. All taken together, consensus in parliament 
decreases with the onset of the crisis mainly be-
cause more salient and divisive socio-economic 
policies have to be approved. However, we also 
observe variations among parties; on the one 
hand the mainstream opposition parties are more 
consensual than they would be if the same policies 
were presented in normal times (as long as they 
do not see a golden opportunity to get in power 
themselves) and on the other hand, the radical 
parties are even more adversarial than usual. In 
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order to demonstrate these claims, we rely on 
qualitative process tracking of the Portuguese op-
position’s positions on key economic issues (in-
cluding interviews with key political players) and 
on quantitative data on the voting behaviour of 
the parliamentary party groups before and after 
crisis (in the period 1995 to 2012).
2. Theoretical argument and hypotheses
Opposition parties are always exposed to two 
contrasting pressures: one towards conflict, which 
comes from the need to mark their position as dif-
ferent from that of the government in office, and 
one towards cooperation, which comes from the 
will to take part in decision-making and influence 
the policy outcome. With the financial crisis, this 
dilemma between conflict and cooperation has 
become even more crucial. Austerity measures are 
by their very nature unpopular and, in bad eco-
nomic times, voters are more likely to withdraw 
their support of the government in office (Lew-
is-Beck 1988). Thus, the opposition parties have 
a choice between the need to cooperate with the 
majority to influence the direction of far-reaching 
socio-economic changes for the nation’s sake and 
the opportunity to weaken a fragile government 
even further and possibly get into power at the 
successive election. 
Little is said in the existing literature about the 
possible behaviour of the opposition parties in 
such a critical situation. Previous research sug-
gests that the opposition’s behaviour is likely to be 
more adversarial on economic and social policies, 
since parties are expected to represent different 
socio-economic interests (Rose 1984, De Giorgi 
2011). Furthermore, the saliency that parties give 
to different issues has an impact on their voting 
behaviour in parliament: low issue salience means 
scarce public attention and consequently fewer 
incentives for political parties to compete. How-
ever, the more a party (and its electorate) assigns 
relevance to an issue, the more costly it will be to 
behave consensually (Carammia and De Giorgi 
2011, Mújica and Sánchez-Cuenca 2006, Stecker 
2011). As the legislation presented by the govern-
ments in order to tackle the crisis is mainly related 
to socio-economic issues and innately salient, our 
first research hypothesis is that:
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H1. Since the beginning of the 
crisis, the level of consensus 
between the government and 
opposition parties has decreased 
as the number of socio-economic 
and salient policies discussed in 
parliament has increased.
However, as pointed out in the existing literature, 
the nature of parties and the type of party com-
petition constitute a crucial variable explaining 
the behaviour of the opposition in parliament 
(Duverger 1951, Sartori 1966, Flanagan 2001). In 
particular, the political parties proposing extreme 
societal changes, the so-called radical parties, are 
often permanently in opposition; while those with 
a more moderate stance, the mainstream parties, 
are usually in government.  As Sartori eloquently 
notes, the former are more likely to act responsi-
bly: ‘An opposition which knows that it may be 
called to ‘respond’, i.e. which is oriented towards 
governing and has a reasonable chance to govern 
[…] is likely to behave responsibly, in a restrained 
and realistic fashion. On the other hand, a ‘per-
manent opposition’ which […] knows it will not 
be called on to respond, is likely to take the path 
of ‘irresponsible opposition’’ (Sartori 1966, p. 35). 
This difference between permanent and alterna-
tive opposition has implications for our research 
question, namely the impact of the crisis on the 
opposition behaviour: since the legislation pre-
sented by the governments to save their country 
from the economic crisis is of the highest national 
interests, we expect mainstream parties to feel ‘re-
sponsible’ and to cooperate with the government, 
although they would have opposed these policies 
under normal circumstances. Alternatively, radi-
cal opposition parties are expected to take advan-
tage of the crisis to fight with the government and 
to be even more controversial than they had been 
before the crisis. 
Thus, although we expect a general decrease in 
the level of consensus after the onset of the crisis 
(due to the rising number of salient and socio-
economic policy decisions), we expect the net im-
pact of the crisis on the opposition behaviour to 
vary from one party to another. Since the onset 
of the crisis, the mainstream parties which usually 
alternate in government in Portugal – the PS, the 
PSD and the CDS-PP –, are expected to behave 
more consensually than they would have done for 
similar policies in other circumstances. We expect 
the contrary to be true for the radical left parties 
(the PCP, PEV and BE ). Therefore, our second hy-
pothesis states that: 
H2. Controlling for saliency and 
type of policies, after the onset 
of the crisis the mainstream 
opposition parties are more 
consensual than the radical 
parties.
In this turbulent period, there is one further inter-
vening variable that cannot be ignored, namely the 
increasing influence of international actors on the 
economic policy issue. Indeed, with the bailout, 
the conditions set by the European Commission 
(EC), the ECB and the IMF for the loan forced the 
Portuguese government to make radical changes 
in their policies. Even before, however, the EC had 
pressed for public debt and deficit to be reduced 
as quickly as possible. As a consequence, there is a 
clear trend that is driven by the crisis: an increase 
in the European influence – a europeanisation – 
in many controversial sectors of social and eco-
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nomic policy. Many scholars have already worked 
on the impact of euro-scepticism – and conversely 
of pro-European attitudes – on the government-
opposition dynamics and party competition 
(Hooghe et al. 2004, Sitter 2001 and 2002, Szczer-
biak and Taggart 2003). We thus expect the tra-
ditionally pro-European parties in opposition to 
be more likely to cooperate with the government 
when the socio-economic measures follow the 
European Union recommendations/orders (with 
or without the intervention of the IMF). Alterna-
tively, we expect the more euro-sceptic parties in 
opposition to have fewer incentives to collaborate 
when the EU is influencing legislation. 
H3: Pro-European parties in 
opposition are more likely to 
cooperate with the government 
on policies recommended by the 
European Union than euro-sceptic 
parties.
Obviously, this third hypothesis is related to the 
former as parties that are permanently out of gov-
ernment tend to be more euro-sceptic (Taggart 
1998, Sitter 2001). Moreover, since it is hard to 
combine euro-sceptic stances with government 
ambitions, euro-sceptic parties that want to be-
come credible coalition partners frequently mod-
erate their hostility to Europe (Conti and De Gior-
gi 2011, Costa Lobo and Magalhães 2011). Two 
different kinds of analysis – one based on inter-
views with the Portuguese MPs conducted at the 
beginning of the crisis in 2008, (Moury and De 
Sousa 2011), and the other based on the study of 
party manifestos in the period from 1995 to 2005 
(Costa Lobo and Magalhães 2011) – indeed con-
verge to show the two major parties, the PS and the 
PSD, have a very strong European attitude : virtu-
ally all their deputies think that EU membership 
is a good thing according to the responses given in 
2008, and the clear majority of statements in both 
parties’ manifestos are pro-European. On the oth-
er hand, it is not surprising that the manifestos of 
the radical left parties, which have never been in 
government, present strong anti-European stanc-
es. However, Moury and De Sousa observed an 
important distinction between the two extreme 
left parties: while a large majority of BE deputies 
finds that EU membership is a good thing (66.7%), 
less than one third (29%) of the CDU (PCP-PEV) 
deputies agree with this statement.  Finally, the 
CDS-PP is less Euro-enthusiastic than its centre-
right partner: while the manifestos of both parties 
have been clearly pro-European since 1996, the 
CDS-PP 1995 manifesto (i.e. in the first electoral 
contest after the Maastricht treaty) showed strong 
Euro-sceptic positions. Similarly, a large majority 
of deputies from this party (87%) welcomes mem-
bership to the EU, but this percentage is lower 
than for the PSD (95.6%). Thus, if H3 is correct, 
after the crisis we should observe variation in the 
voting behaviour between the CDS-PP and the 
two other mainstream parties on the one hand 
and between the BE and the CDU on the other. 
Our final hypothesis is related to the variation in 
time during the period of crisis. As stated above, 
austerity measures are by their very nature unpop-
ular and so it is the government that is constrained 
to implement them. As a consequence, the main 
opposition parties have a better chance during the 
financial crisis of replacing the incumbents if new 
elections occur. So the more the government is in 
jeopardy and the better the prospect of winning 
office for the opposition parties should there be 
an election, the greater the opposition’s incentives 
to challenge – rather than to support – the execu-
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tive. In that sense, crisis leads to the instability 
of governments. This idea is consistent with the 
literature that economic and financial crises tend 
to lead to government instability and termination 
(Browne et al. 1986) . Hence, our last research hy-
pothesis is that, once the financial crisis has be-
gun, the opposition behaves in a more adversarial 
way when the government’s incumbency is at risk 
– for instance, when it lacks a majority of seats in 
parliament and/or its popularity declines – but in 
a more cooperative way when it is not – i.e., when 
elections have just been held. 
H4. After the onset of the crisis, 
the opposition parties will be 
more adversarial when their 
possibilities to replace the 
government in office increase.
In the next two sections we test these four hypoth-
eses first in light of process-tracking of the main 
events and bills approved in parliament since the 
start of the crisis, and second through a quantita-
tive data analysis of the legislation passed before 
and after the crisis, in the period from 1995 to 
2012. 
3. A political overview of the crisis
Opposition’s behaviour and 
narratives (2008-2012)
After the fall of the Lehman Brothers in Septem-
ber 2008, there was a dramatic slow-down in  the 
Portuguese economy . Since exchange devaluation 
was not an option – unlike  in the previous debt 
crises in the 1970s and 1980s –, the first measure 
taken by the first Sócrates government (a single-
party majority government) was fiscal expansion. 
These counter-cyclical fiscal policies were taken in 
coordination with the EU’s initial neo-Keynesian 
approach to the crisis (European Commission 
2008). Those proposals received different answers 
in parliament, with all opposition parties voting 
against the 2009 budget, but in favour of its first 
amendment (with the exception of the PSD which 
voted against). Nonetheless, the reasons behind 
the negative votes of the various parties were very 
different: while the radical left parties criticised 
the PS for not going far enough, the PSD and 
CDS-PP considered the expansionary budget to 
be irresponsible. 
During the second half of 2009, the Portuguese 
government had reported an estimated 2.6 % 
slump in GDP and a public deficit of 9.3 per cent 
in 2009. The European Council urged the coun-
try to rapidly engage in policies aimed at medi-
um-term fiscal consolidation (European Council 
2009), thus putting an end to the short cycle of 
fiscal expansion. In April 2010, the Greek gov-
ernment asked for financial assistance from the 
European Union to avoid bankruptcy, while the 
Portuguese government interest rates soared to 
their highest level since entry into the Euro. As 
the incumbent PS had lost the absolute majority 
in parliament, when a general election was called 
in September 2009, the new Socialist minority 
government urged the parliamentary opposition 
to help approve the budget for 2010. According to 
Portuguese economists, this budget, was not a real 
austerity plan: the new Lisbon international air-
port, high speed train lines and other considerable 
public investments were still on the agenda, as 
were other measures aimed at smoothing the neg-
ative effects of the crisis on economic output and 
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employment. Nevertheless, the freezing of public 
sector salaries and the plan to reduce state person-
nel carried the message to be heard by the markets 
and the EU leaders that the country was back on 
the track of fiscal consolidation. The left wing par-
ties accused international financial speculators of 
robbing the country with the acquiescence of the 
government and rejected the bill. While blaming 
the previous Socialist governments (both Guterres 
and Sócrates) for getting the country into trouble, 
the PSD and the CDS abstained from voting and 
let the budget pass. 
Just three days after the budget’s approval, on 
March 12, the government went back to th par-
liament to ask for support for the Stability and 
Growth Programme (SGP) 2010-2013, before de-
livering it to the EU. Unlike the budget, the SGP 
was undoubtedly an austerity  package composed 
of a wide set of hard fiscal measures on the rev-
enue and expenditure sides. Both the CDS and 
the radical left-wing parties soon announced they 
would vote against. For the parliamentary left, the 
Portuguese governments had mistakenly followed 
the path of recessionary budget policies that not 
only would fail to solve the debt crisis but would 
also destroy the national economy, dismantle the 
welfare state and increase social inequalities. The 
CDS, for its part, blamed the Socialist government 
for targeting the poor and most vulnerable instead 
of cutting the inefficiencies of the Leviathan and 
for lacking a strategy to lead the country back to 
growth. Despite sharing a similar discourse, the 
PSD (just before the election of its new leader Pe-
dro Passos Coelho) decided to negotiate the first 
austerity package and abstained from voting. The 
argument invoked for abstaining from voting and 
letting the austerity package pass in parliament 
was that political stability was of greater national 
interest, especially after Fitch’s  downgrading of 
the Portuguese credit rating. 
By the end of the first quarter of 2010, Portu-
gal was boarding the Greek ship and starting to 
muddle through the storm of recessionary aus-
terity packages, reports of negative growth, rising 
unemployment and poor fiscal behaviour, down-
grading credit rates, and spiking yields. Despite an 
ever critical stance towards the government, the 
PSD negotiated two additional austerity packages 
with the PS and abstained from voting on them 
once in parliament (consequently letting them 
pass). Whenever talks with the government broke 
down, the President of the Republic, Aníbal Cava-
co Silva, pushed the PSD – the party he had led 
in the 1980s and 1990s – back to the negotiating 
table. 
Such a cycle would eventually come to an end in 
early 2011, when the government lost support 
from all sides of the political spectrum, in particu-
lar from the President of the Republic.   While the 
three initial packages of the Sócrates government 
had been sustained by the President (who prob-
ably wanted to avoid being accused of a potential-
ly dangerous political crisis in the middle of the 
financial storm), Cavaco Silva’s presidential re-
election in January 2011 marked a turning point. 
In February, the President vetoed a decree-law ap-
proved by the government for the first time in five 
years of institutional cohabitation with the PS in 
government. His inauguration speech soon after-
wards, on March 9, was regarded by many politi-
cians and observers as a ‘declaration of war’ on the 
government. The scene was set for an institutional 
conflict between the PR and the government.
 In the meanwhile, with 10-year bond yields con-
sistently above 7 per cent, the government was 
forced to negotiate a fourth austerity package with 
the EU, which basically consisted of an amended 
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version of the SGP (Stability and Growth Pact) 
2011-2014. According to the PSD (but vehement-
ly denied by each of the 12 Socialists interviewed), 
the negotiations were conducted behind the backs 
of the parliamentary opposition and the President 
of the Republic.
While there was no formal need to approve this 
new version of the SGP in parliament , the Prime 
Minister declared he would resign if the opposi-
tion proposed a resolution against the programme 
and this received a majority vote in parliament. 
The programme, he said, was the only alternative 
to the bailout, and he was not available to govern 
under the supervision of the IMF. Rejecting the 
government package would therefore trigger a 
political crisis in the middle of a financial storm, 
and the opposition should be blamed accordingly. 
This behaviour made many observers conclude 
that the PM was keen to make the government fail 
before the bailout by also blaming the opposition 
parties for their lack of responsibility. 
Despite the pressure of new rating downgrades, 
the President of the Republic did not take action to 
rescue the plan from rejection on the grounds that 
the Presidency had been prevented from using its 
influence due to the lack of information given by 
the government on the new austerity package. 
The PSD voted against it  and the Prime Minister 
immediately resigned. The eroded authority and 
credibility of the Socialists in managing the cri-
sis, as well as the alleged negotiations of the fourth 
austerity package with the European authorities 
behind the backs of parliament, the President and 
the social partners, were the main arguments used 
by the PSD to explain its shift in voting behaviour 
and the rejection of the fourth and last austerity 
package of the PS executive. In the aftermath of 
these events, the caretaker government had no 
choice but to ask for the bailout on April 6, at the 
beginning of the electoral campaign. 
The negotiating process was conducted by the 
government on behalf of the Portuguese Republic 
and a memorandum of understanding was signed 
in May by the lenders – the so called troika, com-
posed of the EC, the ECB and the IMF – and the 
three mainstream parties: PS, PSD and CDS. This 
was a signal that, no matter which party was going 
to win the election, the new government would 
inevitably be constrained by the commitments to 
its international lenders. And to a lesser extent, 
the same was also true for the signing parties that 
would be in opposition. By contrast, the radical 
parties (PCP, PEV and BE) claimed that the bail-
out was undemocratic and unnecessary and re-
fused discussions with the troika. 
At the general election held in June 2011, the elec-
toral strategy of the PSD and CDS-PP to empha-
sise Sócrates’ personal responsibility in the Por-
tuguese crisis proved successful. The centre-right 
coalition obtained an absolute majority and the 
head of the PSD, Pedro Passos Coelho, became 
the new PM. As the agent of the troika, Coelho’s 
government had to implement a series of painful 
austerity measures, provoking recession and so-
cial unrest. Once in opposition, the PS started to 
blame the government for ever worsening crisis, 
thus aligning its discourse with the more radi-
cal parties on the left. For the PS and the radical 
left parties, the centre-right coalition government 
went far beyond the agreement with the troika 
and its austerity measures – the usual mix of tax 
increases plus spending cuts in social benefits, 
pensions and public sector wages – were unfairly 
distributed and sharpened recessionary effects. 
Despite this common discourse and the actual 
‘irrelevance’ of its voting choice in the current 
majority setting,  the PS had been quite coopera-
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tive on the major (and arguably more painful and 
inconsistent with their ideological background) 
policy packages proposed by the PSD/CDS coali-
tion government until November 2012. While the 
three radical left parties constantly voted against 
the government packages, the PS abstained from 
voting on the 2012 budget – comprising tax in-
creases and public sector wage cuts –  and the 
new labour legislation, which introduced cuts in 
pay and holidays and the easing of restrictions on 
lay-offs and workers’ dismissals. In addition, the 
Socialists voted in favour of amending the legal 
regimes on the recapitalisation and consolidation 
of the banking sector with the help of the state and 
the privatisations of state owned enterprises. The 
need to act responsibly vis-à-vis an agreement to 
which they contributed unanimously was again 
given by the Socialist deputies we interviewed as 
the main reason behind their choices . However, a 
shift was observed in November 2012 when the PS 
refused to vote for the 2013 budget – blaming the 
government for its incompetence and stubborn 
insistence on austerity and failure to take action 
to foster economic growth. Table 1 summarises all 
the events mentioned so far. 
Table 1. Main socio-economic policies passed and the behaviour of the opposition
Bill proposed Opposition voting behaviour 
Sócrates I 19.10.2008 - Budget 2009 (Expansionary) 28.11.2008. All voted against
21.01.2009. Law n. 10/2009. 1st amendment to 
Budget. ‘Investment and Employment Initiative’ (IIE, 
Expansionary)
05.02.2009. All voted yes with exception of PSD 
which voted against 
Sócrates II 26.01.2010 - Budget 2010 (Mild austerity)
12.03.2010. After an agreement with the PS, the 
PSD and the CDS abstained from voting and 
let it pass.
15.03.2010 PEC I (Austerity package) After an agreement with the PS, the PSD 
abstained from voting and let it pass (PEC 
I: 25.03.2010; PEC II: 30.05.2010; PEC III 
30.10.2010). 
13.05.2010. PEC II (Austerity package)
29.09.2010. PEC III - Budget 2011 (Austerity package)
11.03.2011. PEC 4 (Austerity package)
23.03.2010. Resolutions rejecting the PEC 
4 proposed and approved by all opposition 
parties in Parliament
Passos Coelho 28.07.2011 - Budget 2011: 2nd amendment (Austerity) 06.08.2011. Favourable vote from PS. Radical left parties voted against 
17.10.2011 - Budget 2012 (Austerity) 29.11.2012. The PS abstained from voting and 
radical left parties voted against17.10.2011. Amendment budget. Austerity 
23.11.2012 - Budget 2013 (Austerity) All opposition parties voted against
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4. Understanding the opposition’s choices
As already stated, the narratives above offer sev-
eral puzzles. What can explain first the PSD and 
then the PS support of unpopular government 
measures? What can justify a shift in the conduct 
of those parties at one given moment of time? 
And what reasons  can be found for the variation 
among parties? 
The answer to the first question lies in the extreme 
risk involved during the crisis, namely of default 
and bankruptcy – a matter of great national inter-
est - for which the two major parties, the PS and 
the PSD, felt responsible even from the opposition 
benches (H2). While it is true that the Socialists 
and the centre-right parties had been ideologi-
cally close for decades , few of the bills just men-
tioned would have got the support of the major 
opposition parties in normal times. This is espe-
cially true for the PS with regard measures such 
as the privatisation of natural monopolies or the 
severe cuts in pensions and salaries. It thus seems 
that the PSD and PS had felt constrained by a cer-
tain sense of responsibility and, for the latter, by a 
commitment to fulfil the agreement signed with 
the international lenders. 
This sense of obligation was not shared by the radi-
cal left parties and the CDS-PP. As we said, our ar-
gument is that the former’s exclusion from govern-
ment might help explain their adversarial conduct 
even in these hard times (H2), but this distinction 
does not help explain the CDS-PP’s controversial 
behaviour. In H3, we posit that, since most of the 
relevant socio-economic policies had been rec-
ommended by the European Union and, after the 
loan, required by the troika, the variation in the 
opposition parties’ voting behaviour could also be 
explained by looking at their general attitude to-
wards Europe (H3). As noted above, the PS and 
PSD are unequivocally pro-European as much as 
the CDU is euro-sceptic. The CDS-PP and the BE, 
for their part, are more ambiguous about Europe. 
The CDS-PP’s ambiguity on the EU might thus 
explain why it was less consensual than its Social 
democratic ally, despite its ambition to again be-
come a member of the government. Similarly, the 
pro-European stance of the PS and the PSD might 
have contributed (together with their centrality 
in the political spectrum) to explaining their col-
laboration with the government on relevant and 
controversial socio-economic legislation: in par-
ticular, the PS collaboration with the troika and its 
support for the very liberal policies of PSD-CDS 
(even if not necessary). On the other hand, the 
euro-scepticism of the radical left parties sheds 
additional light on why they have almost system-
atically opposed the government’s measures. 
One last puzzle tabled by the Portuguese story 
has to do with the reason why, after three crucial 
abstentions, the PSD finally decided to vote in 
favour of a resolution against the fourth auster-
ity package proposed by the Socialist government 
and why a similar shift was observed from the 
PS in November 2012. We hypothesise that these 
decisions were taken because the government in-
cumbency was more at risk at the time of the two 
shifts than before (H4). Both the PS and the cur-
rent PSD governments were (and are) intrinsically 
fragile: the former because it could not count on a 
majority of seats; and the second, supported by an 
absolute majority composed of the PSD and CDS-
PP, because it revealed severe and repetitive intra-
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coalition conflicts suggesting a possible fall of the 
government. 
A look at the intentions of vote for the period 
from 2010 to 2012 (Figure 1) shows that both the 
PSD and the PS changed their voting behaviour 
from cooperative to conflictual when the elec-
torate’s voting intentions were in their favour. As 
Figure 1 shows, the voting intentions were in fa-
vour of the PS when the first two packages were 
voted upon and were almost even between the PS 
and PSD when the third one was approved; but 
the PSD had a clear edge when the fourth pack-
age was presented to the parliament. Supported 
by voting intention polls and probably under sig-
nificant internal pressure from its party and the 
President of the Republic himself to force elec-
tions (Magalhães 2012), Passos Coelho chose to 
join the rest of the opposition parties in rejecting 
the additional package proposed by the PS. After 
that, Sócrates resigned and elections were actually 
called for June 2011. As Figure 1 shows, this move 
led to a significant decrease in its support so that 
the election results were actually quite vague. 
Figure 1. Evolution of vote intention for the PS and PSD (March 2010 – January 2013)
Source: http://margensdeerro.blogspot.pt by Pedro Magalhães
Since the 2011 general election, a similar dynamic 
has been observed for the Socialist Party in oppo-
sition. After abstaining from voting for the major 
socio-economic measures proposed by the centre-
right government during the first 15 months of 
the current legislature, the PS decided to vote 
318The Euro Crisis & the State of European DemocracySection I
against the government’s proposal in November 
2012 – a time when polls on voting intentions 
gave it an edge over the PSD, and the governing 
coalition was showing clear signs of internal con-
flict. 
Therefore, a sense of responsibility and pro-Eu-
ropean attitudes pushed the two larger parties 
to cooperate with the government even from the 
opposition benches, but this support had a limit: 
when a party can make the government fall and/
or has a good chance to win in case of election, 
self-interest prevails.
Interviews with key players at the time of the crisis 
support this explanation. As a former PSD min-
ister (and current advisor to the President) says 
when asked about what explains the decision to 
vote against the fourth austerity package in March 
2011, ‘if the opposition saw that the life expectancy 
of the government is long, then it will let the mea-
sures pass; if, on the contrary, (…)the opposition 
party sees an opportunity to get in power itself, 
obviously it will start to oppose the government 
measures’. A similar reasoning was made by a for-
mer Junior Minister from the PS: ‘In Portugal, no 
one accepts that the opposition, at the beginning 
of its mandate, starts by being against everything. 
There is the feeling that a party that aspires to gov-
ernment should adopt responsible behaviour. But 
there are also some political strategies at stake: 
now [January 2012, N/A] the opinion polls give 
the edge to the PS. As the crisis always brings gov-
ernmental instability, the PS knows that it is just a 
matter of tim before it is back in government.
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5. Comparing Opposition in normal and hard 
times: quantitative data analysis 
Although the qualitative data analysed so far tells 
us an interesting story, focus on the most impor-
tant socio-economic policies might create a dis-
torted view of the overall reality. We therefore de-
cided to rely also on more quantitative data and 
analyse the opposition’s voting behaviour on the 
final approval of the laws in parliament during five 
different governments: two Socialist minority gov-
ernments – one during Portugal’s ‘golden years’ of 
economic growth (Guterres I, 1995-1999) and the 
other in the period just after the onset of the fi-
nancial crisisonset (Sócrates II, 2009-2011) –; two 
majority coalition governments (PSD and CDS-
PP) – the first in relatively good economic times 
(Barroso II, 2002-2004) and the second just after 
the bailout (the current Passos Coelho, 2011-) –; 
and one single-party majority government, which 
was in charge before and after the beginning of the 
crisis (Sócrates I, 2005-2009). Following Leston-
Bandeira (2004), we excluded from our dataset 
laws dealing with administrative reorganisation 
(reordenamento administrativo) that represent a 
huge proportion of the legislation passed (around 
one third) and are usually very consensual.
The dependent variable
Among the several observable activities that po-
litical actors might put in practice in the law-
making arena, we opted to concentrate on voting 
behaviour and chose the consensual voting of the 
opposition in parliament as our dependent vari-
able. In order to measure the level of consensus 
shown by the Portuguese opposition during the 
five selected governments, we will refer to the fa-
vourable voting behaviour during the final stage 
of the law-making process. As there are no avail-
able data on roll call votes in the Portuguese par-
liament, the information examined only refers to 
the parliamentary party groups’ voting choice on 
all the approved laws, during the five governments 
under analysis. As a result, the voting options – 
yes, no, abstention – are always considered for the 
whole group; and the analysis below will try to 
determine a given political party’s propensity to 
choose one of these three voting options. More-
over, we also built an index of consensus given by 
the sum of non-contrary votes (yes and absten-
tion) divided by the sum of all votes (yes, no, ab-
stention) given by the individual opposition party 
groups to each bill.
Consensus in Parliament  =      S Yes + Abstention
                                                  S Yes + Abstention + No
While we agree that abstention and favourable 
vote are not equivalent, we decided to consider 
abstentions as a form of consensual behaviour 
because, as we have seen in the previous section, 
abstaining in the Portuguese system might have a 
remarkably cooperative connotation: the opposi-
tion party which decides to abstain helps a gov-
ernment  bill to be passed, notably in the case of 
minority governments.
The operationalisation of the 
independent and controlling 
variables
As noted above, our main assumption is that the 
crisis has an impact on the level of consensus in 
parliament. So a dummy variable has been created 
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to identify the beginning of the crisis, even though 
the definition of when the crisis really started 
is not straightforward. The fall of the Lehman 
Brothers, on 15th September 2008, is considered 
by many observers as the official ‘beginning’ of the 
world crisis. Hence, we built one dummy variable 
taking value 1 after September 15 and 0 before. 
Furthermore, in order to capture the effect of the 
Portuguese bailout on the opposition’s behaviour, 
we created another dummy taking value 1 after 
6th April 2011 and 0 before. We expect both these 
variables to be negatively related to the level of 
consensus in parliament.
In order to test the net effect of the crisis, we de-
cided to introduce four control variables. First, 
socio-economic policies are expected to be more 
conflictual, since parties are expected to represent 
different socio-economic interests. Thus, we clas-
sified each law following the 21 categories of the 
Comparative Agendas Policy Project   and then 
created a dummy variable to distinguish the laws 
dealing with the socio-economic policy sector – 
which is the sum of four different policy areas re-
spectively called Macroeconomic issues, General 
Labour and Employment, General Social Welfare, 
General Banking and Finance – from all the oth-
ers. We called this variable Socio-economic sector 
and we expect it to be negatively associated with 
the opposition’s propensity to vote yes or to ab-
stain rather than to vote no. 
Second, Portugal has experienced alternating 
types of government: coalition and single-party, 
majority and minority. The concentration of the 
executive power in a strong single-party majority 
cabinet gives the opposition very different politi-
cal opportunities in parliament, compared with 
those given by the concentration of the executive 
in either a minority government or a coalition 
government. In the first case, the parliamentary 
opposition has neither space for nor interest in in-
tervening or negotiating with the government in 
office, which is already supported by a strong and 
usually disciplined single-party majority. At the 
same time, this situation obliges the official parlia-
mentary opposition to propose itself as construc-
tive and alternative, in order to compete for power 
at the following election. In the second case, the 
life of parliamentary opposition seems to be more 
advantageous, particularly for smaller parties, 
which are the government’s crucial allies  in order 
to get the majority in parliament (essential in the 
case of minority government, and sometimes nec-
essary when intra-coalition divergence occurs). 
Hence, since the opposition parties might behave 
differently depending on the type of government 
in office, we also decide to control this variable 
(Majority government). It is also believed that the 
author of the bill affects the level of cooperation 
between majority and opposition (Mujica and 
Sanchez-Cuenca 2006; De Giorgi and Marangoni 
2011). This is so because the parliamentary oppo-
sition by definition opposes the government . We 
therefore assume that the opposition will be more 
adversarial when a government bill is at stake. As 
a control variable, we thus created a dichotomous 
variable (Initiative) which assumes value 1 when 
the law in question was proposed by the govern-
ment or any majority party member and value 0 
otherwise. 
Finally, some scholars emphasise that the char-
acteristics of the legislative acts are likely to have 
a substantive effect on the patterns of voting be-
haviour. Giuseppe Di Palma (1977) showed how 
the high degree of consensualism found in the 
law-making process in the first four legislatures of 
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the Italian Republic was largely due to the poor 
quality of the laws enacted. In a widely polarised 
and fragmented party system, an impressive num-
ber of leggine (small laws) limited in both scope 
and policy comprehensiveness helped parliamen-
tary actors to find the necessary compromise and 
agreement. Speculating a little on these acknowl-
edgements, we expect the opposition to be more 
consensual on legislation which is limited in pol-
icy comprehensiveness (and hence, less relevant). 
As a result, we use the number of committees in-
volved in the law-making process as a proxy for 
the political relevance of each bill and it is also 
controlled.
Opposition in normal and hard 
times: a description 
Do we observe any difference after the crisis in 
terms of types of law approved and the conse-
quent level of conflict created in parliament? Our 
first hypothesis is based on the assumption that 
a larger number of relevant bills dealing with so-
cio-economic issues has been approved since the 
start of the crisis in Portugal and that both the rel-
evance and the issue area of a given bill have an 
impact on the opposition’s voting behaviour. 
The legislative data at our disposal illustrate our 
assumption well: by examining the content of the 
laws approved during the five governments under 
analysis, we can observe a clear increase in the 
amount of legislation concerning relevant and so-
cio-economic policies in the years of the financial 
crisis (Table 2).
Table 2. Average percentage of socio-economic laws, num-
ber of words and committees per legislature 
Percentage of 
laws approved 
dealing with socio-
economic issues
Average number
of Committees 
involved
Guterres I
(1995-1999) 23.7 1.3
Barroso
(2002-2004) 17.7 1.2
Sócrates I
(2005-2009) 22.2 1.4
Sócrates II
(2009-2011) 34.5 2.5
Passos Coelho
(2011-) 34.5 2.9
Whereas socio-economic laws are never more than 
24 per cent of the total in the first three govern-
ments under analysis (23.7 with the first Guterres 
government, 17.7 with Barroso’s and 22.2 even 
with the first Sócrates government which wit-
nessed the explosion of the crisis), they reach 34.5 
per cent of the total legislation during both the 
second Sócrates government and the current Pas-
sos Coelho government. Furthermore, in Table 2 
we can see the average number of committees in-
volved in the approval process of these bills and 
a clear increase in their number can also be ob-
served. Thus due to the rise in both the number of 
socio-economic bills passed since the beginning 
of the crisis and their growing comprehensiveness 
(given by the increasing number of committees 
involved in their approval), we would expect the 
level of conflict in parliament to grow.
322The Euro Crisis & the State of European DemocracySection I
Table 3. Index of consensus per legislature, all legislation 
(and important legislation only)
Legislature Mean N Std. Deviation
Guterres I  
(PS, minority) .75 (.75) 357 (95) .15 (.14)
Barrosso 
(PSD/CDS-PP, majority) .64 (.57) 167 (31) .25 (.25)
Sócrates I 
(PS, majority) .62 (.65) 347 (41) .27 (.26)
Sócrates II 
(PS, minority) .69 (.65) 88 (7) .19 (.26)
Passos Coelho 
(PSD/CDS-PP, majority) .60 (.66) 54 (19) .22 (.21)
Average .67 (.69) 1014 (193) .23 (.21)
Table 3 presents the average index of consensus 
per legislature. In the last row we can see that, on 
average, the Portuguese parliament is quite con-
sensual: on average, bills are passed with 67 per 
cent of positive votes or abstention . But a further 
look at Table 3 also grants some support to our 
hypothesis concerning the negative impact of the 
crisis on the voting behaviour of the opposition in 
parliament: if we compare the two Socialist mi-
nority governments led by Guterres and Sócrates 
or the two PSD/CDS coalition governments led by 
Barroso and Passos Coelho – thus keeping both 
the variable type of government and party in of-
fice constant – we can observe a decrease in the 
level of consensus after the crisis in both cases. 
Our first hypothesis seems to be confirmed 
As it might be argued that the above numbers mix 
very important and more trivial legislation , Table 
3 also presents the main index of consensus for 
pieces of legislation which went through at least 2 
committees – thus the more inclusive (and prob-
ably more relevant in terms of policy comprehen-
siveness) legislative measures. We can see in the 
second column that, with the exception of the two 
coalition governments, the figures are not funda-
mentally different –for the 200 most important 
pieces of legislation (1/5 of the total),  an average 
of 70 per cent of the votes were either positive or 
abstentions. While a decrease in consensus is ob-
served from Guterres to Sócrates II (as expected 
in H1), the contrary is true when we compare 
Barroso with Passos Coelho. This finding, how-
ever, does not contradict our hypothesis: as we 
expected an increase of conflict due to the rising 
number of salient and socio-economic legislation, 
an analysis limited to the most important pieces of 
legislation is not sufficient to disprove H1. 
Table 4 presents some descriptive statistics about 
the voting behaviour of each opposition party 
during the five governments under analysis. As 
we can see, the opposition parties vote together 
with the government much more often than they 
abstain or vote against. Crossing the average per 
party with the average per legislature, we can see 
at the bottom right of the table that the Portuguese 
opposition parties voted in favour of legislation 
almost half of the time, while they abstained 20 
per cent and voted against only 30 per cent of the 
time. The figures are broadly the same when we 
look at important legislation only (with a slightly 
higher percentage of positive votes). However, 
we do observe variation across time and parties. 
Most importantly, Table 4 shows how the propor-
tion of negative votes is lower during minority 
governments (Guterres I and Sócrates II) and how 
radical left parties are significantly less inclined to 
consensus than mainstream parties (see the last 
column on the right). These findings hold for both 
the entire legislation and the subset of relevant 
legislation only.  
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Table 4. Percentage of No, yes and Abstention votes per opposition party and per government
Guterres I Barroso Sócrates I Sócrates II Passos Coelho Average
PS
No 24% (36%) 20% (16%) 23% (28%)
Yes 62% (46%) 51% (47%) 59% (46%)
Abst 14% (18%) 29% (37%) 18% (26%)
PSD
No 12% (10%) 22% (24%) 9% (0%) 17% (15%)
Yes 61% (64%) 60% (60%) 64% (40%) 61% (61%)
Abst 27% (26%) 19% (17%) 27% (60%) 23% (24%)
CDS-PP
No 12% (15%) 25% (26%) 17% (20%) 19% (15%)
Yes 64% (68%) 49% (50%) 60% (40%) 56% (61%)
Abst 24% (17%) 26% (23%) 27% (40%) 25% (24%)
CDU1
No 16% (16%) 39% (50%) 45% (34%) 34% (60%) 59% (42%) 35% (31%)
Yes 64% (60%) 47% (39%) 37% (49%) 48% (40%) 14% (26%) 47% (48%)
Abst 21% (25%) 14% (11%) 18% (17%) 19% (0%) 28% (32%) 19% (21%)
BE
No 43% (61%) 32% (32%) 55% (60%) 44% (42%) 44% (31%)
Yes 43% (29%) 53% (54%) 24% (40%) 40% (26%) 40% (48%)
Abst 14% (11%) 15% (15%) 22% (0%) 16% (32%) 17% (21%)
Total
No 14% (14%) 37% (49%) 34% (29%) 29% (35%) 45% (33%) 31% (24%)
Yes 63% (64%) 50% (38%) 47% (53%) 48% (45%) 31% (33%) 48% (53%)
Abst 23% (24%) 14% (13%) 19% (18%) 22% (25%) 25% (33%) 21% (23%)
Note: we excluded the bills presented exclusively by the opposition party groups from the analysis; in parenthesis important bills 
only (N=1009 and 116).
1. We initially codified the two groups PCP and PEV separately, but we present them together for the sake of clarity, as their 
voting behaviour is almost identical.
Comparing minority and coalition governments 
before and after the crisis, Table 4 also indicates 
that the impact of the crisis on the PS and PSD – 
which vote less frequently against the government 
after the crisis (and abstain more often) –  is very 
different from the impact on the CDS-PP and the 
CDU – for which the contrary is true. As for the 
BE, no significant difference is observable across 
time during the two governments. If we look at 
the most important legislation only, the difference 
in time is even more marked for the PS and PSD 
(in the decrease in ‘nays’ and the increase in ‘ab-
stentions’) and for the CDS-PP (in the decrease in 
‘ayes’). As far as the CDU is concerned, we see a 
huge increase in ‘nays’ from Guterres to Socrates 
II, but a decrease from Barroso to Passos Coelho. 
Finally, the BE  clearly voted ‘no’ on the most im-
portant legislation more often before the crisis 
than after.
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Table 5. Factors affecting the decision of opposition parties to vote yes or to abstain rather than vote no (excluding votes on initiatives from the opposition)
PS PSD CDS-PP PCP PEV BE
Yes Abst. Yes Abst. Yes Abst. Yes Abst. Yes Abst. Yes Abst.
B 
(sig.)
(B) 
(sig.)
B 
(sig.)
(B) 
(sig.)
B 
(sig.)
(B) 
(sig.)
B 
(sig.)
(B) 
(sig.)
B 
(sig.)
(B) 
(sig.)
B 
(sig.)
(B) 
(sig.)
Intercept .42 (.341)
-.40 
(.437)
.93** 
(.003)
-.20  
(.586)
.79**
(.008)
.01
(.974)
-.11
(.622)
-.73*
(.006)
-.13
(.556)
-.76**
(0.04)
-.19
(.473)
-1.26***
(.001)
Majority 
government - - .71*** (.001)
1.19*** 
(.000)
.95***
(.000)
.80***
(.001)
1.42***
(.000)
1.09***
(.000)
1.42***
(.000)
1.13***
(.000)
.38
(.27)
.29
(.503)
Simple bills 
(Less than one 
committee)
.60 
(.173)
.00 
(1.000)
-.03 
(.907)
-.15 
(.655)
-.00
(.993)
.05
(.881)
-.09
(.682)
-.17
(.504)
-.07
(.759)
-.20
(.434)
.16
(.526)
.20
(.58)
Socio-economic 
bill
-2.03*** 
(.000)
.-65 
(.199)
-.91 
(.000)*** .03 (.901)
-.89***
(.000)
-.13
(.625)
-1.00***
(.000)
-.96***
(.000)
-.91***
(.000)
-.89***
(.001)
-.93***
(.000)
-1.52***
(.000)
Multi-party bills 1.16*(.016)
.18 
(.774)
.90***
(.000) -.40 (.198)
.58**
(.010)
-.69*
(.016)
1.34***
(.000)
.30
(.208)
1.39***
(.000)
.39
(.107)
1.52***
(.000)
.31
(.331)
Crisis - - .31 (.218)
.54* 
(0.06)
-.49 
(.831)
.31
(.23)
-.23
(.266)
.24
(.325)
-.38*
(.057)
.10
(.659)
.15
(.515)
.66*
(.021)
IMF .72 (.130)
1.04* 
(.046) - - - -
-.85*
(0.032)
-.09
(.82)
-.54
(.15)
.02
(.953)
-.41
(.24)
-.21
(.609)
N 214 799 799 994 1009 653
Nagelkerke R 0.21 0.138 0.127 .227 .227 182
 Reference category: No ***p< 0.001 ** p< 0.01 p< 0.1
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6. The analysis
In order to isolate the effect of the crisis on the 
opposition voting behaviour from other possible 
intervening variables, we computed a multinomi-
al logistic regression. In Table 5, we evaluate the 
impact of a series of variables on each party’s pro-
pensity to vote yes or abstain rather than to vote 
no. Together with the controlling variables speci-
fied above, we insert – as our main independent 
variable – a dummy for the start of the crisis (the 
fall of the Lehman Brothers on 15th September 
2008) and for the date of the Portuguese bailout 
(that is, 7th April 2011) . We observe a significant 
independent effect of the crisis on the opposition 
parties’ behaviour but, as expected, the direction 
of the change varies from one party to another ac-
cording to its governing aspirations and European 
attitudes. 
Table 5 shows that the two most pro-European 
parties, the PS and the PSD, which have always 
alternated in government, tend to act more con-
sensually after the beginning of the crisis than 
before, ceteris paribus. The PS, for example, is 
almost twice as likely to abstain – rather than to 
vote no – after the bailout and the international 
intervention. Similarly, the PSD, which came into 
power just after the bailout, was actually 50 per 
cent more likely to abstain rather than to vote no 
after the fall of the Lehman Brothers. By contrast, 
everything being constant, the PCP and PEV ap-
pear to be remarkably less likely to vote yes rather 
than no after the start of the crisis and the bailout . 
No independent effect of the crisis could be found 
for the CDS-PP, whereas for the BE the start of 
the crisis increased (rather than decreased, as we 
would expect) the odds to abstain rather than to 
vote no by 66 per cent.
Three groups of parties can thus be distinguished 
according to the impact the crisis has so far had 
on their behaviour: the PS and PSD, which appear 
to have been, ceteris paribus, less adversarial since 
the crisis began; the CDU (PCP and PEV), for 
which the contrary is true; and the CDS-PP and BE 
for which no significant influence could be identi-
fied. This corresponds to our expectations in H2 
and H3: from the mainstream and very pro-EU 
PS and PSD, to the radical and euro-sceptic PCP 
and PEV; the CDS-PP and the BE being subject to 
contradictory forces (governmental ambition but 
ambiguity on the EU for the CDS-PP; and per-
manency of opposition but moderate euro-scep-
ticism for the BE). These findings thus support H2 
and H3 that the crisis would have contradictory 
effects according to whether the parties are per-
manently in opposition (or not) and according to 
their pro- or anti-European stances. 
Also in line with our expectations, most of the 
controlling variables proved to have a significant 
impact on the opposition’s voting behaviour in 
parliament. First, we see that when we have a mi-
nority government, all opposition parties are sig-
nificantly more likely to vote yes or abstain than 
to vote no.  These governments had probably in-
volved the opposition much more in the law-mak-
ing process than they would have done if support-
ed by a parliamentary majority, thus leading to a 
more consensual decision-making process. Socio-
economic policies, for their part, are significantly 
less likely to trigger a yes than a no (and often an 
abstention than a no) from the opposition parties 
– thus supporting the claim that these types of law 
are more divisive than the others. Finally, we ob-
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serve that bi-partisan or multi-party bills are far 
more likely to trigger a yes than a no (for almost 
all parties), but their effect on abstention are not 
conclusive. On the other hand, we find no support 
for the effect of the number of committees on the 
voting behaviour, suggesting that more complex 
laws (at least according to our measure of com-
plexity) do not trigger different votes from simple 
laws. 
7. Conclusions
The opposition’s voting behaviour is always pulled 
between a tendency towards conflict and one to-
wards cooperation. Since the beginning of the 
crisis, making a choice between these two options 
has become even more difficult for the opposition 
because it implies choosing between the need to 
cooperate with the majority for the nation’s sake 
and the opportunity to weaken an already fragile 
government. This contribution explores how the 
Portuguese opposition parties responded to this 
dilemma.
Our first conclusion is that, due to the financial 
crisis, the level of consensus between the govern-
ment and opposition parties has decreased. The 
main reason for this decline is the rising number 
of socio-economic and salient policies – usually 
more controversial – discussed in parliament. 
However, both qualitative and quantitative anal-
yses demonstrate a strong variation in the effect 
of the crisis on the opposition’s behaviour across 
parties. While mainstream and traditionally pro-
European parties (first the PSD and then the PS) 
are less adversarial than they would be in nor-
mal times, the exact contrary is true for the PCP 
and PEV, two more radical and euro-sceptic par-
ties. For the CDS-PP and the BE, which are less 
extreme in their positive and negative European 
stances (respectively), results are more mixed. 
These findings thus illustrate the importance of 
the exclusion from power and the role external 
actors in conditioning the opposition’s behaviour 
in parliament: the European Commission, the 
European Council, and since the bailout, the so-
called troika (EC, ECB and IMF) have played a 
large role –both positively and negatively – in the 
current government-opposition relationship. We 
finally observe a variation across time in the sense 
that, after the onset of the crisisonset, the main-
stream opposition parties are more adversarial 
when their possibilities to replace the government 
in office increase. Commitment and cooperation 
do not always prevail over an opposition party’s 
ambition to rule.
The drift towards conflict, however, is not just a 
prerogative of the opposition. Self-calculation 
might have been crucial to Sócrates’ decision to 
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present a fourth austerity package to parliament 
without involving opposition parties in the draft-
ing. A similar dynamic seems to have happened 
recently when a package of austerity measures to 
be implemented from 2013 onwards was negoti-
ated between Passos Coelho’s government and 
the troika without consulting the PS (which, in 
response, felt free to vote against the budget for 
2013). The alleged lack of dialogue with the oppo-
sition by both Portuguese Prime Ministers illus-
trates that the decision of the opposition parties 
to vote against or in favour of governmental ini-
tiatives may not exclusively depend on their own 
preferences. It is also contingent on the governing 
parties’ willingness to collaborate.
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1. Introduction
When the deepest recession since the 1930s (EU 
Commission, 2009: 1) hit national economies in 
fall 2008, governments in democratic countries 
rapidly seemed to  abandon orthodoxies of eco-
nomic policy making that  were broadly accepted 
since the 1980s. These include reducing interven-
tion into the economy as far as possible, trust in 
markets, low government deficits and debts, and a 
rejection of counter-cyclical fiscal policies. Radi-
cal versions of this orthodoxy are the  ‘Washing-
ton Consensus’ of 1989 reflecting the common 
views of World Bank and IMF. The Maastricht 
treaty of the European Union and its Stability Pact 
constitute less radical versions, while the prag-
matic manifestation of this orthodoxy is the belief 
that counter-cyclical deficit spending (Keynes-
ianism) ceased to work after the liberalization 
of capital markets, if it ever had worked before 
(Scharpf, 1987). Major government intervention, 
thus, should be limited to keeping inflation low 
through an appropriate monetary policy set by a 
preferably independent national or supranational 
central bank. 
When the problems of the financial sector had 
become obvious in 2007/8, the first step of many 
governments was to support ailing financial in-
stitutions and large firms, while at the same time 
thinking about  reforms of their financial institu-
tions. The crisis of the financial sector led to de-
clining industrial production and employment in 
the ‘real economy’. As interest rates approached 
the zero line, monetary policy reached its market-
correcting limits. Having exhausted monetary 
policy options, most mature democracies turned 
to demand-management. They devised major fis-
cal packages composed of tax reductions and in-
creased state expenditures in order to stimulate 
the economy. This was the second step of the anti-
crisis measures. The third step was taken in win-
ter 2009 - spring 2010 when economies recovered 
and some governments started exiting the expan-
sionary fiscal strategy. Parallel to these measures, 
some governments used the crisis as an opportu-
nity for reform, and attempted to push through 
structural changes to their labor market and to 
their social and environmental policies.
While national governments worked on their 
response to the economic crisis, four inter- and 
supra-national organizations attempted to coordi-
nate these national policies: the European Union, 
the G20, the IMF, and the OECD. The EU and G20 
claim that they have been able to reach this coor-
dination.
In this paper I focus on the fiscal response strate-
gies in late 2008 and 2009. While most observers 
have noted the commonalities – a general move 
from deficit-containing policies to deficit spend-
ing – I am interested in the often overlooked 
variations between the responses. I describe the 
national fiscal stimuli, showing that coordination 
between countries was very limited. This contra-
dicts the arguments that  national governments 
had very narrow maneuvering space on fiscal pol-
icy due a number of factors including economic 
internationalization and capital market liberaliza-
tion, the restrictions imposed by political institu-
tions such as the monetary system of the EU, and 
the impact of international coordination in eco-
nomic policy regimes such as G20.
In explaining this variation, I argue that the de-
fault response strategy of governments was a se-
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verely limited expansionary budget. A few coun-
tries departed from this default strategy. They 
either implemented a swift and significant shift 
to a strongly expansionary policy (given the cru-
cial condition that they had a unified government 
that could react quickly and consistently), or they 
opted for the pro-cyclical policy given the condi-
tion that they would otherwise have had to cope 
with a breakdown of their economy or the loss of 
their membership perspective in the Euro-group, 
both of which were more highly valued than the 
insecure outcomes of risky counter-cyclical fiscal 
policy.
Far from being independent and efficient institu-
tions of global governance, international organi-
zations (IOs) served national governments in that 
these could outsource the blame for tough and 
electorally unfavorable policies to the IOs. For the 
countries following the default strategy, IOs were 
used to legitimate the lack of major anti-cyclical 
measures. For the countries with pro-cyclical fis-
cal policies the IOs were likewise “blamed” for ty-
ing the hands of national governments and leav-
ing them with no other options.
I provide evidence for this explanation in a com-
parative analysis of the fiscal policies of EU-coun-
tries and mature non-EU democracies in 2008 
and 2009. I do not include Cyprus, since Cyprus 
did not feel the full force of the economic crisis 
until fall 2009. I leave out Greece as well, since its 
recent crisis made clear that Greek public sector 
data are far from reliable. And I do not analyze the 
Bulgarian case since in April 2010 the new Bulgar-
ian prime minister said that the preceding social-
ist government lied about its deficits, which were 
much higher than reported (newspaper reports 
first half of April 2010). Due to these severe data 
imperfections these three countries have to be ex-
cluded from this comparison. This does not mean 
that data for other countries are without flaws. 
Some data on government finances for 2008-9 are 
still estimates. Even data for earlier periods show 
considerable variation between respective statisti-
cal sources – such as IMF or OECD – and between 
publications of the same statistical organization 
in time. Even worse, this imprecision does not 
vary at random between countries; rather, some 
countries seem to report much more reliable data 
than others. Therefore statistical analyses assum-
ing randomly distributed errors in the data have 
limited reliability and must be interpreted very 
cautiously. In drawing my conclusions, then, I will 
rely as much on qualitative as well as quantitative 
data.
In the following section I will present my argu-
ment. The third section will describe the fiscal re-
sponse strategies. In the following section I start 
by discussing standard explanations, and finally I 
will show that my argument is supported by the 
data.
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2.  The argument
When a major shock such as the crisis of 2008/9 
hits a national economy, governments have three 
basic options for fiscal policy: (a) they signifi-
cantly expand spending in order to introduce a 
demand stimulus to the economy; (b) they nei-
ther significantly expand nor restrict spending; or 
(c) they curb spending so that fiscal balances are 
not negative, notwithstanding negative economic 
growth.  In addition to pursuing policies that are 
in line with the overall political goals of the rel-
evant parties, each strategy has specific political 
costs and advantages that must be considered in 
regards to the chances for re-election. 
Expansionary budgets are a powerful signal to 
voters that the government is doing something to 
ameliorate an economic crisis. The beneficial eco-
nomic effects of these strategies are dependant on 
a number of variables, such as the ability to pre-
cisely time the implementation of measures and 
the economic openness of a country. Precise tim-
ing requires that the fiscal stimulus follows very 
shortly after the point in time when economic 
output decreases. Very open countries – and this 
applies in particular to small nations – risk that 
the demand stimulus trickles away with regard to 
the domestic economy, since citizens use the addi-
tional resources to buy from abroad.  Unless there 
is a firm contract between nations to harmonize 
their fiscal policy, the economic success of such 
stimulus packages depend either on low import 
shares or on the willingness of other governments 
to expand their budget in a similar way. On the 
other hand the costs of expansive packages may 
be increased debt levels which have to be cov-
ered later, inflationary pressure, and the danger 
of capital flight. Finally, size matters. Very small 
nations that are integrated into world markets 
have to cope with the ups and downs of the world 
economy without any chance of influencing these 
global markets through their own fiscal policies. 
They have much less incentive to enter the risky 
business of demand management than do large 
nations, in particular if their domestic market is 
large in comparison to their world market expo-
sure.
The opposite option is a strategy of radical budget 
cuts during a recession. This strategy has a num-
ber of advantages such as the avoidance of all the 
downside risks of the counter-cyclical policies. 
However, governments run the risk that their pro-
cyclical policies will increase unemployment and 
further decrease economic growth. This hurts the 
programmatic goals of almost all governing par-
ties and also reduces the likelihood of re-election. 
In addition, austerity strategies tend to cut re-
sources in areas such as education, social policy 
transfers, and services. Given the fact that most 
citizens strongly support the welfare state, these 
policies are electorally risky (Pierson, 1994). 
Both strategies imply a radical shift from previ-
ous fiscal policies. During the past 30 years the 
broadly accepted benchmark for fiscal  policies 
in the OECD is prudent policy  based on a foun-
dation of little or even no deficit spending. Many 
governments, however, failed to behave in such 
a way. The literature gives a long list of plausible 
hypotheses why, contrary to expectations, govern-
ments have in fact engaged in considerable deficit 
spending. These hypotheses include arguments 
related to the electoral competition of politicians 
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elected in single-member electoral districts, the 
tendency of parliaments to overspend, the needs 
of compensation offered to compromising coali-
tion partners, the weakness of the finance minis-
ter, or the number of spending ministers (see the 
literature discussion in Franzese, 2010, Haller-
berg, 2004, Hallerberg and Hagen, 1999, Haller-
berg et al., 2009, Wehner, 2010). Furthermore, due 
to time-invariant political institutions, there are 
arguably country-specific levels of deficits. In the 
Euro-zone this deficit should not exceed the 3 % 
level – measured as percentage of GDP –  during 
‘normal times’ according to the Maastricht rules. 
In a major recession such as in 2008/9 this level 
of deficits is shifted upwards. This is due to de-
creased tax revenues and increased social security 
spending (in particular for unemployment insur-
ance) affecting the nominator. In addition, if the 
denominator (GDP) decreases, share of deficits in 
GDP will increase, all other things being equal. 
There are good reasons for governments not to 
deviate too much from this previous level of def-
icits plus the increment that is due to the crisis. 
The effects on debts of this increased deficit will 
be hard to tackle once the crisis is over. It is un-
clear whether the effects of increased spending 
will lower domestic unemployment due to prob-
lems of implementation of the stimulus package 
and due to the risk that it will create demand in 
other countries, whilst being largely inconsequen-
tial for the domestic labor market. Hence it makes 
sense to increase spending for a small amount to 
alleviate the worst labor market outcomes of the 
crisis and signal to the voter that government is 
trying to fight the crisis. I assume that this is the 
default fiscal policy response to the crisis. It is 
not very risky in economic and electoral terms, it 
still allows for the possible positive effect of other 
import countries stimulating the economy, and – 
most importantly – it does not require a signifi-
cant shift from the status quo.
The other two options available to governments 
(significant deficit spending or pro-cyclical poli-
cy) require a significant shift from the fiscal sta-
tus quo. Governments must be willing and able to 
bring about this change in a short period of time. 
Unified governments – i.e. governments that have 
little internal programmatic conflict over fiscal 
policy – that are under no formal and informal ob-
ligation to negotiate with opposition parties have 
a higher likelihood of deviating from previous 
prudence-oriented fiscal policies (this argument 
draws heavily on Spolaore, 2004). Being a unified 
government is an almost necessary but not a suf-
ficient condition for dramatic fiscal policy change 
during economic crisis. There may be many ideo-
logical or economic reasons not to deviate from 
the default strategy. One of the most pressing eco-
nomic reasons is the soundness of pre-crisis fiscal 
policy in a country. It is much less problematic for 
countries with a balanced budget and low debts 
to stimulate the economy by increasing demand 
through increased spending than it is for coun-
tries with high debts and deficits (see Egert, 2010 
or IMF, 2010).
This argument can explain why some govern-
ments opt for a significant fiscal stimulus. But why 
should governments decide to take the electoral 
risk of a significant pro-cyclical policy during a 
severe crisis? The answer could be that this strat-
egy will be honored either by substantial gains 
in other fields which can offset the blame for in-
creased unemployment, or by the avoidance of 
substantial punishment. Both these substantial 
gains and punishments can be offered by interna-
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tional organizations. Potential membership in the 
Euro-Zone may by a substantial gain for former 
post-communist countries. The avoidance of dra-
matic economic breakdowns by accepting obliga-
tions of IMF loans is another example. 
3. Fiscal policy change 2008/9
In this section I describe the course of fiscal policy 
in the 32 countries under study. I combine three 
types of information. First, I consider the develop-
ment of deficits in 2008/9 compared to the pre-
vious period. I take deficits both as nominal as 
well as cyclically adjusted (or ‘structural’) deficits. 
During a crises tax revenue decreases and social 
security spending increases. These so-called auto-
matic stabilizers create additional demand in the 
economy without any further political action, and 
they increase the nominal deficit. The cyclically 
adjusted deficits indicate the size of the deficits 
as if there were no revenue loss and spending in-
crease due to the crises. Hence it informs about 
the discretionary fiscal policy choices. Data about 
deficits (in % of GDP) are of limited reliability and 
the data for 2009 are largely based on estimates. 
Hence a cautious strategy is to avoid the interpre-
tation of small changes, while focusing only on 
the large differences. Since countries tend to have 
nation-specific levels of deficits, it makes sense to 
take the previous level of deficits into account. Re-
gressing the average deficits in 2008 and 2009 on 
the average deficit in 2006 and 2007 yields posi-
tive and significant coefficients for unadjusted 
deficits for 32 countries and positive albeit not 
significant coefficients for adjusted deficits, which 
are available for 25 countries (Data sources are 
OECD Economic Outlook, May 2010 and down-
loads from Eurostat). This supports findings of 
institutional determination of deficit levels and 
is also in accordance with research showing that 
there are country specific patterns of fiscal policy 
use during booms and recessions (Egert, 2010). 
For the countries under consideration, the aver-
age deficit increased from + 0.5 % (2006/2007) to 
-3.5% (unadjusted deficits)(2008/2009) and from 
-0.4% (2006/2007) to -3.0% (nominal deficits)
(2008/2009).
As a sensible strategy for gauging the stimulus 
levels during the crisis I calculated the differ-
ence between the average deficits in 2008/9 and 
in 2006/7, both for the adjusted and unadjusted 
time series. These differences vary considerably 
between countries. The level of deficits is 4.0 (un-
adjusted deficits, 32 countries) and 2.6 percentage 
points (adjusted deficits, 25 countries) higher in 
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2008/2009 compared to the two years (2006/2007) 
prior to the crises. Nation specific deficit changes 
are depicted in columns 2 and 3 of table 1. 
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Table 1: Fiscal responses to the economic crisis 2008 /2009
 
Average deficit 2008/9 
minus average deficit 2006/7 
(unadjusted)
Average deficit 2008/9 minus 
average deficit 2006/7 (structurally 
adjusted) 
Fiscal pack-
age Assessment: Extent of counter-cyclical fiscal policy 
Australia -3.3 -2.4 -4.6 Strong
Austria -1.2 -0.7 -1.1 Slight
Belgium -3.5 -1.5 -1.6 Slight
Canada -3.9 -2.6 -4.1 Strong
Czech Republic -2.2 -0.6 -3.0 Slight
Denmark -4.2 -2 -2.5 Strong
Estonia -4.8     None. Pro-cyclical. In European Exchange Rate Mechanism II
Finland -3.5 -1.1 -3.1 Slight. Among the most-counter-cyclical governments in the group of countries with moderate counter-cyclical policy
France -3.3 -2.2 -0.6 Slight
Germany -0.9 -0.3 -3.0 Slight
Hungary 3.1 5.5 4.4 None. Pro-cyclical
Iceland -20.5 -18.5 9.4 None. Clearly pro-cyclical. No autonomous role of domestic government in fiscal policy
Ireland -11.3 -8.3 4.4 None. Pro-cyclical development
Italy -1.7 0.2 0 Slight
Japan -3 -2.1 -2.0 Strong
Latvia -6.2     None. Pro-cyclical. Under IMF conditionality. In European Exchange Rate Mechanism II
Lithuania -5.4     None. Pro-cyclical. In European Exchange Rate Mechanism II
Luxembourg -2.4 -0.8 -3.6 Slight
Malta -1.8     Slight
Netherlands -2.2 -2.2 -1.5 Slight
New Zealand -4.5 -3.2 -4.3 Strong
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Norway -3.9 -3 -0.8 Slight. Among the most-counter-cyclical governments in the group of countries with moderate counter-cyclical policy
Poland -2.3 -2 -1.0 Slight
Portugal -1.4 -0.5 -0.8 Slight
Romania -4.5     None. Pro-cyclical. Under IMF conditionality
Slovak Republic -1.4   -1.1 Slight
Slovenia -3   (-2.1) Slight. Among the most-counter-cyclical governments in the group of countries with moderate counter-cyclical policy
Spain -8.8 -6.9 -3.5 Strong
Sweden -2.8 0.4 -2.8 Slight. Among the most-counter-cyclical governments in the group of countries with moderate counter-cyclical policy.
Switzerland -0.8 -0.2 -0.5 Slight
United Kingdom -6.2 -4.3 -1.4 Strong
United States -6.3 -4.9 -5.6 Strong
 
Column 2 and 3: Unadjusted /structurally adjusted  deficits 2008 and 2009 minus unadjusted/structurally adjusted deficits 2006 and 2007, divided by 2. Since deficits are indicated by a nega-
tive sign, the increase has a negative sign as well.
Fiscal package: 2008-2010 net effect of fiscal package on fiscal balance.
Source: Deficits: OECD Economic Outlook May 2010; Eurostat (downloaded June 11, 2010). Fiscal Package OECD: (OECD, 2009b), Slovenia: IMF Source http://www.imf.org/external/np/
sec/pn/2009/pn0965.htm; limited comparability to OECD operationalization of fiscal package.
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The obvious problem concerns the difference be-
tween the previous deficit level and the deficit level 
during the crisis. Even the adjusted deficits do not 
necessarily reflect deliberate fiscal response strate-
gies, as they also capture changes in the denomi-
nator (GDP), spending decisions made before the 
onset of the crisis, or time-invariant schemes that 
have some cost dynamics and are not accounted 
for in the calculation of the automatic stabilizers. 
Increasing health care costs due to demographic 
change would be an example. Furthermore, they 
also depend on the cost of one-shoot bail-outs 
and crisis-interventions that were not intended to 
create a lasting  additional demand.
To overcome these shortcomings, we need in-
formation about the magnitude of those fiscal 
packages that were expressly intended to stimu-
late the economy by creating additional demand. 
The respective national governments, the OECD 
(OECD, 2009b; OECD, 2009a: Chapter 3), the Eu-
ropean Union (EU Commission, 2009),  the Eu-
ropean Trade Union Institute (Watt, 2009), and 
the IMF in its surveillance reports have given in-
formation on the scope of these fiscal packages. 
However, the data vary considerably depending on 
the source. The major explanation for this is that 
some governments labeled spending decisions 
which were taken before the crisis as elements of 
the crisis package (Watt, 2009: 12), some govern-
ments labeled EU means as part of the national 
fiscal package, and there may be other  ways and 
means through which governments increased or 
decreased the ‘published’ size of their fiscal pack-
age according to their strategic needs. Combin-
ing data from the OECD on fiscal packages with 
the data on differences of the unadjusted and the 
structural deficits can help to classify countries 
though. In addition to the quantitative data I also 
checked qualitative data from newspaper reports, 
the OECD Economic Outlook, the OECD Eco-
nomic Surveys, the IMF Staff Reports and Reports 
from Article IV consultations, and IMF country 
reports and related materials for whether there is 
strong evidence that the national government ex-
panded the budget in order to create significant 
additional demand. The final assessment is in col-
umn 5 of table 1. The classification for whether 
a country pursues a clear pro- or a strong-coun-
tercyclical policy or whether the countercyclical 
policy is only slight is based on these decision 
rules: In order to classify as pro-cyclical, the fis-
cal packages must be positive (i.e. contraction of 
public spending and/or tax increases). In addition 
there are strong indications in the expert reports 
that the country pursued a deliberate pro-cyclical 
policy. This classification can be sustained even 
if the increase of deficit levels is substantial; the 
increase would have been higher without the pro-
cyclical fiscal policy. A strong counter-cyclical 
policy is defined as fiscal policies with a net effect 
of the fiscal package – i.e. the claimed discretion-
ary policy – on the fiscal balance of at least 1.4 
percentage points. In addition, the increase of the 
structurally adjusted deficit level – i.e. the discre-
tionary policy indicator – has to be ≥ 2 percentage 
points, and the increase of the unadjusted deficit 
level is ≥3 percentage points. Given the size of 
the average output gap in Europe – estimated to 
amount to about 6 percent of GDP in 2009 (Watt, 
2009: 12) – these thresholds are not overly strict. 
Note that deficits are indicated by a negative sign; 
for example a change from a deficit level from -3% 
in period t-1 to -6% in period meets the criteria 
for an increase of the deficit level of 3 percentage 
points. In cases of missing data for one or two of 
the three criteria, I relied on qualitative data from 
OECD and IMF reports. 
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Most countries chose the default strategy. It con-
sisted of a small expansion of the public budget. 
However, a few countries created a more signifi-
cant amount of additional demand, indicated by 
fiscal packages or stimulus size that exceeded 3% 
of GDP. The assessment of these cases as excep-
tionally expansionary was frequently also con-
firmed by the respective evaluations of country 
experts. Australia, Canada, Denmark, Japan, New 
Zealand, Spain, the UK, and the USA are the 
members of this group. When the fiscal package 
was positive (i.e. the government reduced state ex-
penditure), it is clear that the country in question 
cannot be classified as having pursued an expan-
sive fiscal policy, even where there is an increase 
in our stimulus-measure. A third group of coun-
tries falls into this category, having decided to 
pursue a contractive fiscal policy even during the 
crisis. This applies to Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, 
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, and Romania. 
This classification is provisional and some cases 
are difficult to assess correctly: Some data speak 
in favor of moving Sweden to the group of coun-
tries with a strong stimulus, and notwithstanding 
the insistence of the British government to return 
to expansive policies, the UK is a borderline case 
as well. Relying on additional qualitative informa-
tion and a summary evaluation of the quantita-
tive data, one could argue that Finland, Norway, 
Slovenia, and Sweden had the most expansive fis-
cal policy within the group pursuing the default 
strategy.
This descriptive finding of strong variations in cri-
sis responses is interesting in itself. According to 
major theories on globalization, the notion of the 
iron fist of liberalized capital markets or the wordy 
claims of successful coordination by G20, IMF, or 
the EU Commission, we would have expected a 
strong congruence among the crisis responses. 
This did not happen, though. 
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4. Explanations
How can we explain this variation in crisis re-
sponses?  There are a number of very plausible 
economic arguments that may explain some, but 
probably not the most important, determinants of 
government action during the crisis. For example, 
the size of automatic stabilizers correlates inversely 
with the fiscal package (OECD, 2009a: 118) – but 
that does not explain why Switzerland and the US 
chose very different response strategies notwith-
standing the similar sizes of automatic stabilizers. 
In many cases governments considered their level 
of previous deficits and debts when deciding on 
their intervention strategies. Fiscally healthy Nor-
way had a much better starting position for a risky 
strategy of expansion than did Italy or Portugal, 
but all three ended up in the default group, whilst 
Japan with a debt of 167% of GDP in 2007 pur-
sued an expansionary policy. 
Finally, there is a classic collective action problem. 
Countries that are highly integrated in the world 
market need to have strong confidence that other 
nations will pursue similar policies. In the absence 
of coordination, a country that attempts to strong-
ly stimulate demand through an expansive budget 
risks financing the economic recovery in the other 
countries (from which citizen import goods and 
services) while carrying the cost of this measure 
domestically. Small countries in particular have 
little incentive to contribute to such a global ef-
fort in fiscal stimulation, since they know that 
their own effort will be negligible toward the col-
lective good of a recovered global economy. From 
the small country’s perspective, it makes strategic 
sense to allow the governments of large countries 
to carry the burden (Olson, 1965).
Table 2:  Size of the country,  trade integration, automatic stabilzers  and previous debt and deficits by fiscal response 
Expansionary
(8 countries)
Default
(17 countries)
Pro-cyclical
(7 countries)
Deficits 2006/7 (% GDP) 1.0 (4.1) 0.6 (5.1) -0.1 (8.2)
Gross debt 2007 (% GDP) 57.0 (47.6) 55.0 (23.9) 28.1 (25.5)
Imports & Exports 2008 59.5 (23.8) 115.6 (62.0) 116.6 (40.2)
Population size (log) 3.5 (1.5) 2.1 (1.5) 1.1 (1.4)
Automatic Stabilizer 2003 0.41 (0.08) 0.48 (0.06) 0.42 (0.07)
Arithmetic means, standard deviations in brack-
ets.
Automatic stabilizer: This figure indicates  the 
change of the budget balance, as a per cent of 
GDP, for a 1% change in GDP.
Source: IMF (website), OECD (Economic Out-
look) (Website) for debts, deficits, imports & ex-
ports, population size, Automatic Stabilizer: Gir-
ouard and Andre, 2005: 22.
If we start from the ordinal classification (last 
column in table 1), the means of some of the in-
dependent variables are in line with predictions, 
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with the exception of debt and automatic stabi-
lizers (Table 2). In bivariate analyses the fiscal re-
sponse (1 procyclical, 2 default, 3 expansionary) 
correlates significantly (Kendall’s tau b) with trade 
integration (-.40**) and size of population (.40**). 
Using a 4-point scale (1 procyclical, 2 default, 3 
default, but among the most expansionary fiscal 
policies in the ‘default’ group, 4 expansionary) 
yields the same substantive results. Combining all 
five independent variables in one robust model is 
difficult, given the low number of cases. In par-
ticular, data for the size of the automatic stabiliz-
ers are available only for 25 of the 32 countries. 
In addition the outcome variable is ordered and 
therefore the ordered logit model is usually the 
appropriate choice. But in this application we 
only have 32 (or 25) data points. We know the 
properties of the maximum likelihood estimator 
(consistency, normality, and efficiency) in large 
samples, but unfortunately we do not know the 
small sample properties of maximum likelihood 
estimators. Therefore we might abstain from em-
ploying ML estimators when the sample size is too 
small (Long, 1997: 53) The question is, whether 
we want to use an ordered model (ML) which 
requires enough observations or a linear model 
which requires the outcome to be on an interval 
scale and which also suffers – although to a lesser 
degree – from small n’s. Both solutions will force 
us to violate one assumption. I opted for the linear 
regression model. Table 3 reports the results of the 
regression analyses. Regressions have been re-run 
for the operationalization of the dependent vari-
able as a 4-point scale (1 pro-cyclical, 2 slightly 
counter-cyclical, 3 countries with strongest coun-
ter-cyclical policies among the ‘default’ group, 4 
clearly countercyclical). Since data for automatic 
stabilizers are available only for 25 countries, 
models were estimated with and without the vari-
able ‘automatic stabilizer’. 
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Table 3: Regression models : Dependent variable: Fiscal response strategy
Response 
(3-point) 
Response 
(4-point)
Response 
(4point)
Resonse 
(3 point)
Response 
(4-point)
Independent Variables #2 #3 #4 #5 #6
Deficit Level 2006/7 0.04 0.11* 0.11* 0.02 0.08**
Gross Debt 2007 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.01
Import & Export (%GDP 2007) -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00
Population (log) 0.22** 0.48* 0.33* 0.09 0.15
Automatic Stabilizers -3.49
One-Party Government 0.73** 1.09**
IMF-Conditionality or 
European Exchange Rate 
Mechanism II
-0.88** -1.22**
Constant 1.52** 3.57** 1.97** 1.79** 2.18**
N 32 25 32 32 32
Prob>F 0.02 0.01 0.01 0 0
R2adj 0.25 0.43 0.30 0.75 0.73
* p < .05, **p<.01
The most obvious result of the analyses (Model #1 
– Model #4) is the effect of country size. Countries 
with a large domestic market have a stronger in-
clination for countercyclical policy – probably 
since national governments with small and open 
economies do not see much sense in stimulating 
the world economy with their limited resources. 
Free-riding on large nations is a more attractive 
option.
The second result is that the coefficients for the 
level of debts, trade integration, and automatic 
stabilizers have the theoretically expected sign; 
however, they are not significant. Finally the co-
efficients for the level of deficits before the crises 
contradict the theoretical expectations, and two 
of these coefficients are even significant. In ad-
dition, given the large number of independent 
variables and the small number of cases, the R2 is 
not overwhelming. Hence the major conclusion is 
that while these variables of models #1-#4 explain 
some of the variation in response strategies, they 
do not constitute a convincing  explanation. The 
models are not sufficiently specified.
The conclusion from models #1-#4 is that eco-
nomic constraints and the rational economic 
cost-benefit calculations of national governments 
in a global economy impact fiscal policy decisions. 
But they do still leave room for national variation 
in choosing a policy response. Therefore we have 
to focus on politico-institutional determinants 
of fiscal policy, assuming that ‘…economic poli-
cy-making is a quintessentially political process. 
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Even in a field where the correct choice of policies 
depend heavily on expertise and the instruments 
for policy implementation, policy is driven by a 
dynamic that is as much political as economic’ 
(Hall, 1986: 229).
A number of politico-institutional studies on fis-
cal consolidation in Europe would not predict 
this pattern of variance in response strategies in 
2008/9. One-party governments – such as the 
British – would be considered particularly institu-
tionally well equipped to constrain deficit growth 
(Hallerberg, 2004). These governments did exact-
ly the opposite in 2008/9. However, the theories 
and arguments about incremental, long-term fis-
cal consolidation do not apply to a situation where 
governments change goals from deficit contain-
ment to economic stimulation and where admin-
istrations have to react swiftly and in a short-time 
perspective. What counted in the months after 
autumn 2008 was whether governments found 
support and majorities for risky measures within 
a short period of time, or whether it took long to 
agree on a fiscal package. Hence the focus must be 
on government capabilities in reacting swiftly to 
external shocks – and this is not the theme of the 
literature on the long term convergence of levels 
of deficits.
An explanation could be found in partisan theory. 
Tom Cusack showed  for the period 1961-94 and 
for 14 countries that leftist parties are likely to 
adopt counter-cyclical fiscal policies while right-
wing parties adhere to pro-cyclical fiscal stances 
(Cusack, 2001). This explanation obviously does 
not work well for the crises of 2008/9: Austra-
lia, Spain, and the UK were governed by Social 
Democratic parties and the US president is a 
Democrat, but the Canadian, Japanese, and New 
Zealand governments were bourgeois govern-
ments.  Another explanation is federalism. State 
governments have an incentive to save money in 
periods of expansive federal budgets and hence 
tend to turn the counter-cyclical central budget 
into a pro-cyclical direction (Rodden and Wib-
bels, 2010).  However, with the US, Canada, Aus-
tralia, and quasi-federalist Spain among the most 
counter-cyclical governments, this effect obvi-
ously did not have a powerful influence in the last 
two years. Finally, one can assume an electoral 
cycle with governments at the end of their term 
being particularly interested in risky expansion-
ary and electorally favorable policies. However, 
despite facing a general election, the German gov-
ernment disregarded many demands for a more 
pronounced fiscal policy, while the US president 
launched his program of economic stimuli shortly 
after his election.
My argument is very simple and straightforward. 
It starts from the assumption that governments 
need to be able to make swift and significant fiscal 
policy changes. This requires that there is no need 
for time-consuming negotiations between politi-
cal parties that are members of a governing coali-
tion. Hence we expect one-party governments to 
react stronger and more expeditiously than coali-
tion governments. Among the eight governments 
that pursued a pronounced expansionary policy, 
seven are one-party governments (Australia, Can-
ada, Japan, New Zealand, Spain, UK, USA)2.  It 
2.  This classification refers to the period fall 2008 un-
til December 2009. If there were more one party-
governments and coalition governments, such as in 
Japan, the classification refers to the type of govern-
ments that has been most of the time in office. The 
classification of New Zealand as one-party govern-
ment is a borderline-case. One the one hand, Na-
tional’s John Key negotiated support-agreements 
with the very small Maori Party, Act party, and the 
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was only in Denmark that a coalition government 
brought about major fiscal reform within a short 
period of time. 
In almost all other countries that pursued the de-
fault strategy – some slight counter-cyclical policy 
– or even pro-cyclical policy, the government was 
a coalition composed of two or even more parties. 
This does not apply to France and Malta though, 
both having a one-party government. In France 
the government is clearly dominated by the Presi-
dent and the UMP. However, president Sarkozy 
decided to have a broad government including 
many independents and former members of the 
French political left. Hence there is arguably an 
informal French governing coalition. The govern-
ment in Malta reacted through a stimulus package 
in 2009, amounting to 1.5% of GDP, two thirds of 
which is financed by EU grants. A larger stimulus 
package would have been hard to legitimize, given 
Malta’s inflation problem and the previous policy 
of fiscal consolidation pursued by the reelected 
bourgeois government (IMF, 2009b: 11). Even if 
United Future party. On the other hand, it insisted 
that it is a one-party minority government, see ED-
WARDS, B. 2009. New Zealand. European Journal 
of Political Research, 48, 1052-1066.
more governments were one-party governments 
pursuing the default strategy, this would not con-
tradict my argument: In order to depart from the 
default strategy executives must be willing and 
able to change the course of fiscal policy dramati-
cally in the short term. It would be much more 
critical against my argument if there were many 
coalition governments in which governing parties 
held very different views on taxation and spend-
ing that deviated from the default response. 
The German and Swiss case are good examples 
for the logics of the default strategy. Both coun-
tries were hit by the crisis, governments in both 
nations have a strong concern for fiscal sustain-
ability, both were very skeptical about the effec-
tiveness of demand-side management, and both 
feared that they would help other countries more 
than themselves when stimulating their interna-
tionally strongly integrated economies. In both 
countries governing parties disagreed about ad-
equate means and goals of intervention in the 
economy; in Switzerland arguably more so than 
in Germany. In addition to immediate interven-
tion into the financial sector and the electorally 
very visible and self-explaining ‘focused’ policies, 
such as the wrecking premium in Germany, ac-
tors in governments need to argue and compro-
mise about further fiscal policies. This took time, 
and initial claims needed to be scaled back. Other 
strategies to do something but not too much were 
to re-label previously accepted  expansive policies 
as ‘stimulus’ (Watt, 2009), to finance stimuli by EU 
transfers or by the simultaneous introduction of 
taxes to finance the expansive package, such as the 
new tax on pornography in Italy (newspaper re-
ports Nov 17th and 29th, 2008).
Another strategy of electorally favorable crisis in-
tervention with low risks was the shifting of blame 
and virtual resources to international organiza-
tions. During the three G20-meetings that dealt 
with the economic crisis (Washington, D.C., Nov 
2008; London April 2009; Pittsburgh, September 
2009), the US administration – together with the 
British government – tried to motivate European 
governments to stimulate the economy to an ex-
tent comparable to that of the US. The answer 
was a very clear ‘no’ by the German and French 
government and the European Commission, all 
being able to free-ride on the Anglo-Saxon de-
mand-management. (newspaper reports, March 
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21, 2009; April 3, 2009; April 4, 2009;  September 
7, 2009). The solution agreed by most govern-
ments was the reinvigoration of the IMF. It was 
decided to treble the resources of the IMF. This 
increase was not brought about by transfer of real 
funds, but rather by an increase of the credit lines 
of the member states. As far as these resources 
were needed, they were channeled in particular 
to the European members of the IMF (Woods, 
2010). Since far-reaching reforms of the internal 
structure of the IMF failed, the old rich democ-
racies kept their dominance of the IMF. The IMF 
imposed the tough austerity measures in Latvia, 
Hungary, Iceland, and Romania, which otherwise 
would be hard to defend domestically without the 
existence of IMF conditionality. This outsourcing 
of competences to the IMF showed electorates 
that the government was doing something about 
the economic crisis, in particular if the domestic 
crisis packages were small.
At the same time the European Union pursed pol-
icies similar to the domestic default strategy. It re-
labeled expenditures as fiscal packages (such as an 
energy and technology program) and cautioned 
against any further, risky expansionary strategies 
(newspaper reports March 21, 2009).
But how can we explain that some governments 
(Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, Ire-
land and Romania) opted for pro-cyclical policies, 
risking aggravating the economic crisis? Obvious-
ly, coalition governments were able to introduce 
this measure, which could even lead to a break 
down of governments and electoral defeat. The 
simplest answer is that these governments did 
not have much choice. The Baltic nations, Ireland 
(IMF, 2009a), and Iceland were arguably hit hard-
est by the crisis due to their specific reliance on 
international finance. Hungary, Romania, Iceland, 
and Latvia chose to ask for IMF loans, thereby ac-
cepting the policy goals of financial sustainability. 
In addition, the Baltic states (which are in the Eu-
ropean Exchange Rate Mechanism II) are the next 
candidates for membership in the Euro-Zone. 
Hence for these countries a counter-cyclical poli-
cy could endanger the feasible Euro-membership. 
Arguably, this membership is more important 
both for governments and electorates as com-
pared to short term improvements of growth and 
employment. Therefore, the government did not 
have much choice given their relationship with ei-
ther the EU or IMF3. In the case of Ireland, deficits 
increased massively due to lowered taxes and due 
to the extraordinary fiscal burden from financial 
support to banks. Hence the Irish government 
hardly had any other choice but to design a pro-
cyclical fiscal policy package (IMF, 2009a).
The last two columns of table 3 show the results 
when dummy variables for one-party govern-
ments and IMF credits/membership in the Eu-
ropean Exchange Rate Mechanism II are entered 
in the model. Obviously these two variables are 
highly significant and the explanatory power 
of the models with these two dummy variables 
is about twice as high as those of models #1-#4. 
Certainly economic and fiscal variables were im-
portant for governments when they designed 
3.  One could argue that those countries that had un-
sound public finances in the years preceding the 
crises were forced to ask for IMF support given the 
impact of the crisis. Hence the fiscal situation in 
2006/2007 could explain both the fiscal policy in 
2008/2009 and IMF loans. This is not true, though. 
Among the four EU countries (Greece, Italy, Hun-
gary, Portugal) that had public debt > 60% in 2007 
and a deficit of > 3 % of GDP either in 2006 or 2007 
only Hungary was under IMF conditionality in 
2008/2009. 
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their fiscal responses to the crisis. But the most 
important factor was whether these governments 
could react swiftly enough to deliver a sufficiently 
strong stimulus to the economy. The other main 
factors are the political constraints that leave gov-
ernments no choice but to pursue a fiscal policy 
which in all likelihood will contribute to a wors-
ening of the crisis in the field of growth and em-
ployment.
5. Conclusions
The fiscal response to the economic crisis of 
2008/2009 varied considerably between 32 de-
mocracies that belong either to the OECD or EU. 
The countries can be assigned to three groups: 
A group of eight nations reacted by a significant 
demand stimulus that let the countries to depart 
considerably from the previous level of public 
deficits. Governments in these nations pursued a 
counter-cyclical fiscal policy. The US is the most 
prominent member of this group. A group of 
seven countries chose the opposite strategy. They 
designed fiscal policies intended to scale down 
public expenditure. Often this did not result in a 
reduction of the overall deficit. However, the re-
sponse was clearly pro-cyclical. Hungary is a case 
in point. A third group of 17 countries opted for 
a slightly expansionary policy strategies. Govern-
ments did something, but the magnitude of the 
fiscal stimulus is dwarfed by the magnitude of the 
crisis and the magnitude of the fiscal stimulus by 
governments that expanded significantly. Switzer-
land or Germany are instances of this strategy.
I argued that there are strong economic and elec-
toral reasons for risk-averse governments to pur-
sue a mildly expansionary policy such as the 17 
countries of the second group. They minimize the 
risks that future increases of public debt are not 
rewarded by economic recovery, or they minimize 
the risks to avoid stimulating the economies of 
their trading partners more than their own. They 
also minimize electoral risks. Their risk-averse 
policies still allow them to claim to their elector-
ate that they are actively doing something for the 
economy. Furthermore, in becoming active on 
the international level, they shift competences 
and responsibilities to international organizations 
(the IMF in particular), thereby allowing them to 
claim tied hands.
If governments depart from this default strategy in 
favor of a significant counter-cyclical policy, they 
must be able to take swiftly risky decisions. This 
implies that they do not need lengthy negotiations 
between political parties with different views on 
economic and fiscal policy, as is usually the case 
in coalition governments. Therefore a major de-
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terminant of the expansionary strategy is the pres-
ence of a unified government, usually in the form 
of a one-party government.
If governments opt for pro-cyclical policy in a ma-
jor economic crisis, they do so because they have 
little other choice. They are either under IMF con-
ditionality (Hungary, Iceland, Romania, Latvia), 
or they have a much higher valued goal on the ho-
rizon, such as a feasible membership in the Euro-
Zone, that would be endangered by an expansion-
ary fiscal policy (in the Baltics, for example). In 
both cases domestic governments are able to shift 
the blame to international organizations for not 
being able to do more about the current crisis.
I hasten to add that the available fiscal data are of 
limited reliability and that two cases fit the argu-
ment only with additional arguments: Denmark 
with its coalition government that allowed for 
significant fiscal expansion starting from a very 
favorable fiscal situation before the crisis, and Ire-
land, that was hit so hard by the economic crisis 
that it did not need International Organizations to 
legitimize pro-cyclical fiscal policy.
I have to stress that my findings are in accordance 
with many works on fiscal consolidation, which 
show that this process depends critically on the 
distribution of interests and power in govern-
ments (Hallerberg, 2004, Spolaore, 2004, Fran-
zese, 2010).  The major difference between most 
of this literature and this analysis concerns the 
goals: In the absence of an imminent crisis, gov-
ernments are concerned with fiscal consolidation. 
During an economic crisis and if monetary means 
are exhausted, governmental goals may change to-
wards expansionary fiscal policy.  
If I am right, who is wrong? (1) My descriptive 
analysis contradicts arguments according to 
which the option of substantially different fiscal 
strategies is gone after capital market liberaliza-
tion and monetary EU-integration (see for ex-
ample (Scharpf, 1987). (2)  Economic variables 
– such as previous levels of debt or deficits, the 
size of the automatic stabilizers, the size of the 
domestic market, and the likelihood that the fis-
cal stimulus will be exported to other countries 
– have a limited explanatory power. Economic 
variables certainly constrain governments, but in 
the end fiscal policy is about politics. (3) Partisan 
politics explain little of the variation of spontane-
ous fiscal reaction to economic crisis. This contra-
dicts analyses that show that left parties are more 
in favor of counter- and bourgeois parties more in 
favor of pro-cyclical policies (Cusack, 2001). One 
has to add, however, that my findings may be valid 
for the second most dramatic economic crisis af-
ter the crisis of the 1930s (EU Commission, 2009), 
while Cusack’s findings concern the period of 
1961-1994. (4) My findings are not in accordance 
with many accounts that emphasize the constrain-
ing functions of institutions such as central banks 
or federalism. In hard times, politicians are ob-
viously able to stretch the institutionally defined 
corridor for political action considerably. What 
counts in the end is just politics such as the logics 
of one-party versus coalition governments. (5) We 
have little evidence for the claims by international 
organizations that the EU, OECD, or IMF had a 
large capacity to steer and coordinate fiscal poli-
cies across countries. Even in economically dense-
ly integrated societies, fiscal policy is still mainly 
framed by the domestic political actors. 
Some qualifications are in order: Even the default 
strategy of a small fiscal stimulus contributed to 
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strongly rising public debts in most countries; ‘de-
fault’ strategy does not mean that these govern-
ments did not have to cope with major fiscal prob-
lems after the crisis. In addition, my argument 
does not claim to explain the policies of exiting 
the expansionary strategies and of reducing the 
public debt. There are very good reasons that this 
process will be strongly conditioned by the vari-
ables which have shown themselves to be power-
ful in explaining fiscal consolidation in the past. 
Rather, with regard to choosing between a strong, 
a weak, or no counter-cyclical policy, this com-
parative analysis showed that in the global crisis 
of 2008/9 a swift and significant departure from 
standard patterns of fiscal policies towards a ma-
jor demand stimulus required the presence of gov-
ernments that are able to make decisions without 
lengthy negotiation or compromises. It is difficult 
to gauge whether these policies really worked in 
terms of avoiding even worse outcomes in terms 
of growth and employment. And it is even much 
more difficult to gauge whether the advantages of 
a consistent counter-cyclical policy are not off-set 
by the problems facing the public household once 
the crisis is over.
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1. Introduction
In the aftermath of the EU’s enlargement towards 
Central and Eastern Europe, many scholars and 
observers of European integration were proclaim-
ing that the French-German “engine” of Europe 
had come to an end. The political legitimacy of 
French-German initiatives was contested by co-
alitions of smaller member states and the ‘new 
Europe’ was calling for new leadership dynam-
ics. However, the experience of the Eurozone debt 
crisis provided dramatic evidence that no alterna-
tive to the Franco-German partnership has yet to 
emerge in the enlarged EU. In a time of existential 
crisis, Franco-German initiatives appear to have 
remained the basic dynamic of integration. How-
ever, unlike in the past, agreements on steps for-
ward have proven to be particularly difficult.  This 
is largely due to these countries’ contrasting politi-
cal economic policy ideas, cultures, and practices.
The Eurozone crisis itself was ‘read’ very different-
ly by the two countries, which also prescribed dif-
ferent solutions on different timetables.  As the cri-
sis initially unfolded, French leaders continued to 
prescribe neo-Keynesian stimulus; described the 
problem as one of mutual responsibility resulting 
from imbalances between deficit countries (read 
Southern Europe) and surplus countries (read Ger-
many); recommended deeper integration through 
greater gouvernance économique (economic gov-
ernance) along with a range of policy innovations; 
and preached solidarity in response to the Greek 
debt crisis together with a quick bailout to stop 
escalating market concerns beginning in January 
2010. By contrast, the German leadership delayed 
action, first pushing Greece to solve its own prob-
lems with a discourse about public profligacy and 
‘lazy Greeks;’ and only when the crisis was ready 
to explode did it agree to a loan for Greece at pu-
nitive market rates on May 3, 2010, followed by 
a new loan guarantee mechanism—pushed by 
France and even a telephone call from US Presi-
dent Obama—on the weekend of May 9-10, as 
market contagion threatened other European 
countries (the infamously named ‘PIGS’—Portu-
gal, Ireland, Greece, and Spain—the additional ‘I’ 
for Italy comes a year later).  On this historic oc-
casion, a deal was brokered in which France got 
some of the political (economic) institutions and 
policy actions it most wanted, including a bailout 
for Greece and a loan guarantee mechanism—the 
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF)—for 
countries under threat, in exchange for accept-
ing German political economic policies and phi-
losophies. These included enforcing ordo-liberal 
macroeconomic principles of austerity budgets 
across Europe, accepting the creation of a further 
treaty-based loan guarantee mechanism, the Eu-
ropean Stability Mechanism (ESM), and agreeing 
to reinforce the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), 
giving it more teeth through fines and sanctions. 
Subsequent episodes in the saga of the Eurozone 
crisis reiterated this basic pattern.
Paradoxically, the compromise between the two 
powers has been evaluated very differently by their 
European counterparts as well as their own na-
tional publics. Sarkozy’s role in the crisis was seen 
in much more positive light than that of Merkel. 
Whereas Sarkozy was viewed as something of a 
‘White Knight’ riding to the rescue of Greece and 
Eurozone countries throughout Europe, Merkel 
was pictured as Europe’s new ‘Iron Lady’ outside 
Germany, imposing hardship on Greece as well 
as other European countries. This is because at 
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home, the Chancellor had to please a public high-
ly resistant to financial solidarity at the expense 
of the German taxpayers that would come with-
out severe austerity for the ‘PIGS’. In contrast, the 
French public generally accepted Sarkozy’s turn 
to austerity and the increasingly stringent ‘pacts’ 
that accompanied it.  Eventually, the French and 
German discourse converged to a certain extent, 
as they agreed to more solidarity and institutional 
integration along with austerity, but emphasised 
different aspects in order to legitimise the ‘deal’ 
towards their respective public opinion. 
So how do we explain these differential views of 
French and German leadership in the crisis, both 
outside and inside their countries?  Part of the an-
swer naturally requires setting these leaders in the 
context of long-standing national economic and 
political traditions, considering their particular 
perceptions of national economic interest at the 
time of the crisis as well as of political interest—
related to electoral considerations.  But another 
important component has to do with the very 
structure of decision-making, with multiple ac-
tors at multiple levels.  
At the EU level, the main tension concerns the 
articulation between supranational and inter-
governmental politics, and the ways in which the 
various actors have responded to events.  The key 
supranational actors in the Eurozone governance 
architecture, the EU Commission, charged with 
oversight of Eurozone activity and member-state 
adherence to the Stability and Growth Pact, and 
the European Central Bank (ECB), charged to 
maintain the stability of the euro, have naturally 
sought to carry out their respective duties while 
not only ensuring against threats to their preroga-
tives  but also taking advantage of windows of op-
portunity that would enable them to help solve the 
crisis.  Both institutional actors, however, are lim-
ited by the fact that major decisions about any sig-
nificant change in the governance of the Eurozone 
can only be decided by the member states—and 
in particular France and Germany.  As the major 
member-state actors, however, France and Ger-
many themselves have to take into account their 
previous ‘history-making’ grand bargains at the 
EU level, including their ‘certain idea of Europe 
(Parsons 2003) that led to the creation of the com-
mon currency1. At the same time, though, they 
1.  Naturally, other EU leaders present around the 
also have to deal with the responses of national 
publics and their own electoral prospects.   
The national level, in other words, is as important 
to any compromise solution as is the suprana-
tional.  This suggests that Robert Putnam’s (1988) 
classic discussion of the two-level game in inter-
national relations has great relevance for our case. 
What we will show, however, is that rather than 
seeing this as a two level game, in which the two 
levels remain largely separate, the EU’s Eurozone 
negotiations are better viewed as a simultaneous 
double game.  In this game, moreover, rather than 
using rational choice institutionalism to model 
the interest-based calculations of ‘rational’ state 
actors, we argue that a discursive institutionalist 
approach (Schmidt 2008) provides greater value-
added to our understanding of how EU leaders 
perceived their interests as well as achieved com-
promises. Discursive institutionalism consid-
ers both the substantive content of ideas and the table are also important, to propose, mediate, pro�mote compromise, or to oppose.  But they ordinarily line up behind one or the other major player, with the Northern Europeans largely behind Germany as the crisis unfolded, the Southern Europeans behind France.  And if Germany and France cannot agree, then there is no agreement.
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discursive interactions through which agents (re)
construct and convey their ideas about interests 
and values in given institutional contexts on an 
on-going basis. These occur through a ‘coordina-
tive discourse’ with other (supranational) policy-
makers in leaders’ efforts to reach agreement and 
in a ‘communicative discourse’ with the public—
both their own national publics and the European 
public more generally.
To elucidate all of this, the paper analyses the 
ideational ‘frames’ of the two leaders while trac-
ing their discursive interactions against changing 
background conditions since the European debt 
crisis was triggered by Greece in October 2009 
until the last measures taken in 2012 before the 
French Presidential elections. The empirical anal-
ysis is based on a systematic corpus of press con-
ferences and media interviews by Nicolas Sarkozy 
and Angela Merkel after European summits. It is 
complemented by a number of press interviews 
(including some given by their respective Finance 
Ministers) and important speeches in that same 
period of time. 
2. Explaining The Dynamics Of Agreement In 
Eu Multi-Level Politics
2.1 A risky simultaneous double 
game
As European integration has increasingly blurred 
the demarcation lines between domestic and for-
eign policy, the articulation between domestic 
politics and intergovernmental negotiations has 
become increasingly important for any under-
standing of governance and democracy in the 
EU. Paradoxically – partly because comparativ-
ists tend to concentrate on the former while in-
ternational relations specialists deal with the lat-
ter – the processes of articulation remain under-
researched and under-theorised with regard to 
EU integration. In the 1980s’, R. Putnam (1988) 
put forward the famous metaphor of the two-level 
game. His argument was that, while negotiating 
international treaties, national leaders have to 
seek agreement at two different tables, which im-
plies different sets of preferences at the national 
level on one hand, and at the international level 
on the other. These two arenas are presumed to 
mutually influence each other, since the overlap of 
the two preference sets determines the possibility 
of ratifying an agreement. The main implication is 
therefore that moves in international politics will 
mostly be brokered and ratified if they provide for 
domestic benefits. 
Other scholars have extended this analysis to the 
role of domestic politics in EU integration.  An-
drew Moravcsik (1997) put forward a liberal in-
tergovernmentalist account of international re-
lations in which states define their preferences 
on the basis of domestic society (or some subset 
thereof). With regard to the ideational variant 
of liberalism in particular, he suggests that State 
preferences stand for a national identity com-
posed of views about the legitimate social order, 
i.e preferences about the scope of the nation (citi-
zenship and borders), commitment to particular 
political institutions, and ideas about the nature of 
redistribution (Moravcsik 1997). State behaviour 
understood as the management of international 
interdependence is then geared toward gains on 
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the basis of these preferences. Building on this 
approach, German scholars have more recently 
claimed the “domestication”, i.e a new orientation 
towards domestic societal preferences and identi-
ties, of the EU policy of Germany (Harnisch 2006) 
and France (Schild 2009). Here again, the central 
argument suggests a subordination of foreign 
policy to domestic preferences. Both approaches 
are useful in the sense that they point to crucial 
aspects of the articulation between domestic and 
EU politics. While the two-level game metaphor 
stresses the interactions between the two arenas, 
ideational liberal intergovernmentalism stresses 
the importance of societal preferences and long-
established identities. However, both theories also 
have a serious drawback: they assume the exis-
tence of two separate realms of fixed preferences 
that interact with each other. Those preferences 
tend to be reified and pictured as homogeneous 
(especially in the liberal approach) and the forma-
tion of preference sets seems to happen at differ-
ent moments. Moreover, both imply that interna-
tional agreements are mainly geared towards the 
satisfaction of domestic preferences, hence the 
two-stage nature of the process.
This is where the uniqueness of European politics 
must be taken into account. In the EU, we argue, 
the outcome of intergovernmental negotiations 
must be understood as a simultaneous double 
game, rather than a two-level game. The domes-
tic and the EU spheres of preference formation do 
not interact with each other, they inter-penetrate 
each other. Preferences at national and EU level 
are therefore co-constitutive. Democratic legiti-
macy results less and less from the preservation 
or reproduction of established national prefer-
ences, and more and more from the ability to re-
configure and re-negotiate those preferences in 
the context of exacerbated interdependence. The 
“game” therefore should be understood less as the 
overlapping of preference sets and win solutions 
than as a discursive game of real-time deliberation 
and contestation. 
In today’s EU, political leaders and decision-mak-
ers do not only have to address their national con-
stituencies; they also need to speak to other Euro-
pean audiences in order to convince them that the 
policy option they advocate is not the mere de-
fence of a national preference but serves the col-
lective ‘good’ of the EU as a whole. During the cri-
sis of the Eurozone, not just national leaders act-
ing in their EU capacity but also national finance 
ministers like the French Minister for economics, 
Christine Lagarde, and her German counterpart, 
Wolfgang Schäuble, have sought to reach their 
neighbour constituencies with interviews in the 
press. Interdependence among the member coun-
tries in the EU has gone so far that agreement is no 
longer an option: it has become a necessity. As a 
result, it is not just that the possibility of an agree-
ment is at stake – as in the two-level game theory 
– but also the electoral fate of national leaders. If 
they prove to be unable to legitimise an agreement 
brokered at the EU level, national leaders will have 
to bear the political costs of popular resentment. 
The referenda for the ratification of EU treaties are 
the opposite of this. They represent a counter-ex-
ample to the simultaneous double game since they 
do feature a rigid two-step process where treaties 
bargained in intergovernmental conferences are 
then submitted to popular consent. This was the 
case of the rejection of the Constitutional treaty. 
By contrast, in the simultaneous double game of 
policy change in the EU, national elites have the 
crucial role of bridging the gap between the man-
agement of interdependence and of national pref-
erences and identities. 
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How member-states have come to hold, maintain, 
and change their EU-related identities, visions, 
and discourses depends in large measure on the 
interactive processes of discussion, debate, de-
liberation, and contestation among and between 
elites and citizens over time.  National political 
elites, who simultaneously act as EU policymakers 
(henceforth termed European elites), have played 
a key role in articulating visions of the EU that 
have had a major influence on public perceptions, 
especially during the early years of the ‘permissive 
consensus’ up until the 1990s (see, e.g., Schmidt 
2006). Since then, these elites’ discourses often re-
flect as they respond to the greater contestation 
coming from an increasingly ‘constraining dissen-
sus’ (Hooghe and Marks 2009), in which divisions 
over the EU as well as, more generally, between 
more open and closed views of Europe and citi-
zenship have been growing (Kriesi, Grande et al. 
2008).  The media has also played a major role 
in ‘mediating’ between elites and citizens, and in 
particular in shaping public opinion on the EU 
through what and how they report and comment 
on the EU (Koopmans and Statham 2010; Risse 
2010). Social movements also play an increasingly 
significant role in influencing public opinion and 
leaders, in particular on issues of great political 
salience, whether across member-states as in the 
case of the mobilization against the Bolkestein 
directive (Crespy 2012) or within member-states 
in referendum campaigns about EU treaties. Eu-
ropean elites’ discourses have also, naturally, been 
strongly influenced by past elites’ ideas and com-
mitments, whether because of the ‘rhetorical en-
trapment’ engendered by previously accepted 
policy obligations (Schimmelfennig 2001) or the 
ideational trap resulting from the institutionalised 
ideas of their predecessors(Parsons 2003). 
2.2 A discursive 
institutionalist analysis
To say that European elites may be constrained 
by past EU or national level discourses and ac-
tions, however, does not mean that they end up 
caught in the path-dependence of institutional-
ized ideas, as historical institutionalists might 
argue, locked into parroting the outcomes of the 
winning political coalition’s expressed interests, as 
rational choice institutionalists might suggest, or 
even condemned to reproducing national cultural 
and identity frames, as sociological institution-
alists could seem to suppose. European elites, in 
particular when it comes to supranational policy 
articulation and action, still have a certain degree 
of freedom of manoeuvre in the construction of 
their ideas and the articulation of their discourse. 
Certainly, their freedom is greatest when they are 
the ones to construct the founding ideas of a given 
discourse, as was the case for General Charles de 
Gaulle, Konrad Adenauer, Altiero Spinelli, and 
others. But subsequent leaders also have a modi-
cum of choice, even if this must follow to some ex-
tent the flow of past ideas and discourse—if only 
to build legitimacy and ensure resonance for the 
public. 
The analytic framework used herein is ‘discursive 
institutionalism,’ which analyses the substantive 
content of ideas and the interactive processes of 
discourse in institutional context (Schmidt 2006; 
Schmidt 2008). In European Studies, this approach 
is closest to identity and discourse analyses (Diez 
2001, Risse 2010).  The difference is that it is more 
explicit about the need to focus on the dynamics of 
change in ideas through the interactive processes 
of discourse, and more concerned about situating 
these in formal institutional context (in addition 
to the ideational one).  With regard to the EU, that 
357The Euro Crisis & the State of European DemocracySection I
context is a multi-level system consisting of a ‘co-
ordinative’ discourse of elite policy construction 
at the EU level and a ‘communicative’ discourse 
between elites and the public involving national 
level policy discussion, contestation, and legitimi-
zation. Complicating this is the fact that policy-
makers can use an ostensibly communicative dis-
course to their own general publics—in speeches 
or in interviews in national or the foreign press 
- to simultaneously signal their positions to fellow 
policymakers, ahead of coordinative negotiation 
meetings.  By the same token, they may say one 
thing behind closed doors in the coordinative ne-
gotiations, something else to their national press 
as they emerge from their meetings, as a commu-
nication to their own constituencies.  Legitimacy 
issues often arise when there is a significant lack of 
congruence between the coordinative discourse at 
EU level and the communicative discourse at the 
national level. This may come at the national level, 
as the press and opinion leaders may complain 
that national leaders have not been honest about 
the EU commitments they may have made, or at 
the EU level, as EU leaders may complain that a 
fellow leader has gone back on EU level promises 
in national speeches or actions. 
National institutional settings also represent both 
opportunities and constraints for political lead-
ers when trying to persuade at home. These in-
stitutional settings can be stylised as ‘simple’ poli-
ties in which decision-making tends to be chan-
nelled through a single authority, as in countries 
like France, which are unitary states with statist 
policymaking and majoritarian representation 
systems, or as ‘compound’ polities in which de-
cision-making tends to be more dispersed, as in 
Germany, which are federal states with corporat-
ist policymaking and proportional representation 
systems.  In Germany, with its compound pol-
ity containing many veto players – in particular 
the Bundestag (lower house of Parliament) or 
the Bundesverfassungsgericht (the Constitutional 
Court) – the political system requires a ‘thick’ 
coordinative discourse among the wide range of 
national actors with a say in decision-making in 
order to reach agreement.  In France, by contrast, 
with its simple polity in which top down decisions 
by a restricted governing elite are the rule, making 
for a ‘thin’ coordinative discourse, communicative 
discourses to the general public are much more 
elabourate—and necessary, since disagreements 
generally turn into mediatised public debates and 
often also spill out into the street, if unions and 
social movements mobilise and protest (Schmidt 
2006). 
Therefore, European leaders’ positions cannot be 
explained without also considering institutions 
and electoral politics, and in particular the ex-
tent to which, in this simultaneous double game, 
considerations other than those involved in solv-
ing the Eurozone crisis, such as getting re-elected 
or maintaining one’s majority, play an important 
role.  To illustrate, the German leader’s stance on 
the Greek bailout cannot be understood with-
out also understanding the compound polity in 
which she operates, in which ministries such as 
that of Finance have considerable independence, 
in which the Bundesbank and the Constitutional 
Court in Karlsruhe are fully independent, and in 
which frequent regional elections can change the 
majority in the Bundesrat (second chamber). 
In Germany, the heated discussions about the first 
emergency measures for rescuing Greece took 
place in the run-up to the regional election in 
the significant region of North Rhine-Westphalia 
(NRW). The government parties were going down 
in the polls and ended losing more than 10% of 
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the votes compared to 2005. As result, the Chan-
cellor’s party, the CDU lost control of the Land, to 
the benefit of a red-green coalition. NRW was only 
the first in a series of election defeats. In March 
2011, the CDU lost the rich Baden-Württemberg, 
which had been a CDU’s stronghold for 58 years. 
In the Bremen election in May 2011, the CDU lost 
over 5% of the votes while the SPD and the Greens 
were victoriously re-elected with enhanced scores. 
Merkel’s initial discourse, about ‘lazy Greeks’ who 
needed to put their own house in order, while she 
was protecting German savings, made it very dif-
ficult for her to legitimate her switch in discourse, 
to then insist on national TV that ‘the future of 
Europe depended on it [the Euro]’ and ‘it was es-
sential to maintain the stability of the Euro’. The 
discourse rang hollow, while the turnabout an-
gered numbers of her supporters, including the 
influential Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. Part 
of the explanation for her increasing insistence on 
more stringent institutional mechanisms, auto-
matically applied, also has to do with the attempt 
to demonstrate to a disenchanted electorate that 
their savings would be safe, and that the Eurozone 
countries would become more and more like Ger-
many. In contrast, Sarkozy has none of the prob-
lems of the institutional and electoral problems 
of his German counterpart, given that France is a 
‘simple’ polity with tremendous concentration of 
power and authority in the president, which has 
only increased under his presidency as a result of 
constitutional reform.
Drawing from various conceptualizations in dif-
ferent strands of the literature focusing on the 
role of ideas and discourse, the chapter explores 
three dimensions of public discourse about the 
Eurocrisis, focused on economics, institutions, 
and identity. In all three dimensions, we consider 
the cognitive and normative frames contained in 
EU leaders’ discourse, which may be conceived of 
in a number of different ways at different levels of 
generalization (Hall 1993; Sabatier 1998; Schmidt 
2008; Mehta 2010). Putting these together, we 
identify three levels, including:  1) policy ideas 
related to policy measures and solutions, both 
economic (for instance the EFSF) and institu-
tional (the budgetary ‘golden rule’); 2) program-
matic ideas related to larger policy paradigms (for 
instance, convergence or regulation) related to 
broader economic philosophies (Keynesianism or 
ordo-liberalism); and 3) norms, values and identi-
ties (for instance, stability or solidarity). In the lat-
ter category, drawing from the framing literature 
(Hunt, Benford et al. 1994), we also consider how 
political leaders conceive of Europe, the position 
of their country in Europe as well as the role of 
various institutions. Here, attention will be paid 
to frames delineating boundaries between us (the 
French? The Europeans?) and them (the so-called 
PIGS? The speculators?)
The following sections present a diachronic and 
comparative analysis of French and German dis-
courses over the two sequences and at the level of 
institutional and policy solutions, economic para-
digms and philosophies, and norms and identi-
ties.
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3. Policy And Institutional 
Solutions: Activating Solidarity, 
Constitutionalizing Austerity
In the course of 2010, France and Germany even-
tually agree to set up two financial instruments: 
the EFSF with the first Greek bailout in May, and 
then in the fall, the ESM.   With both, German 
leaders kept insisting, both in the coordinative 
discourse with their European partners and in the 
communicative discourse to the German public, 
that they would not agree to such funds, until they 
did.  At a press conference in the fall (on Septem-
ber 16, 2010), for example, both Merkel and her 
Finance Minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, maintained 
that they would not agree to any extension of the 
EFSF to a permanent fund. By December of that 
same year, they agreed to the EMS at the EU level.
What is clear is that Germany mainly followed 
France with regard to policy solutions—albeit re-
luctantly, and with much delay.  This comes out 
clearly from a systematic analysis of the press 
conferences and press interviews of Merkel and 
Sarkozy for the year. Graph 1 demonstrates that 
whereas French leaders advocated establishing 
not only the two funds but also such solutions 
as Eurobonds or enhanced budgetary oversight, 
Angela Merkel was stuck on already existing, but 
inefficient, policy solutions such as respecting the 
rules enshrined in the Stability and Growth Pact 
or even investing in research contained in the Lis-
bon strategy.  At the same time, all the think-tanks 
were abuzz with discussions of how to create a 
European Monetary Fund or to make Eurobonds 
work, while major economists, opinion makers, 
and even government officials, including Schäuble 
himself, published op-eds in major newspapers 
on various mechanisms for financial solidarity. 
But none of this had an impact on Germany’s po-
sition. We observe a similar pattern with regard to 
institutional solutions. Although Germany final-
ly embraced France’s long-standing demand for 
‘gouvernance économique,’ that is, for an economic 
government that would oversee the Eurozone, it 
did so on condition that this meant strengthening 
the sanctioning mechanisms for the countries that 
would not be able to abide by the budgetary rules. 
The French went along with this with some reluc-
tance, in particular because these were increasing-
ly focused on automatic financial sanctions (see 
the French President’s Press conference on March 
25, 2010).  Moreover, Merkel repeatedly evoked 
the idea that the existing treaties forbade bailouts 
in the Eurozone.  And finally, once the bailout and 
loan guarantee had been agreed, Angela Merkel 
missed few opportunities to remind her Euro-
pean partners of her country’s decision to anchor 
a budgetary ‘Golden Rule’ (Schuldenbremse, liter-
ally debt brake) in the German Constitution (PC 
10.05.2010, Le Monde 19.05.2010).
In the sequence of institutional consolidation 
in 2011, the respective French and German dis-
courses on policy solutions did not change much. 
The German Chancellor, while fully endorsing the 
ESFS and the EMS, developed a complex set of ar-
guments to explain how they might function to-
gether. She also continued to refer to the stability 
and growth pact and the need to invest in research 
in order to boost competitiveness. On the French 
side, Nicolas Sarkozy moved on to the advocacy 
of fiscal integration, in particular with regard to 
tax competition, an idea that was followed more 
or less by Angela Merkel.
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By contrast, discourse on the institutional policy 
solutions changed markedly in 2011. The issue 
of automatic sanctions was more salient in the 
French discourse because Nicolas Sarkozy had 
to justify his consent to automatic sanctioning 
mechanisms as well as the role of the EU Com-
mission in the monitoring of the excessive deficit 
procedure. In addition, he very often mentioned 
the role of the new economic government of the 
Eurozone in order to stress that the long-stand-
ing French demand was satisfied in the course 
of Franco-German negotiations. This theme re-
mained marginal for the German Chancellor. 
The newest, most salient theme in this sequence 
of the crisis was the ‘golden rule’ for budgetary 
discipline. Both France and Germany converged 
on this theme, as well as on the idea of enshrin-
ing it in a new intergovernmental treaty. While 
this mechanism was inspired by Germany, Nico-
las Sarkozy had already advocated introducing it 
in the French Constitution since early 2010. Polls 
showed that the French President had been quite 
successful in communicating the new orientation 
towards austerity to the French electorate. In Au-
gust 2011, a poll confirmed that a majority of the 
French approved the introduction of the “golden 
rule” into the French Constitution2. 
2. “Sondage: plus d’un français sur deux approuve la Règle d’or”, 25.08.2011, www.lepoint.fr (20.03.2012)
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4. Economic Philosophies and Paradigms: 
Convergence Towards German Ordnungspolitk
Ordo-liberalism is a German invention.  It was 
forged in the 1950s under the leadership of Ludwig 
Erhard, with the philosophical ideas underlying 
the paradigm informing not just the Bundesbank 
but also, later, the ECB, which absorbed its ideol-
ogy.  The paradigm itself was developed by a dis-
course coalition led in the early post-war period 
by Alfred Müller-Armack, the entrepreneurial ac-
tor who articulated the arguments that convinced 
policy actors, political actors, and then the public 
of the necessity and appropriateness of this idea 
(Lehmbruch 2001). It has remained a pervasive 
and distinctive form of neo-liberalism conceived 
as an alternative to Keynesianism that has also, to 
a certain extent, underpinned the German con-
cept of social market economy (Ptak 2004).  The 
German ‘social market economy’ which emerged 
after much political struggle during the 1950s was 
a compromise accepted by conservatives and so-
cial democrats alike that consecrated a state that 
would govern the economy according to ordo-
liberal economic principles while at the same time 
‘enabling’ corporatist management and labour co-
ordination of wages and work conditions (Streeck 
1997). 
Post-war Germany, as a result, adopted a political 
economic philosophy and program that was the 
direct opposite of that of France’s post-war diri-
gisme, in which an interventionist state was much 
more actively engaged in both macroeconomic 
steering and microeconomic industrial policy. 
France’s dirigiste political economic philosophy 
also began in the 1930s, as the brainchild of tech-
nocratic elites of the right and even, in some cases, 
of the far right who were influential during the last 
days of the Third Republic and the Vichy regime 
as well as the Liberation era (Nord 2010). This pat-
tern of state ‘voluntarism’ has persisted, despite 
the fact that since the 1980s, post-war Keynesian-
ism and state dirigisme gave way to neo-liberal re-
form in which the state engineered the ‘dirigiste’ 
end of dirigisme through liberalization, privatiza-
tion, and deregulation (Schmidt 1996; 2012).
Nonetheless, the deep-seated idea of the legitima-
cy of strong state interventionism helps explain 
why a Conservative French President—who had 
embraced neo-liberalism for the previous two 
years of his mandate—would be ready to jump 
back in with a more state-led, Keynesian approach 
to the 2008 crisis. A very different set of deep-
seated ideas about the value of the ordo-liberal 
‘Culture of Stability,’ which had continued largely 
unchanged since the early post-war period, helps 
explain why a Conservative German Chancellor 
would resist any such state action in response to 
the 2008 crisis. And this also helps explain Chan-
cellor Merkel’s resistance to President Sarkozy’s 
push for more active and immediate response to 
the Greek crisis as of 2010.  
Thus, graph 3 suggests that part of the reason for 
the seemingly interminable discussions over the 
exact conditions for the Greek bail out can be fur-
ther explained by the fact that Sarkozy and Merkel 
focused on different underlying policy paradigms 
and philosophies for the ESFS and the EMS. 
Whereas the French leaders’ discourse contin-
ued to highlight the importance of the economic 
convergence of member-states, in keeping with 
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the original ideas behind the European Monetary 
Union, German leaders used the key words of the 
ordo-liberal frame, austerity and competitiveness, 
while adding conditionality as the way in which 
to ensure that member-states with excessive debts 
commit themselves to austerity budgets to reduce 
public deficits, under the supervision of the EU 
authorities.  The leitmotiv of the German political 
establishment’s discourse was control over public 
finance, as signalled by the use of a wide range of 
terms, all expressing this idea in the German lan-
guage – Haushaltsdiziplin,  Haushaltskonsolidier-
ung, Defizitkontrolle, Sparkurs, etc3. These terms, 
moreover, are all closely associated with the con-
cept of competitiveness, which was over-used in 
every speech of the German Chancellor, as in the 
following quote:
“As a matter of fact, and this has been acknowl-
edged everywhere, the competitiveness of the 
various Euro-countries is different, and we are 
helping ourselves to become the most competi-
tive regions in the world if we pay attention to the 
3. Just as the French term « rigueur » is avoided to refer to austerity measures because of its political negative connotation, Konsolidierung is prefered to 
Sparkurs in the German discourse.
strengthening and the improvement of our overall 
competitiveness. We need to be careful that it does 
not lead to excessive divergences within the Euro-
zone, but rather that we grow together thanks to 
better competitiveness” (PC 04.02.2011).
Moreover, although the Pact adopted in March 
2010 was named the ‘Pact for the Euro,’ the Ger-
mans often referred to it as the ‘Pact for Competi-
tiveness’ (PC 04.02.2011, PC 11.03.2011).  And 
subsequent to the May agreement, Merkel implic-
itly linked the push for zero deficit to increased 
competitiveness, while she strongly associated the 
‘solidity’ of public finances with austerity mea-
sures across Europe (Le Monde 19.05.2010). 
Notably, with the May agreement on the Greek 
bailout and the EFSF, the French President em-
braced to a large extent the ordo-liberal framing of 
the crisis. That said, Sarkozy nonetheless endeav-
oured to maintain a discursive balance between 
the invocation of austerity, on one hand, and of 
growth and employment, on the other.  By con-
trast, the German discourse had no place at all for 
the main French alternative frame, that of a neces-
sary policy convergence within the Eurozone. 
 Graph 3 : Paradigms
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This constituted a clever discursive strategy by 
French political leaders. On the one hand, they 
strongly converged towards the competitiveness 
program and framing. In February 2011, Chris-
tine Lagarde, who was the French Minister for Fi-
nance at that time, gave an interview to the Spiegel 
seeking to persuade the German political estab-
lishment and public of the French commitment to 
increasing competitiveness and stability. On the 
other hand, besides competitiveness, Nicolas Sar-
kozy avoided evoking the austerity frame nation-
ally, emphasizing instead the idea of policy con-
vergence within the Eurozone, which was in tune 
with the French vision of a core Europe. He also 
talked more about growth, employment and the 
regulation of finance as complementary referenc-
es to Keynesian policy. In contrast, Angela Merkel 
used competitiveness, along with austerity, as her 
main discursive frames, with convergence, growth 
and employment and conditionality as secondary 
frames. Regulation was absent from her discourse 
in this period of time.
By the end of the period under study, however, 
President Sarkozy was more willing to see con-
vergence rather than competitiveness as the main 
goal of the Pact for the Euro. The framing discrep-
ancy was acknowledged by the French President: 
‘We have also changed the name, it is ‘Pact for 
the Euro in favour of competitiveness and con-
vergence’. This allowed us to put an end to the 
debate between those who were for convergence 
and those who were for competitiveness’ (PC 
11.03.2011)
Meanwhile, the competitiveness frame also per-
meated the French discourse to a significant ex-
tent (cf. Christine Lagarde in Spiegel 14.02.2011). 
The main French achievement in terms of conver-
gence was the setting up of the so-called economic 
government of the EU, a gathering of the Euro-
zone leaders. While the Germans were stressing 
convergence in terms of wages (with the end of 
indexation on inflation4), Sarkozy emphasised a 
move that France had advocated for a long time, 
namely integration in fiscal policy with first steps 
towards harmonization. 
4.  �ere, one should note that the end of wage index�
ation on inflation had already been implemented for a few years in France.
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5. Norms and Identities: Solidarity Vs 
Stability
Graph 4 : Norms and values
Wohlstand
Stability
Solidarity
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Peace
While the cognitive arguments in the German and 
French leaders’ discourse were reasonably well-
developed, the normative arguments were strik-
ingly thin, with scant reference to values, espe-
cially as far as Germany was concerned. Whereas 
French leaders repeatedly talked of solidarity, the 
best German leaders could come up with was ‘sta-
bility,’ as Graph 4 demonstrates.  Stability itself is 
a traditional frame inherited from the monetarist 
spirit of the Maastricht Treaty, for which the core 
task of the ECB is to ensure price stability (low 
inflation) while the rules for EMU are enshrined 
in the Pact of Stability and Growth. For the Ger-
many, in other words, stability of the currency has 
been elevated to a moral value, as a result of his-
tory and collective memory.
The German Chancellor’s value-based discourse 
on stability stands in contrast to the French Presi-
dent’s emphasis on solidarity, in particular to-
wards Greece and, more generally, within the Eu-
rozone, as the main justification for setting up the 
EFSF and the EMS. Sarkozy also appealed to the 
grand narrative of EU integration: ‘The Euro is Eu-
rope, Europe means peace on the continent’ (PC 
08.05.2010). In stressing the principle of solidar-
ity, the French banking interests that were to ben-
efit most from a bailout for Greece5were discur-
sively absent from the construction of the French 
position, which helped make it more legitimate. 
This was also, one might add, true for the German 
discourse, in which citizens’ interests were at the 
forefront of the discourse, as the German gov-
ernment insisted time and again that it was most 
concerned about engaging the German taxpayers’ 
responsibility in the financial rescue of Greece. In-
deed, the idea of solidarity remains marginal in 
the German discourse and, when mentioned, it is 
always associated with responsibility and stability. 
On the one hand, as the largest and economically 
most significant member of the Eurozone, Ger-
man leaders made clear that they felt responsible 
5.  French banks are massively involved in Greece through the acquisitions of Greek proximity banks, up to €79 bn versus €43 bn for German banks. More generally, French banks are very involved in Southern European markets, including in Spain and Portugal. Cf Elie Cohen, « Grèce : nuages noirs sur les banques françaises », Telos, 02.05.2010, http://www.telos�eu.com/fr/article/grece_nuages_noirs_sur_les_banques_francaises (12.05.2011)
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for the survival of the common currency. On the 
other hand, they were equally clear about the fact 
that the PIGS also had to commit themselves to 
policies that would allow for stabilizing the com-
mon currency. In Angela Merkel’s words, ‘stability 
and solidarity are two sides of the same coin’ (PC 
26.03.10).
The normative discourse and the appeal to values 
became even thinner in 2011 compared to 2010. 
While Nicolas Sarkozy still referred to solidarity, 
albeit less often, the most salient frame in this re-
spect was the idea of stability, which had long been 
most salient in the German discourse. The stabil-
ity of the common currency had by now become 
the main normative guiding principle. Interest-
ingly, Angela Merkel also referred to the German 
concept of Wohlstand as a secondary frame, i.e. 
the underlying idea of the German post-war eco-
nomic miracle, making clear that what was really 
at stake with the Eurocrisis for the Germans was a 
threat to their standards of living and well-being. 
While this frame might have been quite efficient 
in the communicative discourse directed at the 
German domestic constituency, it naturally could 
not work as a legitimizing discourse at the Euro-
pean level. 
The most salient normative dimension here in-
volves the different assignation of responsibility. 
This can be scrutinised through identity frames, 
i.e. the discursive references to actors depicted as 
protagonists (‘us’) or antagonists (‘them’) in the 
crisis, as shown in Graph 5. In the first months of 
2010, the French President mainly put the blame 
on ‘the markets’ while pointing to speculators as 
common enemies for the Eurozone: ‘it is logical 
that a member country of the Euro that is being 
attacked by speculators, as it is the case of Greece 
today, should be able to rely on the solidarity of 
other members of the Eurozone. Otherwise, why 
did we decide to have a common currency?’ (PC 
03.03.10). He pressured the German Chancellor 
while instrumentally appealing to her European 
commitment: ‘I believe in the European solidar-
ity of Germany, I believe in Mrs Merkel’s Euro-
pean commitment’ (CP 07.03.2010). This is where 
Nicolas Sarkozy most clearly manages to profile 
himself as the ‘White Knight’ rescuing Greece. 
Graph 5 : Protagonists
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In contrast, Angela Merkel played the ‘Iron Lady,’ 
first stressing the lax budgetary policies of the 
PIGS as she insisted in a joint press conference 
early on in the crisis that: ‘Greece won’t be left 
alone, but there are rules and these rules must be 
adhered to,’ (Washington Post February 12, 2010). 
In March, she directly countered Sarkozy’s insis-
tence that speculators were the problem, saying: 
“I would suggest that we should not assume that 
the situation was only caused by mean specula-
tors (…) If the budget situation in Greece had 
not been what it was, the speculators would have 
not had such a chance. This is actually something 
that should not have taken place after the Treaty 
of Maastricht” (PC 26.03.10). The underlying idea 
among the German establishment and public was 
that the Greeks should be punished for cheating 
and then lying about the state of the country’s 
public finances. This position echoed the German 
public’s hostile stand on what was then seen as the 
“Greek crisis”. In February-March 2010, numer-
ous opinion polls showed that about two thirds of 
German citizens opposed the idea of the federal 
government committing itself to financial help6. 
6. ht t p://de.st at ist a .com/st at ist ik/daten/st ud�
ie/77453/umfrage/finanzielle-hilfen-der-bundesr�
In the same vein, the French and the German lead-
ers disagreed with regard to the main protagonists 
in the crisis. For Nicolas Sarkozy, the PIGS coun-
tries were to be seen as allies, while integration was 
to be re-directed towards further convergence of a 
core Europe embodied by the Eurozone countries 
and led by intergovernmental institutions such as 
the Council of Ministers and the European Coun-
cil and its permanent President. 
For the German Chancellor, in contrast, the banks 
were to be seen as allies rather than enemies. In 
the first sequence of the crisis, Angela Merkel also 
resisted the vision of a core Europe and insisted 
on moving forward with the 27 member states 
of the EU as a whole; she consistently referred to 
the leading role of the supranational institutions; 
the ECB, the EU Commission and the Court of 
Justice. Furthermore, while Nicolas Sarkozy was 
objecting to involvement of the IMF in the begin-
ning, Angela Merkel insisted that a substantial 
part of the financial burden would be shared with 
the involvement of the IMF. 
egierung�fuer�griechenland/, February 2010. “Bürg�
er stützen harten Kurs gegen Griechenland”, www.stern.de, 30.03.2010. 
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The norm of stability was consistent with a fram-
ing of collective identities that focused on the Eu-
rozone, in particular with regard to the view of an-
tagonists and protagonists in the crisis. First, the 
UK appeared as the main antagonist because of its 
veto and then refusal to adopt the Euro Plus Pact 
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and the intergovernmental treaty; this was equally 
highlighted in both the French and German dis-
courses. More interestingly, the gap between the 
French and the German framing of protagonists 
had closed to a significant extent in 2011 when 
compared to 2010. Nicolas Sarkozy still empha-
sised the French-German axis as a main protago-
nist more often than Angela Merkel, but the lat-
ter mentioned the Eurozone – as opposed to the 
EU 27 – and intergovernmental institutions more 
often than she had in the previous year. This ac-
counts for a relative convergence towards the new 
intergovernmental governance mechanisms ad-
vocated by France in the Eurozone.  In turn, the 
Commission and the ECB became much more 
salient in the French discourse than the inter-
governmental institutions. Similarly, the discur-
sive patterns converged with regard to the role of 
the IMF and the banks as allies for the Eurozone 
countries in the crisis.
6. Conclusion
In the complex set of discursive interactions that 
defined the Franco-German partnership in 2010 
and 2011 during the Eurozone crisis, there was a 
lot of give and take on both sides.  However, if we 
were to be pushed to make a final assessment of 
the exercise, we would conclude that Germany, 
for all the criticism of Chancellor Merkel as the 
‘Iron Lady’ unwilling to take action in solidar-
ity with Eurozone members under pressure from 
the markets, won out over Sarkozy, as the ‘White 
Knight’ ready to ride out in defence of the weaker 
member-states.  This comes our clearly in the final 
table (see Table 1), when we consider how much 
of the German discourse on policy ideas and so-
lutions, programmatic ideas and paradigms, and 
principles and values was taken up by the French 
leadership.
The fact that this discourse has supported auster-
ity policies across Europe and, indeed, has locked 
European leaders into maintaining such policies 
for fear of a loss of credibility with the markets and 
of electoral support from their domestic constitu-
encies, has had serious economic consequences. 
Eurozone economies have slowed, while the PIGS 
have been sliding into recession.  It is true that 
growth has now become a new buzzword.  But 
with austerity budgets linked to rapid deficit re-
duction still the main game in town, one wonders 
how European leaders expect to promote growth, 
and where the money will come from, given the 
continued resistance by Chancellor Merkel to real 
financial solidarity, through Eurobonds, using the 
ECB as a lender of last resort, or even increasing 
the firepower of the loan guarantee mechanisms. 
It is clear that change has begun with the appoint-
ment of Italian Prime Minister Monti in Novem-
ber 2011 and the election of French President Hol-
lande in 2012.  But it may very well be that only a 
further change in leaders and parties, with a move 
from conservative to social democrats in major 
national political posts, will allow for a change in 
discourse and action.  But this would mean that 
the social democrats would also have to develop 
new ideas and discourse capable of changing the 
minds of the markets, by now fixed on stability 
and growth—an impossible combination.
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Table 1 Discursive differences between France and Germany
France Germany
Policy ideas:  
Economic policy solutions
Greek bail out
EFSF + EMS
Fiscal harmonization
EBC last resort (debt monetization)
Fiscal harmonization
Sanctions
IMF involvement
Private sector involvement
Investment in research
Policy Ideas: 
Institutional policy solutions
Gouvernement économique 
Golden rule
Programmatic Ideas: 
Programs and paradigms Convergence 
Growth & employment
Regulation
Competitiveness
Conditionality
Growth & employment
Philosophical Ideas: 
Principles, norms, values
Solidarity
Peace
Stability
Responsibility
Wohlstand
Antagonists The markets/speculators
UK
PIGS
UK
Protagonists The Eurozone 
The French-German axis 
Intergovernmental institutions
PIGS
Supranational institutions
IMF
The banks
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1. Introduction
One of the major and constant aims of European 
integration and EU citizenship in particular is 
to create a common European social, economic 
and political space by diminishing national bar-
riers (Maas, 2008). While the idea of the creation 
of an EEC and consequently an EC citizenship 
has started to manifest itself as early as the mid-
1970s, EU citizenship was formally introduced in 
1993 with the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty 
(Hansen 2000). The main target of EU citizen-
ship is the encouragement of an EU identity and 
the widest possible participation of the member 
states’ citizens to European integration. 
EU citizenship allows citizens of the EU mem-
ber states to circulate, settle and work anywhere 
within the EU, to participate in European and lo-
cal elections (both as voters and as candidates) in 
their country of residence while it promotes citi-
zens’ access to EU institutions (e.g. by establishing 
their right to report to the European Parliament 
and their access to the European Ombudsman). 
EU citizenship is based upon the values of democ-
racy, freedom, tolerance and the rule of law. In 
fact, the European Union Charter of Fundamental 
Rights (2000) brings together the civil, political, 
economic and social rights granted to EU citizens 
and the residents of the EU member states in one 
single text. Those rights are divided into six sec-
tions; Dignity; Freedoms;Equality; Solidarity; Cit-
izens’ rights and; Justice. Beyond this large set of 
rights enshrined in the EU Charter of Fundamen-
tal Rights and in EU citizenship, research suggests 
that the most important aspects of EU citizenship 
is freedom of movement inside a no-internal-bor-
der-zone and a common currency (Euronat 2005).
Seeking an empirical point of entry for studying 
the meaning of EU citizenship today and particu-
larly at a time of economic and political crisis, we 
have chosen to focus on what in global terms has 
been described as social processes of ‘mobility’ 
and non-mobility’ (Urry, 2007; Elliott and Urry, 
2010, Fortier and Lewis, 2006) and what in the 
specifically European context results in distinc-
tions between ‘movers’ and ‘stayers’ (Recchi and 
Favell, 2009).  European societies are changing 
through policy and institutional developments 
at the level of governance but one tangible aspect 
of these developments is to facilitate / encourage 
mobility across the EU. Indeed the movement of 
people throughout the EU is an important part of 
the EU integration process, a test case of whether 
the EU is becoming integrated enough or not. 
Interestingly, mobility within the EU 15 was re-
markably low but dramatically increased in EU25 
and EU27 after 2004. It can be argued that even 
though the new Member State citizens mainly 
moved out of economic necessity seeking better 
employment and life prospects they have become 
pioneers of European integration (Recchi and Tri-
andafyllidou, 2010).
This paper outlines first the dimensions and main 
features of intra EU mobility. It then questions, on 
the basis of original data from a quantitative sur-
vey and a set of qualitative interviews conducted 
in four countries (Spain, France, Italy and Greece) 
with intra-EU migrants from Poland, Romania, 
Britain and Germany, whether intra EU migrants 
have a more positive view of the EU and whether 
they feel more attached to it than the average citi-
zen in the countries studied or the average citizen 
in these mobile Europeans’ member state of ori-
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gin. In other words, the paper asks whether exer-
cising EU citizenship rights such as the right to 
free movement makes people more favourable to 
the process of European integration and more at-
tached to the EU. The paper questions whether EU 
integration can emerge from actual mobility rath-
er than from a common sense of belonging. EU 
citizenship in this sense becomes instrumental. 
While an ‘independent variable’ defining the mo-
bility rights of EU citizens, it is also a ‘dependent 
variable’ as mobility has an impact on the mean-
ing of EU citizenship and the attachment of intra 
EU migrants to Europe, their negative or positive 
views of European integration. Our hypothesis is 
driven by the basic assumption of political science 
that the experience of living within a territorial 
entity with a common set of rights and duties, is in 
itself an important experience of political sociali-
sation that can inculcate a feeling of belonging, a 
feeling of membership to this community. 
Such a growing feeling of belonging to Europe and 
the EU can of course be hampered by negative ex-
periences of rights that are not respected and by 
difficulties in participating in the public life of 
the country of destination. This paper thus inves-
tigates the obstacles that intra EU migrants face 
in their effort to civically and politically integrate 
in their destination country and discusses the dif-
ferent experiences of intra EU mobility of citizens 
from different member states. The main distinc-
tion investigated is between citizens of new and 
old member states as they also signal two different 
types of migratory projects (more on this below, 
see also Recchi and Triandafyllidou 2009).
The paper seeks also to make a contribution to-
wards a better understanding of the relationship 
between political identity and citizenship. It actu-
ally argues that as regards European identity and 
EU citizenship, the latter does not emanate from 
the former, as is the case normally in the context 
of the nation state and with regard to national citi-
zenship, but rather it is the former that generates 
the latter. This does not necessarily mean that EU 
identity is purely instrumental. It rather means 
that in a polity like the EU where the creation of a 
common political and civic space is hampered by 
not only the different national identities and his-
tory narratives but also by the absence of a com-
mon language and a common set of media, the 
experience of mobility and the exercise of the EU 
citizenship rights contribute significantly to the 
making of this common public space and hence 
eventually to a positive view and a feeling of at-
tachment to the EU. 
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2. EU Citizenship and Intra EU mobility
The real ‘pioneers’ of EU mobility are perhaps the 
post war labour migrants from southern Europe 
(Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece) to northern 
Europe (Germany, France, Belgium, the UK). 
While these migrations have largely stopped in the 
early 1970s after the 1973 oil crisis (and the then 
sending countries experienced return migration 
in the late 1970s and in the 1980s), today we are 
witnessing a whole new set of movements where 
the nationalities of the movers and the directions 
of moving are completely different. While in the 
post war period migration within Europe had a 
South to North axis, since 1989 intra European 
and more recently intra EU migrations follow the 
East to West or East to South direction.
The European Union offers actually a borderless 
space among 27 sovereign states (soon to become 
28 with the accession of Croatia in the summer 
of 2013). This is even more striking in a conti-
nent where for centuries so many wars have been 
fought (and even recently, not forgetting the break 
up of the former Yugoslavia) to defend or move 
state boundaries. European citizenship – which 
has its cornerstone in the right of free movement 
– permits one to reside in any EU Member State, 
enjoying the same entitlements of nationals. This 
constitutes quite a unique regime, which can still 
be qualified as international migration, though it 
operates under the conditions of internal migra-
tion. To stress this novelty semantically, in their 
documents EU institutions tend to designate the 
term ‘mobility’ to any cross-state transfer of Euro-
pean citizens, whereas ‘migration’ is used to refer 
to Third Country Nationals only. 
From its early and timid formulation in 1951 (with 
the Treaty establishing the European Coal and 
Steel Community), the right of visa-free cross-
ing and settlement among EEC (then CE then 
EU) Member States widened its scope as well as 
the pool of potential recipients – from miners and 
steelworkers in the 1950s to all workers after 1968, 
to virtually any EU citizen from the 1990s, and 
even EU long-term residents after 2004 (settle-
ment being still conditioned on either work, study 
or economic self-sufficiency). The legal impact of 
the almost universal expansion of free movement 
and settlement rights in the EU is remarkable, es-
pecially because it entails access to social rights on 
a transnational scale. Hence, it contributes indi-
rectly to the creation of a European welfare sys-
tem, eroding an important area of Member State 
sovereignty, and pushing forward political inte-
gration (Favell and Recchi, 2009). To place this 
into context, free movement across states in the 
US was fully acknowledged as a constitutional 
right only in the 1940s (Giubboni, 2007). 
Thus, in the last half-century the rights of free 
movement and settlement have deepened, but at 
the same time they have also enlarged. This was 
seen most spectacularly in 2004 and 2007, when 
12 new Member States joined the EU. 
In the last five years of the twentieth century, 
net migration into the EU15 amounted to about 
600,000 persons per year – that is, half the amount 
of the US. In the following five years, this figure 
almost doubled. For the first time, immigration 
flows became larger in Europe than in the US (es-
pecially as American immigration policy tight-
ened after 9/11). The peak was reached in 2003, 
when net migration to the EU15 reached two mil-
lion persons (Eurostat, 2009: 54). Such migration 
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flows have been notably asymmetric. In absolute 
number, the highest figures have been recorded in 
Spain, Germany, the UK and Italy. Unprecedent-
edly, in Spain and Ireland (as well as Cyprus and 
Luxemburg, small states experiencing vigorous 
immigration), newcomers have been as numerous 
as 15-20 per thousand residents (Herm, 2008: 2).
To a large extent, this migration boom was fed by 
the 2004 and 2007 enlargements. On average, be-
tween 2004 and 2008 the yearly net increase of im-
migrants in the EU15 amounted to about 250,000 
persons from central Europe (mainly Poland) and 
about 300,000 persons from Southeast Europe 
(mainly Romania) (Brücker et al., 2009: 23, 27). 
At the peak of out-migration from Central-East-
ern Europe, in 2006, three quarters of all new im-
migrants in the EU originated from the 2004 and 
2007 accession countries. 
Interestingly, Eastern enlargement triggered East-
West/South population movements even before 
they took place, as migrants moved West some-
what earlier in anticipation of being automatically 
legalized and ‘upgraded’ once their home country 
joined the EU. For instance, 40 percent of citizens 
from central Europe who requested a work permit 
in the UK in 2004 were already residing there pre-
enlargement (European Commission, 2008: 11). 
Movements were even more rapid and propor-
tionally larger (given the size of the countries of 
origin) immediately preceding and soon after the 
second enlargement. By the end of 2007 the stock 
of registered Romanians and Bulgarians living in 
EU15 had equalled that of movers from the 2004 
enlargement countries: 1.9 million persons. 
Overall, Eurostat calculates that in 2007 the EU27 
Member States hosted 29.1 million foreign citi-
zens of which 10.6 million were intra-EU migrants 
(European Commission, 2008: 115). EU movers 
formed 2.1% of the EU population, and 2.6 % in 
the EU15. About 40 percent were citizens of New 
Member States (NMS), the majority being Roma-
nian (1.6 million), Polish (1.3 million) and Bul-
garian (310,000). This means that an astounding 
7.2% of Romanians, 4.1% of Bulgarians and 3.4% 
of Poles exercise their free movement rights to live 
out of their country as EU citizens. Out-migration 
has been remarkably high in Lithuania and Cy-
prus as well, as over 3% of the working age popu-
lation moved abroad in Europe up to 2007. Even 
these impressive figures grossly underestimate the 
real size of the mobile population, as they do not 
include temporary, seasonal and shuttle migrants 
who move back and forth across home and host(s) 
countries and thus escape any form of statistical 
registration (either in local or national censuses, 
permits of stay, or official surveys). They also fail 
to include returned movers, who have made use 
of their EU citizenship rights in the past (for a dis-
cussion see also Recchi and Triandafyllidou 2010). 
Men and women are equally represented among 
citizens of central European countries who have 
moved, while women constitute slightly larger 
numbers among the Romanian and Bulgarian 
contingent, perhaps because of the strong de-
mand for domestic workers from these countries 
in EU15. Furthermore, it is no surprise that the 
new opportunities of mobility created by EU en-
largements have been seized by the youngest co-
horts of workers. More than three-quarters of the 
NMS citizens who moved in 2007 were under 35 
years of age.
Partly due to their younger age, the proportion of 
university graduates among Central-Eastern Eu-
ropean movers is only slightly below that of native 
workers in EU15. In fact, the share of NMS mov-
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ers with an upper secondary degree is higher than 
among natives in the EU15 workforce. This means 
that the human capital of those who moved West/
South after the enlargements is heavily under-uti-
lized. 
Central-Eastern European workers have found 
work mostly in industry, construction, hotels, res-
taurants, and as domestic care-givers. This places 
them at the bottom of the occupational hierarchy, 
with more than 35% classified by Eurostat as hold-
ing low-skilled manual employment (European 
Commission, 2008: 130). In stark contrast, EU 
mobile workers from Western Europe are over-
represented (compared to natives) among man-
agers (more than 10%), professionals (more than 
25%) and other high prestige occupations (ibid.). 
The large differences of occupational destinations 
of intra-EU movers from the ‘old’ and ‘new’ Eu-
rope have eventually become mirrored in their 
collective representations in the EU15. While they 
are European citizens, public opinion views Poles 
and Romanians as ‘immigrants’, to the point that 
they are sometimes even confounded with third-
country nationals in the press, whereas Germans, 
Britons or Spanish can circulate as ‘mobile Euro-
peans’ with little exposure to discrimination (Rec-
chi and Favell, 2009). 
The individual migration projects of citizens from 
the new Member States are influenced by a num-
ber of factors, most notably economic need (low 
salaries, high unemployment rates, decline of 
specific industrial sectors, deregulation of labour 
markets, implosion of welfare systems), but also 
an overall desire to improve their lives and ensure 
a better future for their children. Qualitative stud-
ies suggest a variety of migration projects, moti-
vations and ways in which migrants make sense 
of their migration experiences (Kassimati, 2003; 
Metz-Goeckel et al., 2008; Lazarescu, 2009; Ma-
roufof, 2009; Nikolova, 2009; Triandafyllidou, 
2006; Favell and Nebe, 2009; Meardi, 2009). Here-
after, we draw on these studies for evidence and 
examples.
While economic motivations remain central for 
most if not all citizens of the new Member States 
who have migrated to EU15, the importance of 
these motivations by comparison to other motiva-
tions such as maintaining or increasing one’s so-
cial or professional status or enjoying a family life 
can vary. Thus we may between two extremes: at 
one pole we find people who moved because they 
could not earn a living in their place of origin, 
while at the other end of the continuum we find 
people who moved to improve their future, buy 
a house, support their children’s education, accu-
mulate capital to start a business, or simply expe-
rience work and life ‘in the West’. Of course, these 
are the two opposite ends of a continuum and real 
biographies and experiences lie somewhere in be-
tween (for more see Recchi and Triandafyllidou 
2010). In addition, there are people who move 
within the EU mainly for reasons of lifestyle, this 
is the case mainly of the ‘sunset migration’ of 
northern Europeans to Italy, Spain, Portugal or 
Greece (King et al. 2000).
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3. Methodology
The data presented in this paper come from an 
ongoing project with title “MOVEACT – We are 
all citizens now! Intra EU Mobility and Political 
Participation of English, Germans, Poles, and Ro-
manians in Western and Southern Europe”1 coor-
dinated by Ettore Recchi and Valentina Bettin. 
The study interrogates a random sample of EU 
movers from four Member States: two new (Po-
land and Romania) and two old (the UK and 
Germany) ones. Their countries of origin – Po-
land, Romania, the UK and Germany – are the 
four Member States that have sent the largest 
number of migrants to other Member States in 
the first decade of the new century (Herm 2008, 
3). The receiving countries studied here are four: 
France, Italy, Spain and Greece. These countries 
present a coherent set for comparison as they 
show a relatively high rate of immigration for the 
four selected nationalities. On one hand, the four 
countries are the privileged destination for Brit-
ish and German expatriates within the EU. On the 
1. For more information you can visit the project’s website at: http://www.moveact.eu
other, Spain and Italy have been and still are the 
favoured destination of intra-EU flows of Roma-
nians, while Greece and France have been host-
ing a sizeable Romanian community even from 
before accession; all the target countries have re-
ceived increasing numbers of Polish movers over 
the decade (second only to the UK, Ireland and 
Germany) (Triandafyllidou 2006; Recchi and Tri-
andafyllidou 2010). 
In each target country, we sampled and phone-
interviewed 500 EU movers – that is, 125 per 
nationality. Overall, we have a 2,000 interviews 
dataset, collected between December 2011 and 
March 2012. A few words on the sample are in 
order. Since EU movers form a highly selected 
population, we carried out ‘onomastic sampling’ 
out of landline telephone directories, following 
the successful strategy described in Braun and 
Santacreu (2009). We are aware of the spread of 
mobile phones in recent years – especially among 
migrants, that often stuck to mobile phones only. 
However, our research interest lies with ‘settled 
movers’ – i.e., movers that have long-term resi-
dent histories or plans of settlement. This is our 
reference population. After all, we cannot expect 
social and political participation in the host local-
ities from ‘temporary’ or ‘volatile’ movers – such 
as Erasmus students. Thus, we took registration 
in phone line directories as a proxy of long-term 
settlement.
In parallel, we explored – mainly via internet 
search and consulate lists – the universe of mi-
grants’ associations in Italy, France, Spain and 
Greece to map out organisations and groups (also 
in the cyberspace) formed by EU movers. After 
drawing a first map, we contacted all of them ei-
ther by email or by phone. We were thus able to get 
additional information – crucially, whether that 
specific group was still in existence, as we soon 
discovered that the majority of these associations 
are short-lived but leave their footprint in the in-
ternet even long after their disappearance. At last, 
we came out with a directory of 194 organisations 
formed by EU movers of the four nationalities in 
the four countries. A detailed analysis of this sepa-
rate dataset is provided in chapter 6 of this report.
Finally, we used the association survey also to 
select 48 politically active movers (12 per coun-
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try) from the different nationalities at stake, with 
whom we carried out in-depth interviews about 
their own experience of activism and their in-
terpretation of patterns of political participation 
among co-national movers. Some of these are 
leaders of the surveyed associations, while others 
were named as prominent figures in local or na-
tional politics of the host country. We have used 
parts of the transcripts of these interviews to elu-
cidate some of the statistical findings of the phone 
survey (the full transcripts are in a separate an-
nex).
4. Do Mobile EU Citizens Feel more European 
than Others?
The main research question of this paper is 
whether instead of citizenship emanating from 
an attachment to the nation or in the case of EU 
citizenship from an attachment to the European 
Union as a territorial entity and political com-
munity and to Europe as a general cultural com-
munity, the opposite is the case. Thus, EU citizen-
ship emerges as a practice, through the exercise 
of the right to free mobility within the EU, and 
through this experience develops into a feeling of 
stronger attachment and generates more positive 
feelings towards Europe and the EU, than what is 
the case for the average non-mobile EU citizen. 
In our analysis we first discuss the prerequisite 
for exercising one’s right notably knowing about 
them. Second, we investigate what is the meaning 
of EU citizenship for our respondents and their 
more positive or negative view of Europe and the 
EU. In the analysis we systematically compare 
with citizens of the same countries who are still in 
those countries or with natives of the host mem-
ber state with a view to understanding how intra 
EU migrants views and feelings towards the EU 
are different from those of ‘stayers’. Third we con-
sider how much our respondents feel attached to 
their nation, locality and/or to Europe and the EU. 
We thus seek to understand the meaning of EU 
citizenship also in relation to feelings of belonging 
at the national or sub-national level.
4.1 Knowing about one’s rights
Knowledge of European citizenship rights is 
linked to several demographic factors such as age, 
educational level and nationality of the respon-
dent as well as to factors pertinent to the respon-
dent’s migration experience, such as the period of 
migration, the knowledge of the language of the 
country of residence or having a partner of differ-
ent nationality. 
Four out of ten EU movers in our sample state that 
they have poor knowledge of their rights as EU 
citizens. With regard to the respondents educa-
tional level university graduates tend to be better 
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informed. Interestingly enough, those how have 
migrated before 1989, and hence before the emer-
gence of EU citizenship, appear to be more aware 
of their EU citizenship rights (Table 1).There are 
a number of factors that can account for this as 
the majority of the respondents who migrated 
before 1989 come from Germany (43.9%) and 
the UK (29.3%),they belong to the highest social 
classes2 (65%) and they are, in their vast majority 
(97.1%)3, over 40 years old which means that they 
had already migrated and were adults at the time 
of the Maastricht Treaty (1992) and thus were 
likely to keep track of all the developments that 
concerned them.
2. Based on their profession.
3. 35.2% belongs in the 40 to 59 age group and 61.9% in the over 60 age group. 
Table 1. 
Knowledge of EU citizenship rights  (%)
Poor Mediocre High
By Gender
Men 38.6 28.8 32.6
Women 40.6 31.3 28.1
By Age Group
39 and less 39.3 36.0 24.7
40 thru 59 37.8 31.6 30.5
60 and more 42.9 23.2 33.9
By Migration Period 
1989 and before 35.2 26.0 38.9
1990 thru 2003 39.7 33.1 27.2
2004 and after 46.4 28.2 25.4
By Education Level
University 28.3 27.4 44.3
Lower 48.1 31.6 20.4
By Nationality
United Kingdom 49.2 21.2 29.6
Germany 31.7 28.8 39.5
Poland 41.4 35.7 22.9
Romania 39.9 33.7 26.4
By Country of Residence
Greece 51.7 27.0 21.3
France 36.4 32.7 30.9
Italy 36.4 26.4 37.2
Spain 38.0 33.0 29.0
Total 40.6 29.8 29.6
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German citizens’ awareness over EU citizenship 
is significantly higher than that of other nation-
alities in this sample. As explained by a German 
interviewee residing in Spain: 
I was reported from the Spanish consulate 
and from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 
Germany. Even Lufthansa offers business 
information brochures in the destination 
country.’(Int.1.S.G: German man residing in 
Spain involved in local politics)
Knowledge of rights is particularly low in the case 
of Greece with half of our respondents admitting 
that they have poor knowledge of their rights. Our 
interviews suggest that in the case of Greece there 
has been little or no effort to disseminate infor-
mation on EU citizenship to EU movers, while at 
the same time even public services are poorly in-
formed as to which countries belong to the EU, yet 
this problem appears in other countries as well. As 
a German interviewee residing in Spain describes:
The public administration does not provide 
good and comprehensive information in 
general, neither to his citizens nor to the 
European movers (Int.3.S.G: German man 
residing in Spain active in the field of trade 
unions and NGOs) 
However, some of our interviewees have pointed 
out that the information is available as long as one 
takes the initiative to look for it him/herself, thus 
it is the lack of interest that generates the lack of 
awareness over EU citizenship rights. As a Roma-
nian interviewee living in France notes:
You have to ask for the information, you 
have to be interested to get the information. 
On the Internet you can find every infor-
mation you need (….)I think it’s a personal 
matter, you have to be interested to find in-
formation. (Int.3.F.R: Romanian residing in 
France involved in a Romanian association)
In addition many interviewees have pointed out 
that access to information has been improving 
over the years:
In my experience, and in light of the research 
that I’ve done, awareness and understand-
ing of the rights and opportunities that arise 
from being a European citizen are growing 
and progressing in recent years. More and 
more people are conscious and aware of 
what they’re able to do and what they can 
request, as well as what they must do and re-
quest when living in one of the EU countries. 
(Int.3.I.P: Polish woman residing in Italy, 
social activist)
Finally, a Polish interviewee residing in France 
draws attention to the fact that the current eco-
nomic and Eurozone crisis has had negative ef-
fects on the efforts for raising awareness on Euro-
pean citizenship rights which affects mainly those 
who do not have the means and the skills to edu-
cate themselves: 
There are two categories of European citi-
zens: young ones who will find everything 
on the websites and people who don’t use 
Internet and for whom the information is 
much more difficult to get. Everything de-
mands money, and now we have crisis. Who 
thinks about informing people about their 
rights, we think how to come out of crisis. 
(Int. 3.F.P.: Polish woman residing in France, 
director of a European organisation)
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Table 2
The Image of Europe
A very positive 
image
A fairly positive 
image A neutral image
A fairly negative 
image
A very negative 
image
MOVEACT Survey
By Nationality
United Kingdom 12.2% 35.1% 25.3% 14.9% 12.4%
Germany 20.2% 40.2% 22.7% 12.0% 4.9%
Poland 16.2% 32.4% 38.0% 11.2% 2.1%
Romania 17.7% 35.4% 24.6% 13.9% 8.4%
By Country
Greece 14.3% 29.6% 31.1% 14.3% 10.9%
France 16.7% 48.2% 21.0% 10.5% 3.6%
Italy 14.9% 39.5% 28.8% 12.9% 3.9%
Spain 20.4% 25.0% 30.0% 14.5% 10.1%
Total 16.6% 35.8% 27.6% 13.0% 7.0%
Eurobarometer*
United Kingdom 1% 12% 35% 30% 19%
Germany 3% 27% 44% 20% 5%
Poland 5% 37% 47% 8% 1%
Romania 4% 45% 38% 8% 1%
Greece 2% 26% 35% 24% 13%
France 2% 30% 40% 20% 6%
Italy 5% 37% 35% 16% 5%
Spain 2% 24% 51% 19% 3%
EU 27 3% 28% 41% 20% 6%
*. Data from Eurobarometer 2011
4.2 The meaning of EU 
citizenship for mobile EU 
citizens
The assumption that intra-EU mobility, and the 
interaction between citizens of different member 
states it involves, leads to sense of shared commu-
nity has been behind the establishment of several 
EU funded exchange programs. The actual out-
come of these programs is hardly self-evident4, yet 
such initiatives are still considered very impor-
tant. For instance, a British interviewee residing 
in Italy pointed out that:
The projects for mobility are very impor-
tant. They now find themselves somewhat 
underattack, since they were conceptualized 
as forms of cultural tourism that, in times 
of crisis, can be cut. As anexample, I’ll cite 
the Erasmus university program; its number 
one importance, ahead of exams and results, 
isthe affections and the true mobility that it 
generates. Many, after having gone through 
an experience ofmobility, continue to live 
4. See, for instance, Sigalas, 2010. 
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in another European country, or at the very 
least, feel like European citizens. (Int.2.I.B. 
British man, residing in Italy, involved in lo-
cal politics)
According to the most recent standard Euroba-
rometer (2011: 20) data, whose fieldwork was 
conducted at the same time as our phone survey, 
only 31% of EU’s citizens have a (very or fairly) 
positive image of the EU. On the contrary Europe 
does conjure up a positive image for the major-
ity of our sample (52%) (Table 2).This should not 
come as a surprise, since intra-EU migrants are 
the ones actually enjoying what has been identi-
fied as EU’s most significant feature, namely free 
movement.
A closer look at the data may offer us more in-
sight on how the mobility experience shapes one’s 
image of Europe.  The length of membership of 
a state to the EU and the EC does not necessar-
ily make its citizens feel more European or have 
a more positive view of the EU. The positive or 
negative image of Europe is linked to history and 
geopolitics (EURONAT, 2005; af Malmborg and 
Strath 2001). This becomes apparent when com-
paring the Eurobarometre rates of two of the 
Union’s early member states, German and Britain, 
or when comparing Britain to Romania or Poland. 
However, what is striking is that in the case of the 
‘old member state’ migrants the mobility experi-
ence appears to have increased their positive views 
vastly while negative opinions have decreased.
The rates of positive views of the ‘new member 
state’ movers on the other hand appear to be on 
the same level as those in their country of origin 
while negative views among the movers are more 
frequent than in the country of origin. Perhaps 
this could be linked to failed expectations with re-
gards to changes of their mobility experience after 
their counties accession to the EU. As described 
by a Romanian interviewee living in Greece:
For me it’s just a coincidence that we are 
Europeans. But today I do not know if it 
means something good. We waited so long 
to become a member; I am talking about 
the EU. For the freedom to travel, to work in 
the EU and there is really nothing. On the 
contrary, you have much more to lose (...)
Because you believe that you have equal 
rights with them but you don’t have ac-
cess anywhere; they only see you as a la-
bor force and only in certain jobs. You’re 
limited even if theoretically you have 
equal rights.(Int. 3.G.R: Romanian woman 
residing in Greece, head of a Romanian as-
sociation, emphasis added)
Free movement is indisputably one of EU’s most 
important attributes, yet considering free move-
ment as the most important feature of the EU is 
inversely related to the respondent’s attachment to 
the EU; Only half of those claiming to be very at-
tached to the EU regard free movement as the EU’s 
most important feature while the corresponding 
rates for those not very attached and not attached 
to the EU exceed 60 percent. 
Similar patterns appear with reference to the re-
spondents’ nationality and country of residence: 
nationalities with higher rates of attachment to 
the EU present lower rates of regarding the EU 
as free movement and vice versa (see also Table 4 
below, emphasis added). This finding shows that 
free movement is probably associated with an in-
strumental view of the EU and EU citizenship.
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Table 3
Most important feature of the EU
Free movement 
rights across 
member states
A common 
currency
Common laws 
and democratic 
institutions
A common 
Christian heritage Other
Gender
Men 59.1 13.7 20.6 5.9 0.7
Women 57.5 13.6 24.5 3.5 0.9
Age Group
39 and less 64.3 12.8 20.1 2.4 0.4
40 thru 59 60.4 10.9 24.5 3.4 0.7
60 and more 49.1 18.4 23.2 8.1 1.2
Migration Period
1989 and before 47.2 18.2 26.5 7.9 0.2
1990 thru 2003 62.5 12.3 21.2 2.9 1.2
2004 and after 60.9 12.0 22.2 4.1 0.9
Education Level
University 52.6 12.5 28.9 5.3 0.7
Lower 61.9 14.1 19.1 4.0 1.0
Nationality
United Kingdom 56.8 17.1 17.9 5.9 2.3
Germany 47.4 18.8 29.1 4.1 0.6
Poland 59.0 8.3 27.7 5.0 0.0
Romania 69.3 10.5 16.7 3.1 0.4
Country of Residence
Greece 67.5 9.0 18.4 4.0 1.0
France 50.0 13.8 29.8 6.5 0.0
Italy 58.9 16.1 21.7 3.1 0.2
Spain 56.6 15.7 21.2 4.4 2.1
Total 58.2 13.6 22.8 4.5 0.8
Although the creation of a common space for 
movement is valued highly by most respondents, 
there are also those who are more interested in 
the EU as a political and economic community. 
Based on the above trends, as well as our qualita-
tive findings, while free movement is considered 
as the EU’s most important feature by all cat-
egories of intra-EU movers, those with a higher 
educational level and those who have migrated in 
an earlier period (namely before 1989)  are more 
likely to regard the EU as a community sharing a 
set of democratic values such as equal rights and 
mutual respect.
The results of our study here show a dramatic 
move away from the Euro, as an important fea-
ture of EU citizenship and of the EU integration 
process, if compared with findings from about 10 
years ago when the common currency was intro-
duced. Indeed the results of a quantitative survey 
run through the Eurobarometre for the Euronat 
project study (see Euronat 2005) had found that 
the right to free movement and the common cur-
rency were overwhelmingly the most important 
features of EU citizenship. Our findings suggest 
that while free movement remains a quintessen-
tial element of EU citizenship by far more impor-
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tant than any other aspect, democratic values get 
a second position with the Euro being ranked a 
distant third. Unsurprisingly the Euro is less im-
portant in the countries hit harder by the current 
economic crisis. 
Also democratic values are ranked more impor-
tant by respondents from the old EU countries. 
This comes as no surprise as ‘old’ intra EU movers 
have moved for quality of life or family reasons 
rather than purely for reasons of employment and 
better life and work opportunities, as happened 
for migrants from the ‘new’ member states. 
The image of the European Union and the attach-
ment to it appear to be directly linked: 71.4% of 
the respondents who claim to be attached to the 
EU say that they have a positive image of the 
Union while only 18% of those who are not at-
tached share the same view. There is clearly a rela-
tion between the image of the EU as well as their 
attachment to it and their knowledge of EU citi-
zenship rights which could imply either that the 
higher awareness of EU citizenship rights leads to 
a more positive view of the EU and a higher sense 
of attachment or that those having a positive view 
and feeling more attached tend to stay more in-
formed. 
Table 4
Positive image of the EU Attached to the EU
No Yes No Yes
Age Group
39 and less 50.8 49.2 50.8 49.2
40 thru 59 48.0 52.0 48.0 52.0
60 and more 44.4 55.6 44.4 55.6
Education Level
University 38.3 61.7 23.8 76.2
Lower 54.0 46.0 39.7 60.3
Nationality
United Kingdom 52.6 47.4 45.8 54.2
Germany 39.6 60.4 22.8 77.2
Poland 51.4 48.6 20.9 79.1
Romania 46.9 53.1 44.6 55.4
Country
Greece 56.2 43.8 47.9 52.1
France 35.1 64.9 24.2 75.8
Italy 45.6 54.4 30.2 69.8
Spain 54.6 45.4 32.1 67.9
Total 47.7 52.3 33.4 66.6
Another factor that seems to influence one’s view 
of the European Union is the nationality of their 
partner as our respondents in an inter-ethnic 
partnership have, in their vast majority, a very or 
fairly positive image of the EU.5 Finally, the level 
5. 60.1% of those in an interethnic partnership ex�press positive views of the EU, the corresponding percentage for those in a non�interethnic partner�ship is merely 35.6%. 
of knowledge of the host country’s language also 
influences our respondents attachment to the EU 
and their image of the EU.
More than half of our respondents adopt a geo-
graphical definition of Europe and do not identify 
it with the EU while at the same time claim to have 
a positive image of the EU. The EU’s positive im-
age rates are higher in France than in Italy, Spain 
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and Greece. However, several interviewees have 
expressed their disappointment at the way the EU 
has dealt with the current economic crisis exac-
erbating inequalities between the member states 
and paying less attention to democracy and soli-
darity, the ideals on which the EU was launched 
as a political and not only economic Union in the 
1990s. 
As a German interviewee residing in Italy serv-
ing as an Assessor for the Municipality of a small 
town eloquently puts it: 
When I was in high school in Germany, they 
began speaking of Europe, united, without 
borders, and it was a wonderful idea. But we 
still have a long way to go to get there. What 
is lacking is a shared frame of mind for all of 
the countries. Each country thinks individu-
ally and Europe cannot function without a 
real European government. The Euro -the 
economic union- isn’t enough to keep all 
the countries together. We need something 
else.’(Int.1.I.G: German woman residing in 
Italy, political activist)
The negative stereotyping among the member 
states6 as well as the rise of xenophobia, both en-
hanced by the current economic crisis, certainly 
pose a giant step back to the feeling of common 
belonging between Europeans. As described by 
the head of a Romanian association in Spain: 
To be European is freedom to travel, of 
speech. It is the possibility to collaborate 
among different countries. To help each oth-
er. In this moment, with the crisis, is more 
difficult. We are all European, but many 
think “This Romanian is occupying our 
jobs”. There is an increase of xenophobia. 
People doesn´t care if we belong to the Euro-
pean Union. In this moment the meaning of 
being European and the reality doesn´t fit. 
(Int.3.S.R. Romanian man residing in Spain, 
head of a Romanian association)
6. For instance see: Shore, 2012. 
4.3 Feeling European and 
national identity
European identity is not antagonistic to national 
identities; European citizens regard their nation-
al identities and cultures as powerful enough to 
withstand the pressures of European integration 
(Triandafyllidou, 2005). Feeling European does 
not make one less British, German, Romanian or 
Polish. In fact, ‘Europe has been part of many na-
tional identities’ (Delanty and Rumford, 2005: 92).
Kohli (2000) speaks of a hybridization of identity: 
‘Europe as a post-national entity may offer a focus 
for contradictory attachments. European identity 
may be part of an identity mix linking it with na-
tional (and possibly other territorial) identities; or 
it may be part of a specifically hybrid pattern where 
contradictions remain virulent and situational 
switches occur.’ (Kohli, 2000: 131). According to 
the author, populations with more blurry territo-
rial attachments7 are more likely to be carriers of 
such hybrid identities. 
7.  Including international migrants and those in inter�ethnic marriages.   
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According to Fligstein, Polyakova and Sandholtz 
(2012:118), we can distinguish two groups of Eu-
ropeans. The first one is more attached to national 
identity, but may be open to a ‘Christian and “his-
torical” European identity’. This group has had 
limited interaction with citizens of other member 
states, belongs to lower social strata and educa-
tional levels, it includes the elderly –who ‘still re-
member World War II and its aftermath’-, and the 
right wing that considers European identity and 
immigration as a threat to the nation. The other 
group, which, at least in part, has embraced the 
European identity, includes people of higher so-
cial status and education. Our findings on mobile 
EU citizens are in line with the above categorisa-
tion: attachment to the European Union is higher 
among the respondents belonging to higher social 
classes and to the political ‘left’ and ‘centre’ and 
those having a higher educational level. 
Seeking to understand how European and na-
tional identity are related (if at all) and what is the 
meaning attributed to each, we have asked our re-
spondents to express their understanding of what 
citizenship is more generally, namely if they relate 
it more to ethnic or civic elements.
Table 5
The rates of our respondents in favour of an ethnic 
citizenship appear to exceed the rates of those in 
favour a civic one (Table 5). However, the higher 
the educational level, the larger the scepticism 
over both types of citizenship. What comes as a 
surprise is that an important segment of our re-
spondents disagrees with both types of citizen-
ship: 58% of those who do not endorse strictly 
civic interpretation of citizenship also disagree 
with a strictly ethnic one. 
Looking at patterns of identification at different 
levels (city, region, country, Europe), the major-
ity of our respondents (about 80%) either express 
a strong preference for their city and country of 
residence in relation to their city and country of 
origin or remain neutral between the two (Table 
7). Similarly, our respondents either remain neu-
tral or show a strong preference towards their 
country of residence and of origin in relation to 
the EU (Table 6). However, local, national and 
European attachments are not contending each 
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other, in fact, as shown by the EURONAT project 
‘a European level of identity is included in citizens’ 
national identities’ (Triandafyllidou, 2005: 10).
Yet negative views on both the country of resi-
dence and the country of origin are higher among 
movers from the ‘new’ member states which can 
be attributed to the difficult socio-economic con-
ditions that a large part of the population in the 
new member states is still facing 20 years after the 
socio economic and political transition, to their 
migration trajectories (as economic migrants, 
who often emigrated initially as undocumented 
non EU migrants and later ‘regularised’ through 
their country’s entry to the EU) and also because 
of negative public perceptions of them in their 
country of residence. These findings are in line 
with what we have highlighted above, notably that 
many of our Polish and Romanian interviewees 
note that they face important obstacles and do not 
fully enjoy their rights as EU citizens.
Table 6
Table 7
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5. Concluding remarks
This paper presents new data on how intra EU mi-
gration influences the meaning of EU citizenship, 
the positive or negative image of the EU, and the 
feeling of attachment to it. The data presented and 
analysed are both of a quantitative and qualita-
tive nature and hence allow not only for assessing 
what is the impact of intra EU migration (or else 
called intra EU mobility) but also for illustrating 
and explaining our findings on the basis of quali-
tative interview data.
Our main research question that EU citizenship 
can be strengthened by the reality of intra EU 
migration rather than by a pre-existing common 
political European identity is partly confirmed. In 
principle this is the case indeed. Thus people who 
are intra EU migrants have a more positive view of 
the EU and feel more attached to it than their non 
migrant fellow nationals. However this is the case 
when their overall intra EU migration experience 
has been positive and/or at least their EU citizen-
ship rights have not been overtly violated. Thus 
old member state citizens and people who have 
migrated to another member state earl on  tend 
to confirm our hypothesis. By contrast citizens of 
the new member states and people who have mi-
grated recently tend to have equally positive views 
as their fellow nationals in the country of origin 
and actually more negative views than their fel-
low nationals in the country of origin. As if to say 
the intra EU migration experience has polarized 
them and has actually led many to develop a nega-
tive image of the EU. This is not surprising as new 
member state citizens are mainly economic mi-
grants, at least more often than their old member 
state counterparts who moved largely for quality 
of life, study or family reasons. 
Interestingly those that feel attached or strongly 
attached to the EU and Europe consider the right 
to free movement as a less important feature of 
EU Citizenship and rather emphasise the com-
mon values and the sense of a political commu-
nity. People who feel more attached to the EU and 
who have a more positive image of the EU and 
Europe also tend to know more about their EU 
citizenship rights. It is however unclear what is the 
direction of the causal relation. Is it because they 
know more that they develop a more positive im-
age and a stronger feeling of attachment or is it be-
cause they have a stronger level of attachment and 
a more positive view that they seek for more infor-
mation and have more knowledge. Indeed clari-
fying this point is important for our argument as 
the former view would support a development of 
a positive EU feeling and a stronger attachment 
through political socialization. In other words in-
tra EU migrants need by definition to learn more 
about their EU citizenship rights and duties be-
cause these are pertinent for their everyday lives. 
Thus they are expected to seek for this informa-
tion and acquire this knowledge more than their 
fellow nationals who have not moved within the 
EU. This would then lead to a more positive atti-
tude towards the EU and a virtuous circle of creat-
ing a common political community.
Our study surprisingly  shows that intra EU mo-
bility generates a strong preference for the city and 
country of residence. Indeed, the majority of our 
respondents (about 80%) either express a strong 
preference for their city and country of residence 
in relation to their city and country of origin or 
remain neutral between the two. Similarly, our re-
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spondents either remain neutral or show a strong 
preference towards their country of residence and 
of origin in relation to the EU. This shows that the 
EU is far from creating a common political iden-
tity that would replace national or even local iden-
tities. At the same time this finding also suggests 
that local, national and European attachments are 
not contending each other, in fact, as shown by 
the EURONAT project several years ago a Euro-
pean level of identity is included in citizens’ na-
tional identities.
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Our contribution assesses the impact of the cri-
sis on citizens’ trust in national and European 
governmental institutions. More concretely, we 
examine trust in the national government (NG), 
national parliament (NP), the European Com-
mission (EC) and the European Parliament (EP). 
We analyse an EU-27 country sample over the 
time frame 1999–2012 with a particular focus on 
12 member states of the euro area (Austria, Bel-
gium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and 
Spain – the EA-12). We identify the events associ-
ated with the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in 
September 2008 as the start of the crisis and dif-
ferentiate a pre-crisis period (spring 1999–spring 
2008) from a crisis period (autumn 2008–spring 
2012). 
1. Measuring trust in the national and 
European governmental institutions
We construct our measure of trust in the national 
and European governmental institutions from re-
sponses to the Eurobarometer (EB) surveys car-
ried out bi-annually from spring 1999 (EB 51) 
to spring 2012 (EB 77).1 To measure trust in the 
national and European governmental institutions, 
the survey put this question to respondents: “I 
would like to ask you a question about how much 
trust you have in certain institutions. For each of 
the following institutions, please tell me if you 
tend to trust it or tend not to trust it.”2 The respon-
dents were then presented a range of institutions, 
among which were the national government, na-
tional parliament, the European Commission and 
European Parliament. The respondent could then 
choose from the following answers: “tend to trust”, 
“tend not to trust” and “don’t know”. We analyse 
1.  Our methodological approach is presented in Roth et al. (2013). The data sources used to generate the data from EB 51 to EB 77 are also shown.
2.  A slightly different question is used for the Euro�pean institutions. See here Roth et al. (2013). 
the percentage of net trust measured as the num-
ber of “tend to trust” responses minus the “tend 
not to trust” responses. 
Trust in the national government 
and European Commission in the EU-
15/27 
Figure 1 shows citizens’ net trust in the NG and 
the EC in an EU-15/27 country sample from 1999 
to 2012.3 First, a steady and marked decline in 
trust in the EC of -29/-28 percentage points in 
the EU-15/27 throughout the crisis period can be 
detected. In comparison, a decline in trust of the 
NG by -8 percentage points in the EU-15/27 can 
be considered moderate. Second, when compar-
ing the mean levels of the pre-crisis period with 
the crisis period in the EU-15, the decline of trust 
in the EC was steeper, at 17 percentage points, 
than trust in the NG at 11 percentage points. 
3.  All single time trends are depicted in Figures A1 and A3 in the appendix.
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Third, levels of trust in the EC still remained well 
above those in the NG over the whole time frame. 
Fourth, as there were no pronounced differences 
in standard deviations in the pre-crisis or crisis 
periods for either trust trends (3.2 and -1 percent-
age points), we conclude that both trends followed 
their long-term paths amid the crisis. 
Figure 1. Trust in the national government and European Commission in the EU-15/27 (1999–2012)
Notes: Modified version of Figure 1 in Roth et al (2013). NG = national government, EC = European Commission. Values are 
population weighted for the respective country samples. In Jan./Feb. 2009, the special Standard EB 71.1 was utilised. As the sur-
vey item concerning trust in the NG was not included in Standard EBs 52, 53, 54 or 58, the data for these four observation points 
respectively are missing. The dashed line represents the start of the crisis in September 2008 and differentiates the pre-crisis and 
crisis periods. From autumn 2004 to autumn 2006, the EU-27 country sample consists of EU-25 countries excluding Romania 
and Bulgaria. From spring 2007 onwards, Romania and Bulgaria are included. As the figure depicts net trust, all values above 
0 indicate trust by a majority of the respondents and all values below 0 a lack of trust by the majority. 
Sources: Standard EBs 51-77 and Special EB 71.1.
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Trust in the national parliament 
and European Parliament in the EU-
15/27 
Figure 2 shows citizens’ net trust in the NP and 
the EP in an EU-15/27 country sample from 
1999 to 2012.4 A steady and pronounced decline 
of trust in the EP of -31/-29 percentage points in 
the EU-15/27 throughout the crisis period can be 
seen. In comparison, decreasing trust in the NP 
of -14/-12 percentage points in the EU-15/27 was 
less strong but still notable. When comparing the 
mean levels of the pre-crisis period with the crisis 
period in the EU-15, the fall in trust in the EP was 
sharper, at 21 percentage points, than trust in the 
NP at 15 percentage points. Yet levels of trust in 
the EP remained well above those in the NP over 
the whole time frame. Finally, as there were no 
pronounced differences in standard deviations in 
the pre-crisis or crisis periods in either trust trends 
(2.4 and -1.6 percentage points), we conclude that 
both trends followed their long-term paths amid 
the crisis. 
4.  All single time trends are depicted in Figures A2 and A4 in the appendix.
Figure 2. Trust in the national parliament and European Parliament in the EU-15/27 (1999–2012)
Notes: Modified version of Figure 2 in Roth et al (2013). NP = national parliament, EP = European Parliament. Values are 
population weighted for the respective country samples. In Jan./Feb. 2009 the special Standard EB 71.1 was utilised. As the sur-
vey item concerning trust in the NP was not included in Standard EBs 52, 53 or 58, the data for these three observation points 
respectively are missing. The dashed line represents the start of the crisis in September 2008 and differentiates the pre-crisis and 
crisis periods. From autumn 2004 to autumn 2006, the EU-27 country sample consists of EU-25 countries excluding Romania 
and Bulgaria. From spring 2007 onwards Romania and Bulgaria are included. As the figure depicts net trust, all values above 0 
indicate trust by a majority of the respondents and all values below 0 a lack of trust by the majority. 
Sources: Standard EBs 51-77 and Special EB 71.1.
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Trust in the EA-12, comparing the 
core and its periphery, EA-4 and 
EA-8 
Table 1 depicts the values for the changes in net 
trust from spring 2008 to spring 2012 for the EU-
15/27 and EA-12 country samples. As can be ob-
served, all three samples follow the same pattern. 
Trust in the EC and EP declined significantly by 
around 30 percentage points, while trust in the 
NG and NP declined by around 10 and 15 per-
centage points, respectively. Taking this similar 
pattern into consideration, it seems sound to con-
clude that countries in the EA-12 country sample 
appear to be determining the overall trend.5 
5.  As the trends shown are population weighted, this conclusion is not too surprising given that the EA�
12 countries comprise more than three-fifths (ap�
proximately 323 of 504 million citizens) of the over�all population of the EU�27. In addition, the three EU�15 and non�EA�12 countries – namely Denmark, 
Sweden and the UK – only experienced moderate declines in trust (see also appendix Figures A1�A4). Trust in the NG and NP actually increased in Swe�den.
Table 1. Net trust levels and changes in net trust in the EA-12, EU-15 and EU-27 (2008–12)
Country Trust Levels Spring 2008 Levels Spring 2012 Changes Spring 2012–Spring 2008
EA-12 NG/NP -25/-16 -34/-31 -9/-15
EU-15 NG/NP -28/-17 -36/-31 -8/-14
EU-27 NG/NP -31/-25 -39/-37 -8/-12
EA-12 EC/EP 21/27 -11/-7 -32/-34
EU-15 EC/EP 14/19 -15/-12 -29/-31
EU-27 EC/EP 19/23 -9/-6 -28/-29
Notes: Modified version of Table 1 in Roth et al (2013). EA = euro area, NG = national government, NP = national parliament, 
EC = European Commission, EP = European Parliament. Values are population weighted for the respective country samples. As 
the table presents data on net trust, all values above 0 indicate trust by a majority of the respondents and all values below 0 a 
lack of trust by the majority. The periods still reflecting trust by a majority of citizens are shaded in grey. 
Sources: Standard EBs 69 and 77.
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With the presumptions that countries from the 
EA-12 might be responsible for the trust trends in 
the EU-15/27 sample, Table 2 shows the values for 
the changes in net trust for selected countries in 
the EA-12 (namely Spain, Greece, Portugal, Ire-
land, Italy, Germany and France) along with a pe-
riphery country sample, the EA-4 (Spain, Greece, 
Portugal and Ireland) and a core country sample, 
the EA-8 (Germany, France, Italy, Austria, Finland, 
Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg). Af-
ter differentiating the trends of the EA-8 and EA-4 
countries, the most interesting patterns appear. 
Table 2. Net trust levels and changes in net trust in the EA-8 and EA-4 and across selected EA-12 countries (2008–12)
Country Trust Levels Spring 2008 Levels Spring 2012 Changes Spring 2012–Spring 2008
EA-8 NG/NP -33/-23 -24/-20 9/3
EA-4 NG/NP 3/10 -70/-68 -73/-78
Spain NG/NP 20/20 -70/-71 -90/-91
Greece NG/NP -31/-2 -85/-74 -54/-72
Portugal NG/NP -29/-15 -62/-55 -33/-40
Ireland NG/NP -14/-3 -46/-45 -32/-42
Italy NG/NP -59/-57 -68/-76 -9/-19
Germany NG/NP -25/-15 -17/-3 8/12
France NG/NP -38/-21 -4/-5 34/16
EA-8 EC/EP 16/22 -4/0 -20/-22
EA-4 EC/EP 38/37 -36/-29 -74/-66
Spain EC/EP 42/46 -38/-37 -80/-83
Greece EC/EP 13/21 -56/-43 -69/-64
Portugal EC/EP 42/46 -15/-12 -57/-58
Ireland EC/EP 43/51 -10/-10 -53/-61
Italy EC/EP 29/29 -16/-14 -45/-43
Germany EC/EP 6/18 -9/1 -15/-17
France EC/EP 11/19 5/6 -6/-13
Notes: Modified version of Table 2 in Roth et al (2013).  EA = euro area, NG = national government, NP = national parlia-
ment, EC = European Commission, EP = European Parliament. The EA-8 and EA-4 country samples are population weighted. 
Pronounced differences between the EA-8 and EA-4, as well as the minimum and maximum values are shaded. Darker shading 
represents maximum values. Lighter shading represents minimum values. As the table presents data on net trust, all values above 
0 indicate trust by a majority of the respondents and all values below 0 a lack of trust by the majority. 
Sources: Standard EBs 69 and 77. 
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First, whereas in the EA-8 trust in the NG/NP 
actually increased by 9/3 percentage points re-
spectively, in the EA-4 trust declined by -73/-78 
percentage points. In the EA-8 country sample, 
this positive trend was driven by the two large 
economies, Germany and France, which enjoyed 
increases of 8/12 and 34/16 percentage points, 
respectively. Although the levels of trust in Italy 
were significantly lower than those in Germany 
and France, falls of -9/-19 percentage points were 
moderate compared with the decreases in the EA-
4.6 In the EA-4, the pronounced declines were 
driven by Spain, where trust in the NG/NP fell 
by -90/-91 percentage points respectively (from 
20/20 to -70/-71%).7 In Greece, Portugal and Ire-
6.  Although Italy’s decline in trust in the NP was mod�erate, its level of �76% in spring 2012 was the lowest in the EU�15/EA�12 over the 13�year period covered. 
In spring 2012, only 8% of Italian citizens still trust�ed the NP. 
7.  This was the most pronounced decline in the EU�15/EA�12. In spring 2012, only 13% of Spanish citi�
zens still trusted the NG and 11% the NP. As can be seen from Figures A1 and A2, however, new euro�
zone member Cyprus (from 2008 onwards) encoun�tered even steeper declines of 101% and 98% in the NG and NP. 
land, trust in the NG/NP fell by -54/-72, -33/-40 
and -32/-42 percentage points.8 
Second, while in the EA-8 trust in the EC/EP de-
clined significantly, by -20/-22 percentage points, 
in the EA-4 the fall of -74/-66 percentage points 
was similar to the fall in trust of the NG/NP. The 
decrease in the EA-8 countries was driven by 
moderate declines in Germany and France and 
more pronounced ones in Italy. The substantial 
decline in the EA-4 countries was driven by Spain, 
where trust in the EC/EP fell by -80/-83 percent-
age points.9 In Greece, Portugal and Ireland, trust 
in the EC/EP declined by -69/-64, -57/-58 and 
-53/-61 percentage points, respectively. 10
8.  With a level of �85% in spring 2012, trust in the NG in Greece reached the lowest level in the EU�15/EA�
12. Only 6% of citizens still trusted the NG.
9.  Both declines were the most pronounced in the EU�27.
10.  For Greece it has to be pointed out that in spring 2012, trust in the EC (�56%) reached the lowest level in the EU�27 over the 13�year period.
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Trust in the national and European 
governmental institutions in the 
periphery, EA-4 
Figure 3 shows citizens’ net trust in the NG, NP, 
EC and EP in the countries of the periphery (EA-4 
country sample) from 1999 to 2012. In the pre-
crisis period, all four trust trends were very stable 
around the mean values of 0% for the NG and NP 
and 35% for the EC and EP, with standard devia-
tions of around 6-8%. In the crisis period, all four 
trust trends fell steadily, with standard deviations 
rising to 18-20% and the mean levels dropping to 
approximately -40% for the NG and NP and to 
around 0 and 5% for the EC and EP, resulting in 
an overall decline in mean levels of around 30% to 
40% in trust in all four institutions. Given these 
values, we conclude that trust trends in the cri-
sis period left their long-term paths amid the cri-
sis. Finally, if trust in the NG and NP continue to 
decline linearly at the same pace, we project that 
all trust in the NG and NP will have been lost by 
2014.
Figure 3. Trust in the national and European governmental institutions in the EA-4 (1999–2012)
Notes: Modified version of Figure 3 in Roth et al (2013). The EA-4 comprises Spain, Greece, Portugal and Ireland. NG = na-
tional government, NP = national parliament, EC = European Commission, EP = European Parliament. Values are population 
weighted. In Jan./Feb. 2009 the special Standard EB 71.1 was utilised. As the survey item concerning trust in the NP was not 
included in Standard EBs 52, 53 or 58, the data for these three observation points respectively are missing. As the survey item 
concerning trust in the NG was not included in Standard EBs 52, 53, 54 or 58, the data for these four observation points respec-
tively are missing. The dashed line represents the start of the crisis in September 2008 and differentiates the pre-crisis and crisis 
periods. As the figure depicts net trust, all values above 0 indicate trust by a majority of the respondents and all values below 0 
a lack of trust by the majority. 
Source: Standard EBs 51-77 and Special EB 71.1.
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Trust in the national and European 
governmental institutions in the 
core, EA-8
Figure 4 shows citizens’ net trust in the NG, NP, 
EC and EP in the EA-8 country sample from 1999 
to 2012. With no significant difference appearing 
in the standard deviations in the pre-crisis or crisis 
periods, all four trust trends followed their pre-
crisis paths. In addition, the mean levels of trust in 
the NG and NP only moderately declined by 4 and 
7 percentage points, respectively. The mean levels 
of trust in the EC and EP showed steeper falls, by 
14 and 19 percentage points. Given these values, 
we conclude that whereas trust in the NG and NP 
was not affected at all by the crisis, trust in the EC 
and EP declined significantly in the course of the 
crisis. This declining trend, however, still followed 
its long-term path amid the crisis. 
Figure 4. Trust in the national and European governmental institutions in the EA-8 (1999–2012)
Notes: Modified version of Figure 4 in Roth et al (2013). The EA-8 comprises Germany, France, Italy, Austria, Finland, Belgium, 
the Netherlands and Luxembourg. NG = national government, NP = national parliament, EC = European Commission, EP = 
European Parliament. Values are population weighted. In Jan./Feb. 2009 the special Standard EB 71.1 was utilised. As the sur-
vey item concerning trust in the NP was not included in Standard EBs 52, 53 or 58, the data for these three observation points 
respectively are missing. As the survey item concerning trust in the NG was not included in Standard EBs 52, 53, 54 or 58, the 
data for these four observation points respectively are missing. The dashed line represents the start of the crisis in September 2008 
and differentiates the pre-crisis and crisis periods. As the figure depicts net trust, all values above 0 indicate trust by a majority 
of the respondents and all values below 0 a lack of trust by the majority. 
Sources: Standard EBs 51-77 and Special EB 71.1.
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2. Conclusions
Seven points should be highlighted. 
First, when analysing the effects of the crisis on cit-
izens’ trust in the national and European govern-
mental institutions for the EU-15/27 and EA-12 
country samples, one detects moderate declines in 
trust in the national government and parliament, 
but pronounced declines in relation to the Euro-
pean Commission and European Parliament since 
the start of the crisis.
Second, the overall decline in trust trends have 
been driven by the countries of the EA-12, in par-
ticular by the periphery countries. 
Third, whereas in the core of the EA-12 trust in 
the national government and parliament has actu-
ally increased, in its periphery trust in the national 
government and parliament has fallen sharply and 
steadily since the start of the crisis. This sharp and 
steady fall explains the overall moderate decrease 
of trust in the national government and parlia-
ment in the EA-12. 
Fourth, while in the core of the EA-12 trust in the 
European Commission and European Parliament 
has declined, in the periphery it has done so to a 
greater extent. Thus, the overall pronounced fall 
of trust in the European Commission and Euro-
pean Parliament in the EA-12 is partially driven 
by the periphery countries. 
Fifth, whereas throughout the crisis trust trends in 
the core countries of the EA-12 have still followed 
their pre-crisis paths, the trends in the periphery 
countries have left their pre-crisis paths. Trust 
trends were stable overall in the EA-4 throughout 
the pre-crisis period, but since the start of the cri-
sis trust has declined steadily and the trends have 
departed from their long-term paths. 
Sixth, if the steady decline of trust in the national 
government and parliament in the EA-4 contin-
ues to decline linearly at the same pace, we project 
that all trust in the national government and par-
liament will have been lost by 2014.
Seventh, the continual decline in trust in the na-
tional parliament in the EA-4 has been driven in 
particular by two countries, Spain and Greece. 
Since the start of the crisis in Spain and Greece 
net trust in the national parliament declined by 
-91 and -72 percentage points to reach net levels 
of -71 and -74 percentage points respectively in 
Spring 2012. Latest Standard Eurobarometer data 
from EB78 (Eurobarometer 2012) indicate that net 
trust in Spain and Greece has once more declined 
by -5 and -6 percentage points in November 2012 
to reach levels of net trust of -76 and -80 respec-
tively.11 As both countries can be characterised as 
young democracies, this steady decline of trust 
in the national parliament12 in Spain and Greece 
should be regarded as worrying and should catch 
the immediate attention of national and Euro-
pean policy-makers. In accordance with previous 
11.  In November 2012 the change in net trust since the crisis in Spain and Greece has reached values of �96 and �78 percentage points respectively. In Spain 
and Greece only 9% of citizens still trusted the na�tional parliament in November 2012. 85% and 89% already mistrusted the national parliament at this point of time.
12.  On this point, see also the political scientist Ken�
neth Newton, who clarifies that concerning citizen’s trust in the national parliament, “a sudden or con�
sistent decline in confidence in it is a serious mat�ter” (Newton, 2001: 205).
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empirical results (Stevenson and Wolfers, 2011), 
initial empirical evidence on the determinants of 
trust in the national parliament in an EA-12 coun-
try sample suggests that, among other factors, it 
is the significant increase in unemployment rates 
in Spain and Greece during the crisis period that 
has greatly determined the steady decline in trust 
in the national parliament in these countries since 
the start of the crisis (Roth et al., 2013). 
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4. Appendix
Figure A1. Net trust in the national government, by EU-27 country (1999–2012)
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Notes: Modified version of Figure A1 in Roth et al (2013). 
Y-axis displays a range from -100 to +50. For the EU-15 
countries, the data commence in spring 1999 (EB 51). For the 
12 new member states, the data commence in autumn 2004 
(EB 62), even for Romania and Bulgaria. Data for EBs 52-
54 and EB 58 are missing and have been automatically been 
interpolated by Stata. As the figure depicts net trust, all values 
below 0 indicate a lack of trust by the majority of respondents. 
In the case of Great Britain, data from EBs 51-69 are for Great 
Britain, whereas data from EB 70 onwards are for the UK.
Sources: Standard EBs 51-77 and Special EB 71.1.
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Figure A2. Net trust in the national parliament, by EU-27 country (1999–2012)
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Notes: Modified version of Figure A2 in Roth et al (2013).Y-
axis displays a range from -100 to +50. For the EU-15 coun-
tries, the data commence in spring 1999 (EB 51). For the 12 
new member states, the data commence in autumn 2004 (EB 
62), even for Romania and Bulgaria. Data for EBs 52-53 and 
EB 58 are missing and have been automatically been interpo-
lated by Stata. As the figure depicts net trust, all values below 
0 indicate a lack of trust by the majority of respondents. In 
the case of Great Britain, data from EBs 51-69 are for Great 
Britain, whereas data from EB 70 onwards are for the UK.
Sources: Standard EBs 51-77 and Special EB 71.1.
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Figure A3. Net trust in the European Commission, by EU-27 country (1999–2012)
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Notes: Modified version of Figure A3 in Roth et al (2013). Y-
axis displays a range from -50 to +50. For the EU-15 coun-
tries, the data commence in spring 1999 (EB 51). For the 12 
new member states, the data commence in autumn 2004 (EB 
62), even for Romania and Bulgaria. As the figure depicts net 
trust, all values below 0 indicate a lack of trust by the majority 
of respondents. In the case of Great Britain, data from EBs 51-
69 are for Great Britain, whereas data from EB 70 onwards 
are for the UK.
Sources: Standard EBs 51-77 and Special EB 71.1.
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Figure A4. Net trust in the European Parliament, by EU-27 country (1999–2012)
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Notes: Modified version of Figure A4 in Roth et al (2013). Y-
axis displays a range from -50 to +50. For the EU-15 coun-
tries, the data commence in spring 1999 (EB 51). For the 12 
new member states, the data commence in autumn 2004 (EB 
62), even for Romania and Bulgaria. As the figure depicts net 
trust, all values below 0 indicate a lack of trust by the majority 
of respondents. In the case of Great Britain, data from EBs 51-
69 are for Great Britain, whereas data from EB 70 onwards 
are for the UK.
Sources: Standard EBs 51-77 and Special EB 71.1.
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1. Introduction 
The “European Year of Citizens 2013” has been 
dedicated to the rights that come with EU citi-
zenship.1 Yet, the Euro crisis confronts European 
Union Citizenship with a critical test of whether it 
can adjust past practices and cope with the present 
hard realities. Since its establishment in the Maas-
tricht Treaty, this innovative form of citizenship 
of a non-state polity has unfolded unprecedent-
ed dynamics. It has extended individuals’ access 
to rights and protections against discrimination 
within and across the borders of the EU member 
states, thus turning former aliens into members2. 
Yet, at present, profound power shifts have under-
mined the EU’s established equilibrium between 
markets, intergovernmental and supranational 
powers. This has strengthened the former at the 
1.  Launched by the European Commission, this year long program is supposed to “encourage dialogue between all levels of government, civil society and business at events and conferences around Europe to discuss those EU rights and build a vision of how the EU should be in 2020” ( http://europa.eu/citi�
zens-2013/).
2.  See Evas/Liebert, in Liebert, Evas, Gattig 2013 (forthcoming).
expense of the latter, privileging specifically fi-
nancial players, technocracy and the big member 
states. The outcomes of this great transformation 
will likely shape not just the fate of the single cur-
rency and the EU as we have known it, but also the 
prospects for citizenship of and in the EU.
Two questions arise: First, how does Union Citi-
zenship cope with the Euro crisis and the mode 
of Euro-rescue management? And second, why 
should and how could Union Citizenship matter 
at all for the future EMU regime? My analysis is 
premised on the conceptual framework of “Euro-
pean Citizenship” as a transnational “community 
of practice” that provides mechanisms, on the one 
hand, for associating the existing plurality of di-
verse demoi that constitute the Union and, on the 
other, for linking this new form of political com-
munity to EU governance. Herein derives my as-
sumption that no common European identity or 
homogenous people are required for a legitimate 
EMU, but Union Citizenship norms and practice 
will be a central variable. My key proposition is 
that the current Euro crisis and its management 
face these norms and practices with a reality test 
as to whether and how they can cope with power-
ful market pressures, growing social divides and 
newly centralising pulls for EMU governance. 
While an analysis in full detail of the conditions 
for reinforcing Union Citizenship vis-à-vis these 
challenges is beyond the scope of this paper, it 
nevertheless does appear imperative for a future 
legitimate EMU governance regime.
This paper develops in three steps. I start with the 
conceptual framework of Union Citizenship as a 
‘multi-demoi community of transnational prac-
tice’; in the second part, I assess whether and how 
Union Citizenship copes or crumbles vis-à-vis 
economic divergence, social strains and execu-
tive centered, technocratic modes of Euro-rescue 
management. The third section presents argu-
ments as to why Union Citizenship is constitutive 
for Euro-Governance, followed by suggestions for 
reinvigorating Union Citizenship in view of future 
EMU.
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2. Union Citizenship as ‘multi-demoi 
community of practice’
In the wake of the fall of the Iron Curtain, the 
Maastricht Treaty established Union Citizenship 
as an arguably modest attempt to contribute to 
the legitimacy of Economic and Monetary Union 
which the European Union was resolved to build. 
Citizenship in the EU was not given autonomous 
status but was made dependent on nationality in 
a member state. Albeit a far cry from the consti-
tutive requirements of a full-fledged democratic 
Euro-polity, Union Citizenship after Maastricht 
via Amsterdam to Lisbon Treaty reforms, devel-
oped unprecedented dynamics.3 To account for 
these dynamics, Union Citizenship cannot be 
conceived in the strictly formal sense of treaty 
norms and legal provisions. Drawing from Eman-
uel Adler’s metaphorical depiction of Europe as 
a “civilizational community of practice” (Adler 
2009, 2011)4, I therefore suggest an interdisciplin-
3.  For accounts of this dynamic development of Union 
Citizenship, see Evas & Liebert 2013; Shaw 2010; 
Bellamy et al. 2006; Weiler 1999; Wiener 1997.
4.  “Practices” are defined here as “competent perfor�
ary approach, analysing Union Citizenship within 
the framework of a “multi-demoi community of 
practice. 5 The practice of this community revolves 
around a contentious “space of law” created by 
the EU Citizenship provisions of the Maastricht 
Treaty and by successive EU case law, legislation 
and treaty reforms, hence resulting from the “con-
trasting dynamics at the interface of integration 
and constitutionalisation” (Shaw 2010). Given 
its multi-demoi composition, this community 
rests on norms and practice for overcoming its 
fragmentation. Such ‘bridges’ or transnational 
linkages among the diverse ‘demoi’ include, for 
instance, structural interdependencies, exchange mances” and “socially meaningful patterns of action which…simultaneously embody, act out, and possi�bly reify background knowledge and discourse in 
and on the material world” (Adler & Pouliot 2011: 5�6).
5.  For elaborations on the term ‘demoicracy’, see Nico�laidis (2012), for contributions to developing this as a conceptual, analytical and theoretical research program, see Besson 2007, Cheneval, Lavenex and Schimmelfennig.
and communication networks, coordination and 
cooperation arrangements, or discursive trans-
lation mechanisms.6 This transnational practice 
which Union Citizenship arguably facilitates is 
framed by legal norms but is by no means reduc-
ible to them.
Concerning the normative dimension of Union 
Citizenship practice, the Maastricht Treaty of the 
European Union confers on every person holding 
the nationality of a Member State the status of a 
‘citizen of the Union’ who enjoys complementary 
rights7, most importantly that of free movement 
across national borders, and protection against 
discrimination founded on nationality, gender, 
religion and several other grounds. To safeguard 
6.  For instance, Union Citizenship is grounded on fun�damental rights, basic values and objectives laid down in the treaties and the Charter of Fundamen�tal Rights. To the extent that these are shared cross�
nationally, they can nurture horizontal trust and 
feelings of mutual obligations among fellow citizens from different ‘demoi’.
7.  The most important EU citizenship rights include the rights to free movement, to vote and to stand as a candidate for municipal elections and European Parliament elections, the rights of diplomatic and consular protection, and the right to petition to the 
ombudsman of the EP; see Lisbon Treaty Art. 20. 
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the pluralistic diversity of this community, mem-
ber states are committed to mutually respect their 
nationality laws and not discriminate against 
non-national Union citizens. For developing and 
applying these norms to citizenship practice, in-
dividual litigation cases requesting ‘preliminary 
rulings’ by the European Court of Justice as well 
as EU legislation have played pivotal roles.
Citizenship in the EU since its inception in Maas-
tricht has been subject to longstanding asymme-
tries between the European strong economic free-
doms and weakly constitutionalised social and 
democratic rights (Eder & Giesen 2000; Schiek, 
Liebert, Schneider 2010). Yet ECJ case law has 
contributed to extending citizens’ rights beyond 
the economic realm increasingly into the civic and 
social sphere (Reich 2012), while the 2009 Lisbon 
Treaty has extended social values, objectives and 
provisions as well as political rights: 
Regarding Union civic rights, namely the exercise 
of fundamental freedoms, the ECJ has advanced 
cross border mobility and residency rights, mak-
ing them independent from citizens’ economic 
status as worker, family residency or third coun-
try origin.8 Also, the ECJ has extended protection 
against discrimination based on nationality to ev-
ery citizen of the EU, including students’ access to 
a University abroad9, and has turned down illicit 
residency requirements towards beneficiaries of 
a disability pension10; or invoked data protection 
and equal rights of citizens for non- national EU 
citizens11. Moreover, it has ruled against discrimi-
nation as regards the change of surnames of chil-
dren with dual nationality.12 Finally, it has defend-
ed family protection in its own right, dissociating 
it from cross-border mobility.13 
•	 In terms of social rights, the ECJ has shaped 
the conditions under which Union citizens are 
entitled to non-discriminatory treatment con-
cerning social benefits beyond secondary Com-
munity law, provided they have established a 
genuine link with their host-state that entitles 
8. Baumbast (2002); Zhu (2004); .
9. Commission v Austria (2005), cf. Bressol case 
(2010); 
10.  Nerkowska v Zaklad case (2008).
11.  �uber case (2008).
12. Avello (2003); Grunkin and Paul (2008); Sayn-witt�genstein (2010), 
13.  Zambrano (2011); cf. McCarthy (2011).
them for instance to student fellowships or 
child allowances14, or to post-diploma allow-
ances for nationals, even if they have received 
their education abroad.15 
•	 The Lisbon Treaty has strengthened the ‘social 
dimension’ of European Union, by committing 
it to social values, objectives and provisions 
such as “social justice”, “social cohesion”, “social 
progress”, “social market economy”, fighting 
“social exclusion and discrimination”, “equal 
treatment of women and men”, a “horizontal 
social clause” for assessing the social impacts of 
EU policies, and including also “solidarity be-
tween the member states” (Liebert 2011).
•	 Finally, concerning the political rights attached 
to citizenship in and of the EU, the Lisbon Trea-
ty establishes the new European Citizen Initia-
tive.
•	 As a result of these developments, Union Citi-
zenship has turned from a relatively empty shell 
into an expanding set of norms and provisions 
14.  Martinez Sala v. Freistaat Bayern (1998); Gryelcyzk 
(1999); Morgan (2007); Collins (2004); De-Cuyper 
(2006); 
15.  D’�oop (2002).
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with added value for economic, and to some 
extent, also social and political practice. But 
whether and how it can cope with the Euro cri-
sis is the next question to be addressed.
3. How Union Citizenship performs in (the) 
Euro crisis and EMU
Arguably, the Euro Crisis is the outcome of a vi-
cious circle of negatively reinforcing financial 
markets failure, Eurozone states’ spending irre-
sponsibility, flawed EMU design and heterogene-
ity of Eurozone economies. In response to the Eu-
rozone (EZ) crisis that erupted after 200816, short 
term bailout loans were granted by the EZ and 
IMF to states on the brink of insolvency likely to 
trigger systemic destabilization of the Single Cur-
rency. Thus, Euro-crisis managers made choices 
against direct transfers and in favour of winning 
time for redistributing risks, requiring the govern-
ments of the assisted states to implement severe 
16.  The Eurozone crisis was a result of different dy�
namics triggered by the 2008 financial crisis break out in the US, on the one hand comprising rising international credit costs that were unsustainable 
for some of the fiscally most vulnerable EZ member states, and on the other hand fuelled by failing na�tional banks, as in the cases of Ireland, Greece, Por�tugal and Spain where governments were forced to bail banks out, thus increasing public debt burdens. 
austerity and adjustment programs that would be 
externally monitored by the ‘Troikas’17.
Besides the ‘assisted states’ (Greece, Ireland, Por-
tugal), other Eurozone members with difficulties 
of sovereign debt refinancing, but aimed at pre-
venting loss of sovereignty, adopted large scale 
austerity and structural reform policies on their 
own (Italy, Spain). Moreover, the EU member 
states jointly committed themselves to long range 
preventive measures by introducing balanced 
budget rules into their domestic legal orders, in-
cluding acceptance of supranational scrutiny and 
automatic sanctions.18 Aimed at long term sus-
tainability of the EMU, and for restoring trust in 
international financial markets regarding the re-
17.  European Central Bank, European Commission and IMF.
18.  The “Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Govern�ance in the Economic and Monetary Union” (TSCG, also ‘Fiscal Compact’) was signed by 25 EU member states on March 2nd, 2012 as an international treaty 
since the UK and the Czech Republic opposed it. 
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silience of the Eurozone, member states declared 
that they would embark on a roadmap “towards 
a genuine Economic and Monetary Union”. For 
the future EMU, three building blocks are envis-
aged, to be established in three subsequent stages: 
a banking union aimed at “breaking the link be-
tween banks and sovereigns”, an economic union 
for supporting structural coordination, conver-
gence and enforcement among member states; 
and a fiscal union with a central insurance system 
to absorb economic shocks (Van Rompuy 2012).
This roadmap for completing EMU will require 
member states to delegate important national 
prerogatives to supranational European agencies 
and, thus, hollow out national citizenships with-
out providing mechanisms for Union Citizenship 
to fill these gaps. Certainly, national and EU con-
stitutional and legal norms regulating citizenship 
rights and practices in the EU remain formally 
in place. But under the impact of the European 
Union’s quest for fiscal discipline, not only crisis 
states for a limited period of time but all signa-
tories will have to comply in the future. Thus, fis-
cal discipline and mandates by supranational or 
international agencies inevitably will bring these 
tensions in the EU’s constitutional order to the 
fore. Constitutionally speaking, the future EMU 
would tilt its existing asymmetries further to the 
advantage of financial, economic, and fiscal in-
tegration and to the disadvantage of social and 
democratic integration.
Whether European Citizenship - faced with a 
present crisis management and future EMU re-
gime - can make headway to ensure freedom, 
justice and democratic legitimacy or whether it 
will crumble, is ultimately a question of practice. 
Hence, the question of ‘coping or crumbling’ puts 
Union Citizenship empirically speaking ‘on trial’. 
For the purpose of this paper, empirical evidence 
is selectively scrutinised to develop the argument 
that Union citizenship does not fully fail in cop-
ing with the crisis in terms of economic freedoms, 
but that it falls short in ensuring social justice and 
democratic legitimacy regarding the present and 
future of euro-governance.
Arguably, Union Citizenship’s added value for 
coping with the crisis consists, on the one hand, 
of legal provisions for securing economic benefits, 
social justice and democratic legitimacy, and, on 
the other, of specific transnational mechanisms 
for translating these norms in practice, the effec-
tiveness of which, however, is questionable: 
Regarding the added economic value of Union 
Citizenship that was originally confined to bridge 
the diversity of peoples in an economically always 
closer (converging) Union, can it help citizens to 
cope with diverging economic performance in 
other ways than moving out of crisis states? 
And, considering issues of social justice under 
the austerity rule, does Union Citizenship provide 
mechanisms to translate legal commitments to 
‘Social Europe’ into practice? 
Last but not least, to the extent to which Union 
Citizenship is a prerequisite of a democratic EU 
polity, which mechanisms can help the ‘demoi’ in 
crisis or failed states under technocratic austerity 
regimes to limit the phase of emergency, to forestall 
the hollowing out of democratic institutions, and 
to revert trends towards the deconsolidation of 
democracy?
Searching the economic value added 
by Union Citizenship 
The global financial crisis that has massively af-
flicted the euro-zone since 2008 brought demo-
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cratic-economic prosperity beliefs to a sudden 
halt. Trust in the stability of the euro and the euro-
zone was scattered by the series of protracted ‘sov-
ereign debt crises’. Citizens in EU member states 
are being subjected to the most severe financial 
turmoil and economic downturn since World 
War II. As a consequence of growing disparities 
among member states’ economic competitiveness, 
European societies experienced massive losses of 
incomes and jobs accompanied by increasing lev-
els of poverty or social exclusion.19 In this context, 
European Citizenship – originally designed for a 
diversity of the ‘demoi’ committed to the principle 
of mutual recognition only – cannot cope with 
diverging socio-economic performance with-
out effective mechanisms of redistribution. Yet, 
the disempowerment that citizens experience in 
national arenas vis-à-vis the unprecedented em-
powerment of market agents and non-elected su-
pranational bodies is arguably exacerbated by di-
19.  From 2008 to 2011, in the EU27 the percentage of total population at risk of poverty, materially de�prived or with low work intensity rose from 23.4 to 24.2, corresponding to around 120 million. Poverty or social exclusion were above average in Greece with an increase of 28.1 to 31.0% and in Spain with 
22.9 to 27%; see Eurostat news release 171/2012, 3 Dec 2012. 
visions of civil society, interest groups and public 
opinion about how to distribute the costs of the 
financial, economic and fiscal crises: Although 
economic stagnation, recession and employment 
crises have aggravated, the European trade union’s 
call for reconciling austerity policies in Southern 
Europe with economic growth measures has re-
mained largely inconsequential.20 Nor have EU 
governments responded to public support for 
complementing austerity programs with public 
employment programs, a demand that was jointly 
endorsed by overwhelming majorities in crisis-
countries as well as a majority of the younger co-
horts in the more prosperous countries.21 While 
in principle the majority of the general public 
of the latter is critical against a ‘Transfer Union’, 
people are in favour of economic growth stimulus 
measures to mitigate the socially disruptive con-
sequences of economic stagnation or recession.
20.  The largest industrial trade�union of Europe, the German IG Metall with 2,3 million members, called for a “Marshall plan for Greece” already in 2011 
(FAZ, 28.9.2011, p. 11), since then DGB has followed suit. 
21.  Eurobarometer Fall 2012.
For coping with the consequences of economic re-
cession, and in the absence of stronger capabilities 
of intervention, market citizenship of the Union 
remains the last resort for many as it provides le-
gal rights and entitlements for cross-border mo-
bility in search of jobs. Citizenship in the EU of-
fers particular young unemployed or skilled laid 
off workers opportunities to exit shrinking labour 
markets and to seek a better life in more prosper-
ous economies. Union Citizenship secures them 
the right to cross-border mobility, to picking resi-
dence, seeking and getting employment or enroll-
ing for study to family reunification in another 
member state. However, compared to the scope of 
unemployment for instance in Spain, Union Citi-
zenship did not open the gates for mass-exodus 
of unemployed persons from the European pe-
riphery to the Centre and North22. Disaffected by 
22.  The dramatic situation of unemployment in Spain has reached at the end of 2012 a rate of 26% , in�cluding 55% of young people, and equalling to in total 6 million persons, 3,5 of which were long term unemployed. Over the past 5 years since the beginning of the crisis, it had thus more than dou�bled. Only in 2012, 850.500 jobs have been lost. These data are without parallel in the history of the statistical series, since the Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE) was founded. Among the young 
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language, cultural and administrative barriers in 
potential host countries there, nationals make use 
of freedom of movement rights rather for leaving 
towards former colonies (emerging economies in 
Latin America, Asia or South Africa), and only 
in relatively small proportions in search for jobs 
elsewhere in the EU. Also, it is conventional wis-
dom that citizens are usually little aware of their 
rights, have hardly exercised them, and are there-
fore willing to engage with transnational practices 
to a quite limited extent. The Euro-crisis does not 
seem to have changed this state of play signifi-
cantly.
Different from cross-border movers, the grand 
majority of nationals of assisted crisis states will 
not be able, aware or willing to make use of Union 
Citizenship in terms of freedom of movement as 
workers, job seekers, students, or family mem-
bers. Under the present construct of a technocrat-
ic-executive regime of Euro-Governance, these 
citizen-stayers, even if adversely affected by fail-
ures of good governance - such as lack of trans-people, 125.000 unemployed have left only in the last quarter of 2012 (El Pais 24.1.2013, http://eco�nomia.elpais.com/economia/2013/01/24/actuali�dad/1359013302_659501.html)
parency, budgetary opaqueness or administrative 
mismanagement of their states - are not entitled to 
place complaints with the European Ombudsman 
on the grounds of Union Citizenship. Although 
the TSCG puts member states’ ‘balanced budget 
rules’ effectively under supranational executive 
scrutiny, its implementation remains formally un-
der national responsibility alone. As static Union 
Citizens, they may not even turn to the Europe-
an Court of Justice in hope of finding protection 
against unwarranted infringements of their con-
stitutional rights and legal entitlements.
Claiming social justice
Transnational public debates about how to cope 
with the Euro crisis are marked by discursive 
tensions over the legitimacy of austerity rule, on 
the one hand, and claims for social justice on the 
other. For saving the euro, the fiscally stronger EZ 
members perceive themselves as unwillingly con-
demned to finance the more weaker ones (Arfaras 
2012: 17ff.). Others complain about the disman-
tling of social and democratic citizenship rights 
at the national level, and about the progressive 
fragmentation of citizenship in the EU that would 
ultimately foster European disintegration (limes 
4/3, 2012). In this context, the dominant, Ger-
man led response to the Euro-crisis – the rescue 
strategy based on the implementation of auster-
ity and ordoliberal economic ideas - is accused of 
having led to a new “north against south” wall in 
Europe.23
Concerning tensions among normative expecta-
tions and citizens’ actual experiences and prefer-
ences regarding ‘Social Europe’ in the context of 
the Euro-crisis, three areas must be put under fo-
cus:
New challenges to the ‘social cohesiveness’ of 
Union citizenship have derived from increasing 
social inequalities within the assisted states as well 
as among them and the assisting states; 
•	 Regarding the social values underpinning the 
‘community of demoi’, negative cultural stereo-
23.  In the special issue of the Italian magazine “limes, Rivista italiana de geopolitica ” entitled ““Nord con�tro Sud, il muro d’Europa” (31. October 2012), �ans 
Kundnani talks about a “Scontro di civiltà in Euro�pa” (Limes 2012: 9ff.), José Manuel Freire Nogueira about a “disunione europea”, Carlo Pelando asks 
about “Il posto dell’ Italia nel Reich in formazione” (Limes 2012: 143), and Umberto Cini compares “Xe�nofobia e germanofobia, appunti di un’estate greca”.
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typing reinforced by transnational mass public 
communication frames have reinforced per-
ceptions of differences and moral hazard rather 
than trust, subjective feelings of solidarity and 
shared understandings of social justice;
•	 As a consequence, social policy preferences as 
to where to attribute the competences diverge 
among mass publics: while in the more affluent 
societies majorities want to keep them at the 
nation state level, publics in the assisted states 
in their majority endorse the Union as the ap-
propriate site for ensuring a European social 
dimension (European Social Union), with the 
capability and responsibility for mitigating the 
harsh social consequences of the financial, eco-
nomic and debt crises.
•	 In view of social Union Citizenship rights and 
normative commitments under the Lisbon 
Treaty and the Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
three types of mechanisms for translating such 
norms into practice can be identified: First, by 
encouraging litigation, case law has defended 
individuals or groups against instances of pri-
vate or public employers or government bud-
gets that infringed labour rights or constitu-
tional social rights.24 Second, social objectives, 
such as reconciling work and family obligations 
or part-time work have been advanced in the 
past by the European social dialogue. At present 
the Economic and Social Committee lobbies 
for programs for socially inclusive economic 
growth or measures for social cohesion. And 
finally, the building of transnational advocacy 
coalitions, including European and national 
party-groups in the European Parliament has 
helped promote European social policy espe-
cially in legislative realms under co-decision 
making. Whether any of these established 
mechanisms or the more recent European Citi-
zen Initiative will help prepare the ground for 
applying the transversal “social clause” or soli-
darity projects between member states is an 
open question.
•	 Calling for democratic legitimacy 
Supposedly, the dilemma of democratic citizen-
ship in the EU consists in the futility of squaring 
24.  The Constitutional Court of Portugal, in a 2012 ruling, has revoked the Portuguese Government’s austerity measures affecting nearly exclusively civil servants.
the circle between effective and democratic gov-
ernance – or reconciling the EU’s alleged output 
based democratic legitimacy with one proceeding 
from inputs. The current state debt crises within 
and outside the euro-zone are cases in point: On 
the one hand, driven by financial markets, inter-
ests and doctrinal ideas, all except two of the 27 
EU-member governments have agreed on strict 
fiscal discipline through effectively binding mech-
anisms, to be secured - even in the face of severe 
recessions - by a multilateral Fiscal Treaty regulat-
ing sanctions and incentives, notably with access 
to the ESM. But to the extent to which the EU’s 
new austerity regime under conditions of capital 
mobility will mandate social welfare retrench-
ment on governments, social inequalities can be 
expected to rise, will be attributed by mass publics 
to the EU’s “fiscal straightjacket”, will shake public 
support for European integration. Ultimately, this 
would undermine not only input but also its out-
put based democratic legitimacy.
In the EU under the crisis, power shifts have been 
strengthening the influence of big finance over 
governments and the rule of unelected techno-
cratic agencies at the supranational at the expense 
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of the national level. Provided one agrees that 
Union Citizenship means “the prospect of influ-
encing government policy according to reason-
ably fair rules and on a more or less equal basis 
with others” (Bellamy 2008), then the European 
Council’s politics of ‘permanent austerity’ under 
the Fiscal Compact must be expected to confront 
the multi-demoi community with the challenge 
of securing equal rights across economically di-
verging and even unilaterally depending demoi. If 
general compliance with the debt-brake rule and 
thus prevention of state bankruptcy were not only 
signed by governments and enshrined in national 
constitutions but were to be effectively controlled 
by each of the demoi in particular and in addi-
tion in community, each of them should enjoy the 
same full discretion for implementing this rule in 
detail. Thus, neither would any member state fail 
nor would the Union want to or need to interfere 
within the demoi in crisis, requiring to dismantle 
entrenched social entitlements, undermine con-
stitutional rights, and provoke protest or political 
apathy or, in extreme cases, even leading to demo-
cratic break-down.
Yet, in practice, Euro-crisis governance did face 
European Citizenship with the unprecedented 
dilemma of fiscal consolidation at the expense of 
democratic deconsolidation – or consolidated de-
mocracy at the expense of fiscal deconsolidation. 
In hard times of national fiscal crises, citizens 
have been required to comply with EU budget-
ary control and austerity measures as a condition 
for receiving rescue programs aimed at fiscal re-
consolidation, even if these involved democratic 
deconsolidation – that is the dismantling of the 
democratic standards and rights that citizens had 
achieved over the past or the rise of populist and 
extremist forces. Alternatively, citizens wishing to 
keep intact the social contract and constitutional 
compromise on which their democratic stability 
had rested in the past ran up against externally 
imposed budgetary constraints and austerity poli-
cies. Put differently, they had to choose among the 
alternatives of exit, loyalty and voice. Thus, if they 
did not emigrate, they either silently complied 
with the EU’s 2009 austerity turn, that is accepted 
the shrinking of personal incomes and retrench-
ment of social protection. Or they sought to de-
fend their socio-economic rights by giving voice 
to their claims, acting them out in street protest, 
mobilizing old or new social movements or en-
gaging with populist parties (Kaldor 2012; Pappas 
2013), largely “subterranean forms of politics”, in 
opposition to national austerity and adjustment 
programs.25 Thus they arguably jeopardized their 
state’s fiscal deconsolidation and the EU’s mon-
etary stability. Under these circumstances there is 
a seemingly unresolvable trade-off between input- 
and output-sources of democratic legitimacy. So 
what is left of democratic citizenship in the EU? 
After having explored the impacts of Euro (crisis) 
governance on Union Citizenship in its economic, 
social and political dimensions, the next section 
will reverse the perspective and discuss which in-
stitutional innovations are preconditions for ad-
justing Union Citizenship to EMU.
25.  While street protest in Athens is widely covered by the mass media abroad, this is much less so for Portugal, where teachers, professors, students and including the interest organisations of the members of the Armed Forces took to the streets, inviting citi�
zens to join them in peaceful mobilisations against non�proportionate budget cuts, to protect their social and democratic constitution against auster�ity policies that were mandated by the Troika and namely Germany (LUSA 10. 11. 2012).
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How Union Citizenship matters for the legitimacy 
of Euro-Governance 
Under which conditions can Union Citizenship 
be an asset for Euro-Governance? After shortly re-
viewing the state-constitutionalist proposition, I 
will develop an alternative line of argumentation, 
searching for constitutive mechanisms for linking 
both the multi-demoi community of practice and 
EMU governance.
Regarding the prerequisites for legitimate Eu-
ro-crisis or EMU governance, advocates of the 
state-constitutionalist approach to European in-
tegration maintain that what chiefly matters is 
state sovereignty or, more recently, national con-
stitutional identities. This state-centric concept 
has been used by the German Constitutional 
Court meaning a set of unalienable core values, 
competences and state institutions, for instance 
democratic elections and parliament. Through 
these lenses, only national citizenship norms and 
practices count, but can be easily plaid off against 
each other. For instance, in an assisted member 
state, constitutionally entrenched socio-econom-
ic rights may conflict with structural adjustment 
programs explicitly mandated by the parliament 
of an assisting member state, requiring the former 
to implement state reform for dismantling con-
stitutional social rights and entitlements that run 
counter government commitments to austerity 
budget programs. Another inter-demoi conflict 
arises in case the government of an assisted state 
calls for a national referendum to approve nation-
al austerity programs, which in turn runs counter 
the representative democratic mandate for gov-
ernment issued by the demos (parliament) of an 
assisting state. In these cases of inter-demoicratic 
conflict, Union Citizenship matters little if at all. 
At most, it is invoked to ensure economic freedom 
of movement for young and skilled unemployed 
nationals from crisis-ridden states. But it does not 
help reconcile the power struggles among the Eu-
ro-demoi in the crisis.
By contrast, the so-called “community method” of 
European governance seemingly provides a better 
fit with the assets of Union Citizenship, under-
stood here as a “multi-demoi community of prac-
tices”. The community mode of EU governance 
has been designed to “guarantee both the diversity 
and effectiveness of the Union” by providing “a 
means to arbitrate between different interests by 
passing them through two successive filters: the 
general interest at the level of the Commission, 
and democratic representation, European and na-
tional, at the level of the Council and European 
Parliament, together the Union’s legislature”26 This 
framework does implicitly accommodate Union 
Citizenship at the input as well as the output side 
of community governance: On the one hand as 
the legal basis and would-be constituency of the 
European Parliament, on the other hand as a ref-
erence for the Commission framing the “general 
interest”. Through these lenses, Union Citizenship 
plays a double role for the legitimacy of Union 
governance. The problem here with EMU gover-
nance is that this makes only very limited use of 
the community method for reconciling conflict 
among the multiple demoi of the Union. Thus, if 
Citizenship in the EU is a source of economic, so-
cial and democratic value added, the realisation of 
these potentials requires alternative mechanisms 
to conventional input- and output legitimation.
Pierre Rosanvallon (2008) has made a valuable 
proposition for how to overcome the dead-end 
26.  White Paper on European Governance (July 2001), quoted after Dehousse 2011: 4.
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street of juxtaposing “output” vs. “input” types 
of democratic legitimacy. He distinguishes three 
alternative types of democratic legitimacy that 
compete with and at the same time complement 
electoral forms of representative government: The 
legitimacy of independent non-partisanship for 
surveillance and scrutiny of majoritarian institu-
tions in the “general interest” (id., pp. 93ff); the 
legitimacy of “reflexivity”, as the opening up of the 
electoral-representative channels for polyphone 
discourses and argumentative practices (id., pp. 
151ff.); and the legitimacy of “proximity” based 
on a “politics of presence” by political elites and 
the “democracy of interaction” with and among 
citizens and civil society (id., pp. 209ff.). The fol-
lowing applies these ideas to Union Citizenship in 
the context of Euro-crisis governance.
“Legitimacy of non-partisanship”: Union Citizen-
ship norms and practices have not yet engaged 
with “non-partisan agencies’ for the purpose of 
surveillance and scrutiny of national govern-
ments as well as EU Governance. For instance, 
Union Citizenship and the most powerful player 
in that respect, the European Central Bank oper-
ate on two separate planets. The legitimacy of the 
EU’s supranational institution with the supreme 
authoritative say in the Euro-crisis and EMU is 
vested in financial markets and their responses to 
ECB policy (or rhetoric). Also its formal autono-
my is sealed off against claims for accountability 
in the name of the European multi-demoi com-
munity. But appropriate institutional innovations 
provided, Union Citizenship might well unfold its 
potentials for non-partisan forms of surveillance 
of EMU.27
1. “Legitimacy of reflexivity”: Union Citizen-
ship has to develop innovative devices, such as 
“polyphone channels” if it aims at realizing the 
argumentative practice of “reflexivity”. For Un-
ion Citizenship to count for EMU governance 
in that respect, it requires not primarily rights 
to voting but to voice. Voice requires citizens’ 
representation or participation in forums of 
27.  Innovative mechanisms include, for instance, draw�
ing citizen representatives by lot; an example for a 
citizen- or civil society induced form of surveillance of EMU governance is “Finance Watch”, other exem�
plary fields might include the “Troikas” monitoring 
state governments under adjustment programs; or the scrutiny of national austerity programs, or the 
implementation of the “horizontal social clause”.
consultation for decision-makers, either by in-
terest groups, organised civil society or discur-
sive methods for securing representativeness, 
such as “discursive representation” (Dryzek and 
Niemeyer 2008). If any of these mechanisms – 
eventually coupled with the new social media - 
is effectively in place, Union Citizenship should 
perform as a reflexivity forum even for the most 
remote agencies such as the European Banking 
Association (EBA).
2. “Legitimacy of proximity”: At present, Union 
citizens in search of venues for “proximity”, 
meaning they are wanting to interact with Eu-
ropean political elites, have a limited range of 
options, with varying vicinity. Strictly speak-
ing, Union Citizenship offers opportunities for 
actively participating in the democratic life at 
the local community and the European Union 
levels, wherever one resides. But in a broader 
sense, politically active Union Citizenship in-
vokes the “democratic life of the Union”, as it 
is laid down by the Lisbon Treaty. This is com-
posed of three domains: the party-parliamenta-
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ry “multilayered field of representation” (Crum 
and Fossum 2012); moreover, sites for non- or 
counter-majoritarian citizenship participation 
that have come into play in the life of democra-
cies in general (Pettit 2006a, 2006b), and Un-
ion Citizenship, in particular (Evas, Liebert and 
Lord 2012); finally, third, transnational civil 
society and social movement mobilisation that 
have become a third field where Union Citizen-
ship claims are practiced (Liebert and Trenz 
2010). In none of these three fields, will Union 
Citizenship encourage much “proximity” ca-
pable of transcending self-referential national 
government as well as self-contained suprana-
tional governance practices. For instance, nei-
ther joining a European NGO represented in 
the European Economic and Social Committee 
nor launching a European Citizen Initiative, 
nor rallying for direct democratic participation 
through national referendums nor European 
election campaigns will bring the citizens any 
closer to the EU decision-makers than, for in-
stance, in-depth quality media coverage or the 
new social media can do.
3. In sum, depending on how Union Citizenship 
adjusts to EMU by conceptual and institution-
al innovations for surveillance, reflexivity and 
proximity in modes that foster transnational 
communication, exchange and cooperation 
across the divergent ‘demoi’, it will matter for 
the legitimacy of governing the Euro.
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4. Innovating Union Citizenship beyond the 
Euro-crisis 
Aimed at fighting the failures of markets and 
states, national legislative competences are being 
transferred to the European level, strengthening 
existing non-elected or creating new technocratic 
bodies with unprecedented executive, legisla-
tive and judicial enforcement powers. For doing 
so in legally and democratically legitimate ways, 
the EU will have to either circumvent or reform 
its treaty base, thus creating strains with existing 
equilibriums and putting public support at risk. 
New mechanisms are required for linking Union 
Citizenship to the reconstruction of EMU.
There are many who warn that the politics of 
“permanent austerity“ that EU leaders adopted 
in response to the financial and sovereign debt 
crisis puts “democracy in straightjackets” (Mair 
2011; Schäfer and Streeck 2013 forthcoming). The 
Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly has 
voiced fears that “austerity measures are a dan-
ger for democracy and social rights” (CoE 2012). 
Countering these concerns, there is an emerging 
coalition of those advocating democratization of 
the EMU as a precondition for the rescue of the 
Eurozone, including its fiscally vulnerable states. 
In this respect, Miguel P. Maduro identifies cave-
ats of democracy in Europe as the key to the EU’s 
current malaise: National democratic sovereigns 
are blind towards the mutual dependencies they 
created by co-living with others in a single market 
and sharing a common currency, he argues and, 
in addition they also failed to give themselves col-
lective powers strong, legitimate and just enough 
for safeguarding their common goods (Maduro 
2012).
If governance of the current or any future euro-
crisis is to be effective and legitimate and the vi-
sion for the future of the Economic and Mon-
etary Union to take roots, innovative conceptions 
for democratic legitimation are needed. These 
should credibly convey the message that the un-
finished journey of democracy in Europe is going 
on.28 But such legitimation strategies need to go 
beyond mere communication and tackle three 
structural issues of EU political institutional and 
policy design: How to hold the newly empow-
ered non-elected supranational authorities pub-
licly accountable; how to provide citizens with 
new opportunities for democratic participation; 
and, more specifically, how to provide them with 
a voice on crucial issues of social justice deriving 
from economic decision-making that directly af-
fects their lives.
The following reviews three sets of ideas that do 
not aim at a supranational Leviathan but at devel-
oping the infrastructures for linking Union Citi-
zenship and EMU governance by strengthening 
(1) the fiscal capacity of the Eurozone for reinforc-
ing non-partisan and socially just countercyclical 
redistribution; (2) horizontal party alliances for 
28.  For earlier proposals focusing on representative and direct democratic reforms in the EU, see the „modest propositions“ developed by P. C. Schmit�
ter (2000): “How to Democratize the European Un�
ion. And Why Bother”; P.C.Schmitter and A.Trechsel (2004): “The Future of Democracy in Europe. 
Trends, Analyses and Reforms”; and S. Hix (2008): “What is Wrong with the EU Polity and �ow to Fix It”.
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constituting competing electoral links among citi-
zens and EMU governance, hence proximity and 
(3) deliberative devices for enhancing the reflex-
ivity of EMU. All three are designed to help close 
current weaknesses of Union Citizenship.
(1) “A Budget for Stability and Democracy in 
Europe” (Tavares 2012-13). One of its most im-
portant flaws of Union Citizenship is its lack of 
substantive resources for financing the general 
social programs for the unemployed or specific 
solidarity projects. Tavares and Maduro propose 
tapping Single Market benefits for new revenue 
sources that will allow the EU to co-finance Eu-
ropean policies; thus giving itself the budget that 
is urgently needed to make EMU sustainable but 
that the conflictive logic of ‘donor states’ has con-
sistently denied so far (Maduro 2012; Tavares 
2012, 2012-13). Regarding the feasibility of this 
formula as the basis of a new European political-
institutional settlement, the question is whether 
supporters for this idea can rely on an advocacy 
coalition sufficiently strong to win the opponents 
over. This coalition arguably would include ‘donor 
states’ who have convinced themselves to rather 
endorse a generalised common revenues scheme 
than to shoulder domestically new burdens. On 
the side of the opposition, one would find the ‘iso-
lated tables’ of euro-outsiders, organized banking 
and export industry interests sharing resistance 
against spill-overs from the EMU into Single Mar-
ket taxation.
(2) Contention about the new horizontal and 
EU level redistributive policies will likely trigger 
politicisation and political competition which 
should help build the European political space, 
with competing European parties, first order Eu-
ropean parliamentary elections and a Commis-
sion Presidency supported by the parliamentary 
majority. This practice remains below the thresh-
old of treaty reforms and therefore show a way 
forward out of the democratic legitimation deficit 
of EMU. The emerging European Union would 
be capable of saving the Euro without sacrificing 
democratic standards. Equally important, it would 
dismantle the new ‘wall’ that has already split in-
tergovernmental Europe into core and periphery 
(infamously labelled ‘GIPSI’ countries) and that 
ultimately threatens to destroy the Union. Yet, 
accepting that European political parties would 
live up to the task of putting alternative transna-
tional party programs together and run competi-
tive election campaigns on the same policy issues 
across the different member states, Euro-policy 
makers must also be prepared to deal with the 
rise especially of those parties who want more po-
litical powers to be returned back home. Another 
question is how to reconcile the persistently high 
level of European party political fragmentation 
with the rationale of effective and legitimate ma-
jority governance of the EU/Eurozone. It can be 
assumed that the parliamentary Euro-polity (like 
all complex societies) would most likely attain the 
features of a consociational democracy built on a 
multi-party or even grand coalition government. 
For reversing the paradoxical trend of less and less 
European citizens caring to turn out for elections 
the more powers the European Parliament gets, 
representative democratic reforms from above 
will be necessary but not sufficient. They need to 
be complemented with democratizing practices 
from below (Liebert, Evas and Gattig 2013). These 
will provide citizens with opportunities for trans-
national networking with like-minded, indepen-
dently or coordinated with European elections or 
plebiscites on relevant EU policy issues as much as 
in ordinary EU politics and policy making. Thus, 
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deliberative methods will help develop the cogni-
tive predispositions for citizenship in the EU as a 
community of practices.
(3) Some of the most recent democratic innova-
tions in theory and practice are informed by the 
‘deliberative turn’ that democratic theory has 
taken over the last decade29. Regarding the Eu-
ropean context, the European Think-Tank ‘No-
tre Europe’ has early on aimed at drawing lessons 
from the failed referendums on EU constitutional 
treaty ratification in France and the Netherlands 
in 2005 and is dedicated since to assessing de-
liberative and participatory experiments at EU 
level30. EU Commissioner Margot Wallström 
launched in December 2008 a “pan-European 
Citizens’ Consultation”, inviting citizens from all 
29.  To name but three of the influential contributions to the deliberative turn in democratic theory, see 
J. Dryzek (2000): “Deliberative Democracy and Be�
yond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations”; id. (2006) “Deliberative Global Politics: Discourse and Democ�
racy in a Divided World”; and id. (2011) “Founda�tions and Frontiers of Deliberative Governance”. 
30.  L. Boussaguet (2011): “Listening to the views of Eu�
ropean public. An assessment of the first participa�tory experiments to be organised across the Com�munity”. Notre Europe, Policy Paper 44, September 2011.
Member States to debate the future of the EU in 
the first EU citizens’ conferences across territo-
rial and linguistic boundaries.31 EuroPolis, “a de-
liberative polity-making project” funded by the 
EU’s research framework program, has conducted 
live social experiments focused on the 2009 Eu-
ropean parliamentary elections for assessing how 
European citizens’ attitudes and voting behaviour 
change depending on their exposure to balanced 
information.32 In European integration theory, the 
deliberative turn has gained purchase in inspiring 
the innovative conception of ‘integration through 
deliberation’33. In drawing heavily on and devel-
oping this paradigm, pluri-annual EU framework 
31.  Website of ex�European Commissioner Margot Wallström, www.ec.europa.eu/archives/commis�sion_2004�2009/wallstrom/communicating/de�bate�eu_en.htm. For a review, see Boussaguet L. and R. Dehousse (2007) “L’Europe des profanes: l’expe�rience des premières conférences citoyennes », in Costa and Magnette (eds. 2007) : « Une Europe des 
élites ? Réflexions sur la fracture démocratique de l’Union européenne ». 
32.  For presentation and discussion of EuroPolis re�
search findings, see www.sv.uio.no/arena/english/research/projects/europolis.
33.  E.O.Eriksen and J.E.Fossum eds. (2000): “Integra�tion through Deliberation”. 
research program ‘RECON’ has brought together 
theorists of deliberative democracy such as James 
Bohman and John Dryzek with over a hundred of 
European Social Scientists, Lawyers and Political 
Economists in order to develop and assess alter-
native models for reconstituting democracy in 
the EU34. Deliberative innovations in democratic 
theory and practice provide important resources 
for upgrading the democratic legitimation of the 
future Eurozone/EMU. They are important as 
they will help overcome certain limitations of rep-
resentative democracy, on the one hand, and cor-
rect flaws in implementing direct democracy, on 
the other35. Most importantly, they suggest delib-
erative devices for enhance the democratic value 
added of Union Citizenship in terms of reflexivity, 
non-partisanship and scrutiny.
34.  For the integrated research project “Reconstituting Democracy in Europe” coordinated by ARENA, Uni�versity of Oslo, and funded under the EU 6th frame�work research program (2005�11), see www.recon�project.eu/
35.  See T. Evas, U. Liebert, C. Lord eds. (2012) ‘Multilay�ered Representation in the European Union. Parlia�ments, Courts and the Public Sphere (Baden�Baden, 
NOMOS); and U. Liebert, A. Gattig, T. Evas eds. ‘De�
mocratizing the EU from Below? Citizens, Civil Soci�ety and the Public Sphere’ (Ashgate, forthcoming).
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5. Summary and conclusion
This paper submits that the future of Union Citi-
zenship – coping or crumbling with the Euro-cri-
sis - is contingent on whether and how it adjusts to 
Euro-governance along the way to the completion 
of EMU. To answer the question about how Union 
Citizenship copes in (the) crisis and what it takes 
to fill the current voids, this paper has conceptu-
alised Union Citizenship as a “multi-demoi com-
munity of practice” a conception which serves, so 
my first proposition, as a constitutive framework 
for framing legitimate Euro-(crisis)Governance.
In the main part of the analysis I have reviewed 
three fields – economic, social and democratic – 
where the Euro crisis is challenging Union Citi-
zenship practice and where tensions with Euro-
governance emerge. I suggested that freedom of 
movement and related rights are in fact exercised, 
albeit to a much too limited degree to effectively 
alleviate the pressures of the unemployment crises 
in the Southern European states. Also, the social 
dimension of Euro-governance so far is close to 
non-existing. Finally, political rights associated 
with Union Citizenship are marginalized due to a 
construction of crisis-intervention programs that 
eclipses largely the community method. At the EU 
level social dialogue, civil society participation 
and citizens’ representation or consultation is all 
the more difficult, the more supranational author-
ity is being shifted from elected or consultative to 
executive bodies, namely the European Central 
Bank, European Council and the European Com-
mission, or to technocratic agencies, such as the 
ECB, the EBA and others. To make things worse, 
in matters of Euro-governance, citizens are even 
denied the right of complaint to the European 
Ombudsman. As a result of this current state of af-
fairs, static citizens from crisis societies who can-
not chose the exit option either comply or voice 
protest on the streets as well as via populist par-
ties. On the other hand, also many citizens of the 
assisting member states voice concerns about ex-
cessive economic burdens and anxieties regarding 
the future of their national social security systems. 
Hence, if assessed in the conceptual framework of 
a multi-demoi community of transnational prac-
tices, Union Citizenship is utterly fragmented and 
not (yet) a variable that helps shape the political 
economy of the EU in crisis in more effective, 
socially just and democratically legitimate ways. 
Union Citizenship in the crisis is still largely a 
void.
By way of conclusion, I suggest three lessons about 
Union Citizenship in (the) crisis to be learnt: 
First, regarding the prospects for Union Citizen-
ship to cope or crumble, in the current situation, 
we cannot yet see whether the financial, banking 
and sovereign debt crises and their contamina-
tions of the Eurozone will be good or bad for the 
future of Europe Citizenship (cf. Schmitter 2012). 
On the one hand, the present author joins in with 
many who believe that the EU did reach – po-
litically and normatively speaking – the limits of 
how it managed the Euro-crisis to the detriment 
of Union Citizenship.
Second, I have pointed out the dilemma of demo-
cratic citizenship between fiscal consolidation and 
democratic deconsolidation and argue that this 
can be resolved by reinforcing Union Citizenship, 
filling its empty spaces, and reinvigorating it as a 
framework for coping with the economic crisis, 
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dealing with the social crisis and getting by the 
democratic crisis.
Third, drawing on insights into past failures of in-
volving citizens via direct democratic procedures 
in EU Constitutional Treaty reforms, I have point-
ed to the deliberative turn in recent democratic 
theory and practical experiences across the world 
as a set of complementary techniques to make 
the Community method resilient vis-à-vis the 
new modes of Euro-governance. The present pa-
per argues for upgrading the legitimacy of EMU-
Governance – in terms of its non-partisanship, 
reflexivity with and proximity to the citizens - by 
strengthening Union Citizenship through delib-
erative methods.
These lessons and further detailed propositions 
quoted above – the boosting of Union Citizen-
ship’s own resources and bolstering of its parlia-
mentary link to EU governance – taken together 
will add up to reinvigorate Union Citizenship be-
yond the crisis. Ultimately, this should help build 
the democratic block that the present EMU road-
map still lacks.
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